© The Author(s) 2020
D. L. TomasiCritical Neuroscience and Philosophy https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35354-4_5

5. Brain, Culture, Society

David Låg Tomasi1  
(1)
University of Vermont Integrative Health, University of Vermont Medical Center, Department of Inpatient Psychiatry, Burlington, VT, USA
 
 
David Låg Tomasi
Email: David.Tomasi@uvm.edu

5.1 Context and Situation

Brain, Culture, Society are terms which we will find multiple times in our analysis, as they are at the center of the nature vs. nurture discussion. ‘Community’ is a term that has generally had a much deeper significance than ‘society’ in the sense that it carries forward, in a traditional sense, some values and principles which are closely linked to ethnicity and sense of belonging. Furthermore, culture also shapes societies and their members by way of relating, comparing and juxtaposing a multitude of frameworks, rituals, attitudes, worldviews and many other aspects which ultimately determine our sense of self. Of course, our sense of self is deeply connected with our identity, and when we discuss identity politics, we have to be extremely careful in identifying identity, in the sense of ‘being identical to itself’ (Lat. Idem, Gr. ταὐτότης). This is not sheer philological speculation; it really has to do with the level of theoretical justification we find applied to terms closely linked to identity, as in ethnicity, culture, tribe, family, community and even sexuality, the latter term especially important for descriptors such as sexual orientation, inclination and gender. In regard to the dichotomy heterosexual vs. homosexual, these terms were coined very recently, possibly by Karl-Maria Kertbeny in 1869. In fact, we could argue that the main element defining one’s own sexuality had to do more with ritualistic, enacting (thus, ‘passive’ vs. ‘active’) and romantic aspects, rather than purely biological or social. In other words, a homosexual orientation was found pretty much everywhere in the Ancient world, often with an aura of ‘Sacred’, as in its etymological value of ‘separated from the rest, the norm, the common behavior’. It is truly interesting to note that this separation, this difference, was certainly not meant or understood in terms of superior or inferior, but more of ‘appropriate for the setting’, with all the possible implications that these terms would entail. Historically speaking, one could argue that the Judeo-Christian-Muslim cultural/religious influence played a fundamental role in the modern concept of sexual labeling of this type of human orientation (Fone 2000). However, equating modern monotheism (at least for the last 4500 years) or religion in general with homophobia or LGBTQ persecution would be a wrong assumption, as homosexual orientation and behavior were found from the romantic relationship between King David and Jonathan all the way to the Italian Renaissance and beyond (Dynes 1990). We should also remember that the Roman Catholic Church still contains many elements of Roman paganism, a culture in which homosexuality was accepted and open (although someone might argue that there is a wide gap between Roman Catholicism and American Catholicism in this sense), and the very adjective ‘Romantic’ stems from ‘Rome’ (Kuefler 2006). As much as there is plenty of historical evidence of homosexual behavior throughout human history, homophobic reactions are also found cross-culturally, pretty much the same way we find discussions of ‘value’ regarding skin color or religious affiliation. In the opening question, it is mentioned that St. Augustine in the fourth century AD may have been ‘black’, that is, Afro-Roman, and that it would not have occurred to the Romans to mention his ‘ethnicity’ based on skin color. To be sure, in this context, we refer to ‘tradition’ as a series of analyzed, debated and applied guidelines through centuries and millennia—we do not refer to ‘traditional’ as ‘dogmatic’. In other words, the need that someone might experience in defining himself/herself as a separated/different from others on the base of religion, sexual orientation, ethnicity and so on might stem from the need of being accepted within a certain group and thus be defined by comparison to other groups. From a sociological standpoint, addressing the concept defined by Patricia Hill Collins as the “matrix of domination” or “matrix of oppression”, we need to better define terms such as freedom of expression, power, control, inclusion and exclusion, discrimination and incrimination, difference and diversity, oppression and suppression, group and individual, personal and public, sex, gender, ethnicity, religion and race. Furthermore, we should evaluate the generalizability of the application of these definitions outside an American cultural environment. In Hill Collins’ case, this concept identifies multiple issues related to domination/oppression within a specific sociological paradigm and classification. More specifically, the target of this paradigm was the understanding of the African-American Women’s perspective, deeply embedded in black feminist analysis.

Furthermore, in the work by Hill Collins, we understand how there are several layers of deeply intertwined oppressive domains, specifically divided in the structural domain, which serves as superior structuralization of oppression and power; the disciplinary domain, which appears to manage oppression with the ultimate goal (often hidden) to support and sustain this very oppression; the hegemonic domain and the interpersonal domain. These layers represent multiple forms of powers which in turn apply multiple forms of domination on age, ethnicity, gender, race, sexuality and socioeconomic status. Perhaps, among the weakest elements of analysis in Patricia Hill Collins’ matrix of domination, there seems to be a little confusion in the understanding and use/usage of the terms. More in detail, Hill Collins argues that:

[…] These systems and the economic, political, and ideological conditions that support them may not be the most fundamental oppressions, and they certainly affect many more groups than Black women. Other people of color, Jews, the poor white women, and gays and lesbians have all had similar ideological justifications offered for their subordination. All categories of humans labeled Others have been equated to one another, to animals, and to nature. (Hill Collins 1990, p. 231)

Certainly, Hill Collins knows the difference between race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexuality, and social class and does a wonderful job in describing the social implications of identity politics as a response to increase of sectorialized power and domination of specific subgroups, most specifically a certain majority, over minorities in general. However, we are not entirely sure whether this difference is somewhat forgotten in the attempt of evidencing the common features each of these categories have in the context of suffering a targeted and targeting discrimination within the matrix. Another conscious or subconscious misunderstanding or bias appears in statements such as “additive models of oppression are firmly rooted in the either/or dichotomous thinking of Eurocentric, masculinist thought.”1 The author seems to overlook one of the core issues in this analysis, namely the fact that there is not a ‘single Europe’ and the fact—rooted in history and evidenced by genetic studies—the assumption of a single and/or single-minded ‘European thought’ within the context of domination and oppression is simply put, false. Furthermore, even from a purely neuroscientific–biogenetic point of view (which is the central framework of our analysis), we will have to focus more on the possible evidence—at this stage still very controversial—of possible neural mechanisms of differentiation for neural structures more prone to react to socio-cultural elements of gender bias. A similar conversation can happen on theoretical grounds, for instance, the difference between Continental and Analytic philosophy, especially when addressing issues of socioeconomic status in relation to the specificity of (assumed and/or presumed) dominant cultures as in ‘WASP’ terminology (Kearney and Rainwater 1996). In conclusion and beyond these considerations, the greatest contribution of the sociological matrix of domination as active through the aforementioned axes of age, gender, sex, race and so on is showing that each and every one of us might fall prey of a dichotomy between an overlay and overlap of multiple dominant groups while at the same time being a member of multiple subordinate groups. In fact, sociological and psychological elements of feminism are important cross-culturally and even beyond gender issues. More specifically, there are strong ties between community psychology and feminism, in the sense that they “emphasize the importance of context for understanding behavior; both value social justice and diversity; and both adopt a critical stance toward much of traditional psychology”. Thus, feminism represents a relatively modern and psychologically rich term to identify a broad range of intellectual, social-activist, and political discussions, debates and actions.
Based on all the premises evidenced above, it is evident how our identity is truly shaped by the identity of the other (person, community, culture and society) in front of me. However, there are certainly very few concepts that so profoundly shape our identity than the sense or thought of death. Our ideas about the ultimate moments of our life truly determine what we think our life is and should be about. It determines our meaning and purpose, our role in this world. This is part of a vast discourse we already discussed (Tomasi 2016), but in the context of Critical Neuroscience, we would like to shed some light on the current identity-related aspect of neuroscientific research, Extrasensory Perception (ESP) and Near-Death Experience (NDE). This is truly an incredibly vast field to analyze, and we will reconnect to this discussion at the end of this volume, to focus on ‘Sense, Purpose, Meaning’ as part of Chap. 6, Philosophy as Basic Approach Toward Neuroscience. David Eagleman discussed the role of perception and faith (or lack thereof) in the description of a middle ground between traditional theism and activist atheism, which he and Robbie Parrish called Possibilianism. Although, in our opinion, this position is philosophically quite weak, in the sense that it is absolutely needed in the sociopolitical discourse to mediate extremists’ views on both sides, it does not present any real philosophical groundbreaking ideas or theory. However, in the context of identity and (self) perception, the analysis by Eagleman can provide interesting elements, especially concerning our place in the world under the lenses of visuospatial perception, time analysis, synesthesia and what the neuroscientist defined as ‘Sensory substitution’ (Eagleman 2015), a neurotechnique which substitutes sensory inputs/stimuli from sound to touch, thereby feeding information to the cortical areas in the brain via the activation of neurons (Fig. 5.1).
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Fig. 5.1

Rendering of a neuron with nucleus (purple), mitochondria (beige), endoplasmic reticulum (light green), dendrites and dendritic branches (green/fluorescent green), microtubules (dark green), sections of the Golgi apparatus (orange/red) and of the Nissl bodies (dark red), polyribosomes (dark purple) and axon (light blue)

5.2 Mother Nature, Father Nurture

5.2.1 Medical Anthropology and Ethnomedicine

The terms ‘Medical Anthropology and Ethnomedicine’ have been used to identify two different aspects and at times two different approaches within the same investigation, namely the analysis of the connection between medical system(s) and the individual. Therefore, the ethnic, cultural and social dimension of the healing art, science and practice is understood as an integral part of the philosophical and psycho-sociological elements of the existence of (human) beings in the world. More specifically, medical anthropology studies the etiology, diagnostic approaches and treatment of disorders, the processes related to the development and maintenance of health, and the impact of healthcare systems. As such, it is certainly a branch of (applied) anthropology. Ethnomedicine, although the term has been at times used interchangeably with (or as a substitute for)2 medical anthropology, indicates a specifically ethnological approach which analyzes, collects, categorizes and compares oral and written traditions of healing practices and methods on a local and intercultural, intersocial and international levels/layers. An important question in this context is how we can differentiate between traditional, classic, rural and/or folk healing practices, in the same way we separate, for instance, ‘scientific psychology’ from ‘folk psychology’ or even ‘pop psychology’. Answering this question is a central part of the research scope of this discipline, including the very (re)definitions, according to the classical scientific process of experimental trial and error, of ‘golden standards’ of medicine, including the hierarchy of evidence and evidence-based, double-blind, clinical case-control studies. These standards obviously define what can and should be considered ‘real’ medicine from other (complementary, alternative, integrative) types of medicine. Of note, one of the most problematic aspects in regard to these distinctions comes from the very diagnostic criteria used, especially in regard to symptomatological and psycho-physical (given the social-cultural aspects, even spiritual) presentation of the patient-subject. Very interestingly, definitions such as ‘ethnic disorders’ and ‘culture-bound syndromes’ (such as the evil eye) have been generally assigned to ‘primitive’ medical diagnosis by Western medicine and psychology, without even recognizing that evidence-based biomedicine also promotes ‘ethnocentric’ views on what ought to be considered ‘normal’ vs. ‘abnormal’ or ‘pathological’, and constantly produces ‘culture-bound syndromes’ especially in regard to psychiatric disorder, which appear to grow ‘by the minute’ given the ever increasing size of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). Of course, the very concept of ‘folk’ and/or ‘pop(ular)’ as opposed to ‘hospital/science-based’ is a (by)product of post-enlightenment, post-industrial revolution, utilitarian, mechanistic-positivist views originating in the scientific-academic communities in Europe and the United States and the work by scholars such as Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán, Jean Benoist, Claude Bernard, Gilles Bibeau, William Caudill, George Foster, Ronald Frankenberg, Byron Good, Gilbert Lewis, Abram Kardiner, Arthur Kleinman, Robert Levy, Eduardo Menéndez, W.H.R. Rivers, Tullio Seppilli and Andràs Zempleni. This approach also determined the final separation between the methods used by medical science and the religious practices, seen from this historical moment on as forms of ‘magic’. Aside from the conceptual weight of this term, a similar attitude is nowadays found in psychological examinations of ‘magical thinking’, defined as ‘cognitive distortion’.

In any case, evidence-based techniques in the modern conception of the term have been used to test the natural-based substances sued for healing purposes in different cultures and ethnic groups. The investigation of these drugs and their application (also in terms of clinical effectiveness) to modern pharmacological research studies and clinical use is the main scope of ethnopharmacy, more specifically the connection between the (cultural, social, ritual-istic) perception of these substances and their practical use. While it is true that related disciplines such as ethnopharmacology, which focuses mostly on the evaluation and application of plant derivatives; ethnopharmaceutics, the study of the traditional methods and techniques of preparation of pharmaceutical forms; and ethnobotany, which analyzes the production and delivery of pharmaceuticals through traditional knowledge are often viewed as separate fields, they all contribute to the multidisciplinary approach of ethnomedicine. As such, these study efforts analyze multiple aspects of the natural remedies/pharmacological interventions and help identify, label and categorize the natural substances (especially ethnotaxonomy) and discuss their application not only in terms of clinical use but also in regard to social policies and public health strategies and legislation.

5.2.2 Cultural, Cross-cultural and Trans-cultural Psychiatry

When talking about multidisciplinary fields, words like ‘cultural’, ‘cross-cultural’ and ‘trans-cultural’ play a great role in defining the relatively new approaches in the study of the mind/brain and are therefore applied to disciplines such as neuroscience, psychology and psychiatry. Of course, depending on which term we use, we will expect to study the interaction between (single or multiple, compared) culture(s) and neural activity. The concept of culture is itself a very complex one, related to cult(us) and cultivation (Lat. colere) at the individual and community-social sense (as in the Ciceronian ‘cultivation of the soul’), which is something we “grow, worship, inhabit (determining and determined, as in the nature-nurture concepts of habitat and habitus), and are part of” at the same time. In the case of Habermas (1993), there is a first type of culture, which is understood from a general perspective and is not necessarily shared by all members of society, and a second type of culture, which is both common and political, and marked by a shared (and mutual) respect for rights. Thus, the previously discussed investigations of cognition, emotion and computation and the related combinations (human) perception/awareness, understanding/intelligence and behavior/communication are understood in terms of intercausal (mutual) relations, with specific ‘underpinnings’ in sight. This also implies that the methods and technologies utilized will be derived from the ones used in the fields this discipline attempts to bridge while bringing together different approaches (again, nature vs. nurture) through multiple and multilayered combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods from social and applied natural sciences, including observational, longitudinal studies, single-case and case-control studies, meta-analyses and so on, for instance neuroimaging techniques, genetic testing, as well as surveys and questionnaires. The scope here is again on the origin/production and delivery/transmission of specific cultural-social and genetic-biological (especially neural) traits in human beings and societies. Studies in this area have indicated that cognitive processes can be better understood under the framework on socio-cultural and anthropological analysis, for instance how artificial categories such as East vs. West—interestingly, a juxtaposition deemed true, especially within self-referred ‘Western culture’—can be translated into different and often opposed ways of interpreting reality, for instance symbolic vs. diabolic (in the etymological sense) or ‘the detail vs. the whole’.

What is interesting about transcultural neuroscience and psychiatry is that these differences are investigated with the goal of identifying neural correlates, that is, in order to see which brain areas are activated either in the sense of fully autonomous-independent activation of neural functions, such as involuntary (muscle) functions, as in the case of the medulla oblongata (Fig. 5.2) or depending on the ethno-cultural framework used, as in the studies by Blizinsky, Cacioppo, Chiao, Domínguez, Farah, Han, Hargittai, Iacoboni, Kirmayer, Nothoff, Seligman and others in the fields of neuroethics, neuroanthropology, cultural and social neuroscience psychology and psychiatry. In the case of cultural, cross-cultural and trans-cultural psychiatry, of course, the main attention is geared toward the social, ethnic and cultural context of mental disorders, and it therefore provides more information not only on the etiological and perceptual aspects of a specific disorder within the above-discussed framework, but also investigates the ratio/prevalence of such disorder within a single culture, via the comparison of multiple cultures, and what is even more interesting from the perspective of ‘eradicated culture’. With this term, we refer to those populations that have been willingly voluntarily or forcibly removed from their society-nation of origin and are living as immigrants, refugees or in a state of exile and are thereby separated from their culture. Aside from anti-psychiatric considerations on the definition of psychiatry as a cultural (by)product, there are several research studies that shed light on the development of mental disorder in a causal relation not only with personal, subject-based abuse but also with ethno-social exploitation, as in the case of colonialism (military-political and cultural), conquest, occupation, war and genocide. Furthermore, the very development of ‘DSM-based disorders’ such as schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder but also depression and other mental disorders appear to be linked to the process of alienation-estrangement from the culture of origin, thus increasing the ratio of these disorders within the aforementioned ‘eradicated culture’. This is very well understood in psychoanalytic terms, especially from a Jungian perspective of ‘collective unconscious’ and ‘archetype’, where the subject can become a ‘stranger in a strange-estranged-foreign-fiend land’ as in Entfremdung. This aspect has obviously strong social and economic outcomes, as in the opposition to Gattungswesen in the sense coined by Feuerbach and Marx, but with clinical-anthropological reference to the ‘new cross-cultural psychiatry’ by Kleinman. Of course, trans-cultural means bridging multiple and diverse cultures, and each culture is made up by its members, so that we need first to understand how each member interacts with one another and then how groups are formed and in turn interact. We refer in this context on this member-subject becoming object, in the Levinasian relation between the ‘I’ and ‘the Other’. There is in fact a movement from myself or the personal I, the I-think, the me, which is observed and observable, toward (‘in confronto a’) the Other. This is an incontro-scontro, an encounter-based experience, which is absolutely founding from the cognitive perspective of the inescapable and existential struggle. Levinas (1947) defines (this) Other as Other-from-me, and yet, it is and represents a/the ‘face’, another and the same, in the consequential relationship with the (conceptual and spiritual) image/presentation/epiphany of ‘the (my) Neighbor’ (Tomasi 2016). The neighbor is ‘the other me’, my correlative, my peer. I rely on him for support and meaning, thus presenting a divine dimension of the Other, which calls us to (personal) responsibility (toward, in a movement outside ourselves, an e-motion) and service to him who is calling us. This is thus the dimension of God, who does not act directly, but via the face of the Other; a God who/that “has implanted in us a spark of Reason and no matter how much we try to step on and extinguish it, that is impossible” (Dimitrova 2011) and commands/commits us to a search for justice inspired by charity based on this personal relation with the Other, a relationship which is divine in nature and cannot be destroyed. Of course, this relation happens in this world and in history, and a historical perspective in the Hegelian sense contributes to a better understanding of the concept hereby discussed, given the strong positive vs. negative influences on self-esteem, self-image and self-compassion through, for instance, imperialist-colonialist-cultural supremacist political propaganda, as evidenced in the studies by Beneduce, Carstairs, Cummings, Fanon, Fassin, Fried, Lin, Plotsky, Rechtman, Schechter, Seguin, Wittkower, Worthman as well by comparing other research contributions in parallel fields, for instance developmental and ecological psychology, for example, Roger Barker, Urie Bronfenbrenner, Howard Gardner, James Gibson, Edward Reed and Lawrence Shelton. On the other side, of course, a cultural, cross-cultural and trans-cultural Psychiatry which fully understands the social context of the relationship with the Other in time and history also needs to deal with the biological-matter part of the dichotomy nature-nurture. In this context, Hans Jürgen Eysenck stated in Race, Intelligence and Education (1971) that a variety of intellectual differences which we observe in our culture and much of the difference observed between certain racial groups depend to a great extent on genetic factors.
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Fig. 5.2

A colored representation of the main elements of the brain stem, with the thalamus (light blue), the edge of cerebrum (green), the midbrain (light orange), the pons (bright orange), the cranial nerves (yellow), the edge of cerebellum (dark red), the medulla oblongata (purple) and the spinal cord (red)

5.2.3 Cultural and Transcultural Neuroscience

Most of the conceptual elements discussed above can be applied to cultural and transcultural neuroscience, although in this case, the focus is obviously more on the neural underpinnings of culture and social interaction and—vice versa—to the cultural underpinnings of neural activity and behavior. Of course, given that the specificity of ἰατρεία is theoretically absent in this case, the attention covers both normal and abnormal functions. In fact, we could argue that such judgment on positive or negative aspects of functionality is absent from the scope of this type of research. However, given that it is quite difficult, ‘to the point of missing the point’, to avoid value-judgment when discussing culture, cultural and transcultural neuroscience target processes such as categorization, conceptualization, labeling and organization by linking them to social practices and neural factors. For instance, interesting research has been conducted on the visuo-spatial and object processing areas in the brain, to investigate whether the perception of details vs. broader views or direct vs. indirect gaze, especially between human subjects in a social environment could be linked to geo-cultural differences. The neuroscientific analysis thus covers, for instance, regions such as the bilateral middle temporal gyrus, the left superior parietal gyrus and the right superior temporal gyrus and compares their activities to processing and activation levels in limbic system. Of course, inferring that the above-mentioned areas are more or less activated in the execution of specific tasks such as watching people exchanging verbal conversations or simply gazing at a person’s face directly implies the activation of more cognitive-interpretative areas and a deeper level of cognitive appraisal and judgment which is possibly the primary effector of the socio-cultural components (read: cognitive frameworks) at hand. An even stronger sociocultural component is found in the interaction between certain neurological functions and their connection with the experience of specific emotions and/or thought, particularly in relation to self-esteem, self-perception and lack thereof, as in some aspects of depressive states. Of course this represents the link between neuroscience and psychiatry, from a transcultural perspective.

5.2.4 Social Neuroscience

Similar views are shared by social neuroscience, a scientific discipline interested in the relation between biology and sociology, more specifically neuroscientific discoveries under the light of a sociologically based investigation of human behavior. In this case, the choice of methodology is truly a combination of quantitative and qualitative research at the crossroad of a neuro-bio-social science. Social neuroscience thus uses single studies and meta-analyses with the help of neuroimaging and other neurobiological technologies, for instance, including electrocardiograms, electromyograms, electroencephalography, endocrinology, facial electromyography, functional magnetic resonance imaging, galvanic skin response, magnetoencephalography, positron emission tomography and single-cell recording transcranial magnetic stimulation. Furthermore, social neuroscience obtains very useful information from therapeutic disciplines such as psychiatry and psychology, especially neuropsychology, particularly in the context of brain lesions and their outcomes to single-subject or multiple-subject behavior in a given society. Furthermore, social neuroscience draws theoretical assumptions and frameworks for debate from philosophy. As we have seen at the beginning of our analysis, human consciousness has been found on multiple levels of human existence and in different anatomical areas in the human body. Hegel, for instance, believed that nerves were communicating pattern of consciousness, allowing impulses to be delivered throughout the system, while the brain and spinal cord, which we in modern times defined as central nervous system, constitute “the immediate presence of self-consciousness, a presence self−contained, not an object and also not transient” (Hegel 1986). From the perspective of social neuroscience, the activity of this consciousness is to be found in the activation of this system in the social context, starting from the family, where the child develops the self in stages, including ethical stages, by leaving home and possibly marrying, In Hegel, marriage is where male and female, both antithetic, join in synthetic union and produce offspring to carry on the family estate. Where the female is the domain of Divine Law and the male is the domain of Human Law, the synthesis is a practical ethic which expands to include the whole community (Tomasi 2016). The connection between development, family, society and community is evident in the observed experience-dependent neuro-maturational processes which contribute to this maturation in childhood and adolescence. Moreover, the development of individual differences in processes underlying ethical and moral value judgments is connected to motivation, productivity, social engagement and social economy, where honesty, thrift and reliability are highly valued virtues already within the family. Consciousness, as well as self-consciousness, is in itself properly reason in an implicit form. However, when the object, the other-from-me, the character before consciousness is determined, consciousness possesses reason and that is why consciousness has reason in relation to the categorization of such character. Social neuroscience can therefore be very much helped by phenomenology in the Hegelian sense, as the scientific analysis used by this discipline is itself a phenomenon, linked via the correlation between inner and outer and the stages of thesis and antithesis to ‘the life of the Spirit’. To be sure, the ultimate focus of this science is to show the via to absolute knowledge, which the spirit can attain by getting rid of its own alienation in the correlation/comparison between object and subject, through self-realization. However, for this Absolute Spirit to be there, this consciousness has to take different forms, and has to understand their forthcomings and re-morph into a different shape in order to see itself, als Ende und Anfang, through the way of ‘despair’, the Weg der Verzweiflung, where the doubt is Zweifel and again represents ‘two cases’ (Zwei Fälle). These two cases are to be understood in the context of the principle of falsifiability and the scientific method at the basis of data analysis. A very useful presentation of the basic principles of data analysis and research methods in this sense is offered by the so-called Doctrine of Multilevel Analysis (Cacioppo and Berntson 1992), which is based on the following elements:
  1. 1.

    Multiple Antecedents (= preceding conditions): According to this principle, a target event on a structural level can have different triggers, either within this level or across multiple levels.

     
  2. 2.

    Non-additive determinism: The properties of the whole are not necessarily predictable from the properties of the constituents.

     
  3. 3.

    Reciprocal determinism: There is a reciprocal influence between biological and social factors with regard to the development of the target behavior.

     
While John Cacioppo and Gary Berntson are generally considered the founding pioneers of social neuroscience, Cacioppo also worked with Jean Decety to better define the best research approaches in this field, as evidenced in the ‘golden triangle of human neurosciences’ (Decety and Cacioppo 2010):
  1. 1.

    Behavioral data (i.e. response time, choice and judgment)

     
  2. 2.

    Physiological measurements (i.e. neuroimaging techniques providing correlative data of the human brain)

     
  3. 3.

    Animal-model and human experiments (including lesion studies, experimental pharmacology—for instance, testing oxytocin vs. placebo in social contexts—and transcranial magnetic stimulation): in this case the experimental investigations allow causal inference

     
The correlation between neural process and their localization in terms of neural mapping on one side and the creation and processing of social events is at the center of this triangle, more specifically because the combination of different approaches provides a much deeper and more accurate picture of what is actually happening in any of these processes. In other words, observed and verified correlations are in turn analyzed from a social perspective (including self-reports but also the Implicit Association Test and others) and therefore require a scope-specific research design. The conceptual framework and main hypothesis underlying these perspectives is, of course, the view according to which human beings are ‘social animals’ and are therefore better understood in a social environment, rather on an individual-istic (isolated subjectivist) basis. Therefore, even from a mere reductionist utilitarian-behavioristic point of view, the development of organization and social structures beyond the level of individual subjectivity is an integral part of what it means of being human and is translated into multiple, and interconnected, even mutually influencing or merging into one another and often hierarchical entities. It is the case with dyads, families, small and big groups (from simple friendships and fellowships to very complex social groups such as the Männerbünde), all the way to ethnicities, societies, civilizations-cities (in the context we refer to the very concept of Civis) and cultures. The neurological underpinnings of these developments are found in the activity of multiple systems, especially the nervous and endocrine systems, but also involving metabolic and immune processes, which helped our species survive and reproduce.

5.2.5 Neuroanthropology

If social neuroscience investigated the relationship between society and the brain, the interaction between culture and the brain is the main focus of neuroanthropology. In this sense the two disciplines are closely connected to the point that the relative descriptors are often used as synonyms. Of course, in neuroanthropology the attention is even more focused on the historical processes, interpreted under the lens of general anthropology, that run parallel (some would argue ‘cause’ in an evolutionary biology-based outlook) to the evolution of brain functions mirroring social expectations. Thus, neuroanthropology applies the aforementioned research approach and integrates the investigative basis derived from social sciences with genetics and biology-based studies to promote ever changing theories such as biogenetic structuralism.

Once more, there is a parallel between neuronal location, activation and function, and the theoretical-philosophical analyses at the basis of our efforts to investigate ever improving therapeutic modalities. In the case of anthropology, the focus is on the location, activation and function of the subject in a social context. In the case of neuroanatomy, the focus becomes the true (biological) ‘matter’ of the locus of visual interpretation vs. (self) perception of the individual, that is, the human eye (Fig. 5.3). This has direct applications to therapy, for instance in the role that this type of visuospatial appreciation plays in training the human eye in the social context, with concept-associating/assigning and vertical vs./horizontal appreciation as examined by Doidge (2015).
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Fig. 5.3

Lateral view with the section of the eye including lateral rectus muscle, cranial nerves II, IV, V, VI and frontal, infraorbital, lacrimal, maxillary, nasociliary supraorbital, zygomatic nerves, as well as trigeminal ganglion

5.2.6 Sociobiology

With social neuroscience and neuroanthropology, we investigated the relation between culture and society on one side and neural factors on the other. In sociobiology this general view holds true, in the sense that this discipline is the intersection between sociology and biology. However, the philosophical thought on the basis of sociobiology is completely different. This field originates in the 1970s as a follow-up, intended in negative terms as ‘overruling and opposite’ to the functionalism-dominated debate nature vs. nurture debate up to that point. Thus, in sociobiology (human) social behavior is a direct product of evolution, in the post-Darwinian sense, and as such very close to approaches found in evolutionary psychology (although psychology, by definition, is not limited to the study of behavior only, as in sociobiology) as well as Darwinian anthropology, and human behavioral ecology (the latter often used as a synonym for sociobiology). According to this framework, we can certainly see how the mind-brain problem could represent a false dichotomy, in the sense that the two terms would represent ‘just’ two different aspects (or perceptual views) of the same entity, that is, biological evolution on the level of neural activity producing social processes. Of course, as with the general views in evolutionary theories, the genetic evolution of such biological, especially neurological structures promoted advantageous social behavior. In this context, terms such as gene/meme (the latter interpreted as ‘cultural replicator’) and behavior, genotype and phenotype are understood as sense/direction-creating conceptual frameworks directly following natural processes, natural evolution and natural selection. Sociobiology contributed to the creation of a synthesis of the whole social behavior understood as the activity of a genotype directly influencing the phenotype on the basis of nature and in an adaptive sense. More specifically, given that, according to sociobiologists (even) social behavior is a phenotype, it is in its very nature linked to the interaction between environment (which creates a form of ‘pressure’, interpreted as selective social expectations on the individual or the group) and genotype and it therefore follows natural selection in the neo-Darwinian sense.

From the perspective of theoretical approach and research method, the common practice in modern sociobiology is to isolate a certain social behavior, and develop a related hypothesis on the basis of evolutionary conceptual framework, that is, a reliable strategy (as in the “interpretation of gene sequence/frequency”) that would be juxtaposed to the observed behavior and perfectly match it (as in ‘expressed in a given population’). Of course, the more moderate (in the philosophical sense of ‘not fully deterministic’) views within sociobiology identify the existence of certain behaviors as only partially inherited via natural selection and account for the major role that other forms of ‘history’ (i.e. not limited to natural history, where by natural we only refer to biologically related, matter based) and parallel and/or subordinate processes have in the development of (human) behavior. Although the most important founding fathers of sociobiology are possibly John Paul Scott and Edward Wilson, the development of this field in science and academia happened via precursors such as Richard Alexander, William Hamilton and Nikolaas Tinbergen, as well as through an animated debate between the thesis presented in “Sociobiology: The New Synthesis” (Wilson 1975), the criticism by scholars like Richard Lewontin and Stephen Jay Gould and others. Of note, some criticism is not necessarily related to the negative judgment of specific methodological flaws, but on the theoretical-philosophical assumptions used as premises for sociobiological analysis. Certainly some perspectives denote a truly sociological or political background (especially in regard to Marxism and Anarchy), and a response-debate on such perspectives comes from within the field of sociobiology, as in the case of Anne Campbell and Frans de Waal or through the support of specific sociobiological theses, whether in full or in part, by scholars from fields related but external to sociobiology, for instance, Steven Pinker and Noam Chomsky. In some cases, sociobiology has been criticized as close to reductionist, deterministic, or utilitarian-mechanistic perspectives and falling short of providing evidence, in a purely biological sense, for some of the claims made in regard to the direct connection, in terms of causal effect, between gene transmission and behavior or specific aspects of animal—especially human—nature, for instance, intelligence and creativity. Furthermore, some (including Gould) have argued that specific traits in human behavior could be literally passed on via cultural influence, and other perspectives include a broader (or deeper) definition of culture, that is, the effect of Tradition on (human) action and ideation. Sociobiologists reply that natural selection plays a much bigger role in the development of all these aspects, and that, even if some behaviors are only in part inherited through genetic transmission, behavioral traits (including complex descriptors such as altruism, but also in regard to concepts like the relation between ‘ecological balance’ and expansion/progression of combined temperamental traits) can be passed on to the next generation following the same rules found in general biology, such as reproduction and preservation of a specific gene in the population according to evolutionary fitness and adaptation—in this sense the perspective of psychobiology/biopsychology is very similar.

Of course, an important element of ‘disruptive deconstruction’, literally, is represented by a scientific process which is challenging to all we just discussed, in terms of nature vs. nurture. More specifically, what would happen if we could decide how to ‘nurture nature’? We are obviously referring to the discoveries and application of the genome editing technology known as CRISPR/Cas9, first by the team of the Japanese molecular biologist Yoshizumi Ishino and very recently by the laboratory of Shoukhrat Mitalipov, a Kazakh biologist, currently director of the Center for Embryonic Cell and Gene Therapy at Oregon Health and Science University. At the center of these discoveries is a prokaryotic immune system whose main characteristic is the ability to provide acquired immunity via resistance to foreign genetic elements. This system is called Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats or ‘CRISPR’ and represents repetitive palindromic patterns of prokaryotic DNA, more specifically cascade complex (‘Cas’, bound to single-stranded Deoxyribonucleic acid) genes followed by a leader sequence and finally by a repeat-spacer array, which allows these proteins to identify, isolate and literally ‘cut off’ exogenous DNA. In the latest version CRISPR/Cas9, scientists have finally reached the ability to ‘genetically intervene’ in the modification of cellular structures for the purpose of ‘correcting’ pathogenic gene mutations, for instance at the level of human embryos, or to ‘repair’ or ‘edit’ specific genetic sequences through the insertion of other DNA patterns. In the context of the nature vs. nurture debate, it is extremely important to understand that at this point of our technological development we need to make sure, once again that the totality of our scientific development, that is, inclusive of philosophical, especially ethical analysis, matches those discoveries that will literally allow us to ‘play’ (and we mean the most comprehensive acceptation of the term) with our “building (and self-building, with an added layer of complexity on multiple levels) blocks” in ways difficult to ‘imagine physically possible’ decades ago.