agent—a subject, person, or mind that is capable of and the ultimate source of enacting change in the world
agent causation—the view that agents are a first cause of actions and are not determined by any prior or external event or phenomena
applied ethics—the branch of normative ethics that tries to answer very specific moral questions confronting practical, everyday life
a priori knowledge—knowledge possessed prior to empirical evidence/sense data
argument—a set of statements consisting of one or more premises that support, through one or more rules of inference, a conclusion
Aristotelian virtue ethics—a teleological normative ethical theory that understands the outcome to which moral actions should be pointed is eudaemonia, well-being, or the excellence of the soul, focusing on character building through enacting and embodying virtues
atheistic ethical nonnaturalism—an objectivist metaethical theory claiming that moral properties are brute metaphysical realities and are, therefore, not naturally or divinely derived
body-fission model—the account of bodily resurrection suggesting that the body experiences a fission event (split into two, or duplicated) just before death and that one of these two survives death and remains continuous and numerically identical to the person
brain-snatching model—an account of a possible method of bodily resurrection wherein God “snatches” the body’s brain/nervous system at the point of death, replacing it with a duplicate that decomposes in its place, thus preserving it and the person’s immanent causal connections
bundle theory—the view that a concrete particular is a bundle of its properties
Calvinism—a theological version of determinism such that God’s decree determines the course of history and the actions of human beings even as humans are still responsible and free
categorical imperative—an ethical rule or command that would be universally and objectively applicable (do not lie, etc.)
causal theory of knowledge—the theory claiming justification for a belief as grounded in the causal connection between objects or events outside a person’s mind and the corresponding ideas that form as a result
classical foundationalism—the view in epistemology claiming that beliefs are either basic or nonbasic and that nonbasic beliefs are founded on basic, unmediated beliefs
class nominalism—a version of reductive nominalism regarding properties that analyzes the sentence “a is F” as “a is a member of the class of F things”
coherence theory of truth—the view declaring that truth obtains when a statement or belief coheres within a worldview or set of beliefs
compatibilism—the claim that freedom and determinism are compatible
concept nominalism—a version of reductive nominalism regarding properties that analyzes the sentence “a is F” as “a falls under the concept F”
constitutionalism—the view in philosophy of mind holding that human persons are constituted by their bodies, even if they are not identical/reducible to them
contemporary virtue ethics—the movement, stemming largely from the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, maintaining that we cannot construct a unified approach to morality that applies to all people everywhere, since morality is something inherently tied to cultural systems, contexts, and languages
correspondence theory of truth—the view holding that truth obtains when a statement or belief corresponds to reality
cultural relativism—a subjectivist metaethical theory maintaining that moral statements are true or false relative to the specific groups making them
deductive argument—an argument form where true premises entail the conclusion
defense—an explanation (more modest than a full-blown theodicy) of God’s possible reasons(s) for allowing evil
deontological moral theories—normative ethical theories that understand morality in terms of obligations, laws, duties, or commands
determinism—the claim that the future is fixed, or determined, either logically, theologically, or physically
direct realism—a commonsensical theory of perception holding that what one is directly aware of in perceptual experience is a mind-independent reality
divine-command theory—a deontological ethical theory declaring that morality is grounded in a fundamental way in whatever it is that God commands
divine hiddenness—the notion that humankind lacks universal or obvious evidence of God, or that God has hidden himself from humanity
divine providence—God’s governing mode of interaction with the world
divine simplicity—the doctrine that God is metaphysically simple, having no temporal or spatial parts or properties
egoism—a teleological normative ethical theory that understands morality in terms of the well-being of the self
eliminativism—a view that “eliminates” the mind by holding that there are no actual things such as “beliefs,” “pains,” “desires,” or “feels”
emotivism—a metaethical theory maintaining that moral statements are expressions of emotion
epistemology—the branch of philosophy that deals with philosophical notions about knowledge, perception, justification, and truth
ethical naturalism—an objectivist metaethical theory attempting to reduce moral properties to or define them as natural properties that are the subject matter of biology, psychology, or sociology
ethical nonnaturalism—an objectivist metaethical theory claiming the existence of fundamental moral truths that are not features of the natural world
event causation—the view that causation is a relation between events; a prior event (e.g., the event of Smith pulling the trigger) causes, or brings about, a subsequent event (e.g., the event of Smith killing Jones)
evidentialism—the view that knowledge should be based on evidence and that claims lacking evidence are not knowledge
externalism—the view that what justifies a belief for a person is something external to his or her own perspective
fideism—the view of faith and reason that esteems faith and knowledge gained via personal, emotional, and/or spiritual means over and above rational/empirical ones
first-order discipline—the primary subject matter of an academic discipline; what the academic discipline is about
first-person perspective—the self-awareness of mental life indicating that it is I who is experiencing desires, feelings, and so forth; a classic criterion of personhood
functionalism—a view in philosophy of mind that seeks to understand the mind only by virtue of what it does, by its function
global/Pyrrhonian skepticism—the most radical form of skepticism, claiming that there can be no knowledge
golden mean—an Aristotelian ethical notion describing the virtuous place that stands directly between the polar vices of excess and deficiency
hard determinism—the view that the future is determined and, therefore, freedom does not exist
hard incompatibilism—the view that incompatibilism is true, determinism is either true or false (unsure which), but either way, there is no genuine freedom
hylomorphism—the view that the soul is the substantial form of the body and that human persons are composites of bodies and souls
idealism—the metaphysical position that the only things existing are mental things: minds and ideas
identity theory—the theory (or group of theories) in the philosophy of mind that reduces the mind to the brain
immanent realism—the brand of metaphysical realism holding that universals are wholly located at distinct places at any one time
incompatibilism—the claim that freedom and determinism are not compatible; also called libertarian freedom
indeterminism—the view that freedom is incompatible with being determined
indexicals—perspectival words like “I,” “here,” and “now,” used to capture the first-person perspective
inductive argument—an argument form where true premises render the conclusion probable
intentionality—the “aboutness” or “ofness” of one’s mental life or mental states
intermediate state—in Christian theism, the time between the physical death of the body on earth and bodily resurrection in the eschaton
internalism—the view that what justifies a person in holding a particular belief depends on what is “internal” to his or her own mind, or that the person has first-person awareness of the reasons for the belief
justification—in epistemology, what differentiates knowledge from mere true belief or opinion, and is typically understood as either internalistic or externalistic
Kantian deontological moral theory—Immanuel Kant’s ethical theory, which seeks to ground morality, understood as duty, in objective reality by positing the categorical imperative, which is objectively and universally known and applicable
libertarianism—the view that incompatibilism is true and there is genuine freedom
local/metaphysical skepticism—a form of skepticism regarding claims to knowledge of metaphysical or supernatural things
materialism—the metaphysical position that everything is material
mereological nominalism—a version of reductive nominalism regarding properties that analyzes the sentence “a is F” as “a is a part of the aggregate F thing”
metaethics—the subdiscipline of ethics concerned with answering nonmoral questions about morality
metaphysical dualism—the view that there are two kinds of things, as opposed to monism
metaphysical realism—the view that universals (shareable properties) exist
metaphysics—the branch of philosophy that studies the nature and structure of reality
methodological skepticism—a method for gaining knowledge that begins in doubt, famously employed by René Descartes
miracles—God-caused events that suspend the regular flow of the natural order to accomplish some divine purpose
Molinism—the theological perspective (named after Luis de Molina) claiming that God has “middle knowledge” of what you would do in any circumstance, such that God’s beliefs track our future choices but do not determine them
monism—the metaphysical position that just one kind of thing exists (examples of monism include materialism or idealism), as opposed to dualism
moral realism—the ethical theory or group of ethical theories claiming that there are objective moral properties or truth
naturalism—the view that there is no supernatural aspect to reality
natural revelation—the self-disclosure of God through what can be understood in creation, both physical and existential
natural theology—a branch of philosophy and theology that tries to draw theological conclusions from nature, often taking the form of arguments or providing warrant for God’s existence
nominalism—the view that abstract objects do not exist and that universals (shareable properties) do not exist
noncognitivism—a subjective metaethical category of theories, including emotivism and prescriptivism, that do not appeal to rational factors to explain moral statements
nonreductive physicalism—the view in philosophy of mind claiming that while there are no immaterial souls, there are at least some mental properties that are not reducible to physical ones
normative ethics—the subdiscipline of ethics concerned with answering moral questions, such as about what to do or how to be
numerical sameness—a philosophical term that refers to the same object or person over time
objectivist metaethical theories—realist metaethical theories holding that morality is discovered
Ockhamism—the view, first put forth by William of Ockham, that distinguishes between hard and soft facts about the past in order to understand how the future might not be determined
open theism—the theological perspective maintaining that God does not know the future
ostrich nominalism—a brand of extreme nominalism holding that all resemblance facts can be explained in terms of the qualitative facts of concrete objects that exactly resemble one another
particular—a concrete entity such as a molecule, table, dog, or car occupying a single spatial location at any moment of its existence
phenomenal conservatism—holds that undefeated appearances are a source of justification (perhaps the only source of justification) for belief
Platonic realism—the brand of metaphysical realism claiming that universals are multiply instantiated without being located at a place
Platonism—the metaphysical view of Plato, understanding reality in two worlds: the visible, sensational world, which changes, and the invisible world of the forms, which are eternal, unchanging, and the source of all in the visible realm; in contemporary debates, the view that, in addition to the concrete world, abstract objects exist
pragmatic theory of truth—the view holding that truth obtains when a statement or belief works or has practical/pragmatic value
predicate nominalism—a version of reductive nominalism regarding properties that analyzes the sentence “a is F” as “a falls under the predicate F”
prescriptivism—a metaethical theory maintaining that moral statements function as commands
principle of constituent identity—an intuitive principle for identifying complex wholes in virtue of their constituent parts, properties, and relations, stated as follows: If object a and object b have all the same constituents standing in all the same relations, then a is numerically identical to b
proposition—a statement about things, states of affairs, places, or people that has a truth value
qualitative sameness—a philosophical term that refers to identical properties or qualities in two numerically distinct objects, or in the same object separated by time
reassembly model—the most traditional account of bodily resurrection, claiming that God takes the physical cells/atoms that make up a person’s (dead) body and reassembles them in the eschaton
reductive nominalism—any version of nominalism denying the existence of properties by offering a reductive analysis of sentences that seem to be about properties (e.g., concept nominalism, predicate nominalism, mereological nominalism, class nominalism, resemblance nominalism)
Reformed epistemology—an epistemic movement maintaining that religious belief can be rational without argument
reliabilism—an externalist theory holding that a belief is justified if it was formed in the appropriate environment and the cognitive faculties of the mind were functioning in a reliable fashion
representative realism—the view of perception claiming that we are directly aware of a mental item—our sensory ideas—and indirectly aware of a mind-independent reality
resemblance nominalism—a version of reductive nominalism regarding properties that analyzes the sentence “a is F” as “a is a member of a class of resembling F things”
second-order discipline—a discipline that studies another discipline (e.g., as a second-order discipline, philosophy studies the first-order discipline of physics)
simple subjectivism—a subjectivist meta-ethical theory that understands moral statements to be either true or false depending on the belief of the individual
skeptical theism—the approach to the problem of evil denying that we are in a position to know God’s reasons for evil in the world
skepticism—the view that rejects all or some kinds of knowledge claims, divided into three different brands: global, local, and methodological
soft determinism—the view, synonymous with compatibilism, that the future is determined yet one can still have freedom
Soul-Making Theodicy—the explanation for evil in the world that understands pain and suffering as productive, or even necessary, for building character
subjectivist metaethical theories—antirealist metaethical theories, holding that morality is invented
substance—a concrete object as a fundamental unity of parts, properties, and powers
substance dualism—a view advocated by René Descartes positing two kinds of basic substances: mind and body
substratum theory—the view that concrete particulars have a metaphysical substrate that bears properties
teleological accounts of morality—theories in normative ethics built on the purpose, end, or telos of a moral action and suggesting that morality be thought of in terms of certain kinds of goals or outcomes, not in terms of actions per se
theistic ethical nonnaturalism—an objectivist metaethical theory holding that God is the best explanation for moral values and duties
theodicy—an explanation of God’s actual (as opposed to possible) reason(s) for allowing evil
trope nominalism—the brand of nominalism that endorses the existence of unshareable properties (e.g., the redness of the truck, ball, and shirt are numerically distinct but exactly resembling properties)
universals—shareable properties such as being red, being bald, or being wise that can be possessed by distinct particulars at the same time
utilitarianism—a teleological normative ethical view contending that morality is judged, not by the nature of the action itself, but by the results following from our actions and that the goodness of an action is understood as the degree to which it benefits or is good for a community or society
virtue epistemology—an approach to knowledge that builds on the notion of intellectual virtues, cognitive characteristics, or qualities that allow a person to think well, acquire knowledge, and avoid epistemological error