1938

13 March 1938⁺ Vienna – Guderian

At the Imperial¹ in Vienna I met General Guderian.² He was shocked at what had gone on.³ I also kept hearing from him the word ‘trust’. G. blamed everything on the Army High Command which had not been able to master itself in the . . .⁴ spirit and so win the Führer’s confidence. I was astonished at how frank he was to me as a young captain. Also spoke about our new OB [C-in-C],⁵ of whom he had a poor opinion. I replied that the friction and this crisis of confidence were nothing new, I had experienced too much of it as regimental adjutant and company commander, and the attitude of the SS towards us was monstrous. General G replied this could best be overcome if the Reichsführer-SS or the present Field Marshal Göring⁶ were appointed C-in-C. Then ways and means would be found to clear the path of complications. I was so astonished at this point of view that I made no comment, but I do not find it convincing.

14 March 1938⁷

By chance I witnessed the F[ührer]’s reception of Cardinal Innitzer [Archbishop of Vienna] in the Imperial. F. approached I., bowed low and kissed hands. The cardinal raised the chained cross from his chest and with it made the symbolic sign of the cross. In the evening the F. was much taken with the visit and believes he can get along well with the Church in Austria. Heaps praise in general on the Catholic Church in Austria in contrast to the Reich. Over there it had become ever more political because of the parity of the two confessions. Here it was the state church and had a quite different relationship towards the state. In the Reich Bismarck and Windt-horst⁸ had made the same mistakes. Churches should only be allowed to become political if they were in the greater scheme of things the pawn of politics, that is of the political power. He himself had learned much from the Cath[olic] Church for his political struggle and would not talk of taking things to extremes. But whoever swam against the current and cloaked themselves with the Cross to oppose him would have to be eliminated. For this reason the declaration of loyalty by the cardinal seemed to him all the more precious. The cardinal had requested from him freedom of manoeuvre in the affairs of the Church, and had received from him an assurance.

19 March 1938
(Obersalzberg)

Himmler⁹ came from Vienna and reported about his cleansing measures.¹⁰ Presented a strident report in a previously unheard-of tone and sowed the first mines against the Church. Talks of ‘regrettable’ arrests. Continual shooting of Austrian officers of the Federal Army, who had to be got rid of. I was given a slip of paper with names to pass to OKH. Distinct impression that the thing is getting out of hand and old scores are being settled. In connection with the conversation, Reichsführer-SS asked F. for private talk. Doubtless the Fritsch¹¹ affair is to be discussed.

19 March 1938⁺

Amongst other things I reported to General Haider.¹² I was received with the same distrust as on most occasions with the other chiefs in the High Command, but the disrespect this time was the worst. I don’t know what he thinks I am. Up until now I was an active officer chosen for this post by the highly respected former C-in-C.¹³ In general I do not understand what is going on at OKH. The only thing certain is that everybody is talking of a crisis of confidence. Most blame it on the Party, the remainder are incensed about 4 February.¹⁴ I fail to see clearly how it can have brought us to this. The only thing certain is that everything we experienced so far in Army life in terms of internal opposition to the Party has forced us into the current crisis, wherein the younger General Staff officers, colleagues of my year of entry, are quite forthright and lay the blame not least on the leadership at the War Ministry with all the subsequent consequences. Strange to record that there is a more positive attitude to the Party amongst the General Staff officers of the South German Gaue [NSDAP – Nazi Party – districts] than is the case with us. But, however one looks at it. it is not pleasant and as always since 1933 we in the Army are the lightning conductors.

19 March 1938^*

Reported to General Haider. Distrustful reception as from most commanders-in-chief. Do not yet understand what is going on at OKH. One thing is sure: crisis of confidence of the first order. Most blame it on the Party, others on 4 February.¹⁵ I do not yet know how it came to this. Everything is leading at the moment towards a crisis. The young staff officers blame much on the War Minister.¹⁶ South German officers have a more positive attitude to the Party than is the case with us from North Germany. But, however one looks at it, it is not pleasant and the Army is once more the lightning conductor.

26 March 1938

A highly tense and unpleasant conversation with Schm(undt).¹⁷ Schm. came from F. and, beaming with joy, related how he had suggested that the Hitler salute should be introduced generally within the Wehrmacht.¹⁸ He had got the idea after witnessing the unprecedented wild jubilation shown to the Führer by troops he had met.¹⁹ I was appalled and asked him if he could imagine a positive reaction particularly from officers and NCOs. At Liegnitz²⁰ he must have experienced at pretty close quarters the altercations with the Party, SA and SS as I did at Rostock.²¹ Then the burden of the unexplained affair involving Fritsch. The officer corps would definitely see it as salt in the wound. Schm. gave me a long lecture about what we officers were lacking. We were primarily the guilty party in the crisis of confidence and were making it really difficult for the F. Fact was, he honoured his old teacher Beck and also the old C-in-C but neither had recognised the sign of the times. One should not always look to blame the Party bosses. He had the definite impression that F. was seeking the confidence of the Wehrmacht and correspondingly also the Army, but a number of generals were setting out to sabotage it. I did not agree and opposed what he said as far as I could, having regard to our respective rank and office. Today I recounted all this to Siewert²² in confidence.

28 March 1938

Long talk with Siewert on how things ought to proceed. It is very difficult to get through to him because he is still completely preoccupied with how the C-in-C was treated and apparently cannot get along with Br. [Brauchitsch]. The latter is all tensed up and quite resigned. His reports to the F. are inhibited and hesitant, no relationship of confidence at all. However, he now has a good spy in the RK [Reichskanzlei – Reich Chancellery] for I keep my ears pricked and find out everything. Each day I pass information to S[iewert] and we both then try to give the C-in-C material to enable him to prepare the Army’s rebuttal to accusations. F. does most of the talking and Br. does not dare interrupt or contradict him. Siewert hinted that Br. is very heavily weighed down with family problems and feels he cannot do what he sometimes wants to.²³

19 April 1938
(SS-) Verfügungstruppe

Long conversation between F. and Sepp Dietrich²⁴ about expansion of the Verfügungstruppe [the military wing of the SS which became the Waffen-SS]. Motive was the setting up of 4. Standarte [4th Battalion] ‘Der Führer’ in Vienna.²⁵ F. says that this completes the expansion of the SS-Verfügungstruppe. He wants to keep this ‘elite’ small or it will not be an elite for long. It has to be; a political force blindly loyal to state and Führer. In the event of disturbances, this force would put them down brutally. He sees it as a real Praetorian Guard²⁶ to snuff out all those, even within its own ranks, who swim against the current. Therefore [it has] to be equipped with the best and most up-to-date weapons, also with Panzers rather like a Panzer brigade. I am very concerned at this development and inform the C-in-C. It is high time that the Army did something similar or soon in Berlin we will all be evicted.

20 April 1938

I am on night duty and the solitude in the living quarters contrasts strongly to the hullabaloo experienced today throughout all Germany.²⁷ Shortly after midnight the Führer and I were alone, and I was very curious to see his attitude towards me for, although completely correct, he treats me with obvious distrust which is not surprising. We walked the length of the corridor without pause for over two hours. First he asked me personal questions about my regiment, activity as company commander and my General Staff training. Then he spoke about the parade which had visibly impressed him. Above all the Panzers in the new camouflage livery went down very well. Suddenly changing the subject he talked about the 100,000-man army, praising it highly. I waited my moment to mention the services of Colonel-General Fritsch and hoped for a favourable opportunity but the F. moved on at once to Field Marshal von Blomberg, beginning with the assertion that the necessary departure of both commanders had affected him deeply. The services of the War Minister in helping erect the National Socialist state were historic and would always remain so. He owed it to him that in 1933, knowing precisely the leanings of the generals, he transferred into the state structure an Army loyal and correct. Blomberg had also recognised the need to recruit modern officers who thought as National Socialists. He [Hitler] knew that the political reorganisation of the Army was only possible as a gradual process and he had often had to get the minister to apply the brakes. The majority of the generals had rejected him and that remained the case today. He embodied a different Prussian-ness to that of those generals. Before the seizure of power, only in Bavaria had he had close contacts with senior Reichswehr officers. Politically, as with all other officers, he had not trusted Blomberg a great deal. Blomberg had been opposed to his every bold decision, the worst when Germany left the League of Nations; on that occasion Blomberg protested like an hysterical virgin.²⁸ Yet that did not alter the fact that he was the first National Socialist-thinking commander-in-chief and in matters of rearmament he thought like him [Hitler], and not like Fritsch, who always worked at keeping things in check. The Fritsch affair would never have come into play if the War Minister had not made such an appalling choice. It was fatal only to get to know the bride’s mother at the marriage ceremony. One could tell by her face the type of woman she was and her antecedents. Blomberg knew nothing and would not have believed it anyway if it had been explained to him. But most of all he [Hitler] had been shocked by the field marshal’s attitude when they had had their last conversation. Blomberg had professed astonishment that he, Hitler, should be so reproachful and pointed out that he had been thinking as a National Socialist when he chose for his second wife a simple maiden from amongst the people. Whereas he [Hitler] and his Party colleagues might share a view of affairs different to, and freer than, the perverted morals of society, nevertheless he could hardly overlook a Party member in such a responsible position marrying a reformed prostitute. In the wake of this, he had taken no steps to intervene in the case of Fritsch because his confidence in the generals had been severely shaken.

I was absolutely shocked not to say flabbergasted that the Führer should speak so openly to me, a young officer. I was not in a position to respond, since Siewert and also the C-in-C had neglected to keep me informed. I had to labour at gathering the sum total of what I knew about both matters.

22/23 April 1938^*

The birthday anniversary is gone and I have night duty again. In the vestibule I spent another ninety minutes walking up and down with F. We spoke a lot about the [birthday] parade. He asked a whole series of technical questions about weapons, amongst others the Panzer IV. Was very impressed by the military spectacle. So I dared to have another try about our former C-in-C.²⁹ I mentioned a lot about his life and the regard with which he was held within the Army. Told him about manouevres at Stettin in which he was senior artillery commander, and much of his activities as commander of AR2 [2nd Artillery Regiment] at Schwerin. The Führer, today looking pale, heard me out quietly and for a change did not interrupt. Finally I made a plea, also at the instigation of the C-in-C, that he should receive Fritsch, this being the latter’s most cherished desire. He sought a personal reconciliation and clarification. This was more important to him than any reinstatement or employment elsewhere. Here the Führer became unsettled. In a long discourse he spoke once more of the disappointments he had known since 1934, all due to Fritsch. He had been the restraining element in rearmament. Quite apart from what happened, he would have had to let him go. I interrupted and recalled a conversation at Döberitz in 1935 which had made a particular impression on me as regimental adjutant at that time. To do nothing precipitate had been the byword and nature of Fritsch, since he wanted to avoid the Army being watered down. With that I rested my case. He departed and went to bed.

20 May 1938⁺
(Ideas for Uniforms)

F. made fun of the new Foreign Ministry uniforms.³⁰ Compared them with those of a circus master of ceremonies and suggested that the toilet ladies at the Foreign Office should have a nice uniform too. In all this palaver one saw the hollowness of diplomats and the ‘need to do things properly’ of protocol. He regretted very much that his foreign minister went along with this nonsense. Always people pointed out it was the same with other countries. But one should stop at idiocy. Moreover the cartel in other countries was always a small clique. His father had been a middle-ranking official in Austria entitled to a major’s uniform but was only permitted to wear it on the birthday of Kaiser Franz-Joseph, at all other times it hung in the wardrobe.

Hewel³¹ dared to contradict but made a bad impression. F. started to snap but despite it Hewel shifted the attack to Göring. The field marshal was also fond of fine fancy dress uniforms. The F. gave the surprising retort: ‘That is a special case, and I let him have his fun. He happens to have an extravagant personality; these small weaknesses are redeemed by his services.’

22 May 1938
(Beck)³²

Was with the Chief of the General Staff again to get him to attend the impending major conference of service heads with the F.³³ He was very friendly as usual. To my hint that he was the best person to advise the F. on how things looked in the Army and how necessary it was to tread warily in some areas, he clapped me on the shoulder and said: ‘Dear E[ngel], it is pointless putting all that to the Führer. He thinks only along political lines and is deaf to military objections. Besides, I am not used to his demagogic way. Convey to him my warmest greetings and tell him I will send Gen(eral) Haider who can supply answers to questions in such a way that he receives clear advice.’ I returned really saddened and informed Schm., who was likewise very disappointed.

22 May 1938^*
Reich Chancellery – Rome Society

F. in a none-too-good mood the whole day. Talking about Italian Impressionists and let drop scathing condemnation of Rome society and Italian nobility. So much degeneracy, so many parrot figures and old frumps as he had never previously seen heaped together. Worst thing was, this society together with its hollowness and stupidity still exercised a fair degree of influence on politics because it was protected by the Quirinal [the royal palace] and, having the full support of the crown, made life difficult for the Duce. At the concert in the Villa Borghese ridiculous counts and countesses were seated in the first two rows and the deserving marshals of the empire in the fourth and fifth. At a gesture and at his request at least two of the marshals were brought forward. Worst of all was the queen,³⁴ that mutton-thief from Montenegro. She was at least still stable, but otherwise pig-stupid. He had the worst martyr’s-road behind him, namely the polonaise [dance] through the rooms of the capitol. Women there had thrown themselves on him and almost poked his eyes out with their lorgnettes. Everything had to be done to support the Duce in his struggle against this corrupt society. But he didn’t have it easy, all the more so because the officer corps was thoroughly infiltrated by this kind of nobility.

May 1938⁺
F. – Beck – Haider

The Führer has called a pioneering conference³⁵ of the responsible Army and Luftwaffe Staffs in order to discuss with them the political consequences arising from the return of Austria to the Reich fold.

In many strolls on which I accompanied him recently on the Berg [Obersalzberg] and in the Reich Chancellery garden, he undoubtedly has further intentions of a political nature. His next aim seems to be a solution of the relationship towards the CSR [Republic of Czechoslovakia]. The Sudeten-German question has really got to him deeply and he does not want to see these Germans continuing in a foreign union. In connection with this he rained down more well-aimed blows on the Army. Without a background of force political aims were not possible. In this Fritsch obstructed him and for this reason he had to go. He would not condemn the whole German General Staff for that. On the contrary, based on his observation of the Wehrmacht manouevres, he had grown to value General Haider for his modern ideas and he could picture working together with him rather than with General Beck. The latter was a senior officer still trapped in the concepts of the 100,000-man Army, to whom the [mortar] traversing plate was more important than the fire trench. He would not pass any detrimental remarks, for his personal reputation, for example from the Ulm trial, was an absolutely good one.³⁶ But nowadays he could not use people who did not share his beliefs, and therefore even Beck’s days were numbered. Accordingly he wished that not only General Beck, but also General Haider, would put in an appearance at the major conference.

May 1938⁺
Attitude Schm. – Beck – F.

Schm. asked me personally to invite General Beck to attend the conference arranged by the F. for 28 May. This is a manoeuvre. However, Schmundt thinks a lot of Beck and wants him to experience the F.’s train of thought at first hand more than he has done previously. Schmundt is convinced that Blomberg, and especially also Fritsch, deliberately obstructed the rapprochement between Beck and the Führer. For this reason today I made the personal invitation to Beck and was really taken aback at his response. I made an effort to explain the current mood in the Reich Chancellery just as I had done shortly before for the C-in-C. He just smiled and replied: ‘Convey my kind regards to the Führer, but I don’t know whether I can come, for I have a lot to do and am working on a memorandum³⁷ which I will put before him in due course.’ I did not think he would attend. But in the event he did appear for the conference. Unfortunately, like the C-in-C, he took no sort of active part in it but just listened.³⁸ Only Göring did any arguing, and what he said was not really to the point.

15 June³⁹ 1938⁺
(F. – Br.)

The conversation [between] Führer and C-in-C was not enjoyable. One cannot speak of trust and I am disconsolate that the very precise pointers which I gave in the last fourteen days to the C-in-C, and above all to Siewert, were totally useless. The C-in-C [was] inhibited and unable to speak for us; he leaves that to me, that is when it concerns something unpleasant. They went over the rearmaments plan for autumn, and eventualities for Case Green.⁴⁰ I had given the C-in-C a whole list of matters regarding which the Führer had been misinformed and which had to be remedied. Thus, for example, accusations against the Army Weapons Office regarding the 21-cm gun,⁴¹ the short barrel on the Panzer IV,⁴² to the reactionary goings-on in the officer corps, which an awful case at Stettin has made worse.⁴³ But he failed to take steps to investigate this for himself. The two got no closer at dinner. Rather rashly I told this to Siewert and he was very unhappy about it. Unfortunately he still clings to the former C-in-C with all his fibre and just accepts it. So much so that in my opinion he is unable to exert the right influence on the new C-in-C.

25 June 1938⁺
F. – Gö-Hi

Very distasteful table talk. Göring, in field marshal’s uniform, went on and on criticising the Army, lashing out wildly at the General Staff, expressed himself very tactlessly about the Westwall Inspectorate (Speich).⁴⁴ Himmler held forth similarly, the first time he had really come out of his shell in conversation since I have known him. He wanted to get shot of Haider. Maintains he used to be called ‘The Mother-of-God General’ and had no front-line experience in the First World War.⁴⁵ The Führer was very reserved in his comments but one could see that these tactless criticisms did not find him an altogether unsympathetic listener. He said only that he wished the Wehrmacht had the same elan and willingness to fight as did all his political leaders, particularly the Gauleiters. He often heard reports of friction between his Gauleiters and commanding generals, and mostly the latter were responsible as they did not yet have a feeling for the new epoch.

14 July 1938⁺
(F. about Army Weapons)

While strolling with the Führer I gave him a statistical file concerning the modifications to the sFH18 [15-cm howitzer]. The result was the crudest outburst against the Army Weapons Office. General Becker⁴⁶ was a good technologist and an even better professor but understood nothing of the Army’s needs and even less about why we had to press on with rearmament. That there were only four⁴⁷ prototypes of the 21-cm gun⁴⁸ was criminal and yet here they were turning out more prototypes while the weapon remained unavailable to the troops. To my objection that the Army was experiencing difficulties procuring steel, the Führer replied that that did not explain it. Göring got everything he requisitioned, the difference being that the Luftwaffe used the material while the Army hoarded it.

18 July [1938]⁺
F. – H. – Förster

The Führer talked about progress being made on the construction of the Westwall and the fact that work had advanced as far as it had being due entirely to the Organisation Todt.⁴⁹ If he had given the German Army the job they would still have been building it ten years from now. The report which Engineer-General Förster⁵⁰ had given him very recently about bunker strength, and his knowledge of the effects of modern weapons, had come as a shock.⁵¹ He would not be able to discuss the subject with the Chief of the General Staff of course. The gentleman was still possessed of the mentality of the 100,000-man Army of the epoch when the Reichswehr was being created, a time when peace and order was required to bring it about. He [Hitler] preferred not to think that in the next few years we could be involved in massive battles which might decide the fate of Europe. Europe would either be under German leadership or fall victim to Bolshevism. He would rather not have had to build the Westwall. But one could not simply put the job off, and the more pressing the questions as to our destiny in the East, the greater had to be the reinsurance in the West.

18 July 1938
(Beck Memorandum)

F. had Beck’s memorandum⁵² in front of him and [remarked] to Todt, Schm. and myself that it was a fraudulent piece of paper, but did not deceive him. Childish calculations of strength. While the French included the Mobile Guard, Police and Gendarmerie in their ratios of fighting strength, in the German listings no mention at all was made of the SA, SS and so on. Even the German police were omitted. B. should not think he was stupid. He would draw up a list in riposte and hold it up in front of the gentleman’s nose. Schm seconded this very loudly and strengthened the F. in his resolve. I told Siewert about it this afternoon. He complained about the C-in-C, saying that he had no initiative or drive.

24 July 1938
(Beck Memorandum)

The Führer returned again to the Beck memorandum⁵³ and went over it with the C-in-C. The latter was fully on the defensive. The F. bombarded him with statistics which he had got from the Weapons Office. C-in-C was not in the picture at all. Increased intake White age-band⁵⁴ and stepping up of armaments production were discussed. First objection by Br. the F. said: ‘Then you must also release the steel which now as then is still being kept back.’ At that the F. got calmer and promised to discuss these matters with the field marshal⁵⁵ so as to obtain an increase in steel allocation for the Army.

August 1938⁺
Bayreuth⁵⁶

Uneasy hours at home of Frau Wagner⁵⁷ with close circle. Major Claus of the Fortifications Inspectorate came with new bunker designs all of which were rejected out of hand by the F. Not strong enough, too complicated. Masterpieces of German architecture but of no practical use. Insults rained down on the Fortifications Inspectorate.⁵⁸ The Führer drew up his own bunker sketches and said that he wanted a big conference with Professor Becker and other technicians as soon as we got back. Führer was beside himself with anger about the ‘stone-cutters’ amongst the Army technical people. Officers should not concern themselves with things they did not understand. Large building firms were much better at it and had more experience. Schmundt and I countered that it was not simply a matter of structures. A building firm could not really judge what type of bunker was best for a particular terrain. That was a matter of military planning.⁵⁹ We went backwards and forwards over this subject and the F. was extremely worked up. There was nothing to be gained in discussing it further. He interrupted all the time.

2 August 1938
Command Structure

OKH submitted a study about the command structure. The central point of contention was the leading role of the Army General Staff in all questions of defence and operational planning.⁶⁰ Schm., K[eitel]⁶¹ and F. all highly indignant. The last turned it down out of hand. He wanted just the opposite. These were reactionary ideas bearing Beck’s hallmark, aimed at sabotaging his political aims. If it had been up to the German Army, the Rhineland would still be occupied, not to mention no general conscription, no naval treaty and no Austria. Even Blomberg had shrieked like an hysterical virgin⁶² about all these things. I informed C-in-C of this response. He will speak to Führer personally about it.

6 August 1938
Church (Question) – Mu(nich)

Very long and strikingly calm conversation with Führer about churches and religion. Bormann⁶³ had complained to the F. about church attendance as a duty in the Army and Navy.⁶⁴ Apparently complaints by Party bosses on short-term service with r(eserve) units. F. had surprisingly declined to intervene. Spoke about his attitude towards the churches. Now as before he was a Catholic and would remain so. The [Catholic] Church was far too astute to excommunicate him. How he had learned a tremendous amount from the tactics, organisation and doctrinal method of the Cath[olic] Church. During the period of struggle he had seen the thing in a quite different light. His goal then had been to create a unified German Reich Church. The concordat was the most liberal advance he had achieved so far. This Church could be a fairly loose community of the two confessions in the form of a council. But he had to insist on its unconditional subordination to the state and National Socialist politics. He was very disappointed by the Reich bishop⁶⁵ who so far had not even managed to unite the Protestants under one hat. France did it much better. There the Church was without political influence but on national holidays the tricolour decorated the altars and church towers, whereas in Germany he still had to remunerate his adversaries. Ritual, liturgy and other practices of the churches were neither here nor there as far as he was concerned. It was just that the churches had to be nationalistic as had always been the case in Poland. There the red and white flags and church banners had preceded their troops into battle. The time is still not ripe to get involved, but it will come. For the moment he had too many other problems and as leader of the people he did not underestimate the power of suggestion the churches wielded.

11 August 1938
Schm. – v. Tresckow

Schm. incensed. He had passed on a telex from Obersalzberg containing F.’s agreement to merge various reserve troop units and mobilise them in divisions. The telex went to Chief OKW, (was forwarded) from there to Chief of General Staff, then (to) Operations Division. That is where Schm.’s best friend Tresckow⁶⁶ is. Beck had written a note about Schm. in the margin: ‘This officer has distanced himself from General Staff point of view and is to be removed from General Staff service as soon as possible.’ Unfortunately Tresckow showed the note to Schm., which was oil on the fire. Schm. wants to report it to the F. I hope I have dissuaded him. I told Tresckow that this was not very clever.

13 August 1938⁺
Persons of Mixed Race

F. talked today to his close circle about the Nuremberg Laws⁶⁷ again, and the consequences arising therefrom. When he thought about it, these laws had actually been too humane. Jewish citizens had been deprived of certain rights and excluded from state positions; what remained, however, was activity and work in the free economy and that is precisely what the Jews are best at. Few Jews become civil servants, that is a contradiction of their character. Their instinct for business could not flourish there. Not for nothing in historical times and the Middle Ages had the Jews become the wheels of commerce and moneyed activity; they were in their element. He had travelled through Munich recently and had requested that the Jewish businesses, insofar as any remained, should be pointed out to him. Practically all of them were still there. He would now consider the introduction of supplementary laws to restrict Jewish life in Germany to such an extent that the mass of the Jewish populace in Germany simply would not want to remain. That would be the best way to get rid of them. As far as he was concerned, they should be allowed to take out their money quietly, main thing was that they emigrated. The question of the many mixed marriages and the racially tainted offspring was problematic. He did not yet know how he would handle it. He was sorry for many of them, say what you will, in the world war there had been many brave Jewish soldiers, even officers. One could always make an exception in these cases, for it was not the fault of the children. In all these mixed marriage cases he reserved the right to retain them in state service and the Wehrmacht. Decisive here was their perceived attitude to the state, but above all the racial appearance. He would only go as far as 50 per cent mixed blood, though;⁶⁸ any more was beyond the pale and no allowance could be made for them. I interceded with F. on behalf of the numerous officers with part-Jewish blood and could recount a whole series of cases in which really tragic circumstances were playing a part. I saw that he was reluctant to hear this but he promised to investigate every case. The most unpleasant contribution from this close circle, which included amongst others Dr Ley,⁶⁹ his head of staff whose name I do not know and Secretary of State Hanke,⁷⁰ came as usual from Bormann, who insisted in a very violent tone of voice that officers of part-Jewish blood were still serving. Anyway, in this respect I have a not altogether pleasant responsibility.⁷¹ But one can also do a lot today.

14 August 1938
Reich Chancellery

Uproar about the Westwall. F. has looked over the plans and talks about delays by Army agencies. He had asked the field marshal to look into the rights of the matter.⁷² They had either done nothing, or done things imperfectly. Sharply criticised Engineer-General Forster. Reichsleiter Bo. [Bormann] was standing near F. He clapped Bo. on shoulder and said: ‘If I could do as I wanted, I know to whom I would transfer the work in place of the generals, Bormann. At least then I could rely on it.’ F. did not see me as I was standing off to one side.

17 August 1938
(Schm. – Reichsführer-SS)

Apparently Schm. had had to put up with a long and bitter litany from F. about the lukewarm and sloppy approach of the Army generals. One would soon not know what to do next. Now Himmler even thinks it necessary to monitor the construction of the Westwall and came to the Führer with the usual criticisms already uttered by Göring. He offered concentration-camp prisoners from the Emsland to speed up the work. F. was very keen on this suggestion. The C-in-C, whom I will inform, will definitely not be. The tragic thing is that Schm. is allowing himself to be influenced more and more, and tends to magnify the guilt in our own ranks. We had a violent argument, including about the personality of Himmler, whom he considers an idealist.

20 August 1938⁺
F. – Memorandum – B.

What I prophesied to Siewert has happened. I warned against submitting the memorandum.⁷³ The C-in-C had me present it, and that was very unfortunate. The harshest criticisms against the General Staff and Beck were the immediate consequence: his policies were being sabotaged. Instead of being glad to have the chance of working within his wealth of original ideas, the General Staff rejected out of hand any thought of a war. It was a disgrace in this memorandum to include in the numerical ratio of fighting strengths every English bobby and French Civil Guard, and in the German figures to leave out the SA, SS and Reichsarbeitsdienst [Labour Service]. He could see the intention, of course. It was now high time that the Chief of the General Staff disappeared. Up to now he had confidence in General Haider. As he saw it, he had a modern outlook and spelled out his ideas openly, as he had concluded generally, the Bavarian officer corps was apparently significantly more progressive, and more positive towards National Socialism than the so-called Prussian officer corps. It was a scandal, who was now occupying Moltke’s chair. Moltke had had to be restrained by Bismarck, and now the thing was happening in reverse.

20 August 1938
Purchasing Works of Art

Yesterday I had night duty. Suddenly F. decided to drive to the Haberstock Gallery⁷⁴ to have a second look at some paintings with a view to purchase. As I was in civilian clothing I accompanied him. Additionally I was curious because there were some confiscated works of ‘degenerate art’ available for inspection. Haberstock had bought abroad a number of Rubens and Rembrandts and offered them to F. who bought them all. There were some Italian security people present who had come from London. They were not there as buyers but on behalf of a British gallery arranging an exhibition of ‘degenerate works’. Along with some ugly examples were works by Corinth, Liebermann, other Impressionists and moderate Expressionists which were really good and about which I could enthuse. Also available were canvasses covered with ghastly splodges of colour and in my opinion it was not a matter of regret they had been classified degenerate. F. was invited to barter and he was as pleased as Punch to be able to get old masters so cheaply.

After return to Reich Chancellery there followed a long conversation about paintings to which I listened in silence. The opinions of F. were not uninteresting, but his opinions about art in general deplorable. He dismissed international art and even asserted that art and politics could not be separated. Painting and sculpture were the precipitate of political interest and a reflection of political relationships. The Greeks and Romans were a proof of it. When they were still a warrior race, their works reflected this; later, homosexuality was read into works good in themselves. It was like that in 1918. Oddly enough Jews had always been the carriers of degenerate art and he would not tolerate it any longer in Germany. For that reason he had banned from public display in Germany all paintings and works by Jewish artists irrespective of whether they had any merit. The talk went on long into the night. I was really appalled, but even more so by what the other partners to the conversation had to say. Even a layman would realise that Hoffmann’s⁷⁵ opinion was that of an amateur. Worst of all was the post-mortem on the discussion and many tried to out-trump the Führer.

25 August 1938⁺
Conference with Br. (Siewert)⁷⁶

The conference with Br. was very unpleasant again. He spoke in an extremely harsh vein about the Führer’s reaction to the memorandum.⁷⁷ He ignored my suggestion that he should confer with him personally. Siewert said I was 100 per cent right and stated candidly that it was useless for the C-in-C to attend a conference and when he was there say nothing. As it happened, Keitel had shown the memorandum immediately to Göring, and for the latter the whole thing was grist to the mill. I also told Siewert that, if we shrank from seizing the initiative and did not energetically combat defamatory remarks and false accusations by the Luftwaffe and Party, we had not seen the last of 4 February.⁷⁸

26 August 1938⁺
Conference with Halder

Naturally urged on by Himmler, the Führer is again planning to equip the so-called Totenkopf [Death’s Head] Standarte⁷⁹ with heavy weapons. That means another enlargement of the SS. And I said to Siewert today that if we do not start looking to our own interests it will keep on growing. But the C-in-C will simply not discuss the question of the SS with the Führer.

Without Siewert’s knowledge I went to Haider, who received me with extreme reservation, almost rudeness, told me candidly that he felt he was being followed and watched. As he said this he laid his service pistol on the desk with the remark that he would not allow himself to be knocked off, he would defend himself. I did not understand this at first and he gave me the impression of a very nervous and frightened man at the end of his tether. The OKW and Reich Chancellery were definitely not giving the OKH an easy ride. I supplied him with an insight into the goings-on in the Reich Chancellery both in the organisational respect with regard to the Army and also political. It was significant, and in my opinion is a very grave affair, when the Chief of the General Staff dismissed this with the sentiment: ‘Don’t bother me with this laughable garbage. I am interested in the thoughts of the German Reich Chancellor regarding the world political situation, but not his organisational ideas and military passion. I have my colleagues for that.’

5 September 1938⁺
Volkswagen Works

F. was visited by Dr Ley. The latter had test-driven a new car. I was not present at the test.

During a stroll F. spoke in great detail about the world’s traffic problems and stated that the development of the automobile and increase in its production would lead to a situation in ten years at the latest when the highways were no longer adequate for the traffic. He had tied in special ideas to the creation of the Volkswagen works. It was not only to be a good source of foreign exchange for the Reich but would above all replace the worker’s bicycle. He would not rest until the production over the years had reached such a level that, at a certain time, which he hoped to live to experience, every professional employee at least would have his own Volkswagen. The time was coming, passing on the way the motor cycle which, by the way, he did not think much of, when the baby’s pram and bicycle would become obsolete. The latter would be ridden only by boys and small girls.

For him, construction work on the autobahns was not proceeding fast enough, but it was simply not possible to go any faster, for one had to bear in mind the steel and armaments industries. A nation which had tackled the traffic problem before he had was the United States. Some years ago they had begun to construct large highways which by-passed the cities. Above all they had created multi-lane highways while in Germany, bent on retaining the pre-Flood means of transport, namely the horse, whole companies of provincial councillors fought like madmen to keep the summer paths open. He wanted to do away with this ridiculous idea, and he had already given the necessary instructions to his Gauleiters. In fifty years at the most horses would be seen only at military parades or in zoos and circuses, where children would gaze at them with the same astonishment as they now view camels and elephants.

8 September 1938
Conference at Nuremberg Br. – Ha.

After the concluding ceremony in the Kongresshalle, C-in-C and Haider were summoned at midnight to a conference about the invasion plan.⁸⁰ There followed the dreadful showdown which Schmundt and I had prophesied. The Führer spoke of them dividing his forces, lack of decisive operational objectives, deliberate underuse of Reichenau’s army and so on. It was very unpleasant. In conclusion he demanded in unmistakable terms a modification of the plan so that it corresponded to his own ideas. He even went so far as to dictate how his beloved SS-Leibstandarte⁸¹ should be deployed. I was unhappy that the C-in-C and Chief did not stand up to him. They simply went along with it and put forward no convincing counter-arguments. And then came the worst part. Quite unprompted, Brauchitsch made a declaration of loyalty on behalf of the Army. He had not waited until the Navy and Luftwaffe adjutants had been asked to leave the hall, and naturally the occurrence was reported to their respective commanders-in-chief next day. The consequence was that even the Führer was baffled as to how he was supposed to respond and contented himself by delivering a long harangue detailing how the Army had always disappointed him in the past. Brauchitsch had nothing to offer in reply. The only person who found it good was Keitel, but that proves it is precisely the opposite.

10 September 1938
(Party Congress)

Bad situation for C-in-C and Chief of the General Staff at invasion plan conference in the Deutscher Hof at Nuremberg.⁸² F. put the whole thing on its head, changed the motorised ratios, deprived Rundstedt⁸³ of the mass of Panzers and gave them to Reichenau.⁸⁴

Lamentable that Brauchitsch simply makes no effort to oppose him and just goes along with it all. After these two had gone, K. [Keitel] played a laughable role, agreeing that the F. was right in every instance, then gave him the benefit of his own ‘strategic’ thinking in meticulous detail. This put the F.’s back up against the Army, and as he got more annoyed he even spoke of their fear and cowardice.

Actually he would like to see his armies led by the Gauleiters. His political leaders at the Zeppelinwiese⁸⁵ would all drop by parachute to attack if he ordered it. The difference was that they had belief in the cause while the Army generals did not.

An awful state of affairs and one simply does not know how it will all turn out.

11 September 1938

As Bodenschatz⁸⁶ was there yesterday,⁸⁷ the field marshal [Göring] was naturally told everything and, as he sees it, it is oil to the lamp as far as the Army is concerned. He holds long talks about the invasion plan and speaks of it as like the work of a bad cadet. I have the impression that even the F. finds this talk embarrassing. He is very reserved about G.’s views and makes little comment.

26 September 1938^*

F. returned to Berlin⁸⁸ yesterday. Had there long conversation with Reichsführer-SS,⁸⁹ was drawn into it as duty military adjutant. F. informed me that in connection with Sudeten crisis an SS-Totenkopf Sturmbann [battalion] ‘for special purposes’ had been formed. It would march into the Ascher Zipfel.⁹⁰ He would use it to guard an autonomous Sudeten-German Government⁹¹ if one were set up in Asch. This Sturmbann needed heavy weapons, and the OKH would transfer to the SS forthwith about four light infantry guns. Reichsführer-SS, who was present, asked for six guns, and these were agreed without further enquiry. My objection that a battalion rated only two guns was not accepted by F. and he brushed it aside with the observation: ‘That does not apply here.’ Informed Chief of General Staff about this order. He promised to comply.

28 September 1938^*

F. enquired as to situation regarding the equipping of the ‘Sudeten-German Freikorps’,⁹² as it is now called officially, with weapons. Apparently there was a dispute between SA and SS. SS was naturally the winner. Obtained the necessary information from Army General Office [Allgemeine Heeresamt – AHA] and learned that the guns had been supplied. Former Austrian weapons were in the pipeline. These weapons had been given to the SS, so it seems concentration camp people⁹³ were armed with them originally. Now they are in the hands of the Sudeten-German Freikorps.

Important, and bringing some calm to OKH is F.’s decision that the entire Sudeten-German Freikorps has been subordinated to the Reichsführer-SS for special police tasks.

28 September 1938

(With Siewert) at OKH. Updated ab(out) readiness of Mussolini and Daladier to come to Munich. I kept repeating: F. does not want war, had good things to say about Chamberlain. Long conversation concerning Freikorps.⁹⁴ Told him of harsh words directed at Army and C-in-C by F.: everything⁹⁵ was being sabotaged, even weapons for Sudeten-German volunteers (only delivered in dribs and drabs).⁹⁶ F. will now use Totenkopf units to do the fighting. So I suspect that new SS units will be formed. F. praised the Party; at his order they would all drop by parachute to attack (every Party member) – where was the Army’s will to fight?

Also saw Chief of the General Staff. Seated at his desk in a state of collapse, crying, considers everything lost⁹⁷ does not believe in [Sudeten] unification. Harsh words about C-in-C for not arguing sufficiently forcibly the inadequacy of the Army and its fighting strength. I calmed him down and repeated what I had told Siewert, that F. above all does not want war with Britain. Ha. [Halder] is apparently being influenced very unfavourably and pessimistically by people from Foreign Ministry⁹⁸ and Wiedemann.⁹⁹

End September 1938

Propaganda march [through] WK [Wehrkreis – Military District] III.¹⁰⁰ War of nerves continues. ‘Brown papers’¹⁰¹ about conversations doubting the total German mobilisation eavesdropped at Fr[ench] and Brit[ish] embassies presented to F. F. suggested convoys of motorised units through Berlin. Referred this to Siewert. All up in arms about it. I to Gallenkamp¹⁰² (officer commanding III Corps) and Mellenthin¹⁰³ (No. 3 Staff Officer, III Corps). Decided to improvise a march by Wiinsdorf,¹⁰⁴ the artillery and infantry training schools and some flak units through Berlin to include the streets where embassies situated. Mellenthin with Schm. and me in Reich Chancellery.

Due to shortage of time no parade (possible). F. in a rage and only calmed down when embassies reported to Paris and London that it looks like he means business.

1 October 1938⁺
Chamberlain – Flat

Today there was an odd situation. The British Prime Minister arrived at Prinzregentenplatz 16 and used the lift to the F.’s flat. It stuck but was restarted successfully, thank God.

Afterwards F. spoke for a long time to Schm. and myself about the agreement.¹⁰⁵ My impression is that he genuinely likes the elderly gentleman and would enjoy further dealings with him. F. expresses the opinion that now for the time being it has all fallen quiet. The prime minister had said that he believed he was able to influence opinion in Britain and defuse anti-German feelings. The main thing was that we remained at peace. He had also assured him of this. He [Hitler] himself always bore in mind the primary requirement not to take any step which could be dangerous politically. First of all that which had been regained had to be digested. He would not lose sight, however, of the need for a solution to the points of dispute with Poland.¹⁰⁶ At the right time he would soften up the Poles and make them ripe for attack; to that end he would now apply the tried and tested method. Peace and quiet was something for the long term, when the Versailles Treaty was cancelled in its entirety.

16 October 1938
Reichenau – F. (in) Flat (on Prinzregentenplatz)

General von Reichenau is back and reported on China.¹⁰⁷ F. was annoyed and complained that gen[erals] knew nothing about politics. R. was in the act of ruining his whole Japan-concept. (Reichenau came home, as they all did, ‘infused’ with China).¹⁰⁸ F. discussed recent weeks with R., recounted how difficult it had been with Army High Command, impossible invasion plan (scattered decisive points). He had given to him, R., the job of striking the first decisive blow.¹⁰⁹ The Army was the most uncertain element of the state, worse than the Foreign Ministry and judiciary.

17 October 1938
(Schm. – Himmler)

Schm. had a long talk with Himmler, the former taken in as ever by the latter’s respectable, benevolent and adept manner, behind which so much lies concealed. Schm. was definitely ‘very impressed’ and believes that Himmler wants only the best for everybody and also has nothing against the Army. The SS-Verfügungstruppe would develop into an elite body only; he had no plans for a broader expansion. Neither for that matter did the Führer. But in the OKH there was a certain clique working to sabotage even the Führer-directives. General Fromm¹¹⁰ seemed to be at the forefront of it. Apparently H. was full of praise for Fritsch. He was very sorry about what had befallen him. Above all Fritsch had lent great support towards the setting up of the Leibstandarte.¹¹¹ He knew that the business involving [Fritsch] had only cropped up in the wake of the Blomberg affair, in which the trust placed in the High Command people had had to come under scrutiny.

This was all well and good, but the worst thing is that Schm. is frightfully gullible and believes anything too easily. In conversation Schm. even stated that theoretically one should slip the Reichsführer-SS into the Army structure in order to bring him closer to the heart of things. I merely said to Schm. that he could not be serious about this.

18 October 1938
F. – Bo. – Bouhler (Divorce)

(F. spoke about Colonel-General von Brauchitsch’s divorce. Reichsleiter Bouhler¹¹² had visited shortly before, subject was divorce of the C-in-C. F. spoke quite openly about it.) F. was generous. Offered extensive support to satisfy material demands (of) Fr(au) von Brau-chitsch and is anxious to avoid C-in-C being burdened psychologically in any way by the divorce. Everything else (will be arranged) immediately through RL Bouhler. He administers F.’s special accounts and [can make corresponding] disbursements.

Br. (was afterwards) with Bouhler on a number of occasions. Apparently affair (has been handled up to now very) discreetly and is known only to the smallest circle.¹¹³

18 October 1938

Put my oar in again about Fritsch. After midnight tried to engage F. in conversation about Fritsch. Opportunity was favourable since F. had spoken out in praise of Army; re-occupation [of Sudetenland] had gone off marvellously and our troops made a tremendous impression. Said that these were the fruits of the work of the former C-in-C who was held in great esteem. F. listened attentively, at first said nothing, then pointed to the lack of enthusiasm for rearmament Fr. had shown. When I dared to interrupt, F. curtly broke off the conversation.

11 November 1938

The uproar and shame have dissipated somewhat. Early morning the day before yesterday I drove (to) (Waeger)¹¹⁴ at the Weapons Office to fetch some files the F. wanted. On the drive back through Tauentzien, Kleiststr[asse], Lützowplatz I saw many large shards of glass being swept up. When I asked my chauffeur Stegmeyer if he could explain, he told me that the previous night the SA had smashed all the Jewish shop windows. I have seldom been so incensed. In the Reich Chancellery I met Schmundt. He was also very angry and said quite rightly: ‘This will cost us a lot abroad’. I did not stay for breakfast at the Chancellery but went home and discussed it with my wife. At midday Schmundt was a changed man. He told me that I had missed something at lunch. Goebbels had been there and explained convincingly the reason for the action. Now he was certain that the action was justified and it would demonstrate both to international Jewry and people abroad in general that they could not treat us just as they liked. There was no open season for Germans abroad. Every future attempted assassination¹¹⁵ would accordingly attract a reprisal in some such manner.

12 November 1938

Below¹¹⁶ came from the Reich Air Ministry where he had seen Göring. He told me confidentially that the latter was beside himself with rage about the anti-Jewish action and the crap Goebbels was coming out with to justify it. Göring had said: ‘Economically and politically this will cost us damned much abroad and now I shall have to practise economies again.’