Part 4: Ethics

Ethics, the study of morality, is the branch of philosophy that perhaps most people are familiar with. In every age people have wondered about what is right, what is wrong, and how we are supposed to live. Moreover, ethical questions come from all angles and in every aspect of life. Consider a few examples: Politically speaking, we debate the morality of welfare, abortion, public education, taxes, and marital rights. In our personal lives, we take very strong stances on things like marital fidelity, parenting styles, and education choices. Indeed, ethical discussions are an integral aspect of every facet of our lives.

But moral discussions about the above issues represent only one aspect of our ethical considerations. The examples we’ve just described are good examples of an area within the field of ethics known as applied ethics. This field of ethics deals with our ethical decisions about very particular moral questions we face. While this area of ethics is vitally important to us, these are not the kind of questions we will address in the following section. Rather, in this section we hope to survey two other branches of ethics that are a bit more theoretical in nature and therefore serve as the theoretical foundations for applied ethics. In this section we will consider metaethics and normative ethics.

Metaethics is a particular branch of philosophy and ethics that is concerned with semantic, metaphysical, and epistemological aspects of morality. For example, regarding semantic questions, metaethics attempts to answer questions about the meaning of moral terms like “goodness,” “ought,” and “right.” Take “goodness” as one instance. If we were to say that little Timmy’s actions are “good,” what exactly would we mean when we say this? In exactly what way are they “good”? Metaethics also deals with metaphysical questions about the existence of moral values. So, for example, most people tend to think that there are such things as objective moral standards. These would be moral in the sense that they inform our actions and choices. They would be objective in the sense that they don’t appear to be based on any cultural or subjective factors that are based on individual people or groups. But if there are such standards, what grounds them? If they don’t come from particular peoples or groups, where do they come from? Metaethics attempts to answer these kinds of questions.

In addition to these semantic and metaphysical questions, metaethics also tries to say something about the epistemic conditions of our knowing moral truths. Consider the very commonly held moral belief that it is wrong to murder. Let’s assume that this moral claim is true, and let’s assume that we know how it is grounded. There is another question that we still need to answer: How do we know that it is wrong to murder? Is this moral truth something we infer from reason, a divine command, a social construction, or something else? Such are the concerns of metaethics. We consider these kinds of questions in chapter 16 and offer a survey of the various ways to explore the issues.

In contrast to metaethics, normative ethics is that branch of ethics that deals with the “how” of morality. In other words, normative ethics deals with the various ethical systems that attempt to provide a framework for our moral systems of thought. In chapter 17 we explore three major approaches, with some examples of each along the way. First, we explore the teleological approaches to morality. According to these moral systems, morality is not a matter of rules or rule keeping. Rather, morality is a matter of character or the “end” of our actions. For example, on Aristotle’s virtue approach to morality, our primary concern in the moral life is to develop the right character and virtues. By contrast, John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism is focused on the end, outcome, or result of our actions and choices.

Deontological approaches to moral systems take the opposite approach, focusing on the actual rules we follow and actions we take. And once again, there are various schools of thought that fit under this category. According to Immanuel Kant’s deontological approach to moral systems, certain rules must be followed and applied to all people. He based this, as we shall see, on something called the categorical imperative. Or, according to divine-command theory, for example, God has commanded particular actions, and the moral life is about following these commands. What is important to note at this point is simply that deontological approaches to morality ground morality in rules to be followed.

One final moral system we consider in our chapter on normative ethics is often referred to as contemporary virtue ethics. As we shall see, thinkers like Alasdair MacIntyre take great exception to the idea that we have been working with the same general notions of morality throughout the course of Western history. In his mind, the trajectory of Western thought has so fragmented our moral categories that it is no longer possible to work within the traditional concepts given to us by the great thinkers within the traditions. MacIntyre, and the contemporary virtue ethicists that follow him, suggest that we should embrace the sociotemporal realities we find ourselves in and work to dialogue with other moral traditions in hope of building a moral system of our own. In his mind, this allows our moral declarations to evolve and expand with the increase of knowledge over time.

These are the kinds of philosophical issues that metaethics and normative ethics deal with. In this section we explore some of these issues in depth by considering the major ideas that have shaped our contemporary discussions and views. Once again, we trust that these chapters will be profitable for you.