ASSAULTING THE HINDENBURG LINE
THE 27TH DIVISION
The six Mark V’s of the 4th Tank Battalion opened the assault for the 27th Division, attacking in pairs against the Knoll, Gillemont Farm and Quennemont Farm. The machines were well concealed in the mix of morning fog and smoke from the preliminary bombardment and found little activity at the Knoll and Quennemont Farm, although two machine-guns were put out of action at Gillemont Farm. Given the later resistance, it is likely the defenders in the sector were either surprised or unable to locate the tanks to return fire. The 301st Tank Battalion launched its attack with 35 Mark V and V* tanks an hour before zero; however, with the infantry failing to advance as previously coordinated, they quickly drew concentrated artillery fire. While some tanks succeeded in advancing to the tunnel mound and one almost reached Le Catelet, most were hit early. Only 10 tanks of the 301st rallied, while four of the 4th Battalion tanks hit mines while rallying and were disabled. While they claimed some success in putting several machine-guns and other posts out of action, for the most part their efforts failed to provide effective support for the infantry. As the tanks moved out, the infantry had formed up, supported by fire from 96 machine-guns of the 105th and 106th Machine Gun battalions. Both regiments stepped off on time as the artillery thundered ahead of them.
The 107th Regiment assembled on its jumping-off tapes at 4.30 am, advancing with the barrage at 5.50 am. The 1/107 was the left flank battalion of the division, while 3/107 advanced on the right, followed by the composite battalion of the 106th Regiment and finally 2/107. The 1/107 overran Fleeceall Post and Tombois Farm just 25 yards from the start line and took 60 prisoners before closing up to the Knoll. Some of the battalion’s detachments continued to advance further east where they were stopped by fire from the 153rd IR in Macquincourt Valley and Vendhuille. The Knoll was reported as mopped up, but the assaulting troops were still threatened from the north and east, and the Germans retained some positions on the crest. The regimental machine-gun company pushed forward with 1/107 and took heavy fire, though the combined force eventually gained Willow Trench. A detachment under Lieutenant Harry Adsit broke through between the 8th and 54th divisions and advanced up a communications trench, reportedly as far as the Knob, before withdrawing to the main Hindenburg position. It was more likely that the position Adsit returned to was Willow Trench, as the 3rd Division attacked over his reported location the next day. The 3/107 advanced past Willow Trench, but was halted by fire from Gillemont Farm and Lone Tree Trench. The composite battalion of the 106th intermixed with the 107th as the men worked to mop up the area. The 2/107 followed the composite battalion, but both were halted in front of Gillemont Crescent, though small parties broke through to the main Hindenburg system. The fight degenerated into a swirling melee of rifles, bombs and bayonets against machine-gun nests. A detachment of 3/107 advanced past Gillemont Farm and through the main Hindenburg defences, assisted by the fog. Aircraft later sighted these men, reporting that they were possibly close to Gouy. Captain Egan, the 3/107 commander, was hit by machine-gun fire, but Captain Bradish took command and found a tank to support the battalion’s next push forward. However, the tank was quickly knocked out and the attack failed. The men retreated towards Doleful and Egg posts until Bradish stopped and reorganised them. The 3/107 regained Willow Trench, where the Australians eventually reinforced them.
Disabled tanks in a British minefield east of Ronssoy (AWM E04939).
The 105th Regiment formed up in columns, with 2/105 in the lead followed by 1/105 and 3/105. As the attack to its front ground to a halt, the 105th also became embroiled in the fighting. The 2/105 moved past Fag Trench and Island Traverse into Willow Trench south of the Knoll, where the men erected trench barricades and fought off a counter-attack from Lone Tree Trench. Heavy fire from Macquincourt Valley and Vendhuille, coupled with the fog, caused the regiment to intermix with the 107th and 106th. The 1/105 and 3/105 veered left and the leading elements pushed into Macquincourt Trench, Knoll Switch and Tombois Support, but were thrown back. The 105th eventually halted north and east of the Knoll with detachments moving down to Willow Trench. Some men strayed into the 18th Division’s sector and became intermingled with units positioned there.
Aerial photograph of Gillemont Farm (SLWA B4632820_2).
The 108th Regiment lined up with 3/108 on the left and 2/108 on the right, followed by 1/108 in support. As soon as they advanced, they encountered heavy artillery and machine-gun fire from the 121st Division which garrisoned the advanced system between Gillemont and Quennemont farms. Casualties and heavy fog soon left the attackers in disarray. The 3/108 on the left was engaged by frontal fire from Gillemont Trench and enfilading fire from Gillemont Farm and halted, with a few detachments penetrating Dirk Valley before being held up by fire from Bony. The 1/108 stepped off in support, its leading companies following 100 yards behind the rear companies of the attacking regiments, mopping up some machine-gun nests with rifle and Lewis gun fire, punctuated with grenades. The 1/108 was stopped just 400 yards into its advance. Captain Harry Bagnall, the 108th’s regimental intelligence officer and assistant operations officer, later wrote disparagingly of the battalion and regimental commanders who remained at their command posts and thus exercised little control over the battle. He was particularly critical of the battalion commanders, as the heavy officer losses among the companies had left many leaderless. While Bagnall had a point, commanders who moved too far forward lost touch with their higher headquarters and often became casualties, further disorganising their units. The 2/108 encountered intense machine-gun fire north-east of Malakoff Farm and was enfiladed from Quennemont Farm. Captain Sandberg of 2/108 led 200 men past Quennemont Farm into the main Hindenburg system south of Bony. The group bombed through the trenches and took 159 prisoners, captured four field guns and numerous machine-guns. The men then stoically held their position in the face of multiple counter-attacks until relieved.
By 11.00 am the 27th Division’s attacks had stalled. The 105th Regiment held portions of Macquincourt Trench along with Knoll Switch and Tombois Support, with some elements intermixed with 1/107 in Knoll and Willow trenches. The 2/107 was arrayed to its right in Willow Trench while 3/107 and the 106th were positioned west of Gillemont Farm. The left half of 3/108 was in Gillemont Trench, with parts of the right around 500 yards west of Bony. Some 200 men from 2/108 broke through to the main Hindenburg position 2000 yards to the east while the remainder of 2/108 attempted to mop up Quennemont Farm with 1/108 in support north of Malakoff Farm. The fog grounded aircraft until after 8.00 am and visibility remained limited until 10.00 am. The first contact patrol, flying over the battlefield at 8.35 am, spotted some troops in the trench systems in Malakoff Wood as well as numerous tanks on fire close to Quennemont Farm. German troops were seen emerging from dugouts in the tunnel mound between Bellicourt and Le Catelet.
The 54th British Brigade advanced with the Americans after zero and gained portions of Macquincourt Trench, but was forced to swing back to Knoll Switch, where both British and Americans intermixed with portions of the 105th Regiment. The liaison force from the 18th Division waited for the initial attack and then advanced. At 12.30 pm it reported having only reached Doleful Post, adding that the Germans were attacking from Grub Lane and Gillemont Farm. The leading elements of the 55th Brigade passed Yak Post by 9.45 am and headed towards Macquincourt Valley, but were unable to advance further, as the Australians ahead of them were held up. Eventually elements of the 55th Brigade managed to reach a point south of the Knoll. By 2.00 pm heavy fire had forced the 54th British Brigade to throw back its left flank some 500 yards to the line of Knoll and Lion trenches, where the British became entangled with the 105th and parts of the 107th regiments. A counter-attack from Le Catelet was broken up by their combined fire.
The various reports of detachments breaking through while other units were stalled caused considerable confusion among the senior commanders. Lieutenant W.O. Pasfield from the 11th Brigade, Australian Field Artillery, was assigned to the 105th Regiment as an artillery liaison officer. He followed a detachment of American troops east of the Hindenburg Line after 8.00 am and observed them heading towards Gouy before he worked his way back through the lines to report their movements to the 3rd Division at 12.30 pm. In the same time-frame, contact patrols reported seeing flares near Gouy, but the information was not conclusive. Pasfield’s sightings were reported in the divisional message logs and contributed to the belief that the 27th Division had reached the Green Line in most places, with sporadic resistance apparently limited to positions that had not been mopped up. After the war, Lieutenant McIntyre, in charge of the Stokes mortars of the 107th, returned from captivity and reported that he had been taken prisoner between the Hindenburg Line and the canal, possibly in the vicinity of Knob Wood at around 7.15 am. Several other prisoners from the 107th stated that they had been captured near Le Catelet on 29 September. Bean reviewed German records for the Australian Official History and concluded that the line had not been penetrated. At the time however, the reports of advanced detachments were viewed as credible, and they contributed to the confusion. The 27th Division was reluctant to authorise artillery fire in the area for fear of killing the men in these detachments. Historian Dale Blair argues that Pasfield might have been correct, and that these detachments were remnants of those that had broken through the line, however scattered they may have been. Later contact patrols were inconclusive: from 12.00 pm to 1.10 pm some American troops were reported in the vicinity of the Green Line; however the aircraft took ground fire from the same areas. By this time the 3rd Australian Division had taken over the fighting, though the 27th remained officially in command of the sector.
Le Catelet and Gouy (AWM E03566A).
THE 30TH DIVISION
The 30th Division’s regiments were on the jumping-off tape by 4.30 am and moved forward at zero in good order. They were covered by the artillery and machine-gun barrage, the latter fired by the machine-gun battalions in each brigade. The barrage effectively cut lanes in the wire up to 10 feet wide, with only one sector north of Bellicourt not cut due to rounds falling short. While problems with the terrain delayed the tanks and most arrived late, as many as 34 of the 36 managed to push forward after the infantry. The heavy fire, casualties, smoke and fog saw units lose direction and contact with one another within a few hundred yards. The German counter-barrage began feebly and missed the leading regiments, but gradually increased in intensity. The area between Quarry Wood and Buisson Ridge and the tunnel line between Bellicourt and the southern entrance were subjected to heavy harassing fire. Unit cohesion broke down and the remainder of the fighting degenerated into small group actions. By 10.00 am both regiments reported crossing the canal, with the 120th fighting in front of Nauroy.
Allied tanks and infantry going into action near Bellicourt (AWM H12514).
The 119th Regiment stepped off with 1/119 on the right, 2/119 on the left and 3/119 in support. The right of the 119th had pierced the main Hindenburg system by 7.30 am, but the left was slowed by the 108th Regiment’s lack of progress. The 1/119 captured the northern portion of Bellicourt and some detachments reached the Nauroy Line, but could not hold their positions and fell back to the tunnel while the Australians moved up. In Bellicourt itself, which now lay behind them, many posts were still to be mopped up and had the potential to be troublesome. The 119th’s regimental history records that some men from 2/119 gained their objective, but were isolated and captured due to the failure of the 27th Division to keep pace. Lieutenant Morgenstern from E Company, 119th Regiment, recalled that they had no tank support in the advance, but managed to reach the tunnel mound by 8.30 am. A small detachment gained the Nauroy Line but withdrew after being heavily shelled. Five tanks from A Company, 1st Tank Battalion, supporting the 119th, reached the Hindenburg Line but ditched soon after. Two more tanks reached the canal tunnel and assisted with operations before one was knocked out, although the other returned safely. While the tank action had not been coordinated with the infantry, it nonetheless assisted by eliminating several machine-guns.
The 120th assembled with 3/120 on the right, 2/120 on the left and 1/120 in support and, by 7.25 am, the leading elements had broken through the main Hindenburg system. Captain Byrd of G Company, with four or five men, managed to cross the Nauroy Line and reach the railway 200 yards to the east. Realising that he was unsupported, he withdrew his men to the western trench of the main Hindenburg system, where they found some troops from the 117th and 120th. They advanced again with a composite force under Major Graham, the 2/120 commander, and alongside some tanks, but soon lost contact with them. By 11.30 am, 2/120 was in front of Nauroy, though the village was not taken. The men were pinned down in Riqueval Ravine by fire from the Nauroy Line and anti-tank forts to the east.
Looking south-east towards Nauroy from Bellicourt (photo by author).
A small number of men from 3/120 on the right pushed into the outskirts of Nauroy, but could not hold their position. The 120th Regiment, with some elements of the 117th, cleared the main Hindenburg system and captured the southern tunnel entrance, but could go no further. The Australian artillery liaison officer with 3/120, Lieutenant A.N. Lewis, noted that the 120th took heavy casualties in the advance, some as a result of men running into the barrage, the dead piled in heaps along the wire of the main Hindenburg system south of Bellicourt. When the 5th Division advanced through the 120th to attack Nauroy, 3/120 occupied support positions in a communications trench running between Bellicourt and Nauroy. Lewis wrote later that the American troops sometimes lacked situational awareness, on one occasion asking for an SOS barrage, having failed to realise that the 8th Brigade was in front of them. The tanks accompanying the 120th Regiment were tasked with mopping up the tunnel, along with a section of tanks from A Company. Ten tanks started, with four reaching Bellicourt and the canal line. Just four tanks returned.
Aerial view of the ground between Bellicourt and Nauroy. Cabaret Wood Farm is on the upper left (SLWA B4532817_7).
The 117th Regiment, with 1/117 in the lead, advanced behind the 120th. By 10.00 am the regiment had closed to within 600 yards of the canal but encountered heavy machine-gun fire. Eventually the men reached the tunnel and began working south along the canal bank, with 2/117 on their left as they attempted to screen the 30th Division’s right flank. By 11.15 am, 2/117 was on the line from the canal bank to the crest of the hill south-east of Nauroy. Many men of the 117th lost direction and became attached to other units during the pivot south, but the regiment was able to re-form from Blacktown to Billiard Copse and then advance north-east towards Nauroy.
At 12.50 pm General Lewis ordered the reserve battalion of the 117th (3/117) to reinforce the 119th Regiment and attack north-east of Bellicourt. By mid-afternoon the chaotic state of the attack had become all too apparent. A message from the 119th described both 3/117 and the 120th as badly disorganised, adding that the Australians were attacking through their lines. As the 5th Division passed through the 30th Division, the 117th was on the right, close to its first objective, between the remainder of the 30th and the 46th Division. The 120th was in front of Nauroy, while the right of the 119th was in the Nauroy Line, with the left thrown back to the tunnel. As the Australians passed through to mount their own attacks, they reorganised parties of the 30th Division, with many of these men then accompanying the Australians in their attack. Major Walter Hartigan of the 118th Regiment gathered over 500 men of the 60th Brigade and two companies of the 117th, directing them forward and securing tank support.
Map 18. The front line at 11.00 am
The 46th Division attacked with the 137th Brigade on a 4000-yard front. The trenches on the west bank were overrun and the battalions plunged across the canal. On the right, the water was relatively shallow and the men crossed quickly, the Germans in the dugouts on the far bank surrendering freely. However there was far more resistance on the Blue Line. In the centre, the 5th South Staffordshire had charged the near trenches and encountered Germans surrendering in groups ranging in size from 15 to 70 men. The battalion moved to the Brown Line and captured an artillery battery north-east of Bellenglise. On the left, the 6th North Staffordshire advanced on an 800-yard front and found the Riqueval Bridge intact. The men stormed across, killing the pioneers who were attempting to blow the bridge and tearing out the demolition charges, tossing them into the canal. The 6th South Staffordshire was concealed by thick fog as it crossed the canal, systematically clearing dugouts with Lewis gun and grenade fire and then storming into Bellenglise, securing the western end of the tunnel to Magny-La-Fosse and taking over 800 prisoners from the 33rd IR, 2nd Division. For the loss of 580 men, the brigade forced the canal and tore a hole in the German defence that the follow-on brigades of the 46th and 32nd divisions successfully extended.
The 138th and 139th brigades moved out as the 137th mopped up on the Blue Line. The 137th had consolidated on the Brown Line by the time the other brigades leapfrogged through and advanced to the Yellow Line and on towards Magny-La-Fosse. The 138th Brigade accomplished this by 12.30 pm with the support of three tanks, but its left flank was in the air and it formed a defensive flank until the 32nd Battalion from the 8th Brigade moved up. On the right, the 139th took fire from south of the canal, but subdued the position and continued the advance. By 3.00 pm the 46th Division’s objectives had been taken and the 32nd had moved up. The division took a total of 4200 prisoners and 70 guns, inflicting heavy losses on the 2nd and 11th divisions. The tanks supporting IX Corps were caught up in the American and Australian effort to clear Nauroy and the east bank of the canal north of Riqueval Bridge. The tank supply companies successfully delivered their stores, significantly assisting the divisions during the critical consolidation phase.
The 1st British Division had little difficulty protecting the right flank of the 46th Division. The 3rd Brigade faced stiff resistance in the trenches south-east of Pontruet, but eventually mopped them up and reached the south bank of the canal later that evening.
THE 3RD DIVISION
The 10th Brigade on the left and 11th Brigade on the right cleared their bivouacs by 7.00 am and planned to reach the Brown Line by 9.00 am. The 10th Brigade advanced on a three-battalion front, with the 40th, 39th and 38th in line from left to right, each with two tanks, while the 37th remained in reserve. As the brigade passed Ronssoy it came under heavy fire and encountered groups of leaderless American soldiers. The Australians quickly realised that the 107th Regiment was held up. Two tanks of A Company,16th Tank Battalion, directed by Major Hotblack of the Tank Corps, helped the infantry gain Quennemont Ridge, but both tanks were knocked out shortly after. By mid-morning Brigadier McNicoll of the 10th Brigade had informed the 3rd Division staff that all the tanks supporting the attacking brigades had been destroyed and that the Americans were retiring from the forward trenches. At the same time, Germans were massing in Claymore and Macquincourt valleys. A similar scenario was unfolding on the right with the 11th Brigade. The brigade had moved out with the 41st Battalion on the left and the 44th on the right. As they advanced to the Brown Line, they crossed gas-saturated ground and encountered machine-gun fire. By 8.30 am it was apparent that the 108th Regiment had also been repulsed. B Company, 3rd Tank Battalion, with eight Whippets and eight armoured cars from the 17th Battalion, began its advance towards Bony to probe the defences and exploit through to cut the railway line between Busigny and Bohain. Direct fire from artillery knocked out four Whippets and four armoured cars, with the rest of the vehicles retreating and rallying later.
A destroyed armoured car near Bony (AWM E03857).
Given the situation, the 3rd Division had little choice but to attack from its present position. Heavy shelling cut communications with corps several times as the 10th and 11th were ordered to attack. The lack of artillery and stubborn defence meant little progress was made. By 9.30 am the 40th Battalion on the left of the 10th Brigade had closed up to Gillemont Farm from the north-west, but was unable to take the ruined outbuildings. Ahead of it, the 40th saw American troops pinned down and disorganised. The left of the battalion gradually bombed its way into Willow Trench south of Grub Lane and rallied the Americans there. A platoon of C Company under Lieutenant Frank Larkin moved towards Knoll Support Trench to protect the left flank as the Germans had been feeding men up Macquincourt Valley. Larkin gathered 200 American troops and pushed them into defensive positions before returning to Willow Trench. To the 40th’s right, the 39th Battalion advanced under heavy fire to Dog Trench, south-west of Gillemont Farm, with some troops in Duncan Avenue. At 11.00 am Lieutenant Colonel Henderson, commanding the 39th Battalion, was shot and killed while on a reconnaissance towards Gillemont Farm. The 38th Battalion advanced in short bounds in the face of machine-gun fire from Bony to Dog Trench and Cat Post and sent patrols forward to gain information. The 37th Battalion then occupied positions around Duncan Avenue and waited for the battalions ahead to advance, but was heavily shelled during the day, sustaining almost 50 casualties. Just like the 107th, the men were pinned down by machine-gun fire and unable to move except from trench to trench.
Members of the 38th Battalion in Dog Trench near Gillemont Farm (AWM E03478).
In the 11th Brigade, the 44th Battalion on the right flank advanced A and B companies south of Quennemont Farm and made contact with the 58th Battalion on the tunnel mound around 1200 yards west of Cabaret Wood Farm. The 41st Battalion and the remainder of the 44th continued to grapple with Quennemont Farm, fighting hard to wrest control from the Germans. As the 41st advanced, it took heavy fire from Quennet Copse, which knocked out all four tanks attached to the battalion. Around 100 Americans with a one-pounder gun from the 108th Regiment were organised into 30-man platoons and attached to each company as the 41st fought to Claymore and Triangle trenches, finally taking the position at the cost of over 100 casualties.
General Gellibrand went forward to review the situation and reported to Brigadier Blamey, the corps BGGS, at around 12.00 pm that the Americans had failed to capture the Brown Line. Blamey resisted this assessment, as he had received aerial reports of the Americans in Gouy and elsewhere on the Green Line. The divisions were now directed to resume the advance at 3.00 pm to mop up what the Americans had missed. Patrols pushed forward by the 10th Brigade received reports that detachments of Americans were on the Green Line, but this was contradicted by the intensity of the fighting in front of the brigade. At 3.00 pm the battalions pushed forward without artillery support. The 38th Battalion gained South Gillemont Trench, but was prevented from advancing up Claymore Valley by heavy fire. The right of the battalion was in touch with the 41st Battalion, but no contact was possible on the left as the 39th was still halted in front of Gillemont Farm. On the left, the enemy counter-attacked close to the Knoll, prompting Gellibrand to order the 33rd Battalion (9th Brigade) to the left to form a defensive flank and cover the 10th Brigade.
A section of the Hindenburg Line trench near Bony (AWM E03581).
The 3.00 pm attack by the 11th Brigade also miscarried, but gained Quennemont Farm, relieving an isolated detachment of the 44th north of the strongpoint. This group, along with Vickers guns attached to the 44th, worked up along Top Lane to make contact with the rest of the 44th and the 15th Brigade, eventually achieving a link-up. The 42nd Battalion moved out at 4.45 pm, mopped up Malakoff Wood and parts of Top Lane and pushed one company into the main Hindenburg system. Once darkness fell, the 41st Battalion pushed further, gaining the southern portion of Gillemont Trench. By 7.00 pm the 11th Brigade had positioned the 44th Battalion on the tunnel mound, where it formed a defensive flank anchored by Vickers guns, running west to the support trench of the Hindenburg Line and then along Top Lane to the 41st Battalion holding Claymore and Triangle trenches south and west of Quennemont Farm, which was in Australian hands. The 42nd Battalion had one company in the main Hindenburg system south-east of Top Lane with the other two north of Malakoff Wood. The 43rd remained in support in Triangle Trench.
The 9th Brigade moved out at 7.00 am, but halted shortly after 10.00 am, moving into nearby trenches while it waited for the 10th and 11th brigades to advance. With their 3.00 pm attacks stemmed by heavy fire, the 34th and 35th battalions remained in support, while the brigade ordered the 33rd Battalion to form a defensive flank facing the Knoll. The 33rd found disorganised groups of British and Americans in Causeway Lane south of the Knoll and patrolled further to Fag Trench, where groups of the 7th Buffs (East Kent Regiment) and 7th Queen’s (55th British Brigade) with 20 Vickers guns were holding the line. A number of Americans were attached to the battalion and operated with the Australians until they were ordered into relief.
By evening the 9th Brigade had closed up to Doleful Post and Fleet Street while the 54th British Brigade and elements of the 55th had troops in and around the Knoll. An estimated 500 American troops were brought into the line and reorganised under Australian leadership, before eventually being ordered to remain in support. The 3rd Division later estimated that almost 1000 American troops had joined its ranks, mostly soldiers and NCOs, given the high casualty rate among the officers. Reports from the 3rd Division commented that the Americans had fought gamely despite lacking the advantage of surprise, numbers or a creeping barrage. The 54th British Brigade consolidated around the Knoll with one battalion in Knoll Support and Tiger Trench and the left battalion in the trench systems west of Vendhuille. A battalion from the 55th Brigade was also in support at Lark Trench and Causeway Lane. To their left, the 12th Division consolidated its advanced positions in Tombois Support, Tino Support and Tino Trench. The division had been unable to secure Dados Loop.
THE 5TH DIVISION
Behind the 30th Division, the 15th Brigade advanced at 7.00 am shrouded in fog, with the 59th Battalion on the left and the 57th on the right, leaving the 58th in support. Three tanks halted due to mechanical problems and two ditched, the latter replaced by reserves. The 59th Battalion lost direction and found the 58th on its right and elements of the 44th in front. In Quennemont Lane the 59th Battalion found 40 Germans who, on surrendering, gave the battalion a box of cigars, which the delighted men quickly shared around. In the thick fog, the 57th resorted to using a line of telephone poles to maintain direction. Despite this, there was some intermixing of companies with the 58th Battalion as they approached the Brown Line.
While resistance from machine-guns that had yet to be mopped up slowed the advance, at 7.05 am a liaison officer from the 119th Regiment reported that the Americans were into the support trench of the main Hindenburg system. By 11.00 am the brigade had reached the canal tunnel from Bellicourt to Mount Olympus and discovered scattered groups of Americans. On the right, the 57th and 58th dug into the west bank of the tunnel mound and formed a temporary defensive position. The American detachments were consolidated into the battalions and the 57th and 58th advanced under heavy fire from the 250th RIR of the 75th Reserve Division up to Railway Ridge in front of the Nauroy Line. The 59th on the left was further back in the main Hindenburg system with the 44th Battalion, their left flank entirely in the air as the rest of the 11th Brigade had been halted by fire from north of Quennemont Farm. The 59th, 44th and around 100 Americans from the 108th Regiment formed a defensive flank, joined later by some elements of the 41st Battalion. At 4.30 pm, with this defence established, the 59th Battalion was ordered into reserve in the vicinity of Mount Olympus.
The 15th Brigade attacked at 3.00 pm alongside the Americans, five Mark V tanks and eight Whippets, the 58th Battalion having replaced the 59th in the assault. The attack miscarried from the start, with the barrage falling to the south of the assaulting troops. Anti-tank guns manned by the 55th Field Artillery Regiment in Nauroy and outside Cabaret Wood Farm, supported by the 251st RIR, destroyed all five Mark V tanks and five Whippets.
Despite the strong resistance, the 57th gained the Nauroy Line, while the 58th secured a similar foothold with one company, although there were stubborn posts of Germans in the trench between them. Both battalions constructed bomb stops (barricades) to contain the Germans and made contact by 7.00 pm. The left of the 58th took heavy casualties from the 65th and 87th IR, halting the advance to Cabaret Wood Farm. The battalion formed a defensive flank stretching back to the main Hindenburg trench in touch with the 44th Battalion. A running bomb fight ensued as the Germans attempted to work south along the trenches and split the brigade, but the men repelled the attacks and erected bomb stops to prevent further advances. Parties of Americans were organised to hold the defensive flank facing north, while the 58th Battalion consolidated its gains and brought up hot food to the grateful troops. The bearer division of the 15th Field Ambulance company discovered two German officers and 40 other ranks in a dugout that was co-located with battalion headquarters, quickly rounding up the group and sending the captives to the prisoner-of¬war cages at the rear. That evening 2/118, ordered out of divisional reserve, arrived to help secure the flank and was sent into the line.
The 8th Brigade moved out at 7.00 am with the 29th Battalion on the left and the 32nd on the right, while the 31st prepared to swing right to make contact with the 117th Regiment. By 9.40 am the 29th Battalion, with two tanks and detachments of the 5th Pioneer Battalion, had mopped up Bellicourt. The pioneers sent six officers and 201 men back to the prisoner-of-war cages and resumed their work. As the 8th Brigade passed east of Bellicourt looking for organised American units, it took heavy fire from Nauroy. Individual Americans were withdrawing back towards Riqueval Ravine under fire from machine-gun and field artillery, and around 250 were in the sunken road east of Bellicourt. On the left, Cabaret Wood Farm was strongly held and enfiladed any advance on Nauroy.
The 8th Brigade attacked the Nauroy Line at 11.15 am and gained the ridgeline west of the village. The 32nd Battalion gathered 200 Americans and seven tanks from the 1st Tank Battalion and swept into Nauroy. They mopped up the southern portion and took over 50 prisoners. The 29th Battalion finally captured the Nauroy Line, but was enfiladed by fire from Cabaret Wood Farm. The 30th Battalion sent two fighting patrols supported by two tanks to help mop up Nauroy and then handed over to the 29th Battalion as it moved up on the left. While a tank fort on the high ground north-west of Nauroy quickly picked off all but two of the supporting tanks, their efforts, along with some supporting artillery fire, enabled the 29th and 30th to close up and capture the guns. The 32nd Battalion left the Americans and tanks behind and continued its attack with all four companies from Nauroy south to Magny-La-Fosse. At 11.30 am contact was gained with the 4th Leicesters on the right, close to Knobkerry Ridge, and the battalion attacked towards Étricourt while the southern company mopped up the northern half of Magny-La-Fosse and drove the remnants of the 4th Grenadier Regiment of the 2nd Division past Joncourt. Major Blair Wark, commanding the 32nd Battalion, personally captured a battery of 77mm guns, their crews, and 50 other prisoners. At 2.30 pm, the battalion reached the Red Line from Fosse Wood to Whistle Copse, but quickly realised that it was completely unsupported and withdrew reluctantly to Étricourt.
Cabaret Wood Farm (AWM E03480).
MAJOR BLAIR ANDERSON WARK, VC, DSO, 32ND BATTALION
The citation for Major Blair Wark’s Victoria Cross reads:
For most conspicuous bravery, initiative and control during the period 29th Sept. to 1st Oct. 1918, in the operations against the Hindenburg Line at Bellicourt and the advance through Nauroy, Étricourt, Magny-La-Fosse and Joncourt. On 29 th Sept., after personal reconnaissance under heavy fire, he led his command forward at a critical period and restored the situation. Moving fearlessly at the head of, and at times far in advance of, his troops, he cheered his men on through Nauroy, thence towards Étricourt. Still leading his assaulting companies, he observed a battery of 77mm guns firing on his rear companies and causing heavy casualties. Collecting a few of his men, he rushed the battery, capturing four guns and ten of the crew. Then moving rapidly forward with only two N.C.O.s, he surprised and captured fifty Germans near Magny-La-Fosse. On 1st Oct., 1918, he again showed fearless leadership and gallantry in attack, and without hesitation, and regardless of personal risk dashed forward and silenced machine guns which were causing heavy casualties. Throughout he displayed the greatest courage, skilful leading and devotion to duty, and his work was invaluable.
Major Blair Wark, VC, DSO (AWM P01046.001).
The barrage for the 3.00 pm attack was thin and almost ineffective as the supporting artillery had been forced to displace west of Bellicourt. Before it moved however, a section of the 13th Field Artillery Brigade silenced the tank fort north-west of Nauroy. The 29th reached the Green Line, but was forced to withdraw as its left flank was in the air, though it managed to hold Nauroy. The battalion later established contact with the 57th Battalion south of Cabaret Wood Farm. The 30th Battalion headquarters was set up in one of the tunnel entrances, along with the Regimental Aid Post. The battalion medical officer treated German wounded who had been left in a barge with two attendants, but no doctor, inside the Bellicourt Tunnel.
While the rest of the brigade attacked the northern portion of Nauroy and Cabaret Wood Farm, the 32nd Battalion secured a defensive line at Étricourt and sent patrols as far as Joncourt and the sugar factory east of Nauroy. The 32nd was too few in number to capture Joncourt and fell back to Étricourt. The 31st deployed on a line from Billiard Copse to Étricourt, but received word from the 32nd that its left flank was in the air. The 31st pivoted on Étricourt and swung its line left towards the south-eastern outskirts of Nauroy. An enemy counter-attack from Mill Ridge was broken up by rifle and Lewis gun fire from both battalions. Once darkness fell, the 8th Brigade was ordered to establish its front line east of Nauroy, placing the 29th Battalion in position prior to the attack on 30 September.
The 14th Brigade advanced behind the assaulting brigades at 8.30 am, but was held up when the 8th and 15th brigades attacked to secure the Green Line. The lead battalion eventually halted on Sentinel Ridge with the rest of the brigade sited around Villeret. The brigade moved up to assembly positions on the Nauroy–Bellicourt road and maintained contact with the 30th Battalion of the 8th Brigade. The 54th Battalion was ordered to Riqueval Ravine as a reserve for the 8th Brigade. A Company’s tanks, supporting the 14th Brigade, did not participate in the attack, but two tanks were nonetheless hit by direct fire and two ditched, while four rallied at Hargicourt. Overall, only four tanks of the initial 24 from the 8th Tank Battalion were available for action after 29 September.
THE 32ND DIVISION
The 32nd Division formed up behind the 46th and awaited confirmation of a successful crossing. The 14th and 97th brigades moved forward at 11.45 am and were across the canal by 6.00 pm and advancing on the Red Line. The 14th Brigade on the right gained the western end of the Le Tronquoy Tunnel, but the 97th Brigade was held up in front of Levergies and instead consolidated on Lehaucourt Ridge. The Whippets allocated to the 32nd Division closed up for the attack and provided valuable fire support. From there, the brigade held a defensive flank until it linked up with the 5th Division south-west of Mill Ridge. The tanks allocated to the brigades were held up crossing the canal, and most were retained in the Magny-La-Fosse area instead of being used in the final attack.
Map 19. The front line, evening
The fighting on 29 September produced both spectacular success and significant difficulties for Fourth Army. The 27th Division, which grappled with the advanced Hindenburg system, was shattered and disorganised. The 3rd Division worked to restore the situation, but by nightfall was still a considerable way back on the left and astride the Hindenburg Line on the right. The 30th Division had reached its start line and enjoyed solid barrage support, and it showed in the smooth progress of its attack. The men pushed forward and gained the main Hindenburg trenches and Bellicourt before their attack faltered in front of Nauroy. The 5th Division, however, experienced mixed success. On the left, the 15th Brigade fought and retained the defensive flank to the west of Cabaret Wood Farm. This combined pivot point by the 3rd and 5th divisions would be the key to a move to outflank, rather than crash head-on into the advanced and main Hindenburg systems anchored by Bony and Vendhuille. The 8th Brigade on the right of the 5th Division finally gained Nauroy after a tough fight. The 32nd Battalion benefited from the success of the 46th and 32nd divisions and ranged far beyond Nauroy to the outskirts of Joncourt before defending Étricourt and ensuring a solid link with IX Corps.
On the right, the IX Corps attacks succeeded beyond expectation. IX Corps secured virtually all of its objectives and tore a hole in the Hindenburg Line defences at the boundary between the Second and Eighteenth armies. Over 5100 prisoners, 90 field guns and 350 machine-guns were taken. IX Corps secured the right flank for the combined Australian and American Corps over the tunnel sector. General Rawlinson’s diary recognised the 46th Division as the heroes of the day for crossing the canal and taking so many prisoners for so few casualties.
The Germans exacted a fearful toll on the Allied tanks, with only 79 of the 195 that started still operational by the end of the attack. The faulty coordination, fog, heavy casualties and inexperience of Americans in tank operations hindered their operations. The Germans’ skilful use of terrain and placement of anti-tank guns, particularly the ‘forts’ that were now part of German defensive doctrine saw them destroy Allied tanks in droves. The lack of tank cover removed a key weapons system and made any advance against enfilading machine-gun fire much costlier.
Rawlinson blamed the Americans’ lack of progress, particularly the 27th Division, on faulty mopping up and he regarded II Corps as disorganised and short of officers, to the point at which it should be relieved from the line. He sent Haig a despatch on 30 September proposing to withdraw the divisions completely, and to place XIII Corps in the line, allowing the Americans time to reorganise. Rawlinson also requested that American regiments or battalions be attached to British divisions or brigades. In his reply, Haig merely stated that the ‘American Corps must continue after a short period out of the line to reorganise, to take a share in the victory.’ While their performance had not been up to British standards, Haig knew Pershing was vehemently opposed to breaking up American divisions the way Rawlinson suggested. It would be a case of having American divisions under their own commanders, or not at all, and for Haig the choice was clear.
Like Fourth Army, Army Group Boehn was in a mixed position at the end of the first day of fighting. Second Army reported the IV Reserve Corps line engaged in heavy fighting along the support trench of the advanced Hindenburg positions. LI Corps had been pushed out of Bellicourt and Nauroy, but retained Joncourt, the Lamp Signal Station and the Sugar Factory. Counter-attacks by the 56th RIR and 87th IR north of Cabaret Wood Farm had stemmed the thrust to the north into the flank of IV Reserve Corps. Eighteenth Army reported that the 79th Reserve Division had managed to hold the southern shoulder of the breach, but that the enemy had captured Magny-La-Fosse. Forces were being assembled north of Levergies to close the gap between Eighteenth and Second armies. The 119th and 241st divisions from Eighteenth Army were placed at the disposal of Second Army and moved forward.
The combined effects of the attacks by the French, British and Americans — with at least 36 divisions engaged by British forces alone from 27 September — had completely exhausted the German reserves. An OHL directive to Army Group Boehn stated that it must constitute local reserves from its own forces. The current lines of defence were to be held, but instead of eingreif divisions counter-attacking to restore every breach, they would form new defensive lines to contain the advance. Army commanders alone would have the authority to order counter-attacks. Crucial sectors were supported by machine-guns and artillery to be arrayed in depth beforehand. Army Group Boehn implemented this directive once the remaining troops in the advanced Hindenburg line had withdrawn to the main Hindenburg trenches. The intent was to delay the enemy long enough for the evacuation of artillery, reconstitution of reserves and preparation of the Hermann positions. No officers below regimental commander were informed of the withdrawals; the men were to hold at all costs until ordered otherwise.
THE SECOND DAY: OUTFLANKING THE HINDENBURG LINE
The uncertainty over the American positions hindered supporting fire for future assaults. Indeed, at 6.35 pm on 29 September the artillery was informed that it could not fire within the boundaries of the Green Line. Limited shooting was approved on a case-by-case basis once troops on the ground verified that there were no Americans in the area. The restrictions were lifted completely at 3.00 pm on 30 September once the 3rd and 5th divisions assumed control of the battle area.
Fourth Army ordered the attacks to resume on 30 September. IX Corps would capture the rest of the Le Tronquoy Tunnel to allow the passage of the French XV Corps while the 32nd Division advanced against Joncourt to assist the Australian Corps. The Australians were to make contact with the American detachments and roll up the Hindenburg and Nauroy lines to the northern tunnel entrance. III Corps would use the 18th Division to capture Vendhuille and relieve the 12th Division. The Australian Corps now took over the battle from the 27th and 30th divisions which were ordered to consolidate their men and head into reserve for reorganisation. XIII Corps and the Cavalry Corps remained in reserve.
Map 20. Attack plans, 30 September
By the afternoon, the 54th British Brigade had captured Vendhuille up to the west side of the canal, and the 18th Division relieved the 12th Division that night. To their left, the 12th Division finally captured Dados Loop and, by evening, the 37th Brigade had gained the west bank of the canal. On its relief the 12th Division was transferred to First Army.
In the Australian Corps the 3rd and 5th divisions were ordered to advance north to capture the Knob and Railway Ridge with the 11th Brigade on the left and the 14th Brigade on the right. As the 11th Brigade pushed north, the 10th Brigade mopped up to the east. The 15th Brigade would advance its left flank to protect the 14th Brigade’s right as the attack proceeded. The 8th Brigade’s objective was past Étricourt to support IX Corps as it attacked Joncourt. The attacking battalions would assault under a barrage that opened for 15 minutes on the start line and advanced at 100 yards every five minutes, to a total depth of 3000 yards.
In the IX Corps sector, the 32nd Division tasked one battalion from the 96th Brigade to assist the 5th Division by attacking Joncourt from the south-west, supported by three Whippet tanks. The 97th and 14th brigades advanced by patrols and captured the remainder of the Le Tronquoy Tunnel at 2.45 pm, along with 10 guns and 250 prisoners, before taking Levergies and mopping up by 7.30 pm. The 1st British Division took Thorigny and Talana Hill and met the 32nd Division south of the Le Tronquoy Tunnel. The 1st Brigade relieved the 32nd between Le Tronquoy and Levergies on the night of 30 September. The French 47th Division, attacking on the right of IX Corps, was held up and managed an advance of just 1000 yards.
Rain, darkness and continued shelling meant that the 9th Brigade was unable to reach the start point in time. Instead, the 9th sent the 33rd and 35th battalions to the 11th Brigade and received the 41st Battalion in return. The 41st was the pivot on which the 11th Brigade attack would swing north to take Bony Point, the Knob and the northern tunnel entrance. The 11th would advance on a one-battalion front and leapfrog through the battalions to maintain momentum. The 10th Brigade would attack eastwards to clear the area between the advanced Hindenburg position and the left flank of the 11th Brigade. This would squeeze out the 9th Brigade, which would return to reserve. Artillery fire was initially prohibited but, after consultation with the 27th Division, a barrage was planned along the main Hindenburg system to support the attacking brigades. Command of the battle area passed from the 27th Division to the 3rd Division at 3.35 am. The 13th and 16th tank battalions, each with nine Mark V tanks, were tasked to support the 11th and 9th brigades. However the orders to attack were received late, and no infantry liaison was possible. Unsurprisingly, the infantry guides never arrived and only six tanks for the 11th Brigade and one tank for the 9th Brigade reached the starting point in time. The tanks never found the infantry and attacked separately west of Bony, putting several machine-gun nests out of action before six tanks rallied. One tank driver remarked, ‘We walked down the Hindenburg Line but luckily Hindenburg was not at home.’
The 34th and 41st battalions mopped up Claymore and Dirk valleys along with Bony Avenue as the 11th Brigade pushed north. The 41st Battalion attacked Gillemont Trench at 6.00 am, capturing 20 machine-guns and occupying a line from Stave Trench to Paul Trench near Quennemont Farm. The 34th left two companies in support at Benjamin Post while B Company with the 41st Battalion mopped up Bony Avenue. The slow progress of the 11th Brigade and the relentless machine-gun fire from Bony prevented movement by the 34th until 8.30 am. After that, B Company advanced steadily and, by 2.30 pm, had mopped up to the northern end of Claymore Valley. The 34th secured touch with the 10th Brigade at Stave Trench on the left.
The 10th Brigade advanced east as the 11th Brigade attacked north. At 4.00 am the 37th Battalion was ordered to Doleful Post to strengthen the left flank, as the situation surrounding the Knoll was still unclear. Two companies moved up to Willow Trench with a support company in Pomponious Lane. The withdrawal of enemy units during the night allowed the 39th and 40th to mop up Gillemont Farm and break into Gillemont Crescent and Lone Tree Trench where they found a number of heavy machine-guns abandoned by the Germans. The 38th succeeded in capturing Claymore Trench at 6.00 am and gained touch with the 39th on the left. Later in the day, the 38th finally made some progress up Bony Avenue.
The 11th Brigade planned to attack at 6.00 am to take the main Hindenburg systems from the flank. Planning was rushed, and the 44th and 43rd battalions, reinforced by a company of the 42nd, were the only units ready to attack on time. The barrage opened while the 44th Battalion was delivering the attack orders to the company commanders. D and C companies, bolstered by a number of Americans, led the assault and lost the barrage, but crossed the sunken road leading to Bony. By 3.30 pm the advance had halted and bomb stops were emplaced. To their left, the 43rd Battalion broke into the Hindenburg Line at its junction with Top Lane at 7.00 am and made contact with the 44th Battalion. A bombing fight ensured as the companies worked north, gaining several hundred yards, but subjected to severe machine-gun fire and bombing that drove the advanced posts back to a position 700 yards south of Bony. As the 43rd was held up, the 33rd Battalion halted in the trenches north of Quennemont Farm. The remainder of the 42nd Battalion was in support, the trenches from Top Lane to Malakoff Wood crowded with elements of three Australian battalions and numerous American troops. Eventually the 35th Battalion withdrew to relieve the overcrowding.
Command of the forward area passed from the 30th Division to the 5th Division at 1.05 am on 30 September as the next day’s attacks were planned. The 14th Brigade attacked with the 3rd Division to flank the Hindenburg defences from Bony to Le Catelet. With the 55th in support, the 53rd Battalion led the attack to the objective line along Railway Ridge east of the Nauroy Line. The 54th and 56th battalions remained in reserve. The 15th Brigade planned to swing out its left flank as the 14th Brigade moved north. The 8th Brigade gained the high ground east of Nauroy on the night of 29 September and planned to advance on a frontage extending from the Lamp Signal Station to south of Joncourt.
The 53rd Battalion was late and raced to catch up to the barrage. The battalion divided into groups of two companies — one each to advance up the tunnel mound and Nauroy Line — but immediately took heavy fire from field artillery and machine-guns. After several counter¬attacks and bombing duels, the battalion advanced 1000 yards and gained the southern portion of Railway Ridge, but could push no further. The 53rd and 55th were consolidated, with Lieutenant Colonel Cheeseman of the 53rd assuming tactical control. The men constructed bomb stops and fended off a heavy counter-attack at 3.30 pm that initially drove them back 200 yards. Private John Ryan of the 55th Battalion led a small group that blunted the counter-attack and then rushed an enemy bombing party that had worked into the flanks. Although wounded, Ryan recovered and was later awarded the Victoria Cross for his actions. At 6.00 pm the battalions formed a defensive flank connecting to the 44th, some 1500 yards south of the objective line for the day. Sixty Americans from the 119th served on carrying parties during the day, providing valuable assistance to the men in the line.
The sugar factory east of Nauroy (AWM E03776).
The 15th Brigade eliminated the gap between the 57th and 58th battalions while the latter extended its left flank to conform with the 14th Brigade attack. Cabaret Wood Farm resisted two attacks in the morning, the defenders driving off the Australians with heavy machine-gun fire. At 12.00 pm the brigade was ordered to take the Lamp Signal Station north of Nauroy, but delayed the attack until 4.00 pm to allow it to cooperate with the 8th Brigade on the right. The attack was supposed to have been launched by the 59th while the 57th pivoted the right flank to conform. However, the 57th had already achieved contact and attacked instead, gaining around 200 yards before being forced to fall back to the start line as the 8th Brigade could not dislodge the Germans from the sugar factory. The 58th Battalion advanced the left flank as the 14th Brigade attacked and took prisoners from the 1st and 4th Guards Grenadier regiments of the 2nd Guard Division.
The Victoria Cross citation for Private John Ryan, 55th Battalion, reads:
For most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty during an attack against the Hindenburg defences on 30th September, 1918. In the initial assault on the enemy’s positions Pte. Ryan went forward with great dash, and determination, and was one of the first to reach the enemy trench. His exceptional skill and daring inspired his comrades, and, despite heavy fire, the hostile garrison was soon overcome and the trench occupied. The enemy then counter-attacked, and succeeded in establishing a bombing party in the rear of the position. Under fire from front and rear, the position was critical, and necessitated prompt action. Quickly appreciating the situation, he organised and led the men near him with bomb and bayonet against the enemy bombers, finally reaching the position with only three men. By skilful bayonet work, his small party succeeded in killing the first three Germans on the enemy's flank, then, moving along the embankment, Pte. Ryan alone rushed the remainder with bombs. He fell wounded after he had driven back the enemy, who suffered heavily as they retired across no man's land. A particularly dangerous situation had been saved by this gallant soldier, whose example of determined bravery and initiative was an inspiration to all.
John Ryan, VC (AWM A02621A).
The tunnel mound near the Bony–Bellicourt road (AWM E03590).
At 4.00 pm the 8th Brigade attacked with the 29th, 31st and 32nd battalions. The 29th Battalion attack met heavy fire from the Lamp Signal Station, but the men managed to break through and threaten the sugar factory from the north. Eventually they were compelled to withdraw to their original positions as the 31st on their right could not advance. The 31st remained in touch with the 14th Brigade south-east of Estrées while the 32nd Battalion gained 500 yards north of Étricourt by cooperating with the 32nd Division.
As 30 September unfolded, it proved to be a day of trench attacks, bombing and close-quarter fighting by the 11th and 14th brigades as they rolled up the Hindenburg and Nauroy lines from the south. The 9th and 10th brigades achieved limited gains towards Bony, although they captured Gillemont Farm and the remainder of the advanced system. In the 5th Division sector, the 8th Brigade was halted by stubborn resistance from the sugar factory east of Nauroy, while the 15th Brigade maintained contact as the 8th attacked east and the 14th Brigade bombed north. While the overall ground taken was minor, the breach in the Hindenburg Line was now beyond repair, and the Australians would shortly be in position to confront the last of the prepared defences, the Beaurevoir Line.
Map 21. Attack plans, 1 October
THE THIRD DAY: WIDENING THE BREACH
On 30 September, Army Group Boehn finalised the Hermann positions and ordered construction to begin immediately. The evacuation of wounded and the removal of stores began while critical installations were prepared for destruction. Second Army ordered IV Reserve and LI Corps to fall back to the line Le Catelet–Gouy–Estrées and then south along the Beaurevoir Line. Two rearguard lines were designated. The first was the Beaurevoir Line, with the second line around 7000 yards east. The 54th Division, along with the 87th Regiment of the 21st Division, defended Le Catelet and Gouy. South of these were the remnants of the 2nd Guard Division and the newly arrived 119th Division. The remainder of the 21st Division defended east of Estrées with the 241st Division on their left and then the 34th Division, Eighteenth Army, near Sequehart.
Early on 30 September, Fourth Army issued orders to continue the advance the next day. XIII Corps would take over the front from III Corps at 12.00 pm and relieve the 18th Division with the 50th Division that night. The Australian Corps attacked to secure the line from the northern tunnel entrance to Mont St Martin and then to Joncourt and Estrées. On its right, IX Corps advanced towards the Le Tronquoy–Sequehart Ridge and the Beaurevoir lines from Sequehart to the Wiancourt–Joncourt road. The 5th Cavalry Brigade was allocated to IX Corps to exploit any breakthrough. Once the Australians took their objectives the 50th Division would take over their front as far south as Mont St Martin. To the south, the French XV Corps protected the right flank of IX Corps. As soon as XIII Corps turned the canal defences and enabled V Corps to cross, Fourth Army would resume its advance east.
The 14th Brigade, 32nd Division, was tasked to capture Sequehart while the 96th worked with the 5th Division to take Joncourt and the 97th Brigade advanced through Chataignies Wood. The 5th Division entered Joncourt from the west while the 14th advanced from the south, mopping up by 8.00 am. The attack on Sequehart and the Beaurevoir Line at 4.00 pm was supported by a creeping barrage and nine tanks from the 9th Tank Battalion. The 2nd Manchester Regiment captured 1400 yards of the Beaurevoir Line from Swiss Cottage south, taking 210 prisoners from the 2nd and 241st divisions. The tanks took heavy fire, but destroyed at least 20 machine-gun posts. The 5/6 Royal Scots took Sequehart and 200 prisoners, but were driven out by counter-attacks. South of IX Corps, the French 47th Division’s attack reached the west bank of the canal.
The 3rd Division’s early morning reports indicated weakening resistance. The 11th Brigade continued its advance to the north while the 10th Brigade mopped up the rearguards to the east and the 9th Brigade moved to support positions north of Quennemont Farm. The 10th Brigade closed up on the main Hindenburg system with the 37th, 40th, 39th and 38th battalions from north to south occupying positions on the tunnel mound, with advanced posts in Bony Point and the Knob. The 37th advanced on the left of the 10th Brigade, occupying the Knob with one company, leaving the rest of the battalion in the main Hindenburg system. The 38th had mopped up Bony by 9.45 am with assistance from the 39th Battalion and then moved to support positions, while the 39th halted along the ridgeline 500 yards north-east of the village. The 40th advanced to the canal tunnel, close to the northern entrance, and remained in support. The 42nd, 43rd and 33rd battalions advanced north along the canal tunnel and made contact with the 40th Battalion north¬east of Bony. The 43rd Battalion cleared the southern outskirts of Bony while the 38th and 39th moved in from the west. The 33rd and 42nd battalions passed through the 43rd and, by early afternoon, had occupied positions on the tunnel mound in contact with the 10th Brigade on the left and the 14th Brigade in Vauban Valley on the right.
Aerial photo of the Hindenburg system at Bony (swla_b463307_3).
The 10th and 11th brigades were ordered to attack the Beaurevoir Line at 2.50 pm, but the orders were issued late, and the attack was cancelled at 5.00 pm. The brigades were instead ordered to garrison the main Hindenburg system and push outposts into the Nauroy Line. The 9th Brigade remained in support, but at 4.20 pm sent the 35th Battalion to reinforce the 10th Brigade north-west of Knob Wood to fill a gap between the 40th Battalion and the 18th Division. By evening the 3rd Division had placed the 10th Brigade, with the 35th Battalion attached, in positions from Knob Wood south to Bony Point with three battalions in line and two in support. To their right, the 11th Brigade positioned the 33rd Battalion in the line on the left and the 43rd and 42nd on the tunnel mound. The 41st was in support north of Quennemont Farm. The 9th Brigade was further back in the advanced Hindenburg system. The brigades were ordered to consolidate their positions and prepare for relief the next day.
The 5th Division planned to attack and gain the line from Vauban Valley to south of Joncourt. The 8th Brigade attacked the sugar factory and then Joncourt Hill to the Nauroy–Joncourt railway line. On its left, the 15th Brigade would take the line from Cabaret Wood Farm north for 1000 yards while the 14th Brigade captured the Lamp Signal Station and placed two battalions in divisional reserve. Ten Mark V tanks supported the attack, eight with the 14th Brigade and two with the 8th. The exploitation objectives given for 1 October were the Beaurevoir Line from Joncourt to Torrens Canal and then along Le Catelet Trench.
The 14th Brigade attacked with the 54th on the left and the 56th on the right to capture the Lamp Signal Station and the trench network west of Estrées. B Company of the 16th Tank Battalion supported each battalion with four tanks. The first objectives were taken quickly, and the 54th and 56th advanced through Estrées, but had both flanks in the air and eventually withdrew to the west of the village. By 11.35 am the flanking battalions had moved up and the 56th re-entered and mopped up the village. The tanks provided valuable support and four of the eight allocated rallied at the end of the attack. That afternoon the 54th Battalion extended its left flank to remain in touch with the rest of the brigade. The 53rd and 55th patrolled north and discovered that the Germans had withdrawn to Le Catelet and Gouy, leaving only rearguards in the main Hindenburg system. The battalions consolidated on the line of Vauban Valley to Railway Ridge and linked up with the 33rd Battalion on the left and the 58th on the right.
The 8th Brigade was supported by two Mark V tanks. The 32nd Battalion was to attack on the right, the 31st on the left, with a company of the 30th Battalion attached to each battalion. At 6.00 am the barrage fell thickly and evenly and the 32nd and 31st were on their objectives before 7.00 am and patrolling towards Joncourt under heavy machine-gun and artillery fire. By 9.00 am they had cleared the village but were unable to exploit further. The 15th Brigade positioned the 58th Battalion on the left, the 57th in the centre and the 59th on the right to clear the area from Railway Ridge to west of Estrées. The attack began well, and all battalions were on their initial objectives, including Cabaret Wood Farm, by 6.40 am. The enemy was seen retiring in haste and the brigade moved to exploit along the line Estrées–Mint Copse–Bank Copse–Rudder Copse. The 57th and 59th reached Bank Copse and Folemprise Farm, but were shelled out of the position by 5.9-inch and 8-inch artillery fire. On the left, the 58th gained Bank Copse but was held up by the 53rd Battalion’s failure to advance, though they eventually made contact 1000 yards north of Cabaret Wood Farm. Further exploitation objectives were allocated, but the brigade was already exposed to heavy artillery fire and unable to advance further. The line was consolidated along the Estrées–Grandcourt road. The 5th Division attack gained its objective lines and exploited forward, although it failed to take the Beaurevoir Line. The division reported the capture of almost 1000 prisoners from six divisions, 37 artillery pieces and over 250 machine-guns.
AFTERMATH
While Second Army’s withdrawal to the Beaurevoir Line made its task easier, the Australian Corps still had tough fighting to endure on 1 October. The 3rd Division gained the main Hindenburg system up to the tunnel mouth and had advanced posts in the Nauroy Line. To its right, the 5th Division captured Joncourt and Estrées and was firmly in contact with the 3rd on its left and the 32nd Division on the right. During the day, the 2nd Division moved up and prepared to take over the corps frontage in the southern half of the sector while, to the north, XIII Corps would begin active operations by relieving the 3rd Division with the 50th Division and attacking to secure Gouy and Le Catelet. It had been a tough few days and there was more hard fighting to come against a stubborn opponent with nothing to lose.
