Contents

1. Reference Abbreviations
2. Introduction: A Pragmatist Semantic Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology
3.      I.  The Focal Topic: The Content and Use of Concepts
4.     II.  The Strategy of Semantic Descent
5.    III.  The Social Dimension of Discursiveness: Normativity and Recognition
6.    IV.  The Historical Dimension of Discursiveness: Recollective Rationality
7.     V.  Cognition, Recognition, and Recollection: Semantics and Epistemology, Normative Pragmatics, and the Historicity of Geist
8. PART ONE. Semantics and Epistemology: Knowing and Representing the Objective World
9.   1.  Conceptual Realism and the Semantic Possibility of Knowledge
10.      I.  Classical Representational Epistemology
11.     II.  Genuine Knowledge and Rational Constraint
12.    III.  A Nonpsychological Conception of the Conceptual
13.    IV.  Alethic Modal and Deontic Normative Material Incompatibility
14.   2.  Representation and the Experience of Error: A Functionalist Approach to the Distinction between Appearance and Reality
15.      I.  Introduction
16.     II.  Two Dimensions of Intentionality and Two Orders of Explanation
17.    III.  Two Kantian Ideas
18.    IV.  Hegel’s Pragmatist Functionalist Idea
19.     V.  The Mode of Presentation Condition
20.   VI.  The Experience of Error
21.  VII.  The Two Sides of Conceptual Content Are Representationally Related
22. VIII.  Conclusion
23.   3.  Following the Path of Despair to a Bacchanalian Revel: The Emergence of the New, True Object
24.      I.  The Emergence of the Second Object
25.     II.  From Skepticism to Truth through Determinate Negation
26.    III.  Recollection and the Science of the Experience of Consciousness
27.   4.  Immediacy, Generality, and Recollection: First Lessons on the Structure of Epistemic Authority
28.      I.  Sense Certainty Introduced
29.     II.  Two Senses of “Immediacy”
30.    III.  A Bad Argument
31.    IV.  First Good Argument: Classification
32.     V.  Second Good Argument: Anaphoric Recollection
33.   5.  Understanding the Object / Property Structure in Terms of Negation: An Introduction to Hegelian Logic and Metaphysics in the Perception Chapter
34.      I.  The Lessons of Sense Certainty
35.     II.  Determinateness and Exclusive Negation
36.    III.  Formal Negation and Two Orders of Explanation
37.    IV.  Properties and Objects
38.     V.  Two Metaphysical Roles of Objects
39.   VI.  Ten Kinds of Metaphysical Differences
40.  VII.  From Perception to Understanding
41.   6.  “Force” and Understanding—From Object to Concept: The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities and the Laws that Implicitly Define Them
42.      I.  Forces as Allegorical for Theoretical Entities
43.     II.  Invidious Eddingtonian Theoretical Realism
44.    III.  Holism and the “Play of Forces”
45.    IV.  From Forces to Laws as Superfacts
46.     V.  The “Inverted World” and Possible-World Semantics
47.   7.  Objective Idealism and Modal Expressivism
48.      I.  Explanation and the Expression of Implicit Laws
49.     II.  Objective Idealism
50.    III.  “Infinity” as Holism
51.    IV.  Expressivism, Objective Idealism, and Normative Self-Consciousness
52. PART TWO. Normative Pragmatics: Recognition and the Expressive Metaphysics of Agency
53.   8.  The Structure of Desire and Recognition: Self-Consciousness and Self-Constitution
54.      I.  The Historicity of Essentially Self-Conscious Creatures
55.     II.  Identification, Risk, and Sacrifice
56.    III.  Creatures Things Can Be Something For: Desire and the Triadic Structure of Orectic Awareness
57.    IV.  From Desire to Recognition: Two Interpretive Challenges
58.     V.  Simple Recognition: Being Something Things Can Be Something for Is Something Things Can Be for One
59.   VI.  Robust Recognition: Specific Recognition of Another as a Recognizer
60.  VII.  Self-Consciousness
61. VIII.  Conclusion
62.   9.  The Fine Structure of Autonomy and Recognition: The Institution of Normative Statuses by Normative Attitudes
63.      I.  Normative Statuses and Normative Attitudes: A Regimented Idiom
64.     II.  The Kantian Autonomy Model of the Institution of Normative Statuses by Normative Attitudes
65.    III.  A Model of General Recognition
66.    IV.  A Model of Specific Recognition
67.     V.  The Recognitive Institution of Statuses, Subjects, and Communities
68.   VI.  The Status-Dependence of Attitudes
69.  VII.  Conclusion
70. 10.  Allegories of Mastery: The Pragmatic and Semantic Basis of the Metaphysical Incoherence of Authority without Responsibility
71.      I.  Introduction: Asymmetrical, Defective Structures of Recognition
72.     II.  The Subordination-Obedience Model
73.    III.  Identification
74.    IV.  The Practical Conception of Pure Independence
75.     V.  The Struggle
76.   VI.  The Significance of Victory
77.  VII.  The Master-Servant Relationship
78. VIII.  The Metaphysical Irony at the Heart of Mastery
79.    IX.  From Subjects to Objects
80.     X.  Recognition and Cognition
81.    XI.  The Semantic Failures of Stoicism and Skepticism
82. 11.  Hegel’s Expressive Metaphysics of Agency: The Determination, Identity, and Development of What Is Done
83.      I.  Looking Ahead: From Conceptual Realism and Objective Idealism to Conceptual Idealism
84.     II.  Two Sides of the Concept of Action: The Unity and Disparity that Action Involves
85.    III.  Two Models of the Unity and Disparity that Action Essentially Involves
86.    IV.  Intentional and Consequential Specifications of Actions
87.     V.  Practical Success and Failure in the Vulgar Sense: The Vorsatz / Absicht Distinction
88.   VI.  Identity of Content of Deed and Intention
89.  VII.  Further Structure of the Expressive Process by Which the Intention Develops into the Deed
90. 12.  Recollection, Representation, and Agency
91.      I.  Hegelian vs. Fregean Understandings of Sense and Reference
92.     II.  Retrospective and Prospective Perspectives on the Development of Conceptual Contents
93.    III.  Intentional Agency as a Model for the Development of Senses
94.    IV.  Contraction and Expansion Strategies
95. PART THREE. Recollecting the Ages of Spirit: From Irony to Trust
96. 13.  The History of Normative Structures: On Beyond Immediate Sittlichkeit
97.      I.  Epochs of Geist
98.     II.  Immediate Sittlichkeit
99.    III.  The Rise of Subjectivity
100.    IV.  Alienation and Culture
101. 14.  Alienation and Language
102.      I.  Introduction: Modernity, Legitimation, and Language
103.     II.  Actual and Pure Consciousness
104.    III.  Recognition in Language
105.    IV.  Authority and Responsibility in Language as a Model of Freedom
106.     V.  Pure Consciousness: Alienation as a Disparity between Cognition and Recognition
107.   VI.  Faith and Trust
108.  VII.  Morality and Conscience
109. 15.  Edelmütigkeit and Niederträchtigkeit: The Kammerdiener
110.      I.  Two Meta-attitudes
111.     II.  The Kammerdiener
112.    III.  The Authority of Normative Attitudes and Statuses
113.    IV.  Naturalism and Genealogy
114.     V.  Four Meta-meta-attitudes
115.   VI.  Looking Forward to Magnanimity
116. 16.  Confession and Forgiveness, Recollection and Trust
117.      I.  Niederträchtig Assessment
118.     II.  Confession
119.    III.  Forgiveness
120.    IV.  Recollection
121.     V.  The Conditions of Determinate Contentfulness
122.   VI.  Trust and Magnanimous Agency
123.  VII.  Hegel’s Recollective Project
124. Conclusion: Semantics with an Edifying Intent: Recognition and Recollection on the Way to the Age of Trust
125.      I.  Edifying Semantics
126.     II.  Geist, Modernity, and Alienation
127.    III.  Some Contemporary Expressions of Alienation in Philosophical Theories
128.    IV.  Three Stages in the Articulation of Idealism
129.     V.  Recollection: How the Process of Experience Determines Conceptual Contents and Semantic Relations
130.   VI.  From Verstand to Vernunft: Truth and the Determinateness of Conceptual Content
131.  VII.  Normativity and Recognition
132. VIII.  Dimensions of Holism: Identity through Difference
133.    IX.  Truth as Subject, Geist as Self-Conscious
134.     X.  The Age of Trust: Reachieving Heroic Agency
135.    XI.  Forgiveness: Recognition as Recollection
136. Afterword: To the Best of My Recollection
137. Notes
138. Index