© The Author(s) 2020
D. L. TomasiCritical Neuroscience and Philosophy https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35354-4_7

7. Conclusion: Philosophy as Basic Approach Toward Neuroscience

David Låg Tomasi1  
(1)
University of Vermont Integrative Health, University of Vermont Medical Center, Department of Inpatient Psychiatry, Burlington, VT, USA
 
 
David Låg Tomasi

7.1 Preliminary Discussion

At the beginning of this volume, we discussed the possibility of extended approaches to the scientific inquiry at the center of our investigation. We stressed on multiple occasions how it is very important to follow the scientific method when dealing with scientific investigations, that is, investigations of matter that can and should be observed and interpreted by science. In this context, Matthew Rampley (2017) advocates “for [a] wider recognition of the human motivations that drive inquiry of all types, [arguing] that our engagement with art can never be encapsulated in a single notion of scientific knowledge.” We tend to agree with this view and we also embrace some elements from the well-known theory of multiple intelligences by Howard Gardner (2006). Thus we could propose a simplified scheme of the different levels/layers of “Philosophy as basic approach toward Neuroscience” and science in general. For instance, we could list the following models-methods:
  1. 1.

    Scientific (evidence-based, observational-empirical, double-blind, case-control, the principle of falsifiability and hierarchy of evidence-based) model and method.

     
  2. 2.

    Philosophical model and method (each of which depends on vast supragroups and positions, as we evidenced several times in this analysis, including thought experiments in experimental philosophy).

     
  3. 3.

    Artistic model and method (from theories of perception to art movements and philosophies, to the “sheer enjoyment through the senses”, and to the social, political, sense/meaning-making, affirming-affirmative and activating-activist component of performance art).

     
  4. 4.

    Religious/spiritual/meditative model and method (with special reference to mysticism and mystical experiences, but also related to NDEs, OOBEs, alternate states of consciousness, neurotheology, etc.).

     
Following this thought, we can relate to John Gray’s view on contemporary science (also in relation to Kurzweil’s Singularity), which in modern times resembles what magic was for ancient civilizations, that is, it provided a general sense of hope toward the achievement of eternal life. According to Hegel, through religion, the absolute knowledge presents itself, though not in a conceptual form, proper of the Begriff, but in a pictorial form, as described in and by the Vorstellung. It is interesting to consider the poetic-imaginative-creative German (almost idiomatic) expression stell’ dir vor. This pictorial form is essential to comprehend many perspectives and theoretical basis of a quantity, probably the vast majority, of alternative therapies. In order to understand what absolute knowledge really is, a fundamental concept in “Philosophy as basic approach toward Neuroscience” we should focus on the dual meaning of the term Aufhebung, indicating cancellation/annihilation as well as preservation, which represents the focus of Traditional perspectives. To be sure, absolute knowledge is not the combination of An sich sein and Für sich sein, but is actually the absolute distance that cannot be reduced between the two terms. Thus, the appropriate philosophical methodology should follow a formal dialectical process, but should engage in an “introspective rememorization, recollection” or internal absolute, which brings ‘to the surface’ this memory; a method called Erinnerung (Tomasi 2016) but truly connected with the main concept of ‘speculative philosophy’ in the sense given by Verene, through the analysis (which is ultimately and truly deeper perception and poetic creation, from this perspective) of the work by Grassi, Vico, Tagliacozzo (Verene 1997), and the very comparison of what the philosopher defines as “Vico’s tetrad” (i.e. Plato, Bacon, Tacitus and Grotius) and his own tetrad (Hegel , Vico, Cassirer and Joyce).

Criticism of traditional (albeit not necessarily traditionalist) religions often identified the perceived delusional-illusional aspects of belief and practice. In this view, revealed religion is an illusion, for its truth is always something to be represented, not conceptualized, not conceptually understood, because the content of religion is correct, but the form is wrong, and that is the perspective of Verene in his analysis of Hegel. This certainly defines the “problematic relation between illusion, representation, perception, conceptualization and revelation of metaphysical, spiritual, and religious, especially messianic and/or prophetic type such as premonitions, apocalyptic visions, clairvoyance etc., is at the center of the debate on the ontology and phenomenology of psychiatric events” (Tomasi 2016). Philosophical, psychological and psychiatric definitions of ‘manifestation’ and ‘epiphany’ are particularly relevant in analyzing the cognitive-rational perspective as the preferred method of investigation of such issues. For example, a rationalization/cognitivization of (the figure and/or imago of) Christ or the Spirit would not make sense according to Verene because of their nature-substance. In the attempt to unify the two elements and moments, the Father and the Son, problems appear on both strictly cognitive levels (because cognition necessarily has an object) as well as from the theological perspective, for instance in the filioque doctrine at the center of the Great Schism. The Holy/Whole Spirit vs. the Ghost (Geist) appears in time as substance, and unsuccessfully tries to unite the elements, which is the same as saying it tries to annihilate (reduce) time. Under this framework, Erinnerung is a denial of time but recollection. That is precisely why cognition is ‘less than absolute knowledge’, and our understanding can only move beyond the cognitive stage, through the previously analyzed ‘beautiful soul’ which is both the very intuition of the Divine, and the Divine’s intuition of itself, the self’s own act in contraposition to what was ‘content’ in religion. This is the reason beyond the divine nature of language (learned at the level of das Meinen, since the real cannot be said), of the poetry of the very poetic art of intuition, which ultimately leads to philosophy, to a communion with itself (Tomasi 2016). Now, all these discussions on communication, creativity and intuition are to be understood, in this context, as areas of investigation for neuroscience. More specifically, as this conclusion involves ‘Philosophy as basic approach toward Neuroscience’, we want to spend some time justifying why we should care at all about these ideas. With the ever increasing specialization and subdivision of science into multiple subspecialties, we can observe how very often this process happens not for a genuine interest in the best possible practices or form of scientific inquiry, but simply due to an ever increasing demand for added ‘labeling’ at the scientific level in academia. In other words, modern science, ever since post-enlightenment developments (as we have seen multiple times in this study), has increasingly become distant, even ‘foreign’ or ‘alien’ to disciplines such as natural philosophy. While it is understandable and to some extent justifiable, that, once a solid scientific paradigm, in terms of method and technology, has been found to be effective and accurate in the efforts of new discoveries, science will focus more and more on areas in which results can be found, these efforts are themselves part of (could read: ‘prisoners of’) the general goal of such paradigm. This has a direct impact on funding research studies, especially in the context of grants. If the amount of money is limited, and ‘everyone wants the money’ one of the best ways to access these funds is exactly this further subdivision of fields, a subdivision which promotes the idea that is actually better to know a lot more about a very limited area of investigation (a view which can certainly be defended given the increasing complexity of science in all areas) and ‘not so much’ about the ‘general connections’ between fields. While we do agree that is humanly very difficult, almost impossible, to be a specialist in one field and at the same time know ‘a lot about everything’ without losing focus on and expertise in that very field, we also see an increasing negative bias toward researchers who are actually trying to bridge these two perspectives. To give a quick example in the form of mere anecdotal evidence (the reader will not find any bibliographical reference in this case), we have observed, personally and professionally, that an expert in diverse fields of science can sometimes be viewed as someone like a ‘popular science author’ but (at times) with not enough knowledge of the complexity and multitude of details in any field. A similar bias we observed in the field of medicine, where terms/titles such as ‘general practitioner’, ‘family physician’ and ‘generalist doctor’ are at times ‘looked down upon’ by the (just as an example) “neurosurgeon-researcher who only specializes in the substantia nigra selectivity, with special reference to the pars cumpacta in relation to sleeping patterns observable in animal modeling”. Let us restate that we completely understand the incredible difficulty of mastering a lot of knowledge in such a vast area like modern science without sounding (and often truly being) ‘superficial’ or ‘general’, but we want to promote the idea of “Philosophy as basic approach toward Neuroscience” to at least try to be flexible in moving the focus back and forth from the smallest detail to the bigger picture. Furthermore, as we also mentioned many times, an “expert is someone who experiences”, someone who has or makes an experience, certainly with the methods of science but also via relations with other scientists, and human beings in general, all the way to those experiences that need to be quantified/qualified as personal (at times even subjective), artistic, spiritual and even mystical. Once more, this is the very nature of consciousness as ‘shared knowledge’. If we do not ‘keep this mindset in mind’ the risk is that the aforementioned subdivision of fields will not be motivated by true scientific (and human) curiosity (broadly indeed to include genuine interest for fellow human beings, and the world in general), but by money. There can be in fact very dangerous consequences when science is used to foster not clinical research, but the monetary gain for pharmaceutical companies, not green energy solutions, but the oil industry, not universal wellbeing, but class-divided health coverage. To provide an example in this sense, when analyzing socioeconomic status, healthcare and medicine, education and literacy, science and technology, and equal distribution of wealth in the United States, for instance, this country does not score very high globally (Mujkanović 2016). However, although the general quality and affordability of the US healthcare and medicine in general is still far away from the standards of other countries (especially other American countries like Canada and European countries like Austria, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway), the United States were certainly on the right path, and the implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act have been successful in achieving the goal of quality, affordable healthcare and reduction of uninsured rate for all citizens of or residents in the United States, until the change of powers in policy making. In this regard, we can certainly state that not everything was perfect with ‘Obamacare’. First of all, many opponents felt that the centralization of powers in the hands of the Washington federal government might take away some of the liberties and abilities of single states to provide good (health) care to their citizens. Of note, the same fear is still found throughout Europe when discussing the centralizing power of the European Union in terms of financial structuration of society, which many perceive as globalizing in the sense of increasing the privileges of the banks, of corporations over people and of economy over morality. In any case, the vast majority of European countries, EU-members or not, were able to keep a relatively free healthcare system, with paid maternity leave, and very inexpensive higher education tuition rates, especially in the fields of medicine and medical science, again relatively to the US-based higher education system.

7.2 The Triple-S Model: Self, Soul, Spirit

7.2.1 Critical Neuroscience

In this final chapter we finally came back to the very definition of critical neuroscience. As we mentioned at the beginning of this volume, all the previously discussed fields in neuroscience, psychology, psychiatry and so on have made major contributions to our understanding of human nature. Each contribution provides a fundamental piece which is needed to solve the mysterious puzzle of our essence and existence as human beings in this world. Of course, critical neuroscience is also limited in its understanding of the whole, but it serves the fundamental purpose of bridging the thereby achieved knowledge and the perspectives of the last four areas of investigation we will discuss, namely neurolinguistics, neuroheuristics (or neuristics), neuroeconomics and artificial intelligence. The last discussion we will encounter is on ‘Sense, Purpose, (and) Meaning’. As we have seen, the main reason behind this choice has to do with the very essence of our analysis, namely the twofold interpretation of ‘critical’ and the related discussion spanning the scientific analysis of the matter-at-hand and the following suggestion on new perspectives and viewpoints on our lives. Critical neuroscience is therefore a direct heir of epistemology and heuristics, although we want to stress here the relevance of all three elements of scientific knowledge, that is, the Aristotelian episteme, techne and phronesis, the latter especially representing a fundamental cornerstone of our investigation. In fact, we want our analysis to be ‘mindful and aware’ of neuroscience’s potential, informative abilities and also limits. Limits that are created not in order to necessarily narrow the scope of observation found in this discipline, but that are naturally created by the existence of other elements such as the social, psychological, physical and metaphysical, spiritual and transcendent(al) parts of our self, the self of all the people and other beings around us, and the self of the world(s) we live in. Thus, critical neuroscience has the very important duty to investigate the fallacies such as deriving “[a] prescription from [a] pure description” (Moore 1903), also in connection to—we could argue—computational-mathematical perspectives such as Gödelian information not reducible to bytes, and provide elements to foster this level of understanding of the human mind-brain. In the research by Sperry and Gazzaniga, we have referred to on multiple occasions in this examination, one of the most important aspects is exactly this link between pure description and:
  1. (a)

    What our mind and soul (both of which, at this level do not make sense at all, anymore) really are (reality=observation=description, following the same schemata).

     
  2. (b)

    What (in the absence of a self, intended as connected to mind and soul) our brain should do.

     
In this regard, Vincent Torley thoroughly analyzed the significance of corpus callosotomy on the possible existence vs. non-existence of an immaterial soul, also quoting John Eccles and presenting the substance dualist, the thought control dualist and the formal-final dualist perspectives. To be sure, critical neuroscience has to be a subgroup of ‘critical science’, thus containing all the philosophical considerations (especially from the philosophy of science and natural philosophy) focused on (at the very least) epistemological, ontological and phenomenological (in our opinion) elements of investigative methods. However, given that our primary focus has been on issues such as the mind–body problem, the existence of free will and possible neural underpinnings for cognition, computation, action, interaction, communication, attention, memory, behavior, perception, awareness and consciousness, our study has targeted neuroscience first and foremost. This premise has also been the center of our previous discussions on ethics in the context of medical research and practice. This is due to the existential (here intended in a broader sense) components of the application of the insight gained via neuroscientific experimentation on clinical decision making. Therefore, we have to spend some time discussing what these components represent in our Triple-S Model: Self, Soul, Spirit, starting from the clinical context. As we have seen, there are multiple models for the application and significance of neuroscience in the investigation of these terms. Leaving aside etymological, semantic and historical considerations, this tripartite model does not represent any new idea in philosophy or neuroscience, but simply refers back to the tripartite component of our existential experience as:
  1. (a)

    Individual and/or subjectively understood

     
  2. (b)

    Transcendental and/or internally felt

     
  3. (c)

    Metaphysical or/or divinely inspired

     
As we previously mentioned, we do not embrace any specific philosophical or spiritual position in this context, as our primary goal is to provide a common framework for the interpretation of the problem of consciousness in the context of neuroscientific research. However, this framework is critical by definition, in that it examines the first level of data collection from experimental studies in neuroscience, the second level of scientific (mechanical/process-based, statistical, epidemiological, etc.) and philosophical interpretation, and the third level of direct implications for the ‘life lived’. Thus, the main point here is that similarly to what happens with the awareness of placebo/nocebo effects, the ‘mind model’ and ‘model of mind’ we use in our everyday life and in the laboratory truly influence our rationale for a concept such as ‘empathic cruelty’.1 It is exactly this ethical component that connects a scientific re-examination of the mind–body problem in the context of critical neuroscience with social, political and legal aspects of healthcare. Stephan Schleim (2014) accurately describes the possible outcomes of a moral discourse originating in a very specific (and we might add, narrow vs. narrow-minded) “philosophical assumption deprived of philosophical understanding” in modern neuroscientific research:

Generations of anthropologists and moral psychologists before had gathered evidence on the development, cognitive-emotional mechanisms, and cultural diversity of morality, but suddenly in 2001 with the publication of the first neuroimaging experiments the situation seemed to have changed. It seems fair to say that of the seven different psychological-neuroscientific theoretical accounts of morality distinguished by Jorge Moll et al., all the evidence gathered hitherto does not unequivocally favor any particular one (Moll et al., 2005). While the science communication accompanying the original study by Greene et al. suggested the philosophical relevance of the research, even putting forward the idea that the new findings could make moral philosophers superfluous (Helmuth, 2001), so far the opposite has been the case: theoreticians of all kinds responded to the prescriptive/normative claims and emphasized how these neuroscientific reports rely on theoretical presumptions and individual interpretation. While theoretical in its scope, moral neuroscience is used to provide the ultimate answers of human right and wrong that Sperry and Gazzaniga called for. More applied/technical implications are promised by the complementary research that might be coined “immoral neuroscience”: the investigation of what makes us behave immorally or criminally.2

Moral neuroscience is a subfield and a sub-theoretical framework which can be applied to many other fields in neuroscience and to science in general. To provide further explanation of the direct implication of a ‘moralizing neuroscience’ in those areas where medicine intersects and interacts with ethics, morality and end-of-life decisions, we would like to briefly discuss the application of such ethical aspects as found in acute care settings. Medical Science, including those areas covered by neuroscience and neurology, is structured on a vast array of clinical, theoretical and ethical standpoints, upon which the combination of medical, patient-centered theory and practice of care is based. In this context, the analysis of advance directives is a fundamental cornerstone of critical neuroscience, because—in research, academia and healthcare—we need to understand those parameters which can guarantee patient’s informed consent from both the quantitative perspective (patient’s capacity for autonomy), and the qualitative perspective (the patient’s ability for autonomy and voluntariness). These aspects are always present in clinical efforts at every stage of care, from the initial treatment to palliative care. More specifically, end-of-life decisions should be made once patient autonomy is assessed, thus determining a series of considerations including the broader conceptual umbrella of good and evil categories, particularly good life versus good death. In this regard, Schicktanz and Schweda (2009) helps us understand the planning of advance directives in juxtaposition and comparison by the way they are interpreted by a third party. Critical neuroscience faces bioethical demands by addressing questions from a multilayered, multifaceted and multicultural perspective. In this context, the focus on diversity and universality is key to determine a structured process which fosters a better understanding of the patient in his/her individuality. In fact, advance directives indicate a document addressing the specific needs and preferences of care in the partial or total absence of ability and/or capability in health-related decision making, including (self) care, due to illness or incapacity. To be sure, these decision-making abilities are influenced by an interplay between personal and cultural identity (Schicktanz 2009). Certainly, the underpinning ethical considerations are part of the broader theoretical debate in philosophy, most particularly in the philosophy of medicine. Johnson (2009) refers to universalism versus casuistry in addressing the problems arising by considering ethical questions under the lens of the individual case/patient and the context/case-situation/environment, including universalization and generalization (as in the perspectives of Immanuel Kant vs. situation ethics). Furthermore, this analysis helps reframe the problem of the continuity of self also in terms of our connection with the sensory apparatus (Fig. 7.1), which is central to our efforts, as researchers and healthcare providers in general, to better address the needs of each patient, especially when a full understanding, diachronically intended, is compromised due to issues related to the ever changing medical situation. It is certainly the case of degenerative disorders, including comorbidity of causes and effectors, such as neurological disorders and mental health disorders in general, for instance in patients with Alzheimer’s disease or specific psychiatric diagnosis (schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, etc.). The conceptual issues regarding autonomy, consent and personhood are addressed by Coleman (2013) when discussing yet another philosophical concept, the harm principle by John Stuart Mill. In fact, utilitarian principles are in place in analyzing physicians’ attitudes toward clinical decisions within advance directives. This perspective is certainly a core issue in the patient-provider, especially patient–physician relationship. Scientists and clinicians can and should be able to address this issue by fostering open, positive and competent communication with and between patient and physician.
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Fig. 7.1

The concept of continuity of self and the interaction of the individual-subject with the external world of stimuli via sensory perception. As it is well known, the olfactory system has the particular feature of almost completely bypassing the thalamic analysis (decoding, amplifying and transmitting) in its paths toward cortical areas

This is another essential aspect of this study, that is, the promotion of appropriate ideas—thus, appropriate for the target population, for example, our patients—for the amelioration of care. Let us restate this principle once more. To provide better care we need to (a) provide the patient with better tools to foster self-care in the healing process, (b) identify those tools as parts of the mind–body connection, in terms of strategies the patient can think of and use for his/her wellbeing and (c) define the terms ‘mind’ and ‘body’, via the thorough analysis of the mind–body problem and the justification-proof of the existence of these two terms, their interaction, and its modalities.

As healthcare members provide direct clinical care to patients, the most effective strategies in this area include both the patient and the patient’s family as active participants in health care decisions. According to Kroning (2014), there are several aspects underlying these strategies. In particular, physicians, clinicians and nurses on hospital units participate in the coordination and integration of care and are in need of educational modalities, specialized training, certifications or re-certifications to guarantee quality and safety within the framework of a shared decision making on the unit. This in turn originates from an organizational culture of safety, continuing education, positive approach and (mutual) support between staff members (Hinderer and Lee 2014). To be sure, both evidence-based practice and well-grounded clinical roles are required by healthcare institutions to adequately assist patients with advance directives. In particular, as team members become patients’ advocates throughout the care they provide, there are several arguments that could be directed against the implementation of advance directives. In this regard, the delicate balance between autonomy and self-determination (not to mention the broader concept of free will , especially when certain neurological issues are in place) is at the center of a possible lack of support by some medical professionals, as noted by Mitchell (2011). According to this view, advance directives should not be considered a valuable source of information in the formation of treatment plans. To address these problems and suggest possible solutions and related practical implementation of the above, the American Bar Association (ABA) has analyzed the legal aspects both from the perspective of medical ethics, as well as from the epidemiological-statistical analysis, monitoring advance directives completion rates, and discussing in-depth state recognitions and liability. This analysis includes the instructions on advance directives by the American Medical Association (AMA) as well as the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA). Nurses especially, as healthcare members working in direct patient care need to follow basic human rights (in fundamental ethical term), as evidenced by Aiken (cited in Kearney-Nunnery 2012):
  • Beneficence—What is in the best interest for the patient while focusing on safety in healthcare environments.

  • Justice and Fidelity—Fair access to quality healthcare with a focus on trust and loyalty to the patient.

  • Self-determination and Autonomy—Ethical obligation to patients; What measures to take on the patient’s behalf.

  • Full disclosure and Veracity—Full disclosure of truthful information allowing the patient to make an informed decision.

  • Informed consent—A voluntary choice to accept or refuse treatment.

  • Privacy and Confidentiality—Exercising trust in health care professionals to disclose private information.

Aside from the legal component of the utilization of advance directives in healthcare, medical professionals need to be aware of the psychological and sociological aspects of their clinical decision-making abilities to provide better care for their patients. More specifically, medical professionals can draw upon social contract and individual rights to understand the point of view, needs and abilities/capabilities of the patient throughout the lifespan, with a special understanding of the different developmental stages in young and older patients. This can be achieved for instance by analyzing Kohlberg’s theory of moral development, especially the III-level model for morality, from heteronomous to universal, as discussed by Ma (2013), as well as through the implementation of principles of justice and human rights into the required coursework or training for healthcare professionals. A similar approach would foster a Universal Ethical System as an ethical, practical and clinical basis or the role and profession of researchers, within healthcare groups and systems. These aspects will all be fundamental parts of the legal decision-making process determining the hierarchy of health professions by reducing conflicts and dysfunctional patterns of communication, and clarify the role of clinicians, degrees and licensures. To suggest an alternative conceptual framework to Kohlberg’s theory, parallels can be drawn between the psychologies in place in the patient-provider relationship, focusing in particular on the therapeutic self-care demands and needs as well as the specific evaluation of the professional role of the nurse in this context. Helpful in this context can be the hierarchy of human needs proposed by Abraham Maslow and discussed in Thielke, Harniss, Thompson and Patel (2012). In detail, being an expert and competent medical professional means:
  • To be able to meet her/his full potential (self-actualization).

  • To feel competent, with strong self-esteem, self-perception and self-worth (esteem).

  • To feel psychologically and professionally supported in the system (love and belongingness).

The practical implications of understanding and implementing advance directives in acute care settings are linked to a general improvement in therapeutic outcomes and ethical considerations. As we have seen, from the patient’s perspective, a fully informed and autonomous conceptual framework is necessary to guarantee the patient’s informed consent from both the quantitative perspective and the qualitative perspective. This is possible if medical/nursing education will include an apt analysis of teamwork, collaboration and communication between healthcare members, to guarantee a strong and universal ethical basis and promote therapeutic effectiveness. From the perspectives of critical neuroscience applied to medicine, the psychological analysis of medical/nursing theories helps structure effective methods of clinical intervention following specific stage of action. Based on the evidence-based literature review and the theoretical analysis of the issues discussed above, we can posit that healthcare team members educated in advance directives will:
  • Better understand their own needs, values, role and identity as they apply in a healthcare system, and better relate to the patient’s own needs by clinically addressing them.

  • Be more prepared and ready to check all the clinical tasks required as part of their clinical interventions, and verify their self-actualization process while performing those tasks.

  • Be clinically and ethically more competent in addressing issues such as clinical decision-making and advocating for patients’ actions in the case of illness or impaired capacity and autonomy.

  • Be legally responsible for the application of specific ethical guidelines in advance care decision making (e.g. end-of-life and palliative care).

  • Be supported by healthcare and higher educational system in which the role and scope of nursing will be better understood and respected by other healthcare providers and team members.

7.2.2 Neurolinguistics

In linguistics, the main area of interest is the analysis, in the form of scientific enquiry, of language, more specifically its structure, form, mutations and changes as well as of the context-at-large, including the history, development and environment as ‘sense’ or ‘meaning’-creating effectors on the form and the use of language. Of course, the assumption here is based on the general (Western, evidence-based, empirical-experimental, etc.) scientific assumption that all these processes have a natural (in terms of matter-essential res) origin, and are not thus the product(ion) of a—for instance—a supernatural/paranatural entity and/or being which (who) gave the ‘gift’ of letters, alphabets, language and communication to mankind as a form of ‘divine providence’. The same assumption is kept in neurolinguistics, although the focus here is on one specific side or part of nature, that is, the neural underpinnings beyond the production, comprehension, understanding, acquisition, recollection, categorization and communication of language, including speech-language pathology. Of course, there is a vast array of intersections and influences from other fields, especially from psycholinguistics, biolinguistics, sociolinguistics and many other subfields in applied linguistics. There are also enormous differences between the science-based field of neurolinguistics and some ‘not-as-qualified’ offspring. Monitoring the validity, strength and causational inference levels between what we can observe in the biological matter and mental-psychological processes in regard to the aforementioned linguistic elements is part of the primary questions posed to neurolinguistics and even more to neurolinguistics-linked (whether approved/accredited or not) approaches such as Neuro-linguistic programming (NLP), whose scientific validity (especially in terms of goal-oriented strategies applied to focus in attentional modeling) remains to be verified. In fact, the history of neurolinguistics starts from the neurobiologically-based scientific discoveries by Broca and Wernicke in the area of aphasiology first and dyslexia after, to the rise of an entirely new field with Henri Hecaen, Alexandr Luria and Edith Crowell Trager. From a philosophical point of view, neurolinguistics is a fundamental approach to provide a deeper analysis of important issues such as the debate on determinism vs. indeterminism on free will. For instance, the study of the very development of language from and evolutionary biology point of view contains some theoretical inference on the predictability of specific linguistic-morphological structures, and thereby a contextualized environment in which the options to choose from might be contained-constrained or conceptually limited into a therein produced set. Whether the analysis of complex linguistic forms such as sentences as indicators of underlying psychological mechanisms vs. processes such as priming vs. meaning, or the observation of neural activity as correlational activator of semantic sequences and algorithms, we are here faced with one of the defining component of science, namely the predictability aspect, which originates in the translation of neurological processes—especially cortical response to sets of stimulations, but also more generalized neuroimaging techniques in the context of linguistic exposure—into psychological theories and models explaining language, as well as their relation to auditory stimuli (Fig. 7.2). Good examples in this area are such as the ‘unification model’ by Gerard Kempen and Theo Vosse, or the ‘serial model’ by Janet Fodor and Lyn Frazier.
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Fig. 7.2

Anatomical view of the ear in relation to auditory transmission (signaling in blue). Highlighted we can observe the ear canal and the eardrum or tympanic membrane (pink), the labyrinth (orange), the middle ear space (purple) and the cochlea (blue)

The philosophical discussion at the center of the aforementioned considerations also provides the framework for the semantic analysis of meaning vs. value judgment, especially in relation to the development of morality, as well as the theoretical basis for mismatch design, subtraction paradigm and violation-based studies. Charles Leslie Stevenson examined the cognitive use of language, thereby presenting the perspective of human self-knowledge through communication with other human beings in a specific context. The first pattern analysis focuses on the two parts of ethical statements, the speaker’s declaration, that is, the declaration of the speaker’s attitude and an imperative to follow it in a specular way: to mimic, copy and mirror it. The intersection of philosophy and neurolinguistics thus helps us frame the way human beings shape their meaning and significance, whether to or through self-reflection or external factors. In the case of Stevenson, the translation of an ethical sentence remains a non-cognitive one, but it raises existential(ist) questions on personal responsibility and action. Since imperatives cannot be proven, they can be supported, and the purpose of this process is to make the listener understand the consequences of the action they are being commanded to do.

Furthermore, cognitive-attentive/attentional task monitoring studies originate from this semantic analysis design, including the probe verification in which a series of sentences are analyzed by presenting the subjects with a ‘probe word’ following each statement. In this type of experimental study, the subject then has to identify the presence of such words in the previously administered sentence. From this perspective, this experimentation is akin to acceptability judgment task-based research studies, and other types of research areas—for instance lexical decision tasks used in priming studies, or research on grammatical acceptability or semantic acceptability—shared by linguistics in general, including lexicology and morphology (the study of the relationships between related words, their independent and codependent structure, their formation and storage/accumulation and access/accessibility, thus related to recall and memory-based processes and LTP), semantics (concerned with encoded meaning, value and significance), syntax (concerned with combinatory patterns), phonetics and phonology (the study of speech sounds and—in neurolinguistics and psycholinguistics—their neural and psychological underpinnings, including the ability of separating language-based sounds from background noise), pragmatics (analyzing the context, and its role and conceptual weight in the interpretation of meaning, also in relation to sociocultural conventions at the base, for instance, of orthography).

Of course, in each of these areas of neurolinguistics, the ‘neuro’ element has to be experimentally understood with the help of evidence-based studies based on a series of tasks. The responses, reactions and/or outcomes following the tasks can then be analyzed both theoretically and with the support of technologies in neuroimaging and hemodynamic techniques such as functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS), or diffusion tensor imaging (DTI), especially useful to track neural connections between brain areas while the task is performed, and others. This type of research in neurolinguistics also monitors quantitative data in relation to (reaction/decision/acquisition) time and ordering—processing of linguistic patterns by the subject. More in detail, if we observe (via electrophysiological techniques such as EEG) a certain pattern of neural activity following a specific task, we can identify (again, we are still within the same theoretical framework) discrete values of brain response, on a computational level. In this context, we refer to the common neural responses reflecting semantic processing (event-related potentials or ERP) ELAN, N400 and P600. A less passive-observational and more active-stimulatory approach comes from other techniques such as transcranial magnetic stimulation and direct cortical stimulation. Furthermore, in neurolinguistics, we also find the usage of outliers to the standards for this type of investigation. More in detail, observing grammar-syntax anomalies in the order, disposition and conceptual structure of words within sentences, providence evidential relations for, as an example, the N400 effect or the P600 response. Studies by Embick, Hillyard, Kutas and Osterhou were able to shed new light on the neural processes and their location in neuroanatomical and functional terms behind these language-use anomalies. These studies also provide important information on the processes behind language acquisitions, more specifically around the various stages of linguistic development in connection to neural development (including ‘babbling’ stages), in relation to the acquisition of multiple languages and the interactions between them, also in terms of crossing-violation. The use of Neuroimaging techniques in this context allows for a deeper comparison between language processing and specific area neural activation at baseline (for instance, in experimental observation of subjects reading complex vs. basic sentences), to monitor not only area-specific developmental stages, but also to incorporate a broader analysis on neuroplasticity and increase in gray and white matter. The so-called subtraction paradigm focuses exactly on such comparison. Electrophysiological techniques and electrocorticography have also been used in the study of language processing, but they are generally limited, due to the nature of these techniques, to the analysis of the mechanisms at the basis of these processes and their time-sequence (often implemented with studies on event-related potentials, which provide detailed information on amplitude, latency and broad scalp/cortical topography) rather than on their exact location.

Certainly, when combining observation-type and experimental technology-based research with quantitative vs. qualitative theoretical, statistical/epidemiological analysis, we need to avoid, as much as possible, any type of subjective bias, or attempt to isolate this component to monitor possible contributors or distracters to the processes involving a final result. In fact, some researchers will use an artificial, experimental ‘distractor’ to (a) better investigate working memory in language processing and (b) avoid bias originating from the subjects (over) focusing on (in other words, orienting more attention to) the experiment itself and its stimuli. The distraction in this context might come from multiple and non-related stimuli to elicit a mismatch negativity response or MMN, or by asking the subject to engage in multiple tasks at once, as it is the case of the double-task experiment.

7.2.3 Neuroheuristics or Neuristics

A strong philosophical approach is presented in the heuristic examination of neural underpinnings. Such an approach is embraced by the field of neuroheuristics, also called neuristics. Therefore, research in this area analyzes the scientific information on neural activity from within, adopting a problem-solving framework including complexity, non-reducibility, deduction-induction-intuition-based debate and (abstract vs. extract) philosophical speculation, especially in relation to the cognitive examination of decision-making procedures. Neuroheuristics combines many transdisciplinary approaches in both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ sciences; however, the philosophical baseline of such investigation is non-binary in an experimental sense. More specifically, neuroheuristics utilizes the fundamental data and information pieces gathered by neurosciences, neurobiology, in particular, to follow a ‘bottom-up’ process to have a deeper understanding of the structure and function of neural areas, especially in the CNS. However, a challenge to this approach is represented by the difficult task of monitoring (and avoiding bias at the same time vs. simultaneously) multiple neuroanatomical areas and activities and relate them to internal/external variables. To compensate this experimental difficulty, neuroheuristics also relies on theoretical frameworks such as double heuristics, quantum physics debate and black box theory, the latter in particular regard to the understanding of essence vs. existence in terms of (just vs. only) functionality. In fact, the term ‘black box’ is somewhat akin to the concept of ‘camera obscura’ although in this context the narrowing focal process is not mirroring, (re)representing, (re)coding or portraying an image, but is aware of the absence of knowledge of its internal functions, processes and workings; it is ‘aware of being unaware’. This black box could thus represent the computational or at least quantitative aspect of the (human) brain as a calculator, better understood via algorithms and equations.

The neuroheuristic input comes from the realization of the importance of the observer in observation, and the attempt to quantify and qualify such impact in the experimental studies, with different degrees of evidence, of neural activity and psychological/mental processes. Neuroheuristics therefore attempts to bridge the gap between nature and nurture and monism (especially of the reductionist type) vs. holism by shedding light on the thereby interpreted lack of permanence of value in the binary analysis within the principle of falsifiability, because positive vs. negative or 1 and 0 results are already constructed in one-sided evaluation of the process-at-hand and are influenced by observation. It follows that the prereflective understanding of Hermeneutics is also a parareflective understanding. This understanding is at the center of the debates on the interpretation of medical disorders, and it therefore a funding component not only of medicine but also of psychology and bridging fields such as medical humanities or narrative medicine, as evidenced by Tricia Greenhalgh and Brian Hurwitz (1999) or Maria Giulia Marini (2012). Thus, Neuroheuristics help us understand illnesses, diseases and disorders by determining the neural basis for patient-provider, provider-medical science/knowledge, interaction, confrontation and communication as well as quid/qualia effects. Within these parameters, we can certainly remember Plato, as his definition of illnesses as originating in metaphysical ignorance, with a special connection to the soul. This view, expressed in the Timaeus where we learn about the role of anoia and novs, the contemporary concepts of placebo vs. nocebo effect and the underlying mind-brain connection, can thus be interpreted by taking into account Mania and Amathia as derivative from anoia and generate an imbalance in the soul. From the perspective of neuroscience, this imbalance deprives the mind-soul of its virtues connected to the absolute truth, being and the divine essence. Philosophically understood, the human soul-mind is in constant motion toward becoming more rational. Rationality obviously involves awareness and its related concept of consciousness. The latter is also the unknown variable for psychoanalytic interpretations, but can be perceived via the action of other layers of essence, as in the description of Paracelus, obviously modeled on archaic forms of traditional medicine:
  • Ens Astrorum or Ens Astrale, representing the influx and influence of the stars

  • Ens Veneni, through the poison absorbed, inhaled by the body

  • Ens Naturale, or the natural predisposition and constitution

  • Ens Spirituale, representing the influx and influence of the spirit

  • Ens Dei, defined as influx and influence of God

Whether we can identify some of this analysis as still valid in the context of modern neuroscientific research, or we completely reject all the teachings by Paracelsus as pseudoscience, it is still interesting to relate to the multilayered conceptualization of essence in our attempt to understand the effects of each of the element on our psycho-physical and possibly spiritual health, whereby spirit we are willing to accept, theoretically assuming, the ratio it carries, as it helps us the reach higher levels of wholeness and perfection, also in reference to the narratio described by Verene (1997). According to this view, there is a constant battle of the soul against the influence of evil which ultimately causes physical and psychical disorders, a battle that can be won through education. This education is actually self-education, not in the sense of self-referring intellectual efforts (although certainly self/internally-directed, at least in part) but ‘education of the self’ as in the complex multilayered meanings of culture, as we observed in Transcultural and social neuroscience and psychology. Christopher, Wendt, Marecek and Goodman (2014) described this aspect very well when they argue that every form of psychology is indeed folk psychology or in the analysis by Drew Leder on clinical interpretation (and) the hermeneutics of medicine (1990). Leder argues in fact that there is a need for hermeneutics in medical sciences, in order to ‘interpret the interpretation of the interpretation’ and thus provide insight on the role and relation of the physician-clinician/scientist-researcher in the diagnostic apparatus.

7.2.4 Neuroeconomics

What we have discussed so far in relation to cognitive and computational decision-making analysis is used by neuroeconomics to further investigate the relationship between neural activity and behavior involved in the creation-production, distribution-sharing-selling and use-usage-consumption of (primarily material) goods and services. More specifically, behavior is interpreted from the perspective of single vs. multiple decisions, or a single (less-least or more-most) better/worse choice among many options. Given this premise, neuroeconomics is fully part of a much broader philosophical debate, especially in regard to (hard/soft) determinism vs. indeterminism and compatibilism vs. incompatibilism in the free-will debate. However, in mainstream modern neuroeconomics, the main assumptions follow the ones of contemporary economics, especially in regard to expected utility, utility maximization (as in Bernoulli) logical base of informed and rational agent-based decisions, and standardized/single-currency/system models on overall utility value. A heuristics-based criticism of mainstream economics applies even more strongly to neuroeconomics, given the assumption of the validity of some animal modeling-based investigation of decision-making processes at a neural level. A similar criticism is found in the definition of risk and avoidable or unwanted outcomes, and on whether firing rates of individual neurons can be understood under the lens of ‘better choice’ or ‘decision to avoid’, as in the studies by Padoa-Schioppa and Assad on the orbitofrontal cortex of monkeys. As animals, especially humans, make the decision in a social environment, elements of social neuroscience and psychology or sociology are used in this field to account for the number of social effectors in each decision or series of choices. Strong moral-ethical and even theological-eschatological elements of discussion are present, as universality of value and judgment, cooperation, prize/praise, retribution, punishment and altruism are the direct outcomes of such analysis. To provide an example, in the so-called prisoner’s dilemma by Flood and Dresher (1951) the concept of trust plays a fundamental role, in that it determines the level of cooperation between/among individuals. On the level of neuroeconomics, the increased outcome in terms of spread/shared benefit within social cooperation is compared with individual/single gain and it is modulated by the presence of the hormone oxytocin and the activation of the reward pathway in the CNS, most specifically the ventral striatum (as well as the tegmental area) in the brain. Therefore, the theoretical assumptions in neuroeconomics are tested using multiple Neuroimaging technologies. These studies rely on the analysis of blood-oxygenation levels as well as on the presence, absence or increase/decrease levels of specific, task-related chemicals during activation-action-function and at baseline, often by comparing any such activity with a control activity or comparing average subjects with subjects affected by neurocognitive damage, especially in the case of behavioral and emotional-related areas such as the limbic system, and especially the amygdala (which appears to play a very important role in loss aversion studies). Aside for the effects on trust and risk perception of oxytocin, we will mention serotonin in relation to intertemporal choice (the expected utility assigned by human subjects to events occurring at different times, as opposed to the assumed constancy-consistency of choice found in discounted utility), the presence of dopamine and increased activation of the dopamine reward pathway (especially the nucleus accumbens), as well as the BA8 area of the frontomedian cortex, the frontoparietal cortex and the mesial prefrontal cortex for difficult decision-making processes involving uncertainty. The latter is at the center of investigations regarding normal and abnormal (not necessarily in psychological-psychiatric terms) behavior, as with the generalized tendency to overweigh small probabilities and underweigh large ones in terms of showing risk-seeking behaviors, as evidenced by the studies by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). Moreover, when the balance between sheer uncertainty and risk appears to show ‘heaviness’ on the latter (as in gaming or gambling), we notice an increased activation of the insular cortex.

Finally, another important element in neuroeconomics is shared with psychology, especially in regard to the studies conducted by Bandura and Mischel on cognition, decision making and the connection (which is choice) between immediate and delayed reward. In such a process, the neural underpinnings appear to be the lateral prefrontal cortex, although with a ratio differential. More specifically, research studies suggest that the limbic system is (more) activated in the case of impulsive decisions, while the cortex is (more) activated in general aspects of the intertemporal decision process. In other words, the ratio of limbic to cortex activation decreased as a function of the amount of time (passed) until reward (obtained or perceived as such), and this would also explain the activation of other chemical components, especially hormones and neurotransmitters, as well as the production of cortisol and activation/deactivation of stress response in individual with drug addiction.

7.2.5 Artificial Intelligence

A thorough and critical examination of neuroscience, especially in regard to the mind–body problem, cannot possibly avoid the debate over artificial intelligence, a tremendously important topic in the contemporary scientific research. As we did in previous conversations, we will start with a definition of terminologies. First of all, debating artificial intelligence means being aware of a very particular comparison within the—for now assumed to be valid in theoretical terms—dichotomy/distinction between ‘artificial’ and ‘natural’. The first term is pretty straight forward, as it originates in the Lat. artificialis, with the meaning of ‘made with/by/out of art’ (also in an Aristotelian ‘techne’ model, thereby scientific) and thus opposed/differentiated from nature. In this sense, ‘artificial’ also means “made, created, or produced by (human) beings rather than occurring naturally”. Whether other (types of) animals beyond the human species could account for artificial in this case, is for now beyond the scope of this analysis. However, at least in English, the term was often used to define something first created as a copy or imitation of something natural. The second term, ‘intelligence’, is something more difficult to define in this context, although the etymology does not present particular difficulties in translation. As a direct derivative of the Lat. intelligĕre, the concept involves a specific way of ‘reading between the lines’, thus including ‘comprehending’ or ‘perceiving’. Focusing for a moment on the first verb, if we follow the translation of ‘understanding’ in terms of “taking (each element, alone, and in combination and/or mutual interaction) together” we don’t see too many complications in relating the term to a computational activity. This obviously implies a non-specific value/structure/meaning to human intelligence, in comparison to an artificial one, given that both deal with aspects such as collection, compilation, comparison, combination and calculation. Leaving aside for now philosophical considerations on utilitaristic/utilitarian and mechanistic aspects of such activity, artificial intelligence such as the one provided not only by the most advanced computer systems, but also by simple electronic calculators, appears in this area faster and more precise—in other terms, better—than the intelligence of human beings. With some elements possibly shared by both comprehension and perception, such as capacity for logic, learning (also, but not limited to a psychological-behavioral sense), planning, creativity and problem solving, the main problem in identifying perception has to do with the connections with ‘the self’ as in self-perception, self-image, self-awareness, all the way to multiple types (which is in itself an assumption, albeit with strong scientific evidence, for instance in the differentiation of cerebral areas and functions) of knowledge, wisdom and (deeper? broader?) understanding, also in the translational sense of ‘foundation’ or ‘principle’, thus connecting with ‘inclination’ (as a translation for the German Neigung) and motivation, orientation. Moreover, even from a strictly scientific point of view, a universal and universally accepted definition of intelligence is far from being ‘a thing’. Certainly, throughout history there have been multiple attempts to provide an accurate definition in this sense. The Board of Scientific Affairs of the American Psychological Association gave in this sense this definition of the term:

Individuals differ from one another in their ability to understand complex ideas, to adapt effectively to the environment, to learn from experience, to engage in various forms of reasoning, to overcome obstacles by taking thought. Although these individual differences can be substantial, they are never entirely consistent: a given person’s intellectual performance will vary on different occasions, in different domains, as judged by different criteria. Concepts of “intelligence” are attempts to clarify and organize this complex set of phenomena. Although considerable clarity has been achieved in some areas, no such conceptualization has yet answered all the important questions, and none commands universal assent. Indeed, when two dozen prominent theorists were recently asked to define intelligence, they gave two dozen, somewhat different, definitions.3

Within the realm of human intelligence, there are also certain parameters which are used to better define the term, including the volume, speed, acceleration (frequency, velocity) and/or structure of the working memory and/to the capacity for sequential activation and activity forecast, the hierarchy system of information-processing neural activities, including neurogenesis and axonal structuration, and the more complex (philosophically speaking, at least) activities of biographical memory and consciousness. In the United States, a popular definition of intelligence is the famous definition offered in 1994 by Mainstream Science on Intelligence:

[Intelligence is] A very general mental capability that, among other things, involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience. It is not merely book learning, a narrow academic skill, or test-taking smarts. Rather, it reflects a broader and deeper capability for comprehending our surroundings – “catching on”, “making sense” of things, or “figuring out” what to do.4

Among the very interesting skills that human intelligence provides, and is therefore at the center of the developments of artificial intelligence technologies, we find pattern recognition (for instance, the ability to recognize facial expressions on one side and familiar faces on the other), and communication, including language understanding and speech production, as well as concept/idea formation. To be more precise, given the current scientific knowledge, at least until new technological advancements would reach the same levels and possibly surpass them, much of human intelligence is shared by other animals, especially mammals, as well. On a theoretical level, human intelligence can be understood within specific frameworks, for instance, the ‘theory of multiple intelligences’ by Gardner, which in turn refers to eight main abilities as bases for related ‘intelligencies’: linguistic, logical-mathematical, spatial, musical, bodily, kinesthetic, interpersonal and intrapersonal.5 Other wide known theories include Bandura’s theory of self-efficacy and cognition (with further developments by Walter Mischel), the Intelligence Compensation Theory or ICT by Wood and Englert, the Investment theory based on the Cattell–Horn–Carroll theory, the so-called LI effect or Latent inhibition by Lubow and Moore, the Parieto-frontal integration theory of intelligence, Piaget’s theory and Neo-Piagetian theories, the PASS theory of intelligence by Luria, the Process, Personality, Intelligence & Knowledge theory or PPIK, and the Triarchic theory of intelligence by Sternberg. Aside from the specific content and differences between theories, for the perspective of our analysis we are interested in possibly defining, when and if possible, the main components that could possibly separate, in qualitative and/or quantitative terms, artificial intelligence from human (or more generally, animal) intelligence. This could also mean ‘simply’ characterizing those differences as stages or levels, albeit this decision would lay or ascribed, possibly artificial in themselves assumptions and values/goals, thus drawing a connection—once again—between intelligence, knowledge and awareness—consciousness, also in neurobiological terms (Fig. 7.3). For instance, we could quantify intelligence a (Ia) as ‘less complex’ or ‘slower’ than intelligence b (Ib). Then we would also decide (observe?) whether these intrinsic qualities are essential or existential, in the sense of result or (by) product of (external/internal) environmental factors, to determine whether the outcomes are ‘produced’ or ‘defining’ the ‘being a’ from (the)6 ‘being b’.
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Fig. 7.3

View of the Reticular Activating System (RAS), with thalamus and corpus subthalamicus, substantia nigra, medial and lateral lemniscus (including the nucleus and the decussation), decussation of the superior peduncle, reticular formation, the internal arcuate fibers, and the olive. The RAs play a very special role in the processes involved in alertness, arousal, attention, consciousness and habituation

7.2.6 Sense, Purpose, Meaning

We finally reached the last part of our analysis, thereby investigating ‘Sense, Purpose, Meaning’ in relation to critical neuroscience and the mind–body problem, but also to determine its application to the sense, the purpose and the meaning of the research discussed so far. At the beginning of our discussion in Chap. 1, we made sure to stress how through this analysis we never claimed to have found a final solution (to the mind–body problem) because we do not think that there could be such thing as something ‘final’ given the very etymological sense of the term which we agreed upon, namely the combination of ‘termination’ and ‘end’ but also ‘perimeter’, ‘boundary’, ‘function’, ‘goal’ and truly ‘Sense, Purpose, Meaning’ which, by definition (again, a de-fin-ition) varies from individual to individual, subjectively and personally. In this sense, we argue that there can be as many “my own final solution to the mind-body problem” as there are individuals; even more, as there can be perspectives or viewpoints, even traits, even personalities, in each individual. To be sure, this view has been for centuries at the center of a harsh criticism of the very scope and practice of philosophy, it the sense that many have viewed philosophy as an empty effort, at least from the scientific (in this context fully intended as mechanistic, utilitarian, functional, empirical, material-observable problem-solving oriented, etc.), to provide any real progress. In our analysis we will not tackle the epistemological validity or integrity of philosophy given these premises, as our intention is not to provide evidence or defense for any related position (which we argue, could be certainly viewed as truly philosophical nevertheless, thus making the opposite argument a true fallacy), but to ‘simply’ provide a ‘scientific re-examination of the mind-body problem’ and related issues such as perception, cognition, awareness, (artificial vs. human) intelligence, hard problem of consciousness and conscience, only (thus limiting our searchlight to the related areas) in connection to our understanding of ‘the mind’. Now, as there are as many minds as there are individuals (leaving aside for a moment the problems of corpus callosotomy, dissociative identity disorder, /multiple personalities, demonic, diabolic vs. symbolic possessions, good vs. bad angels, etc.) we would like to embrace here a ‘relatively relativistic’ (thus limited, concept-constrained, not absolute, universal and general-izable) view according to which (certain/specific) philosophical positions, and more generally, worldviews might in turn have (certain/specific) neural underpinnings and vice versa. Thus, we would like to expand philosophy to philosophy itself and neuroscience to neuroscience itself. In other words, the relatively relativistic view here is that an individual might embrace a certain stance on the mind–body problem or the hard problem of consciousness exactly because of (which is, let us restate it again, not equivalent with ‘caused by’) a ‘certain state of mind in the individual’s brain’. This is of course a theoretical assumption, and it might remain such, given that it involves (an) observation from within, “(an) observation which is itself observing itself observing”—yes, adding a third level to double hermeneutics, possibly something like ‘Triple Hermeneutics’ necessary for the Triple-S Model (TH-TS): Self, Soul, Spirit—and therefore not subject-able to the scientific method it attempts to use. However, this realization, just like the aforementioned epistemological considerations on philosophy itself, wouldn’t have to be “indicative of epistemological failure or logical fallacy”; on the contrary, it might provide the exact key for solving the problem, that is, its ‘insolvability due to particularity’. We could even link this argument to what we have previously said on the sensus divinitatis, the relation between sin and mental disorder, and even Pascal’s wager. Thus, a ‘believing brain’ would be right in perceiving that god (or free will, or a mind-soul separated from the body) existed, just as much as a ‘non-believing brain’ would be right in perceiving that god (or free will, or a mind-soul separated from the body) did not exist. We could certainly theoretically extend this relativistic (many would argue very postmodernist) view to pretty much anything we can think of, understanding that the cognitive process underlying this view would be itself influenced by itself, that is, by the neural processes thereby in process. This application of nature vs. nurture-mutual influence, ‘mind over matter’ vs. ‘matter over mind’ would however, in our view, not necessarily lead to the dismissal of any absolute or universal truths we could (hope to) find, but to the realization that there are ‘ulterior perceptual modalities’ the content of which can only be understood (read: felt, perceived, interjected, intel-lected and interjected) with a different mindset, a different state of mind, ultimately a different state of consciousness (Fig. 7.4).
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Fig. 7.4

Rendering of the comparative analysis of neural correlates of consciousness in humans according to the meta-analysis by Rees et al. (2002), showing localized areas (in red), Lumer et al. (1998, in aquamarine), Kleinschmidt et al. (1998, in light blue), Portas et al. (2000, in yellow) and Beck et al. (2001, in dark blue)

We are certainly aware of the difficulties of demonstrating in empirical terms the very existence of (a)—a somewhat easier task—these conscious states beyond their diagnostic labeling, and (b) this very metaphysical content we are expected to perceive. We attempted to present the most relevant research areas and fields investigating these varied layers of perception-consciousness based on neuroscience, and we certainly believe—that is, our applied opinion has been formed in connection, and in part as a result of the aforementioned processes—that there is enough (this time objective, albeit—thankfully,7 we could say—limited to subjective evaluation and validation) evidence of the existence of these states, of multiple modalities of perceiving, understanding, and being, and of a non-physically-based-matter-based form of mind, soul, spirit. In this context we would also like to mention that the very concept of (having, possessing, be defined by an) opinion is connected to the Lat./Ital. opinàre, thus literally touching, reaching and creating, more specifically:
  1. (a)

    Touching with the eye, reaching with the eye and creating with the eye (based on the Sansc. Root *op as in the Gr. ὄψις, thus [ap]perception, grasping, seeing)

     
  2. (b)

    Touching with the mind, reaching with the mind and creating with the mind (based on the Sansc. Root *ap as found in Opus/Opera)

     
Given these premises, our perception is our opinion, and given the foundational impossibility of avoiding this subjective component of understanding reality, we should not try to eliminate (our) subjectivity in reaching a more objective understanding, the same way we should not try to eliminate the place effect in reaching a more universal (statistically intended) healing method. Let us restate to clarify, this is definitely not a post-modernist position involving a rejection of ‘anything absolute and absolutely everything’ but the (possibly: exact) opposite, it is a truly Traditional (some would argue even reactionary or anti-modernist) view that understands the subjective experience as primary pathway (even in a purely neurological sense) to reach absolute, universal truth. It is finding infinite doors to an incredibly vast room beyond. To relate all these considerations to some practical examples, we can think of a theoretical understanding of the role such subjective perception plays in defining what we could qualify as an “impaired [ethical vs. moral] pathway” due to our human nature, which is truly sinful in the aforementioned sense, thus lacking the ability to perceive the whole picture, that is, ‘the picture as perceived by the subjectivities of others’, again in a Levinasian sense.

How can we then quantify these subjective experiences and judgments as universally valid, when faced with the difficult task of creating a series of guidelines to serve more noble (once this hierarchy of ethical nobility is in place, which in itself warrants further discussion) goals, to protect and serve the general population, or humanity as a whole? A good example to remember in this context, is the famous Stanley Milgram’s experiment, also referred to as the ‘obedience experiment’, which began in July 1961 at Yale University. In this series of social-behavioral psychology experiments, Dr. Milgram was interested in answering questions on the role of authority and obedience to unethical, immoral and possibly dangerous and hostile behavior in the general population. More specifically, three types of individuals were involved in the study; the teacher, the learner and the experimenter. The subject of the study—always playing the role of the teacher, a role picked a priori without the subject’s knowledge—was required to administer a shock to the learner (an actor) for each wrong answer, in 15-volt increments, to the maximum 45-volt shock three times in succession, after which the learner would cease to answer or reply in any way to the questions asked (Milgram 1974). The main controversy regarding the ethics of the experiment is related to the ‘inflicted insight’ suffered by the subjects-teachers, which is considered part of the more general methodology within ‘deceptive debriefing’ with potential future psychologically-emotionally harmful consequences (Levine 1988). More in detail, this criticism stems from the ‘Right to full disclosure’ according to which the researcher not only fully describes the specifics of the research to each participant/subject prior to the beginning of the experiment, but also grants the right to withdraw or refuse participation (Polit and Beck 2014, p. 84).

Notwithstanding these aspects of ethical research, the bigger questions might be focused on whether granting this right is of competence of the researcher himself/herself or whether it should be monitored, promoted and controlled ‘from above’. This ‘aboveness’ could start through the legal path of guidelines, rules and regulations such as the ones found in professional Codes of Ethics (Polit and Beck 2014, p. 81). A good example in this sense, the Belmont Report, focuses on the three main ethical principles of “Respect for Persons”, “Beneficence” and “Justice” (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services 1979) to address these issues. In our case, the question arising from the considerations above would be ‘Beneficence for whom?’ In other words, we could argue that even if the results of the experiments, as well as the experiment itself, could be beneficial for the general scientific research and therefore—which is not always a segue, from the perspective of correlation vs. causation—to the health of the general public, the experiment would fail to be beneficial to the subjects involved. Moreover, as we have seen, the experiment could also be potentially harmful to the subjects. Finally, aside from the details of the claimed unethical behavior of the researcher in planning and administering the study, another controversy stems from the very nature of this type of study. Some argue that the results were not completely correct, both in the sense of imprecise collection and in the sense of purposeful omission (Perry 2012); others argue that the results do not add much to the ‘common sense knowledge’ that anyone can commit wrongful act if:
  1. (a)

    Under pressure or coercion

     
  2. (b)

    Under perceived or real authority

     
  3. (c)

    If they are made to believe that they are doing the right thing (the combination of a & b)

     
Certainly, in this debate lies the very difference between scientific psychology and ‘pop’ psychology, in the sense that every claim needs to be verified according to evidence-based methodology. Furthermore, many experiments and meta-analysis showed on multiple occasions that ‘common sense’ is not that ‘common’. More specifically, although there are still many questions about the ethics of this study, Stanley Milgram’s biggest contribution was the demolition of the assumed ‘exceptionalism’ of Nazi evil. He was able to add more evidence to the fact—I use this term with intent and purpose—that wrongful acts are not committed by certain cultures, nations, ethnicities or races (although we do not thereby negate the possible influence of particularisms in the context of collective unconscious in psychoanalytic perspectives). This is especially true in the context of WWII. First of all because many developments of medical ethics originate in the debate within the Nuremberg trial and the Adolf Eichmann trial, but also because it clearly challenges the assumption that the horrible war crimes, genocide and holocaust perpetrated by the Nazis won’t vs. wouldn’t fall within the ethically and morally wrong behavior of human beings in general.

In conclusion and paradoxically8 the ethically wrong procedure of Stanley Milgram’s Experiment contributed to the realization of the possibility of ethical wrongdoing within and across perceived opposite sides. Beside considerations proper to ‘the banality of evil’ (Arendt 1963) and ‘the evil of banality’ (Minnich 2016), we should also remember that both (even) Sartre and Camus warned us against the risks of ‘bad philosophies’ which promote the full abandonment of reason/rationality/rational methods, as in the case of (form the existentialist judgment) Heidegger, Husserl, Jaspers, Shestov and especially Kierkegaard, who didn’t just abandon reason, but ‘turned himself to God’ and Husserl, who elevated reason, ultimately arriving at ubiquitous Platonic forms and an abstract god (Tomasi 2016). Under this analysis, embracing the absurd means acknowledging the contradiction between the desire of human reason and the unreasonable world. As it is well known, Sartre defended (his) affirmation of the reality of every truth in a naturalistic manner, as the confrontation of human beings with the possibility of choice. Therefore, since man is “responsible for what he is and at the same time he is responsible for other human beings, he always chooses the better for himself and therefore for humanity”.9

The possibility of free will, free won’t and free choice then is to be understood in a higher sense of personal opinion, as discussed above. The ethical-structural-functional ‘goodness’ of the (human) brain as a universally-similar neural element which is both sensor and deliverer of physical and metaphysical experiences helps navigating such notions of good vs. evil. We mentioned that the ‘aboveness’ of ethics in research could start through the legal path of guidelines, rules and regulations, but we now have to admit that there is an ulterior ‘aboveness’ which involves a higher, more profound sphere. An element of transcendental existence, which many have attributed to a divine, spiritual, religious entity. An entity10 which communicates with us through us, more specifically to the complex apparatus of mind–body processes (in our analysis, especially neurological ones) to create—in this context, we agree with the poetic element therein—our own, true, both objective and subjective experience. A mind–body experience. A mind–body evidence. An experience which, to be completely understood, needs to be fully integrated. In conclusion, we hope that our re-examination of the mind–body problem provided experience and evidence, in ontological and practical (in the clinical sense) terms for the fact that we, human beings, can be ‘out of tune’ with our self, and this tuning activity, which is also a neurological mechanism, a psychological process, and an existential need, can be supported by “(an) appropriate application of (an) appropriate philosophy” to shed light on our true nature and nurture.