7. Buckling to Bandar

Helen Garlick is a statuesque woman in her fifties. Her attractive, soft-featured face is framed by striking white hair. In appearance and voice she is British landed gentry. But her upper-class charm belies a steely determination. She is a crusading barrister of over thirty years’ experience, a renowned corruption and fraud investigator who assisted the Nigerian government’s investigation of theft on a grand scale by its former Head of State, General Sani Abacha, and the Italian authorities’ inquiry into allegations of fraud by the Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi. At the UK’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) she served as Head of Policy before becoming the first head of its Overseas Corruption Unit, in which capacity she led the investigation into the Al Yamamah deal, which began in July 2004.

The SFO first got wind of possible corruption in the deal when Edward Cunningham, the Saudis’ pleasure valet, brought evidence of fraud in the management of the BAE slush fund to the office in 2001. The MoD, through its Permanent Secretary, Sir Kevin Tebbit, rejected the concerns, based on assurances from BAE’s Richard Evans that there was nothing untoward. Nevertheless, the SFO and the Economic Crimes Unit of the City of London Police began to investigate the slush fund, interviewing Peter Gardiner and others, and culminating in the dramatic raid in Hertfordshire in late 2004.

When David Leigh and Rob Evans of the Guardian came to see the SFO with revelations of BAE’s system of covert payments to agents around the world, Garlick’s team sprang into action. They issued a blizzard of requests for Mutual Legal Assistance from foreign jurisdictions and requisitioned BAE’s bank records, which helped them build an ever-growing picture of the payments and the mind-boggling web of financial complexity with which they were concealed. They achieved a major breakthrough in early 2006 with the arrest of the BAE agent Barry George, a Briton married to a Romanian, who had secretly received £7m to fix a remarkable deal in which two surplus British frigates were transferred to Romania in 2003. The ships had cost the British taxpayer about £250m to build only fourteen years earlier. But the Ministry of Defence handed them over to BAE for a scrap value of £100,000 each. The company received £116m from Romania to refurbish the ships, plus a lucrative further contract to maintain them.1 With the knowledge of how George had been paid his fee, and particularly useful information from the Swiss authorities, by September 2006 the SFO had learned about Red Diamond and Poseidon, the key companies used to divert the commissions, and the trail of money to Prince Bandar and other Saudis.2

From the early days of the investigation, the government’s attitude was one of ambivalence. This followed a pattern that had been established as early as 1985 when a question was asked in Parliament about possible commission payments related to the Al Yamamah deal. The government deflected the matter by referring it to the National Audit Office (NAO), which undertook an investigation from 1989 to 1992. This report has never been released, making it the first and, so far, only NAO report to remain secret.3 Attempts to access the report under Freedom of Information requests have been rebuffed on grounds of sensitive international relations, parliamentary privilege and commercial interests. An MoD spokesperson said the report was not released to avoid breaking a confidentiality agreement with the Saudis: ‘The report remains sensitive. Disclosure would harm both international relations and the UK’s commercial interests.’4 A briefing note prepared for John Major for Prime Minister’s Questions in Parliament confirmed that: ‘The NAO has been monitoring MoD’s involvement in Al Yamamah to ensure that proper accounting arrangements are followed. In particular, MoD has introduced special accounting arrangements for Al Yamamah, for example, to ensure that Saudi confidentiality is preserved. If the normal rules had been followed, Saudi transactions would appear each year in the department’s published appropriation accounts, laid before parliament; and we need to avoid this.’5 When the SFO and Ministry of Defence Police attempted to obtain the NAO report in 2003 and 2006 they were told that the report had been suppressed due to fears that it could upset the Saudis. The SFO even considered raiding the watchdog in order to obtain it.6

The government’s Chief Auditor at the time, Sir John Bourne, was not only criticized for undermining the integrity of the independent watchdog body but was also accused of conflicts of interest as he had worked at the Ministry of Defence on the Al Yamamah project as Under-Secretary for Defence Procurement from 1985.7 The continued suppression of Bourne’s NAO report suggests that successive British governments were prepared to ensure the truth about Al Yamamah was not revealed.

During the SFO’s investigation, the government’s senior legal adviser, who has a seat at the Cabinet table, the Attorney General, Peter Goldsmith, met Robert Wardle, the diminutive and seemingly nervous Director of the SFO, and the head of the Ministry of Defence Fraud Squad, on a number of occasions to discuss developments in the case. He would be crucial in determining the investigation’s ultimate fate.

Virtually from its inception BAE launched a calculated campaign to shut down the investigation. It employed the prestigious law firm of Allen & Overy, which in turn hired a lawyer who knew the Attorney General personally. He used this relationship to call Lord Goldsmith at home about the case. Goldsmith claims that he rejected these ‘private and confidential’ approaches.8

BAE’s chairman, Dick Evans, wrote an unsolicited letter to Sir Gus O’Donnell, the Cabinet Secretary, who in turn raised the possibility of consulting with government departments to establish whether there was a public interest argument for discontinuing the nascent investigation.9 The company’s legal director, Michael Lester, wrote to the Attorney General in November 2005 suggesting that ‘recent developments in this investigation raise in our view serious public interest issues which we consider should be brought to your personal attention having regard to the prosecutorial discretion conferred upon you’.10 He confirmed that he had discussed the issue with Sir Kevin Tebbit, Permanent Secretary at the MoD. Appended to the letter was a four-page memorandum, arguing that the public interest dictated that the investigation be discontinued on the basis that the company had on 27 July 2005 voluntarily released ‘a written analysis of the accounting treatment of the [redacted] prepared by Price Waterhouse Coopers and Allen & Overy, the Company’s accounting and legal advisers respectively. The conclusion reached in this analysis was that the costs were effectively borne by the Saudi customer in accordance with the terms of contract with the customer.’ The memorandum continued: ‘Allen & Overy have written to the SFO on a number of occasions questioning whether the SFO has a legal basis for continuing the investigation given that the investigation has revealed no evidence of criminal conduct and the conclusion reached in the analysis provided to the SFO on 27th July 2005.’11 Essentially BAE was saying: we’ve looked at ourselves and haven’t seen anything criminal so why should anyone else investigate us?

The company refused to identify its agents, despite repeated requests from the SFO, and then complained that the SFO had obtained:

the name of consultants engaged by the Company and the amounts paid to them, notwithstanding written assurances of confidentiality given by the then Inland Revenue to the Company and a conversation between the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence (Sir Kevin Tebbit) and the then head of the Inland Revenue (Sir Nicolas Montagu) at which the highly confidential nature of the information to be provided by the Company to the Inland Revenue was explained.12

The memorandum referred to Tony Blair’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia, his planned future visit ‘to cement the relationship between the two countries’ and his efforts, together with the MoD, to secure ‘the next tranche of work under the Al Yamamah programme’.13 BAE continued:

Disclosure to the SFO of the information relating to Al Yamamah requested in the section 2 notice [effectively a subpoena] would be regarded by the Saudi Arabia government as a serious breach of confidentiality by the Company and the UK government. The Company believes that if this information is provided there is little prospect of it remaining confidential with the consequent jeopardy to the next tranche of the Al Yamamah programme relating to the sustainment of Tornado aircraft and the sale of Typhoon aircraft being agreed between the UK and Saudi Arabian governments.14

In a nutshell the company believed that providing the information for a criminal investigation ‘will be seriously contrary to the public interest in that:

i) it would adversely and seriously affect relations between the UK and Saudi Arabia governments at a time when the UK government and the Prime Minister in particular, is seeking to nurture the relationship between the two countries in pursuit of the UK’s strategic objectives in the Middle East: and

ii) it would almost inevitably prevent the UK securing its largest export contract in the last decade of some [redacted] with the consequent adverse consequences for the UK economy in general and employment, both in the UK and Continental Europe, in particular.15

This despite the fact that the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, to which the UK was a founding signatory, specifically rejects international relations consequences or commercial considerations as a reason for failing to take action against bribery and corruption.16

The memo concluded: ‘The Company does not believe that it has committed any offence in connection with its [redacted, but last letter is ‘n’] relation to the Al Yamamah programme, notwithstanding the SFO’s assertion that it has reason to suspect that an offence has been committed. The SFO has not given any indication of the grounds for its suspicion.’17

The strategy of this well-connected, some would say protected, company was to claim that it had done nothing wrong despite overwhelming evidence of corruption, drop the names of powerful politicians and repeat endlessly that any investigation would annoy the Saudis and cause the loss of future contracts.

Illustrating BAE’s desire for secrecy and its sense of the way things work politically, it wrote a ‘STRICTLY PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL’ letter to Lord Goldsmith. The Legal Secretary to the Attorney General suggested that ‘It is not appropriate for representations to be made to the Law Officers on such a private and confidential basis. The proper recipient of such representations is the Serious Fraud Office and I have therefore forwarded your letter and the memorandum to the Director of the SFO.’18 BAE responded: ‘my letter dated 7 November to the Attorney General was marked strictly private and confidential in accordance with good practice. I would however be happy to re-submit this memorandum with the legend removed.’ BAE continued: ‘representations made in my letter related essentially to public interest issues affecting this country’s international relations. In these circumstances, I concluded that it would be appropriate if these representations were made at ministerial level. It is my understanding that the Attorney General is the minister responsible for the Serious Fraud Office and I accordingly wrote to him.’19

According to sources close to the investigation, Robert Wardle, Helen Garlick and case controller Matthew Cowie were incensed that the company, which was after all under investigation for criminal wrongdoing, was making representations to the Attorney General. And in the process refusing to respond to what is, in effect, a subpoena for information, referred to as the ‘5th notice’. They wrote a letter to BAE’s lawyers that, in typically British fashion, was courteous, curt and devastating:

I refer to your fax received at 3pm yesterday.…

You are asking the SFO to give full and proper consideration to the contents of a memorandum, apparently prepared by the company and not by yourselves, addressed not to the SFO but to the Attorney General and sent to the Attorney without providing the SFO with a copy, or even giving us notice that this approach had been made.

The return date in relation to hard copy documents under the 5th notice was yesterday. The notice is dated 14th October and was sent to you on that date. The memorandum was dated 7th November, a bare week before compliance was required and would appear to amount to a fundamental objection to compliance with the 5th notice. It also raises the same claim of public interest as a ground to discontinue the entire SFO investigation. However, as I set out in my last letter dated yesterday, your firm had never sought to raise any such concerns or objections in the previous detailed correspondence that had passed between us.

I have no reason to believe that the terms of the 5th notice raise any issues that could amount to a reasonable excuse for the company to refuse to comply.

… Further, no explanation is given for the assertion that compliance by the company with a compulsory statutory requirement is capable of being regarded as a breach of confidentiality on the part of the company, or why the pursuance by the SFO of its independent statutory powers of investigation could properly be regarded as a breach of a duty of confidentiality by the United Kingdom government.…

On th[e] basis [of Article 5 of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention] I can confidently discount the public interest considerations raised in the memorandum based on economic considerations as irrelevant.…

We have no duty to consult with other Government departments on operational matters; however we will receive and consider any representations that are properly brought to us from any quarter. Strictly speaking the SFO need not take representations concerning public interest until it has completed its investigation, however in matters as serious as these, we would not stand in the way of direct information being made available to the SFO at this stage. BAE has had a month to make such information known to the SFO and it has failed to do so.20

The SFO team and the Attorney General met on 2 December and agreed to carry out a Shawcross exercise.21 This enables the SFO to canvass the views of government ministers in order to assess any relevant considerations in continuing the case. In this instance the exercise included consultations with the Prime Minister’s office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the MoD, DTI, the Home Office and the Treasury.22 The Cabinet Secretary passed on a note to the SFO from the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary which identified concerns about the investigation’s impact on the ‘commercial importance of the Al Yamamah programme’. The note also raised the possibility that counter-terrorism cooperation might be endangered by the investigation, though Wardle said he ‘was not convinced that the danger referred to was imminent’.23

The letter asking for responses to the Shawcross exercise reiterated that matters excluded by Article 5 of the OECD convention would not be considered in the public interest test. The Cabinet Secretary’s note made clear that this was ignored: ‘It is, of course, for the Attorney General and the prosecuting authorities to decide whether there should be a prosecution, and also to decide how Article 5 bears on the current circumstances. We have, however, assumed that it may be possible for considerations of the kind mentioned in Article 5 at least to be taken into account for the purpose of taking an early view on the viability of any investigation.’24

And sure enough the note spoke about the ‘importance of the relationship with Saudi Arabia and that the Al Yamamah air defence programme, including the upgrade programme for Tornado aircraft, was a cornerstone of that relationship’.25 It referred specifically to the purchase by the Saudis of the next generation of attack aircraft, the (Eurofighter) Typhoon, and to the importance of Saudi Arabia in the fight against Islamic terrorism and the potential damage to British security interests should the investigation continue. The note described Saudi Arabia as a key country in the Middle East because of its advocacy of moderate foreign policy, concluding that Saudi stability was of vital strategic interest to the United Kingdom and to the West generally.26

While the exercise was underway the SFO investigating team continued their efforts to access BAE documents on their agents. On 7 December 2005, Matthew Cowie and Helen Garlick phoned Michael Lester, BAE’s legal head, and made the obvious point that ‘a formal consultation on the public interest was being undertaken but we do not see how public interest considerations would prevent the company providing us with the documents now’. Lester and BAE were playing for time. ‘Mr Lester said that there was and it concerned the duty of confidentiality and that they would wish to make further representations.’ Cowie and Garlick replied that ‘at this stage, bearing in mind that BAE was the suspect company, it was best if they set it out in writing and without wishing to be offensive BAE was a suspect in a criminal investigation and the amount of weight that can be given to a suspect’s representations as to the public interest in continuing an investigation are [sic] likely to be much less than those of a Government Department.’27 Nevertheless, the SFO extended the time allowed for BAE to give up the documents identifying its agents.

The next day BAE sent a second memorandum to the SFO, reinforcing that Al Yamamah was a government-to-government contract. The company argued that ‘First, the provision of defence equipment by one state to another is key to a much broader political and strategic relationship. It is symbolic of mutual trust between the two countries. Second, Saudi Arabia has a culture which is markedly different from that of western nations with, in particular, a higher degree of respect of privacy.’28 BAE repeated that providing the information would amount to a breach of confidentiality and that the ‘highly confidential nature’ of the information was underlined by the fact that the documentation was also classified by the UK MoD. It continued: ‘It is important to understand that, in the context of a sensitive and strategic inter-governmental relationship, an understanding between governments that certain matters will be kept confidential must be respected, whether or not that understanding is based on a strict legal obligation.’ There is then a portion redacted before the memo goes on to say: ‘The sanctions that can be imposed for perceived breaches are political and economic. It would be a mistake to proceed simply on the basis that unless a strict legally enforceable duty of confidentiality exists, the Saudi Arabian government would not perceive disclosure of information, which it understands to be confidential, as a breach of confidentiality.’29

BAE’s contention was that if another country has colluded in the breaking of British law, but likes to keep things private, Britain should simply overlook the crimes. Besides the obvious implications for the British justice system and the international rule of law, there is also the hard reality, always avoided by Saudi sycophants, that the Saudi royal family also wants to keep the extent of its own corruption and debauchery hidden from the Saudi people.

The company goes on to remind the SFO that its political friends in government will soon be in Saudi Arabia, drumming up more business for Britain:

Arrangements have been made for the Secretary of State for Defence to visit Saudi Arabia on 19 December. During the course of this visit, it is intended that the Secretary of State for Defence will attend meetings with the King and Saudi Defence Secretary with a view to signing a Memorandum of Understanding for the sale of 72 Typhoons pursuant to an extension of the Al Yamamah programme. The Saudi Arabia government has already complained to the UK government about the SFO investigation announced in November 2004.30

Matthew Cowie argued passionately in reaction to BAE’s arguments, stating in a memo he circulated to his superiors:

The SFO must investigate crime. It has a reasonable belief that crime has been committed. It must investigate all reasonable lines of enquiry and do so in the light of our domestic and international obligations. Those international instruments envisage an independent role for law enforcement outside of economic or political considerations. To have any meaningful effect they must have application, regardless of the seriousness of the consequences stated. There are always likely to be economic and political consequences of any major enquiry into defence contracts. That is why such considerations must ultimately be irrelevant to the independent conduct of such enquiries.

    Have they [the Cabinet] given full consideration to the public interest in the rule of law, the independence of the SFO and MDP and the role of central government, all of which could suffer reputational damage if it emerged that an investigation by the SFO had been cut short, [REDACTION – half sentence]31

This was the approach taken by the SFO when it met BAE, the Attorney General and Detective Superintendent Robert Allen of the Ministry of Defence Police, on 11 January 2006. In a somewhat frosty encounter, Helen Garlick and Robert Wardle made clear that they were conscious of the competing arguments but reaffirmed the importance of tackling overseas corruption and the government’s obligations to do so in terms of the OECD convention. They also pointed to the reputational damage to the SFO and the UK if the case were dropped, a view reinforced by the gruff Detective Superintendent Allen. The SFO made clear that it viewed efforts to prevent prosecution as an attempt to avoid the anti-bribery law. Robert Wardle felt that the balance of public interest was in continuing the case and in enforcing the notices on BAE to divulge documents. Following the meeting the Attorney General came round to allowing the investigation to continue,32 which it did unhindered for a few months.33

But in April and May 2006 the pressure on the investigators began to mount again. The Attorney General determined that in terms of UK anti-bribery legislation it was crucial whether any of the payments were authorized by the Saudi government. In other words, ask those being bribed whether the bribes were authorized. The OECD had previously pressed the UK to fix this loophole in its very weak legislation. By stating that proof was required that there was no authorization to receive a bribe, the Attorney General was effectively destroying what there was of the UK’s pitiful anti-bribery law.34 Lord Goldsmith continued to push this issue in September and October 2006, deeply frustrating Garlick and Cowie, who were puzzling over how this evidence of authorization, or the lack of it, could be found.35

On 29 September 2006, the Cabinet Office made further representations to the SFO, raising the issue of counter-terror cooperation and strongly reiterating the financial impact of losing the Typhoon contract.36 The next day the Attorney General passed the letter on to Robert Wardle, who still believed that Goldsmith was in favour of continuing the case.

After an impassioned internal meeting on 30 September at which the Cabinet Office’s response to the Shawcross exercise was discussed, Helen Garlick made clear that complaints about the investigation breaching confidentiality were not going to stop it.37 Garlick then made the point that the investigation had not yet caused commercial harm and that even if it did it would still be the SFO’s duty to keep investigating corruption.38 She repeated the multiple concerns and threats raised – disruption to oil supplies, loss of contracts, undermining Middle East peace initiatives and retraction of intelligence assistance – and warned her colleagues that the Saudis and BAE, as the accused parties, would say anything to stop the investigation. She expressed surprise that these real concerns weren’t raised a year earlier and questioned whether the Saudi threats were credible. Defiantly, she concluded by saying that the information requested was now long overdue.39 Her exasperation and determination were clear to everyone in the meeting.

In November 2006, Jack Straw, a senior minister in the New Labour firmament and the Leader of the House of Commons at the time, requested a meeting with the Attorney General to discuss the BAE case. A former Home Secretary and future Justice Secretary, Straw is known as a strong BAE supporter as his Blackburn constituency is home to many company workers.40 In the same month the British ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Sherard Cowper-Coles, met Robert Wardle, members of the SFO case team, the Director General of the Attorney General’s office, and officials from the Cabinet and Foreign Offices. This was the first of three meetings between the Attorney General’s office and the ambassador in two months, Lord Goldsmith attending the final meeting on 12 December.41 Clearly a great deal of scheming in the ranks of the New Labour great and good was underway.

Towards the end of 2006, the public BAE and Saudi campaign to have the investigation closed down intensified. In December, the SFO even contemplated approaching BAE and negotiating a plea bargain in which the company and certain executives would plead guilty.42 Dick Evans would admit guilt on the relatively minor slush fund charges, in exchange for which the more embarrassing counts relating to the gargantuan payments handled by Prince Bandar, Safadi and Said would be dropped.43 But there was insufficient support for this approach inside the SFO, despite the mounting pressure.

In November, the Sunday Times had reported that the Saudis were threatening to cut off diplomatic ties unless Downing Street blocked the investigation.44 A few days later the Daily Mail printed a headline claiming that 50,000 British jobs were at stake.45 At the end of the month, BAE stated publicly that the Eurofighter deal had stalled, the Financial Times quoting the CEO, Mike Turner, as saying: ‘We don’t want to interfere with the judicial process … but we do want to see a resolution. It is damaging for our business.’46 On 30 November, Michael Jack, a Tory MP for Fylde, where a large BAE factory is based, said in the House of Commons that the SFO investigation was ‘gumming up’ the negotiations. He claimed: ‘As the Leader of the House will know from aerospace workers in his constituency, that is now causing a great deal of concern, as it appears that the current inquiry is impacting on important negotiations.’ The Leader of the House praised Jack, saying: ‘I applaud the way in which he has represented the interests of the British aerospace industry … I will pass his remarks to my right honourable and noble friend the attorney-general.’47

In December, the Daily Telegraph reported that the Saudis had given Britain ten days to halt the SFO investigation or lose the prospective Al Salam contract.48 The Sunday Times chimed in that local MPs were planning to lobby Tony Blair.49 The National Defence Industries Council, chaired by Rolls-Royce’s chief executive, Sir John Rose, announced that it would write to the Trade and Industry Secretary, Alistair Darling.50

This PR campaign was masterminded by Timothy Bell, who had been a consultant to Margaret Thatcher during Al Yamamah and also advised her on how to deal with the controversy over allegations of Mark Thatcher’s receiving contracts in Oman after his mother’s visit.51 After the fall of the Conservative government, Bell worked for, among others, the Malaysian offshoot of GEC, which was part of the Pergau Dam controversy, in which British aid for the building of a dam was linked to £1.3bn in arms contracts to Malaysia.52 When interviewed about Al Yamamah he commented:

‘The suspicion is that if you have a deal like that, with that much money floating around in cash. Of course there’s suspicion and of course people are entitled to be suspicious, but there is a difference between suspicion and fact. As far as I’m concerned, if the British government and the Saudi government reached a sovereign agreement over an arms contract that resulted in a tremendous number of jobs in Britain, a great deal of wealth creation in Britain, and enabled Saudi Arabians to defend themselves, I think that’s a jolly good contract.’53

He described the SFO investigation as ‘all tosh’, suggesting that there was no prima facie evidence.54

Bell’s deluded perspective was matched by the jobs figures bandied about in the PR campaign, which claimed that anywhere up to 100,000 jobs were at risk due to the SFO investigation.55 The figures were entirely fictional. The MoD’s estimate, quoted in the Shawcross exercise, put the figure between 10,000 and 15,000 British jobs at BAE and subcontractors, as well as 2,000 expatriate jobs in Saudi Arabia sustained by the Al Yamamah deal.56 York University put the figure at only 5,000 British jobs.57 But the inflated figures ensured a willing audience when MPs and trade unionists were briefed to complain to Downing Street about the jobs threat of the investigation.58

The Al Salam deal was crucial to these jobs figures and the commercial argument against the investigation. Meaning ‘peace’ in Arabic – arms dealers not being strong on irony – Al Salam is the successor deal to Al Yamamah, consisting of the sale of seventy-two Eurofighter Typhoon jets for more than £4.43bn. The exact terms of the contract are secret and the actual value of the deal is likely to be much higher, as the £4.43bn only reflects the price of the planes but not the training, supply services and spare parts. Some estimates suggest the deal is potentially worth as much as £40bn.59 The deal was laid down on 21 December 2005, and finalized and signed in September 2007.60 It is, like Al Yamamah, a government-to-government transaction with BAE acting as the prime contractor. It will be paid for in cash from the Saudi defence ministry coffers rather than oil. The first twenty-four aircraft are to be built at BAE’s site in Warton, Lancashire, and the remaining forty-eight in Saudi Arabia61 by a consortium that also includes EADS in Germany and Spain and Alenia Aerospazio in Italy.62

The Eurofighter was originally designed for dogfights with Soviet aircraft over Europe, and as its relevance has plummeted, its cost has spiralled upwards. The UK portion of the project will cost at least £20bn,63 £13bn more than initially projected.64 This equates to £350 for every person in the UK and £1.1m for every job estimated to have been sustained by the project. The project took thirty years and came into service ten years later than predicted.65 It is both a drain on UK finances and designed for a situation that no longer exists. As the flamboyant former Defence Minister Alan Clark said with characteristic candour, the Eurofighter is ‘essentially flawed and out of date … we must find a less extravagant way of paying people to make buckets with holes in them’.66 The UK is desperate to sell the Eurofighter because the country is tied into buying a set number of the aircraft and would face substantial penalties if it cancelled orders; and the UK currently has a budget shortfall of approximately £36bn for its arms procurement programme.67

The Al Salam and Al Yamamah deals have almost single-handedly sustained the UK arms trade. Military exports to Saudi Arabia accounted for 62 per cent of all Britain’s military exports from 1997 to 1999. In 1987–91 it was 73 per cent.68 As Mike Turner, CEO of BAE at the time, said shortly before a visit to Riyadh by Tony Blair in 2005: ‘The objective is to get the Typhoon into Saudi Arabia. We’ve had 43 billion pounds from Al Yamamah over the last 20 years and there could be another 40 billion pounds.’69

Despite this dependency the Al Salam deal was criticized as being inconsistent with Britain’s human rights obligations and the UK and EU’s code of conduct on arms exports. A study concluded that ‘the evidence suggests that a deal of this scale with Saudi Arabia would see the UK government fundamentally undermining a series of key criteria within the EU Code. This raises important questions about the government’s real commitment to the consistent implementation of the Code of Conduct that it has signed up to.’70

With New Labour’s brief embrace of an ethical foreign policy long abandoned, government was committed to safeguarding the Al Salam deal. To this end, the Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett, instructed senior diplomats to dissuade Robert Wardle from continuing with the investigation: ‘Wardle was told he was pissing the Saudis off big-time, and that this involved security, terrorism, the whole future of the Middle East.’71

The Saudis communicated regularly with the UK government about the investigation, primarily through Deso and the UK ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Cowper-Coles. In September 2006, in a letter to Peter Ricketts, the Permanent Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the ambassador said:

I recall that, in the margins of the meetings, and possibly on one or two other occasions (e.g. during The Prince of Wales’s visit in March this year), I had brief oral exchanges with [a senior representative of the Saudi Arabian Government – assumed to be Bandar] on the SFO enquiry.… I remember [the Saudi representative] giving the impression that he had information of his own about the SFO enquiry (for example, he once volunteered that he understood that the enquiry could be discontinued if it was not in the public interest – although he used a curious phrase which I can’t now recall). I remember telling him more than once that senior officials in London were well aware of just how serious the enquiry could be, and that we were working to persuade the legal authorities of this. But I always made clear that the enquiry was not in our hands, and that there could be no guarantees. I remember being worried that [the senior representative of the Saudi government] was more optimistic about the SFO enquiry than seemed justified on the facts available to me. I confess that I did ask myself at least once whether I should have done more to disabuse him. But he always gave the impression he had his own information, and really just wanted to use me to convey to London how concerned he was.72

Prince Bandar operated deviously and brilliantly in trying to end the investigation. Allegedly, it was Bandar who made the threats about withdrawing intelligence cooperation, meeting Blair and Jonathan Powell, his Chief of Staff, in July 2006. ‘Bandar went into No 10 and said: “Get it stopped.” [Words omitted.] Bandar suggested to Powell he knew the SFO were looking at the Swiss accounts … if they didn’t stop it, the Typhoon contract was going to be stopped and intelligence and diplomatic relations would be pulled.’73 He also allegedly met Blair in London in December 2006 to convey the threat to withdraw intelligence cooperation.74 And the month before he ostentatiously visited Paris to discuss buying Rafale jets to exert commercial pressure on the UK government, even though the Saudis had no intention of purchasing the French jets.75

On 8 December, Tony Blair sent Robert Wardle an extraordinary personal minute, directed through the Attorney General, about the ‘real and immediate risk of a collapse in UK/Saudi security, intelligence and diplomatic cooperation’ and ‘the critical difficulty presented to the negotiations over the Typhoon contract’.76 The attachment to Blair’s minute on the national security considerations deals primarily with the issue of terrorism in Saudi Arabia, including the British role in securing the oil supply, but at no point mentions a threat of imminent terrorist attacks in the UK, although the document is heavily redacted.77 The second attachment concentrates on Saudi Arabia’s role in Middle East foreign policy and its support for the Israel/Palestine peace process, but again no threat to the UK is mentioned.78 In an astonishing indictment of Blair’s scaremongering, MI6, in later discussions with the OECD, refused to say that it ‘agreed with [this security] assessment’.79

A few days later, Lord Goldsmith told Blair that halting the investigation over Saudi claims to withdraw cooperation ‘would send a bad message about the credibility of the law in this area, and look like giving in to threats’.80 The Prime Minister responded that ‘he felt higher considerations were at stake. Proceeding with the case would lead to the end of Saudi–UK cooperation.… While the Prime Minister understood that halting the investigation was not a step to be taken lightly, he was clear that in this case there was a supervening national interest at stake, and that the British people would regard these as higher interests.’81

On 13 December 2006, Robert Wardle and Helen Garlick were summoned to see the Attorney General. In a tense and emotional meeting the investigators were told that there was not enough evidence to continue and that the strength of the public interest case compelled them to close down the investigation. Wardle angrily denied that there was insufficient evidence and tried to buy time to take advice from their barrister, Timothy Langdale QC. Garlick, fuming at the capitulation of the Attorney General, was asked her view specifically in the context of the threat to British lives. Isolated, she felt unable to argue against the others on the issue of national security:

AG asked for my views. I said that the SFO had never sought to place the interests of our investigation above those of national and international security. It seemed to me that the AG and RW were in the same position. We were qualified to make judgements on the law and the evidence. On questions of security, we had to take the advice of others. The SFO had only heard first hand from HM ambassador, we assumed that the AG had better advice, including advice from the Security Services. At the meeting at the FCO attended by JJ we had been told that ‘British lives on British streets’ were at risk, also that [redaction]. If this caused another 7/7 how could we say that our investigation, which at this stage might or might not result in a successful prosecution, was more important?82

They discussed the implications of dropping the case, including the likelihood that the US and the Swiss would take on different elements of it, which could prove embarrassing for the UK government. The Attorney General asked Wardle and Garlick to inquire into the Swiss and US positions. Throughout the meeting Goldsmith suggested that while he wished to test the SFO’s case and would support it if it was viable, he was unhappy at the implications of dropping it at this point.83 He claimed that:

Having considered the various views conveyed as to the public interest, including those of the ambassador, the Director of the SFO independently concluded that it would not be in the public interest to continue with the investigation because of the risk to national and international security. He conveyed this view to the Attorney General on 13 December 2006 and, having considered the matter further overnight, confirmed his decision to the AGO on 14 December 2006.84

Some close to the investigation contend that Wardle had no choice. He was intimidated by Goldsmith, who could be arrogant, cold and disrespectful to people. A reliable source claims that at one point the investigators were told that ‘the Cabinet Office had met and decided the fate of the investigation, and then this was quickly changed to “no, it’s the AG’s Office”.’ If correct, this makes clear that the executive were instructing the prosecutors what to do.

The same source suggests that ‘Goldsmith knew exactly what he was doing the whole time – his political master’s bidding. He was never sincere about wanting it to go ahead. It was always all about how to close it down.’ This view is supported by at least one other source close to the investigation. Goldsmith was desperate to show the investigation to be flawed, so that national security would not have to be invoked. But the SFO refused to allow him to trash what was a strong, well-marshalled case.85

The following morning a meeting was held between the Attorney General, the Solicitor General, the heads of the security and intelligence agencies and the Cabinet Office Permanent Secretary for Intelligence to discuss the possible consequences if the Saudis withdrew cooperation with the UK. The Attorney General claimed that ‘None of those consulted disagreed with the overall assessment that the Saudi threats were real. The Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service’s view was that the Saudis might withdraw their co-operation if the SFO investigation continued, and that they could decide to do so at any time.’86 He also came to the conclusion that a prosecution against BAE would not be possible given the need ‘to obtain evidence to refute the proposition that the payments made by BAE were approved by or on behalf of the Saudi principal(s)’.87

At 5.21 p.m. on 14 December the Attorney General announced that the investigation into the Al Yamamah arms deal would be stopped.88 Conveniently, in terms of the news cycle, the announcement was made the night before a report into the death of Princess Diana was due out and Tony Blair became the first serving Prime Minister to be interviewed by police in a criminal case – the loans-for-peerages inquiry in which his most important fundraiser, personal aide and friend had been arrested.

After the announcement BAE shares, which had been depressed by the investigation, rose significantly.89 Robert Wardle, whose application for the renewal of his contract as Director of the SFO had been sitting on the Attorney General’s desk, was ‘rewarded’ with a one-year extension.

The Guardian said of Tony Blair at the time: ‘For a prime minister who once taunted his predecessor as someone “knee deep in dishonour” over an arms deal and who promised that he would be “purer than pure” in office, yesterday was a shabby, shaming day, among the most inglorious he has spent in office.’90

Even John Scarlett – rewarded for his role in producing the sexed-up dossier used to justify the invasion of Iraq by being made head of the British intelligence agency MI6 – publicly questioned the national security justification for the decision.91

Tony Blair, who never downplayed his role in ending the investigation,92 had caved in to the pressure of a corrupt, undemocratic ally, in the process sullying the reputation and standing of the United Kingdom around the world.

Embarrassingly for the government, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) instituted an inquiry into whether the British government contravened the organization’s Anti-Bribery Convention. In March 2007, the OECD sent inspectors to establish why the investigation had been dropped and also why the UK had yet to bring a single prosecution since incorporating the OECD’s anti-bribery treaty into UK law.93 In response the British government attempted, from behind the scenes, to have the head of the OECD’s Anti-Bribery Commission removed from his position.94 It failed. Lord David Chidgey was moved in the House of Lords to remark that ‘Britain has become a laughing stock within the OECD’ and suggested that ‘something must be done to restore faith in the British justice system urgently’.95

The news that the brother of Tony Blair’s Chief of Staff, Jonathan Powell, was hired as a lobbyist by BAE to press their case for the termination of the Al Yamamah investigation, and that he might have chatted to his brother about it, only deepened the growing sense of a decision made by desperate politicians, motivated by more than national security.96 Charles Powell said he had discussed the investigation with ‘senior government officials’ and that it was ‘perfectly possible’ these included his brother. A Downing Street spokesman insisted that Jonathan Powell did not discuss the case with his brother. ‘The fact that they are brothers is therefore totally irrelevant’, and added that Jonathan Powell was not involved in the decision whether to prosecute. But Charles, in trying to recall whether he had discussed the matter with his brother, said: ‘It’s perfectly possible. If you were told that, then you can print it. I mean I honestly can’t remember … We discussed all sorts of things.’ He added that the contents of discussions with members of his family were ‘sacrosanct’.97

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Blair’s contention that ‘the British people would regard these [intelligence concerns] as higher interests’ was not a view unanimously endorsed. The Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT) and the Corner House, a social justice NGO, wrote to the government immediately after the announcement, arguing that closing the investigation was unlawful and demanding that it be reopened. This was followed in January 2007 by a letter to Tony Blair from 140 NGOs from thirty-seven countries protesting at the decision and reiterating the grievous effect of corruption on democracy, sustainable development, human rights and poverty.98

Even elements in the business community spoke out against the decision. Hermes, the UK’s biggest pension fund, wrote to the Prime Minister that the decision had threatened the UK’s reputation as a leading financial centre and would have a high long-term cost for business and markets.99 F&C Asset Management, with more than £100bn under management, felt that the decision was bad for business, stating in a letter to the government:

We believe that, for long-term investors, bribery and corruption distort and destabilise markets, expose companies to legal liabilities, disadvantage non-corrupt companies and reduce transparency for investors seeking investment opportunities.… There is a danger that the government’s recent action will be perceived as undermining the consistent application of the UK’s national legislation governing corrupt practices, precisely at a time when wider take-up of the OECD convention is beginning to take root.100

In November 2007, CAAT and the Corner House were granted permission to bring a full judicial review in the High Court. The NGOs argued that the decision to discontinue the investigation was based on considerations of potential damage to the UK’s relations with Saudi Arabia, in particular damage to UK/Saudi security, intelligence and diplomatic cooperation, thus contravening Article 5 of the convention. They argued further that the UK effectively colluded with Saudi Arabia to breach the Saudis’ international legal obligations to cooperate and share information on terrorist activities. They also believed that government ministers, including the Prime Minister, gave the SFO tainted advice insofar as it took into account the risk of the UK not being able to sell the Typhoon and other commercial, economic and diplomatic matters, despite being told by the Attorney General that the convention forbids such considerations. They suggested that neither the Director nor government ministers assessed or took into account the harm to the UK’s national security of discontinuing the investigation.

Most grievously they argued that government ministers expressed a view on what decision the Director of the Serious Fraud Office should take. Despite the rules on public interest consultations forbidding ministers from giving an opinion on whether a prosecution should proceed or not, Tony Blair made clear that the public interest would best be served by halting the investigation. And finally they contended that it is unlawful for an independent prosecutor to permit threats or blackmail to influence his decision to discontinue a criminal investigation or prosecution. To do so is to surrender the rule of law.

In April 2008, the High Court ruled decisively in CAAT’s and the Corner House’s favour. The judges’ verdict was damning of the British government, describing its ‘abject surrender to the threat’ which was ‘an attempt by a foreign government to pervert the course of justice in the UK’.101 The High Court agreed that the Shawcross exercise had been tainted by representations that should not have been taken into account and also noted that the SFO had correctly stood up to attempts to shut down the investigation. Importantly, the government did not dispute in court the NGOs’ contention that Bandar went into Number 10 and threatened to halt both the Typhoon deal and intelligence and diplomatic cooperation if the investigation was not stopped.102 The court also took exception to the force with which the Prime Minister intervened, concluding:

He [the Director of the SFO] submitted too readily [to the threat] because he, like the executive, concentrated on the effects which were feared should the threat be carried out and not on how the threat might be resisted.

No-one, whether within this country or outside is entitled to interfere with the course of our justice. It is the failure of Government and the defendant to bear that essential principle in mind that justifies the intervention of this court.… We intervene in fulfilment of our responsibility to protect the independence of the Director and of our criminal justice system from threat. On 11 December 2006, the Prime Minister said that this was the clearest case for intervention in the public interest he had seen. We agree.103

In effect the court had determined that the investigation was stopped because Prince Bandar had threatened that if it was not, the withdrawal of Saudi intelligence would lead to ‘blood on the streets of London’.104 The judgment stated that ‘had such a threat been made by one who was subject to the criminal law of this country, he would risk being charged with an attempt to pervert the course of justice’.105

The judgment was widely praised. Susan Hawley of the Corner House proclaimed it ‘a great day for British justice’, while CAAT said it ‘brings Britain a step closer to the day when BAE is no longer calling the shots’.106 The renowned philosopher A. C. Grayling wrote that the judgment:

strikes at the heart of the dilemma of our time: the way our democracy and its institutions are being subjected to manipulation, cover-up and dishonesty of purpose, to the extent that they can even be bought by outsiders. One might even say that [Lord Justice] Moses has brought tablets of law from the mountain top; down below, the worshippers at the golden calf of expediency are preparing to smash them, in part to cover their own backs in an ignominious matter in which the honour and integrity of British law has been sold for a large mess of pottage; thereby not just covering the country in ignominy, but seeking to undermine the justice system itself.107

Even the right-wing Daily Mail agreed that the UK should stop grovelling to the Saudis, on the grounds of not giving in to threats from foreigners.108 The New York Times editorialized that:

British Prime Minister Tony Blair seems determined to use his final weeks in office to show how far he has strayed from the pledges of clean government that helped sweep him to power a decade ago.… Mr. Blair said last week that the probe would have led nowhere except to the ‘complete wreckage’ of a vital strategic relationship. That glib dismissal ignores the crucial point: bribery is never justified, smart or legal.’109

A key aspect of the judgment was that the government and the SFO had not considered how the Saudi threat might be dealt with other than merely submitting to the pressure. They never considered how unlikely it was that Saudi Arabia, a key target of Al Qaeda, would withdraw intelligence-sharing when they are more dependent on the UK and the US than the UK is on them. If the Saudis had carried out their threat they would have seriously damaged their relationship with the US and undermined their position in George W. Bush’s War on Terror. As likely as Bandar’s threatened ‘blood on the streets’ is that terrorist groups would decide to attack the UK specifically for engaging in a massive arms deal with their enemy, the Saudis.

It is of course quite likely that the threats were never real, but simply a tool with which to end the potentially embarrassing investigation: utilized by the Saudis who did not want their corrupt behaviour exposed, and seized upon by the British to hide government complicity in what was, after all, a government-to-government transaction. It also served to protect BAE and its future commercial prospects. David Howarth MP suggested as much, claiming that moves to end the investigation were motivated by machinations to protect BAE,110 the company which the late Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, described as ‘having the key to the garden door of Number 10 [Downing Street].… I never knew No 10 to come up with any decision that would be incommoding to BAE.’111 A senior source close to the investigation concurred: ‘BAE are the ultimate establishment, part of government really.’

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In the aftermath of the damaging High Court judgment, BAE attempted to take the moral high ground by releasing a report it had commissioned from a former Chief Justice, Lord Woolf, on the company’s ethical practices. Though BAE referred to the Woolf report as an independent review, the news that it had paid him £6,000 per day for nine months raised questions of its independence, as did the stricture that he could not consider any of the company’s historical actions but could only look forward.112 When asked by the Economist about the extortionate sum of money he was paid to run a PR event, Woolf replied: ‘Have I been influenced by the amount of money? I don’t deserve to be approached on that basis.’113

I reluctantly agreed to give evidence to the Woolf Commission and used the opportunity to criticize Lord Woolf for accepting so limited a brief. I told him that to do so meant he could not understand the true nature and instincts of the company. In informal conversation I suggested that BAE’s morality and ethics could never be enhanced unless it came clean about its corrupting history. He replied that the law made it difficult to do so. So a former Chief Justice of the United Kingdom was suggesting that a company that had broken the law should just move on, forgetting about its past involvement in criminal acts. And he was helping them do so.

The entire report contained little mention of BAE’s use of dodgy agents, the payment of enormous bribes, the corrupting of governments around the world, or even the company’s infiltration of spies into the Campaign Against the Arms Trade.114 The report made some sensible, if obvious, recommendations such as not making facilitation payments, acknowledging the need for updated anti-corruption law in the UK and using a due diligence process in dealing with advisers.115 However, the Woolf Report was never meant to solve or even really address BAE’s problems. As David Leigh commented on the whole initiative: ‘Woolf commands [a] fact-free zone with aplomb.’116 The £1.7m spent on the Woolf report was a wasted expense on what was a whitewashing PR exercise.117

The amnesiac approach to the past undermined what was supposed to be a new dawn at BAE. The statement by the chairman, Dick Olver, at the company’s 2008 AGM, that BAE would not just be the most ethical of arms companies but would reflect the gold standard for ethics of any company in any industry bordered on the delusional.118 I can’t imagine Dick Olver, or any defence industry executive, grappling with the fundamental problem of whether it is even possible to be an ethical arms company.

Part of the PR reinvention of the company was to claim that a new management team under Dick Olver had moved on from the days of Dick Evans and Mike Turner, who were credited with the establishment of the system of slush funds and covert financial transactions. But then it transpired that Dick Evans, who had built his career in BAE on his relationships in Saudi Arabia and had run operations in Saudi during Al Yamamah, was retained as a consultant by Olver’s BAE after his ignominious retirement. Dick Olver was forced to reveal that Evans earned almost £1.5m from BAE after stepping down in 2004. His role? Specifically to advise the company on its relationships with Saudi Arabia.119 His contract was only ended after massive public fallout in early 2010.120

BAE had attempted to reinvent itself as an ethical arms company before, and would continue to do so. In 2006, Deborah Allen, director of corporate responsibility, told the BBC that BAE was doing ‘Everything from looking at making a fighter jet more fuel-efficient and looking at the materials that munitions are made of and what their impact on the environment would be.’121 The company had plans to manufacture ‘green’ lead-free bullets so that once in the environment they ‘do not cause any additional harm’.122 Additional that is to the harm they’ve caused to the injured or dead target. BAE also spoke about making a quieter bomb so that the users’ exposure to fumes would be reduced. And the company was reported to be making landmines which would turn into manure over time. As Allen put it, they would ‘regenerate the environment that they had initially destroyed’.123 She continued: ‘It is very ironic and very contradictory, but I do think, surely, if all the weapons were made in this manner it would be a good thing.’ This green initiative led only to much mirth at the absurd notion of the ethical arms company making weapons and ammunition that would be more caring. The plan to make green bullets was scrapped two years later after BAE discovered that tipping bullets with tungsten instead of lead resulted in higher production costs, making the venture unprofitable.124

The company also launched a mass advertising drive using a BAE slogan laid over a Union Flag. The adverts were placed in publications, including the left-leaning Guardian and New Statesman – in one issue of the latter alongside a critical article I had written on the company – and on many London taxis and buses. The wrapped-in-the-flag series of adverts continues, spawning a minor industry in satirical spoofs.

Amid this PR onslaught Dick Olver spoke out against the SFO investigation, claiming it was ‘doomed to failure’ and suggesting that it should be abandoned.125 A year after the High Court judgment the SFO had come under new leadership. Richard Alderman, a career civil servant who had previously been head of tax investigations at the Inland Revenue, was perceived as a safe choice by the Attorney General, Lady Scotland, ‘a tax settlements guy, who likes files’, according to one insider. A candidate from outside government with a strong track record of combating bribery and corruption would have strengthened the SFO’s independence and reputation, rather than its choice reinforcing the perception of a tired government that had lost its moral compass.126

Alderman aimed to raise public awareness of fraud and focus on cases with clear victims. He insisted that investigations would still take priority but soon after withdrew an application to the Attorney General for consent to prosecute a high-profile overseas corruption case relating to the activities of London-based firms in Bosnia. His arrival coincided with the mass exodus of a third of the SFO’s senior management, many of whom felt the new direction was a mistake and would lead to even fewer convictions.127

With Alderman’s arrival, the High Court decision was appealed to the Law Lords, the antiquated bastion of the British establishment. The government changed tack before the Lords, denying that Bandar had tried to stop the investigation. Jonathan Sumption, the government’s QC, claimed that there was ‘no basis’ for saying that Bandar had acted out of his own interest to seek an end to the investigation. He said the suggestion had been based on an article in a Sunday newspaper but had never been admitted by the government. He did not say who had made the threat to ministers but contended it was ‘perfectly clear’ it had come from the highest level of the Saudi state ‘from several channels over a period of time’.128 Documents revealed by the government in the Lords intended to show that they had resisted the Saudi representations by repeatedly stating that the SFO and Attorney General were independent and that they had no power over the prosecution.

The Lords rapidly found for the SFO and the government. One of the five judges expressed regret in having to acquiesce to the dropping of the investigation. Lady Hale found it ‘extremely distasteful that an independent public official should feel himself obliged to give way to threats of any sort’. She maintained that the threats and risks were matters that the director was entitled to take into account, but unlike the other four Law Lords she did not ‘accept that this was the only decision he could have made’. She added: ‘I would wish that the world were a better place where honest and conscientious public servants were not put in impossible situations such as this.’129

The Law Lords also ruled that it was not for the UK courts to determine whether the SFO Director’s decision was compatible or not with Article 5 of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, but for the OECD’s Working Group on Bribery to do so, as the dispute mechanism provided for in the convention. They were also swayed by the SFO Director’s admission that he would have taken the same decision irrespective of the convention. This is a startling admission that the UK had failed to incorporate Article 5 of the Anti-Bribery Convention into its domestic legislation, that the government and the SFO were not prepared to follow it, and that the article’s provisions are unenforceable in the UK. As Corner House pointed out: ‘This means that, regardless of whether or not it was unlawful for the SFO to halt its BAE–Saudi investigation, the UK is in breach of its international law obligations.’130

The decision was widely condemned. The Guardian, which helped spark the SFO investigation, responded to the Law Lords:

‘Whether or not patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel, national security can be the last refuge of the tyrant.’ Lord Walker issued that shrewd warning before going on to side with the government in a landmark case concerning the legality of heavy-handed terrorism laws. While well aware of the scope for abuse, the courts are always reticent about second-guessing the executive on national security; ministers, after all, have special responsibilities and privileged information here. Yesterday, the law lords unanimously displayed the traditional deference. They ruled that it had been lawful to axe a police probe into BAE Systems – a move made, officially, out of concern for public safety.131

Sue Hawley opined: ‘It is a very disappointing and very conservative judgment … If the courts are not prepared to hold the government to account, who will do that job? As Moses and Sullivan’s judgment most powerfully put it: “The rule of law is nothing if it fails to constrain overweening power”.’132 Lawrence Cockcroft, the UK chairman of Transparency International (TI), lamented that ‘The hope that our courts might rescue the credibility of the government’s duty to fight corruption has evaporated.’133

As Robert Wardle admitted, the SFO had submitted to blackmail, and the Law Lords made prosecuting major arms companies with powerful friends virtually impossible.134 Blackmail and threatening a government into dropping inconvenient investigations was now permissible.

On 1 April 2009, Helen Garlick said her farewell to friends and colleagues at the SFO. The venue was the basement of the Bung Hole Cellars on High Holborn in central London. The bunker-like subterranean gloom suited the occasion perfectly. Courageous people of integrity and principle, like Helen, were no longer wanted. As she said her dignified and heartfelt goodbyes, people wept openly, as much for the colleagues they were losing as the dark future facing the fight against corruption in the UK.135