1939

17 January 1939
(Niemöller)

Himmler was with F. and had apparently visited Pastor Niemöller¹¹⁷ in Oranienburg. Related that he was well and receiving special treatment.¹¹⁸ Führer became extremely critical of this person. If during his lifetime there was somebody who would never be released from custody it was this clergyman. He had the typical mentality which constantly rejected [sic], and was an opponent on principle, not from conviction, not to mention from religious belief. He knew all about his pledges of loyalty.¹¹⁹ And what had become of them? And all because he [Niemöller] had not become what he had hoped after the seizure of power. Now he was inciting people against the state using the cloak of God’s word. He [the Führer) would not allow him to preach in the camp. Niemöller was the typical renegade with the fanaticism of a Jesuit. He was a definite danger for the younger generation. Raeder¹²⁰ might intercede on his behalf as much as he liked out of old naval loyalties, but he would remain hard as iron and never allow N. to go free. Himmler added that his followers amongst the pastors were well known and being watched.

19 January 1939
Marriage – Officers

I have just put behind me a farce for which the Personnel Office, but above all the C-in-C, bear the blame. A lieutenant from Weissenfels had business in the house of a provincial court jurist in Halle. The latter’s 19-year-old daughter lived there. The 22-year-old lieutenant and the girl became very close and the affair had its consequences. The officer reported it at once as he was bound to and asked permission to wed the girl at once. The jurist was incidentally a reserve officer. The divisional commander acted on the lieutenant’s behalf in the petition to marry, but his superior turned it down and so did C-in-C. Afterwards Little K.¹²¹ rang and asked what he should do. C-in-C wanted me to advise F. of refusal. Word was that the lieutenant was going to lodge an appeal. I advised the Head of the Personnel Office to dispose of the matter with a consent to the marriage, admonition and disciplinary transfer because I know the F.’s viewpoint in these things. Everything was then down again to the ‘reactionary’ Army. K. sent me to Siewert and to the C-in-C where I found no change. So the affair ran its full course. I presented the appeal and the response was as I expected: a wild tirade against the Army, officer corps. They were all liars! The gentlemen could not see farther than their own noses. Outcome was consent to marriage with transfer to 1st Division. What is one to do when confronted with this sort of behaviour? And the worst of the bunch are in P2.¹²²

18 February 1939

The talk suggested by Schm. for all Army colonels (and) ([Navy] captains) in command positions throughout the Wehrmacht was held in the Kroll Opera House.¹²³ F.’s veiled criticism of the Army’s position with regard to political] matters humiliating and depressing. He did not mention actual names of units but everybody knew who was meant. What I found surprising was the F.’s openness regarding further pol[itical] aims and solutions ahead. Here the Wehrmacht was the indispensable guarantor of success. Long explanations of world view which had not yet become generally accepted in all Wehrmacht areas. Quite clear utterances ab[out] intentions, to negate the Versailles Treaty with regard to Poland, if necessary availing himself of other means than diplomacy, with which he was at odds in any case. Very positive towards Party in this respect. In the National] Socialist] State the Wehrmacht should not think of behaving like the Reichswehr.

Afterwards reception and banquet in the Reich Chancellery. Very mixed reception to the speech by commanders and generals, some enthusiastic, other highly sceptical. Once again Schm. gave the F. a false picture about its effect on commanders. Spoke of whole-hearted enthusiasm and approval.

8 April 1939

F. up in arms about the Italians and their invasion of Albania.¹²⁴ Possibly there was some envy in it. F. himself described the attack as aping his own recent political moves. In this Mussolini did not wish to be outdone. While he would never forget the Duce for his stance during recent events, particularly in March 1938. nevertheless he had the definite feeling that M. was not exactly overjoyed at his success. In all probability it came down to the fact that the Duce thought the F. understood military matters better than he did. Undoubtedly the Italian generals and nobility had played a sinister role and done everything in order to denigrate him, F. He regretted that Mussolini had not consulted him about the invasion of Albania but could understand why he had not, thank God, because he himself had refrained from seeking the Italians’ advice. If one told the garrulous Italians absolutely anything, one could be sure the press would get it. In general, he considered the penetration of the Balkans at this time to be risky, and the Italians must surely be aware that it was a powder keg. The dual monarchy [of Austria-Hungary] had been feared, but the Italians were hated and not feared.

Present were Schmundt, Keitel. Brauchitsch, Siewert, also Goebbels, Kerrl, Hewel, Lorenz¹²⁵ and myself.

June 1939^*
Conversation with Bormann, Hoffmann, Brandt in Munich

On the terrace of the HdK,¹²⁶ F. embarked on the subject of artists and their peculiarities. This came about after two plain-clothes officers made a heavy-handed attempt to prevent Weiss Ferdl¹²⁷ from sitting two tables away. F. intervened to let him have his way.

Unfortunately many Party members did not subscribe to the idea that artists could be anything other than normal earthlings. There was a certain something about the very word ‘artist’ which one had to respect. Such people were beyond good and evil and could not be just forced into the general run of things. They did things differently, and the crazier they appeared, the greater was their talent. He had not siphoned off Jewish artists because they were different to other people but on account of their racial predisposition to foster bad art. The race had the knack of transforming everything good into something to be despised, and they frequently did it with masterly satire. But there was more behind it: the tendency to impugn and demean authority. This meant a fight to the finish, at least as far as he was concerned. Actually he was not an enemy of humour and of people like Weiss Ferdl or even Schäffers¹²⁸ and Kläre Waldoff¹²⁹ could slate what they liked, provided it was kept within limits, but to mock and belittle oneself was unworthy of a National Socialist. On the other hand it was quite wrong to sniff an attack on the state every time a cabaret artiste started cracking a few jokes. The worst error was to lock up those artists who would not allow themselves to be forced into the scheme of things, because then they became martyrs and drew strength from that.

June 1939^*

The question of appointing a military attaché for Kabul became acute today and was discussed by F., C-in-C and Keitel. F. said suddenly, ‘Toussaint¹³⁰ must go there.’ He thinks the world of him since learning of his activities in Prague. F. then talked in general about military attachés and their duties. For some time German attachés had had their shortcomings. Military attachés were nothing more than accredited spies whose diplomatic passport enabled them to find out more than the Abwehr [Military Counter-Intelligence] could. If they were rumbled it was just bad luck and they flew home. He knew his Pappenheimers¹³¹ very well in this respect, and could draw a picture from the content and manner of presentation of their reports of which ones put breakfast with colleagues above all other duties, which ones went for an in-depth investigation of the host nation’s army or were trying to establish the intentions and aims of the host nation’s General Staff behind military-political dodges. Of the political reports he read with special pleasure those rendered by Bötticher¹³² in Washington; he could see through the stage props, had a very good appreciation of the Americans and their intentions and was also a very good judge of what in practice was going on behind the scenes. The worst were those attachés – and their recall was something that [was] necessary forthwith – who had become imbued with the mentality of the host nation, found everything there to be wonderful, and when the opportunity presented itself abroad were quite happy to mouth off against their own people. Here was something impossible to eradicate amongst career diplomats. That was one of the reasons why, one after the other, he was filling consular and ambassadorial posts with competent and proven Party members who had, above all, the correct world view. The C-in-C might well say in closing that, with a few individual exceptions, he was well satisfied with the attachés. But it was also important that these should be instructed politically by their embassies, and that was not always the case.

4 June 1939

Up in arms about elementary school-teachers. F. had apparently got annoyed about Gauleiter Simon,¹³³ therefore the emotional outburst. Spoke about the great danger in half-educating. Intelligence without education was a bad thing, discontent and complexes were the result. The King of Prussia [Frederick the Great] had done it the right way with the old NCOs. These had been modest people and taught the youth discipline and order. At that time nothing more had been necessary. But now the whole thing was much more difficult; political enlightenment and socialism had sharpened the critical faculties of the masses and the talented had become more ambitious. As the vehicles of social democracy, teachers had taken advantage of this development. In addition there came the stupidity of which the Army was guilty in the world war when it created hybrids which were neither fish nor fowl: the sergeant-lieutenants and commissioned warrant officers. These people often made up the soldiers’ councils of 1918 and in many cases were teachers by profession. In due course he would abolish all that once and for all. Teacher-training institutions must become similar to the Party-run Ordensburgen and Napolas;¹³⁴ moreover teachers should be paid a respectable wage and be given a proper title. When rearmament began, there were still people in the Army who wanted hybrid grades as in 1914/18, and he had stopped that; and he did not want to see the French troupier¹³⁵ in the Army either. That had nothing to do with the idea of earmarking intelligent Hitler Youth boys for the NCO career-path.

14 June 1939⁺
Radke – SA – C-in-C

Had a long conversation today with Schmundt about the intentions of the C-in-C regarding the SA.¹³⁶ One gains from Sch. the distinct impression that he is unhappy about the politics of the C-in-C in this respect. He is a Keitel-man, and very often Himmler and others are at his ear, influencing him to face in a particular direction. Schm. is a victim of circumstance. He realises that he is only nominally a member of the General Staff and that they do not think of him as a full member following Beck’s devastating marginal note.¹³⁷ From his own standpoint the C-in-C is right. Since its backbone was snapped in 1934 [as a result of the Night of the Long Knives], the SA is, for the moment, politically speaking the most harmless Party organ. A big role in the C-in-C’s politics is being played by Radke, who is carrying out his special duty as the so-called ‘Political Officer’ in the C-in-C Staff very conscientiously and with zeal. He has undoubtedly been successful, for it was exclusively his doing that the SA has been intensively nursed in the pre-military respect, and he has no doubt been trying to pour oil on Army-SA troubled waters. So far, however, he has had no luck with the Hitler Youth and Party, while the NSKK [Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrkorps] is pursuing the course laid down for it by Chief of Staff Lutze. One thing is quite clear, and Schm. almost swore to it: the SA is now powerless against Himmler and Heydrich. It was certainly also the will of the Führer to concentrate political power completely in the SS, probably goaded on by Bormann who, as one sees daily, exercises an ever-growing influence on F. He¹³⁸ has upset Reich Minister Hess to such an extent that Hess is almost never seen in the Reich Chancellery, and we have the impression, as does Schm, that he wants to kill off Hess politically and reduce him to insignificance.

Schm. spoke very critically about Radke himself, in reply I argued most forcibly. And the strange thing was that Schm. referred me to the opinion of his General Staff colleagues. A few days ago he had a talk with Groscurth¹³⁹ who had made a long complaint about Radke. Harsh criticism fell from his lips, for example Party hack, puppet of the C-in-C and similar. But really that does not seem right. Radke is undoubtedly very crafty and slippery as an eel, but from numerous conversations I have had with him I have the definite impression that his main objective is to consolidate the position of the C-in-C and with it that of the Army.

18 June 1939
Führer about Churches

Conversation with F. about Wehrmacht priests. Surprisingly, F. said that he had been thinking of cooperation with the churches quite differently. Contrary to his stated policy he had been hoping to be able to give the churches a national character. But churches had even refused to display national symbols, contrary to the practice in France and Italy. Politics had no place in church and he did not want God becoming a Party member. The churches (however) criticised the state instead of supporting it. Originally he had been thinking of a German Churches Federation composed of both confessions, but Rome and the likes of Niemöller had put paid to the idea.

18 June 1939
Naval Visits Abroad

After watching a film about calls made by German warships to foreign ports, F. talked about these voyages. They were a wonderful thing, and one saw in the naval officer’s deportment and conduct the self-awareness of the worldly man. Horizons and degree of education would be greatly enhanced by them. Confidence would result from learning to judge what was better abroad, and more importantly, what was worse. An officer of the Emden had told him¹⁴⁰ that one returned home comforted by the knowledge that nothing could beat German sense of order, precision, incorruptibility and thoroughness. There were complaints, of course, unfortunately often justified, about the foreign representation handling such visits in too stiff or formal a manner. He would discuss it with Bohle.¹⁴¹ He would have to involve the Party Foreign Organisation (AO) if a spineless ambassador was being stupid. In conclusion F. said he was considering whether it would be possible later to arrange for large parties of land officers to go on that kind of voyage.

28 June 1939⁺
Prince(-Regent) Paul

F. spoke at length about the Yugoslav visit.¹⁴² He repeatedly expressed his anger and disappointment that the couple had practically pulled a fast one. He cannot get over the fact that the pair of them, without even so much as a peep beforehand, will be going on to England after visiting Germany.

He considers Prince Paul¹⁴³ a complete weakling who would be better employed running a section at the Haus der Kunst rather than as a Head of State. The lady was undoubtedly charming, but remains a typical ice-cold Englishwoman as we saw today.¹⁴⁴ It was interesting that Prince Paul asked him several times if he might settle in Munich once Crown Prince Peter had come of age. Politics were insufferable to him, and the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were just a mish-mash with whom he had no desire to spend the rest of his life arguing. F. said, probably rightly, that she was behind this attitude. She wants to have an English life-style. But Prince Paul was slippery as an eel and he [Hitler] had not succeeded in getting his claws into him. Always when he thought he had got him, he dodged and hid behind his parliament.

All in all, I have the impression that, despite the big parade and other notable events, F. was not overly enthusiastic about this visit.

July 1939⁺
Haus der Kunst

F. spoke again about his appreciation of art and went over one of his favourite themes of recent times: Leda and the Swan. It had given him great satisfaction in this matter to have prevailed against the otherwise very progressive Frau Troost.¹⁴⁵ He had informed Director Kolb¹⁴⁶ that in his opinion somebody had deliberately tried to deceive the latter with regard to this work of art. If, while strolling to the gallery, he had not happened to notice that this painting was standing upside down, and had not observed from Kolb’s confusion that something was amiss, this work by Padua¹⁴⁷ would either have been incinerated by now or reside in some boiler room. The painting was unusually beautiful in colour, unsurpassed in its arrangement and was technically a masterpiece which the Dutch would be overjoyed to get their hands on. If people had gone out of their way to hide the title of the painting from him, those who were responsible need not have been so fussy. There was no reason for it and they were mostly the worst hypocrites themselves. The whole picture breathed strength, and this was the strength of the male over the bending female, and that was the way it should be in life. A woman wants a man and not a puppet. That kind was mostly abandoned by their spouses who then sought out something stronger. Padua was not the first to use the title ‘Leda and the Swan’ but there were no earlier works quite like it. It was not the artist’s role to be ashamed and prudish. One did not come into this world clothed, but in the glory of the body. What appeared to Jewish artists to be the right thing to do was cheap to his artists. On the stage too he allowed a great deal of licence and would not be perceived as ridiculous as the old Queen of England, Victoria, had been, when she censured her daughter for wearing a dress without stays: a female child of royal blood was not supposed to have any legs. He would have tried to get the old queen to see that no institution existed which forced her to think in that way. And in her case obviously, her children must have come directly from the heavens.¹⁴⁸

Art ought to strike out at everyday life, to be a talking image of human strength, also human mistakes and weaknesses and frequently the expression of heroic opinion.

4 July 1939
Danzig – SS

Today I pulled a fast one on the SS. From the very talkative Wolff,¹⁴⁹ Chief of the Reichsführer-SS Staff, I heard that Himmler was proposing arming and reorganizing the Totenkopf units into a brigade at Danzig.¹⁵⁰ I went at once to Fromm and Koehler¹⁵¹ and expressed my opinion that it was high time to mobilise and arm the Danzig police, thereby facilitating their transfer later into the Army. I then received from the Army General Office an organisational plan with dates. I presented this to the F. that evening, he approved it and signed it at my request. Tomorrow the AHA will advise the SS-Verfügungstruppe (Jüttner)¹⁵² of the order, and that will dispose of the Totenkopf question [in Danzig]. since from experience even there they tend to fight shy of things which bear the Führer’s signature.

8 July 1939

Bormann’s pathological agitation against church and religion simply has no bounds any longer. Today at table another violent outburst on account of Prof[essor] Schreiner¹⁵³ of Rostock, who is well known to me and is waging a brave struggle there against the Gau and Kreis leaderships. B. is demanding amongst other things that the Wehrmacht be made religion-free, and that the military-district and parish priests¹⁵⁴ be discharged. Schmundt – finally, thank God, in this case – and I spoke out against him saying the idea was very risky. At least 80-90 per cent of Wehrmacht conscripts had religious beliefs and wished to retain them. B. mouthed off loudly maintaining that the officers had ordered and forced them. He knew his young Party people and the SA better than we did. Nevertheless we didn’t relax our hold.

F. was strangely quiet and asked only that B. obtain information from the Gau heads as to the percentage by which church attendance had fallen amongst the general population.

In the evening I succeeded in saying a few things about Prof[essor] Schreiner to F. and took up the cudgels for him. F. is fairly disinterested in the personality, but was not sparing with some angry remarks about Dohrmann.¹⁵⁵

12 July 1939
Albrecht Case

We have put a quite bad spell behind us, but I am not yet done with the business. It concerned the conduct and future of a close colleague, and stirred up a whirlwind of dust. Albrecht¹⁵⁶ had married and took three weeks’ marriage leave, from which he had not returned. In response to my enquiry to the OKM [Oberkommando der Marine – Navy High Command] Chief of Staff Schulte-Mönting,¹⁵⁷ I was supplied with an evasive answer and given some talk about supplementary leave, all frightfully secretive, and he continued to behave throughout the whole affair in the most stupid manner possible. Meanwhile something filtered through. It had to do with Albrecht’s young wife, and I found out about it in the following way.

The Grossadmiral¹⁵⁸ appeared unannounced at [Obersalz]berg and spoke for over two hours with F. privately in the vestibule. Voices were raised occasionally and I heard F. speaking in a highly excited manner. The Grossadmiral left without a word to me, and afterwards I walked with F. At first completely silent, then it came out, words to the following effect. Apparently there was a typical officer-type intrigue going on again, but he refused to put up with any suspicions against his naval adjutant. It was always a bad thing if third parties alleged something and just left it at that. All the same, he had not let the matter drop and would have it investigated fully. In response to my question as to the nature of the occurrence, F. blurted it out. After the wedding it had been reported to the Grossadmiral that Frau Albrecht had previously been following an immoral life-style. There was talk of various relationships, the main one with a rich friend. Big parties had been thrown, a smoke screen being laid to disguise slightly what they were. One had to wonder how it came about that something like that was not general knowledge until after the marriage. In his view there was a large amount of bad judgment involved. This assumption appeared all the more justified as some of the accusations had apparently been made by officers’ wives. As a first step he had recalled Albrecht from leave and arranged to be introduced to his wife so that he might obtain a personal impression of her. As a result I was given the job of collecting Frau Albrecht tomorrow from the Berchtesgadener Hof and bringing her to the Bechsteinhaus.¹⁵⁹ As the Führer was very worked up, I did not ask further. Spoke in the evening with Below in Berlin. Since the Navy had not kept us informed, we had no excuse to bring the matter up with them.

13 July 1939⁺
Albrecht Case

Today I had a mixed bag of experiences. I fetched Frau Albrecht from Berchtesgaden. He himself was not to be seen. Impression: a strikingly attractive woman, very self-confident and apparently also very self-assured. She gave me a very hostile reception and we drove to the Bechsteinhaus in silence. F. was already there and conversation lasted an hour and a half. Afterwards I drove her back to Berchtesgaden. This time she was more communicative. She said in very emotional tones that she had met a person who had complete understanding for her as a woman, and steps would be taken to ensure that those who had denounced her would not go unpunished. I cannot say that she is nice. Despite her good looks, there is something hard about her face. It is obvious to me that there is a great deal behind the exterior. We parted formally and she said only that she was taking the night train to Berlin with her husband. I returned to the Bechsteinhaus where F. was standing on the doorstep and went with me to the Tea-House.¹⁶⁰

The whole affair was to be kept strictly secret. Apart from his valet, nobody was around. Now he let loose: the liars in the officer corps, the hypocritical morals, the staff doing what they could to break people and meddling in things which had nothing to do with appearance, conduct, achievement and opinions. The only thing new to come out of it was the fact that the Navy was more jesuitical than the Army. Albrecht had been within his rights to marry this good-looking woman and to overlook her past. The wife had simply had friends, which was a woman’s right if she looked good. The Gross-admiral had brought up the Blomberg case. The Blomberg case was something quite different. There was no way of telling how many officers’ wives who were now playing the moral guardian had had affairs in the past. Those were domestic matters for man and wife and were no business of third parties provided they did not become public property, The Blomberg case was quite different, he had knowingly married a street-girl who offered her body to all-comers for money. That was obviously not acceptable. But he understood enough about women to know that this was not the case with Frau Albrecht. He would not brush the matter aside. If the Grossadmiral wanted him [Albrecht] out, he could have it. But one could not speak of great Fatherland-conviction and responsibility in doing so. It went on and on in the same vein and I was glad when the time came to drive F. to the Berghof. On account of the secrecy I did something that had not happened before and chauffeured the Führer and Reich Chancellor home in my own car.

17 July 1939⁺
Albrecht Case

F. spoke to me again about the Albrecht affair which is now probably drawing to its conclusion. We had not seen him again. Below and I agreed not to inform Schmundt, who was on leave, about it so that he can continue to relax for a few days free from the cares of office. Apparently he had been going backwards and forwards for some days. F. pledged me to silence about the affair. Continued to heap abuse on the lying generals in the officer corps. F. said he had remained hard towards the Grossadmiral. At his suggestion Albrecht would leave naval service and enter the personal Adjutantur as No. 4 Adjutant. He would award him a high Party rank and that way the Grossadmiral would also get what he wanted. He had spoken in laughable terms about the burden of the officer corps. His preoccupation was cowards and defeatists, these were worse than officers’ involvements with women. This standpoint did not originate with him, but the great king [Frederick the Great] had a similar outlook and therefore also [did not want] rotten eggs.

18 July 1939

Was witness to a long talk between F. and Bormann who has apparently submitted another church-paper. Speaks bluntly about the ‘handservants’ of the churches ensconced in the Wehrmacht. Long legal arguments about whether and how one can incorporate the churches into the state structure or otherwise bring them under state control. Borm. is fire and flame for this project. F. more reserved. Even casts doubt on the figures produced by Bormann about reduction in church attendance generally. Complete lack of influence of the German Christians asserted by F. and admitted by Borm. With state help he wants to set up a ‘Church of God’ or something similar using pastors who have left the ministry, and thus set up a rival body to the Bekennenden Kirche [Confessional Church]. Suggested that all Party members should be forced to leave the church, which F. waved aside and distanced himself from any coercion or pressure in this respect. Then they noticed me and went out to the Winter Garden terrace.

20 July 1939⁺
Albrecht Case

Schmundt had an in-depth discussion with Schulte-Mönting and put Below and myself in the picture at once. The affair is significantly more serious than it appears to the Führer. We learned for the first time what accusations lie against Frau Albrecht. The thing in itself combines the most tawdry gossip with a corresponding salvo aimed at indecency. The fact is that the lady was not exactly unknown to naval circles at Kiel and had a year-long, very close relationship with a mill-owner – but also with others. The gentleman in question threw a series of rousing parties in which both sexes were scantily clad, and all this could be seen and confirmed from officers’ quarters opposite.

All well and good, but in any case the Führer is right; nothing was said about it until after the wedding and then apparently it was brought to the attention of the ObdM in a very back-handed manner. In general it is customary that wives whose husbands are adjutants at the highest level are vetted as thoroughly as a company commander has to do with regard to all marriage petitions submitted by his NCOs.¹⁶¹ I see in the whole affair an indictment of the Navy. It is regrettable that once again things fell into the Führer’s lap, leading to sharp criticism of the officer corps with respect to its conduct and outlook. It has been clear to us younger officers for some time that the so-called marriage regulations require a thorough overhaul, and most importantly should not employ two differing yardsticks.

28 July 1939⁺

Today an interesting table group at the home of Frau Wagner. Present were the ubiquitous Lady Mitford¹⁶² and her sister Frau Mosley.¹⁶³ The conversation ranged at length over the possibilities for Fascism in Britain. Frau Mosley presented a very optimistic picture. Emphasised that anti-semitism in Britain was increasing steadily. More interesting were the assertions of Lady Mitford, as is known a niece of Churchill.¹⁶⁴ She showed herself to be an expert on the British armaments situation. That was music for the ears of F. If what she said was correct, then the files of the German military attache were wrong. She stated firmly that Britain could not fight a war. At the moment there were only eight anti-aircraft batteries available for the whole of London. The Army was equipped only with obsolete weapons and had armoured vehicles for only two divisions. And so it went on and on. Only the Navy got any praise. This was strong and could be mobilised swiftly.

To us soldiers it is not clear what Lady M.’s role actually is. Is she a spy, an informer or just the fanatical Führer-supporter she makes herself out to be? One thing is clear – she has access to an excellent information network. She always knows where F. is.

8 August 1939
Film ‘Worthless Life’

Today we watched something really vile. Bouhler and Bormann showed F. a film called Unwertes Leben. It was about the life of incurable mental patients in a variety of institutions. It is really shocking to see it and one does not understand how the poor nursing staff can spend every working day with these unfortunate people. It must require all kinds of idealism and Christian commitment to devote oneself to it. Apparently the Reichsärzteführer¹⁶⁵ had the film shot and edited. Finally came the maddest idea of the lot: Bormann suggested to F. to put it on general release as a trailer in all cinemas. Brandt¹⁶⁶ objected at once on the grounds of causing public disquiet, and he would not exaggerate to those present the effect of having such a thing seen. He asked B. sharply what he would say if it was one of his own children there. Thank God F. agreed and forbade it.¹⁶⁷

The subject attracted a long discussion. F. had very strong opinion about duties and responsibility of doctors respecting maintaining or not maintaining such lives. If he had such a child, he would always request that its life be extinguished, not least for the sake of one’s fellow man. The peoples of the Orient did things better and in a more practical manner by placing the newly-born child in cold water or in the snow to establish if the creature was capable of life. Finally we came round again to the racial theme and selection in the SS. As the circle was a fairly big one, it was only a general discussion.

15 August 1939
(Flags)

F. up in arms against Army again on account of the colours trooped before him at a march-past. He could get really annoyed because he had given the nod to tradition in these things and approved the flags in the old style. The emblem of the Third Reich had been included in a modest way, but so craftily that a short-sighted standard bearer wouldn’t be able to see it. Unfortunately Blomberg had let him down there, fie himself had really wanted to introduce all flags at once with the national colours. The unit identification could have been sewn into a corner or on a strip of material. One could see how other countries did it in a quite reasonable way. The French had done so since the time of their Revolution. Unfortunately the German Army was anything but a revolutionary army. Tradition here, tradition there, he did not want the past to be forgotten, but the design and content was determined by the future, otherwise it might come about that flags would be paraded whose original bearers had fallen at Jena and Auerstedt. It was a very unpleasant conversation. The Führer was undoubtedly angered by other matters of which we learned nothing but his excitement was such that there was no point in interrupting him to ask. Here again Bormann seconded his Führer and master vociferously and even went so far as to say that everything could still be changed. At the next Party rally, new military standards, in reality no different to Party banners, would be lent to the Army and if necessary theirs would be put in some drill hall.

22 August 1939^*

This evening F. spoke calmly and was impressed by his talk to the generals. Gave Schmundt the job of finding out what the reaction to it was. It was particularly important with the generals, he thought, to be a really good popular psychologist and at his gatherings, irrespective of whether they involved the people in general or Party colleagues, he always knew what effect his words had had. It was different with the older officers, they adopted a staring, mask-like expression which betrayed nothing. That was how it had been today.¹⁶⁸

Politically, he reiterated, he was convinced that Poland would remain isolated, Britain and France were only bluffing, and he was not intending to negotiate with the latter in the near future. If the British left him alone, he would also leave them in peace. It was different with France. There was an account to be settled over Alsace-Lorraine. That was a worry for later; but it would certainly be sorted out. F. recalled his visit to Kehl. From up on the water tower, looking at Strasbourg Cathedral, he had embraced an unshakeable resolve, and he would keep it in mind.

F. repeated, that he now saw the developments ahead more calmly than for months. The front lines were drawn up and the other side could choose. His only fear, that at the last moment a ‘stupid acrobat of emotion’ could spoil his determination ‘with soft suggestions’, and he would be forced to give ground once more.

24 August 1939

Sp(eech to the) generals (Obersalzberg).¹⁶⁹ Am outraged at optimism of Schm. He reported that the generals were very impressed by the speech the day before yesterday and would tackle what lay ahead with confidence. They were also convinced of the necessity for the impending moves.

Nothing could be farther from the truth. F. was very calm and objective, but the mood amongst the generals is grave.¹⁷⁰ Not just over Poland, but what will follow. They are expecting definite consequences with France and Britain. The fear amongst many is that F. will resort to the use of arms to settle the Polish question.

25 August 1939⁺
Reich Chancellery

The C-in-C had his big day today. Before noon the Duce’s answer was received to the effect that that he was not in a position to go to war.¹⁷¹ F. was totally downcast. He seemed not to know what to do next. Doubtless influenced by Göring, at midday he summoned Ribben-trop, Brauchitsch and Göring. Finally I had to fetch Haider.¹⁷² Outcome was that the attack scheduled for tomorrow will be called off and Brauchitsch guaranteed that he would be able to blow the whistle and get everybody back in time.¹⁷³ F. was pleased and will set up new negotiations. Göring announced talks with middle-men.¹⁷⁴ This evening the opinion is that an attempt will be made to avoid war provided that the Poles are reasonable.

26 August 1939⁺
OKH

Have been with C-in-C, who talked at length about yesterday’s conference and is not wrong in ascribing to it the successful postponement of the outbreak of war. He remarked to F. that he could push forward the mobilisation more intensively and said that this yesterday had only been a feint. He knew that many peace feelers had been put out¹⁷⁵ and in this question for the first time Göring had been his best confederate. Through tight lips he added: ‘He knows very well that he does not want war, for it wouldn’t get any better than this in wartime.’

27 August 1939⁺
OKH

Have been with C-in-C again and brought him up to date with events in the Reich Chancellery. The place is a complete shambles. Yesterday there was the collision with Hewel, with whom F. wanted to bet that even if war broke out with Poland, the British would not get themselves involved. Hewel challenged this very forcibly and replied: ‘Mein Führer, do not underestimate the British. Once they see that there is no other way, then they get stubborn and do what they have to. I think I am a better judge of that than my Minister.’ F. was very annoyed and broke off the conversation.

The C-in-C sees it the same way and puts the situation in such a way that F. is lost for a solution. The expected¹⁷⁶ step back by the Italians¹⁷⁷ had been a grievous disappointment for F. Now the important thing was to convince him that Britain and France would stand behind their guarantees if we attacked. He sets great store by Göring, who apparently has good contacts in England to arrange something, not only through Sweden. Dahlems¹⁷⁸ is definitely one of his leading horses. Unfortunately his influence only reaches to certain English politicians and does not extend to the Cabinet or the Crown.

29 August 1939
Reich Chancellery

Another day of utter chaos and nobody can see the way clear. Certain circles are again doing what they can to abort new peace efforts, and also I now believe that these forces – they come primarily from within the Party – are stronger than those who really want to remain at peace.

F. is as never before on edge, irritable, sharp with everybody. Thus Schmundt and I had to receive a heap of abuse against the Army after it had been all quiet on that front for some time. F. emphasised that he now knew how the General Staff were thinking. Certain things had come to his knowledge about which he preferred not to speak at present. One thing was clear: he would not allow the military to give him counsel on whether there should be peace or war. He was simply unable to understand those German soldiers who feared battle. Frederick the Great would turn in his grave if he saw today’s generals. All he wanted was an end to unjust behaviour by the Poles vis-ä-vis the German state.¹⁷⁹ He did not want war at all with the others. If they were stupid enough to get involved, the blood would be on their hands, and they would have to be destroyed. He did not want another ‘First Silesian War’;¹⁸⁰ even the flags authorised by him to the Wehrmacht needed to have secular strips recording their battle honours, otherwise a glorious army would lose its identity. We left thoroughly depressed.

10 September 1939⁺

It keeps on revolving, i.e. around me as Army adjutant, the Fritsch affair. The Führer knows that he is with his regiment¹⁸¹ and apparently it annoys him but he cannot do anything about it. Meanwhile a letter has arrived from Blomberg in which he offers his services and requests a position. Schmundt is playing an unfortunate role in this and in a conversation today with the Führer explained that Blomberg would be content to be given a corps. Undoubtedly he is seeking rehabilitation. Keitel had his doubts about showing this letter to the Führer. After discussing it with Siewert I brought up the subject with the Führer today and requested that if possible he decide against offering Blomberg an appointment;¹⁸² it would not be understood in Army circles, especially since Fritsch is with his regiment. Fortunately the Führer was more clear-headed and resolute in this matter than his senior ADC. He emphasised in candid terms that an appointment would only be considered once Blomberg had left his wife. Despite everything, however, he would never forget his service to the cause that is when he gave him the 100,000-man Army for safekeeping, and above all his attitude towards National Socialism,¹⁸³ for the 100,000-man Army had been a state within the state. That might have been the right thing during the Weimar Republic but he had not been prepared to put up with it in the Third Reich. With Blomberg’s help a large number of reactionaries amongst the Army generals had been put out to grass and the others muzzled and shown the path of discipline and subordination. Despite its great abilities and high standards of training it had become a necessity to slot the Reichswehr Army into the state, for the state was now powered by a soldierly Party and not by portfolio-wielding parliamentarians. A truly politically unified Army would not come into being until the next generation, by when the spirit of the 100,000-man Army would have been banished and that of the Hitler Youth would permeate the officer corps. But that was a long way ahead. I put the C-in-C and Siewert in the picture about this conversation first thing this evening.

19 September 1939

Excursion to the front with AOK 8 [Eighth Army Command].¹⁸⁴ General Blaskowitz¹⁸⁵ escorted F. through Lodz. Visited several divisions, also parts of the LAH [Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler]. Sch. and I were horrified when Bl. suggested to the Führer forming the numerous available Green-Police¹⁸⁶ and SS-Totenkopf units into a division. That evening F., who had seized upon suggestion with great enthusiasm, ordered the Reichsführer-SS to form a police division,¹⁸⁷ and at the same time the majority of the Totenkopf units into an SS division.¹⁸⁸ I told C-in-C and Gen. Fromm. Both were raging. On political grounds F. turned down my suggestion that these units should be given to the Army.

26 September 1939⁺
(Racial matters – Poland)

F. gave long and involved talk about annexation of former eastern provinces of Posen and West Prussia currently in hand. In this connection he explained the future of Poland, its resettlement by Germans and how the Poles generally are to be treated. Those stratas of the Polish population considered racially valuable can be Germanised. Racial appearance and heredity are the important factors here. Originally, several centuries ago, after being settled by the German military orders, these racial groups were made up of Slav and German blood in roughly equal parts. German peasant settlers who had emigrated from the Magdeburg Erbrecht¹⁸⁹ to the east sought wives there. As German women were not available they had settled for Slav females, and these hot-blooded women had very quickly imposed a powerful influence on their upright husbands. In accordance with local tradition, the female was the dominant partner and accordingly much Germanness was lost and the thing had now to be overturned. A special racial group was going to be created in which the language was the most important thing. Children had to forget Polish and learn only German, although the parents could more or less carry on as they were. The benefits of the transformation process would be felt by the next generation. The important thing was, above all, that the peasant stock was maintained. He placed no value on the Polish intelligentsia. There was no place for them in the overall picture. They were dangerous, being the vehicle of Polish nationalism. Incidentally one should not overlook the church. From time immemorial Poland had always had the most radical national church; in itself that was not a bad thing but it could not be allowed in Poland. How often had he said that he wanted for Germany a radical church of that kind, whose processions were led not by modest church banners but by the national flag, and he wanted this same flag dressing the altars and flying from church towers.

28 September 1939⁺

F. is very pleased about his talks with Gauleiter Greiser.¹⁹⁰ The latter had the right politics for the Warthegau. As a child of the east he knew Poland and the Westmarkenverein.¹⁹¹ He would liquidate the Polish intellectuals wherever he thought it justified. They had killed us earlier, one should not now shrink from the task if it was about getting rid of trouble-makers. He would have another talk with Greiser and Forster¹⁹² regarding the direction to be taken. The two of them did not see eye to eye on this. Forster was probably a soft-liner, even towards the Polish intellectuals, and that was not promising. It was hardly surprising, though, because he was from Franconia and even in Danzig had not had many dealings with Poles, but he would soon have that straightened out. Under no circumstances did he want the smallest fragment of Polish influence to survive in the Reich provinces. In thirty years’ time he wanted people to be able to drive across the country and have nothing to remind them that once upon a time these regions had been the subject of disputes between German and Pole. He would let the Reichsführer-SS know, for example, that a heavy-handed police chief¹⁹³ was coming to Danzig, a person to whom all maudlin sentimentality was anathema, who would suppress with all means at his disposal any cultural activity of the Polish people.

1 October 1939⁺

F. was outspoken in his anger at Forster, who differs from Greiser¹⁹⁴ in his ideas on how to handle the Polish people. As was to be expected, the Army received a few more side-swipes. F. said to Schmundt and myself that von Heitz’s¹⁹⁵ influence was undoubtedly making itself felt with Forster. He had heard from other sources that Forster was in favour of the mild route. But that was typical of those officers who were sometimes like children in political matters and as a result of their upbringing and work simply did not understand historical connections and political requirements. In a short while he would announce that no Polish lawyer was practising in Posen and West Prussia, and Polish doctors were only there under German control and if necessary. It is now clear even to the simple-minded that no Pole has a place in any remaining offices and positions. The best thing would be if large sections of the Polish people could be resettled in an area where they could be reabsorbed. A good example was the Ruhr, where virtually all Poles there have been Germanised.

4 October 1939

Very serious and interesting conversation with Brandt.¹⁹⁶ Br. had spoken to Bishop Gr(af) Galen¹⁹⁷ in Münster and [had] discussed Church and other problems with him. It appears that the bishop had been very forthright and told him a great deal about morale generally, war morale and how the people felt. Apparently the bishop also held nothing back even when speaking about the Jewish question and detainees. Br. was very impressed by the personality and very reflective over many things. To my question if (he) would be making a full report to the Führer he was evasive and replied: ‘If I repeated to the Führer everything that Gr(af) Galen told me, he would have us both locked up.’ They got on so well together that Graf Galen asked Brandt to visit again.

On the same day I was able to inform C-in-C and Siewert about this matter.

8 October 1939⁺
Ghettos

Within a small circle F. spoke comprehensively about the Jewish problem which had come to his attention so visibly during his visits to Poland and had to be resolved not only in Germany but also in other countries within the German sphere of influence. It was not a religious but a racial problem. He continued to ponder why he had been so humane and liberal with the Nuremberg Laws. At that time the idea had occurred to him to rid himself of the 600,000 German Jews in a kind of business deal, and his 1937 plan to offer this half million or so Jews to Britain as a workforce for Palestine had been perfectly serious.¹⁹⁸ But it had not gone down well with the British and other nations. Britain had told him in no uncertain terms in a diplomatic note that they had quite enough of this problem in Palestine already and preferred not to invite further unrest.

Even if the political influence of the Jews in Poland had been slight, the whole affair would still have had to be dealt with rigorously. The setting up of large ghettos, such as those at Lublin and Lodz, had already begun. But these would be insufficient, and there would have to be several more. Former army camps and fortresses would be ideal. Within them, Jews could have autonomy, even their own police, and could then resolve their differences amongst themselves; that they would have to work was obvious. Such a solution had been neglected in Germany. It could not be achieved by distinctive badges and so forth. Together with Himmler and Heydrich he would decide, once Poland had fallen, to what extent the main Jewish population could be shifted around locally, or into the Protectorate.

F. laughed as he recounted the episode in which the Foreign Minister had been in Moscow with Stalin working out the respective limits of the mutual occupation zones. When Ribbentrop demanded the Suwalki height, arguing that it formed part of the border with East Prussia, Stalin attempted to talk him out of it with the following advice: ‘Don’t take this area, if the Reich Chancellor knew how many Jews live there, he would certainly reject it.’ F. then embarked upon a monologue, and none of his Party friends butted in. I sat in the background near the fireplace, the only officer present. Also there amongst others Dr Dietrich,¹⁹⁹ Schirach,²⁰⁰ Esser,²⁰¹ the Munich Gauleiter Wagner²⁰² and Murr.²⁰³

I was very depressed and will report the matter to the C-in-C tomorrow, for the whole affair will greatly involve the occupation forces.

15 October 1939⁺
Heitz’s Report

F. was very excited and rained reproaches on the Army. Reason was that Hertz had presented a report from local centres which mentioned the arbitrary executions of Jews and Polish intellectuals²⁰⁴ including at Mewe, Graudenz and Thorn. This document had been forwarded to SS- and police chief von Alvensleben;²⁰⁵ from him it went to Heydrich, who sent it on its short journey to the Reich Chancellery. The point was, officers had to keep all maudlin sentimentality to themselves. What was necessary to be done to bring peace to the old Reich territories was no business of the Wehrmacht, and it should keep its nose out of what did not concern it. Earlier, the Poles themselves had not been fussy when their turn had come to deal with the German minority. He had already given instructions that the process should be made known to all heads of the Westmarkenverein. I saw the C-in-C again today to keep him informed. He cursed and is asking personally for a report from Danzig.

7 November 1939
Reich Chancellery

Br. requested a private talk with F.²⁰⁶ Siewert told me that Br. wanted to make some decisive points to F. Asked F., and to my surprise he agreed. C-in-C left F. at 1350 hrs; said to me in passing only: ‘Now it’s all up, he doesn’t believe me.’ S. told me that C-in-C had presented a memorandum from Gen.Qu.²⁰⁷

1700 hrs with Schm. to F. The latter very irate, spoke of sabotage by Army. The memo was a pack of lies and asked for the alleged mutinous groups to be identified. [Engel’s addition: Only third-rank divisions were involved which by their nature did not have the same outlook as active units.] Ordered me to ascertain the facts by going there myself to clarify the situation. Now he wants to distance himself from C-in-C and dictated a record of the conversation to Frl. Schröder. F. placed this in his safe.

F. is significantly calmer today. He had a long talk with Keitel. Latter told Schm.. he had advised F. against dismissing C-in-C as there was no obvious successor. In the evening spoke at length with Schm. [F.] told him the whole crisis of confidence was the fault of the Army and change would eventually have to come about. F. stated that he could not accept Reichenau or anyone else.

10 November 1939

F. received C-in-C in private.²⁰⁸ Was there briefly to deliver various reports. Impression was awful; without advice or having been put in picture by ourselves, C-in-C had submitted a memo about the state and preparedness of the Army. Files came from General Wagner. Contents according to F.: Army (was) unreliable; amongst reserve-units (cases) of signs of disintegration in Poland; (Army) not in the position to carry out further aggressive war. F. was beside himself, sent for Christa Schröder for dictation regarding dismissal of C-in-C. We endured some bitter hours. Siewert told me in the evening it had only been done in order to make F. think in terms of peace.

18 November 1939
Reich Chancellery

Siewert sent for me and handed me a memorandum²⁰⁹ from Gen. Blaskowitz about the situation in Poland; serious concern about illegal shootings, arrests and seizures. Worries about Army discipline amongst those who see these things going on; local discussions with SD [Sicherheitsdienst – Security Service] and Gestapo unsuccessful, they refer back to orders from Reichsführer-SS. Please, restore rule of law, above all only carry out executions which result from proper judicial proceedings.

Submitted the memo, which is precisely factual, to F. the same afternoon. He read through it calmly then lashed out furiously against ‘infantile attitude’ in Army High Command. The war couldn’t be run with Salvation Army methods. A long-held aversion came to light. He had never trusted Gen. Bl. He had been opposed to giving him command of an army, and considered it right to relieve him of it since he was unsuitable. Informed C-in-C and Siewert, also OQu.IV.²¹⁰

22 November 1939
Reich Chancellery

Telephone call from Guderian. Wanted to speak alone with F. Came at once. In with him an hour.²¹¹ Told me afterwards he had retrieved Gen.Qu. memorandum.²¹² Considers relationship between C-in-C and F. intolerable. Had assured F. that troops were not as portrayed. Did not have a name in mind for successor. (I) was present at the tailend as I had to fetch some Panzer files. Conversation was warm and friendly and then turned technical. Agreement on need to upgrade weapons Pz. II and IV. Also all Pz. division artillery [to be put] on mobile chassis.

23 November 1939
C-in-C – Talks

Decisive conf(erence) with F.²¹³ All possibilities of an end to the war and a separate treaty with a Polish government, of which F. has spoken several times, have been destroyed. F. informed C-in-C, Keitel and Jodl of his firm resolve to attack in the W(est) as soon as possible, and moreover in the winter, in any case before Christmas. In his opinion the Army is ready. Long waiting periods were a curse, cold and frost less a danger than people always said. F. spoke of offensive which would begin if possible at the beginning of December.²¹⁴ He was making that dependent on what the meteorologists promised, however. This was decisive because the Luftwaffe was essential. In the midst of political and operational ideas he switched to trivialities, considering the possibilities of surprise raids and landings near antitank obstructions. He hit out at the Army repeatedly. In conclusion all three C-in-Cs asked for more armaments. Field Marshal Göring the most strident. The attitude of the ObdM [Raeder] was rather peculiar, welcoming the invasion of Belgium and Holland from a naval point of view because he would then have better forward bases for his U-boats.²¹⁵ I accompanied C-in-C, who was very serious and thoughtful.

6 December 1939

Dramatic argument about the decisive point of attack.²¹⁶ F. dismissed the ‘old Schlieffen ham’. Other ideas were floated, primarily to split the French and British. He saw no problem in sending Panzers through the mountains. Ordered a new plan to be worked out but offered no concrete suggestions himself based on how he saw it. In this connection very critical of Br. and Ha. His ideas were being deliberately sabotaged, but he would prevail even if he didn’t happen to be a learned General Staff officer.

10 December 1939

Succession C-in-C. The disaster is still rumbling.²¹⁷ F. had a long talk with Schmundt and me about his decision to make the final break with C-in-C.²¹⁸ He needed optimists, not the opposite. He had nothing personal against the colonel-general, but he had no use for political worriers. Actually the best thing to do would be to smoke the General Staff out into the Bendlerstrasse and start again with young people. Frederick the Great had said that generals understood nothing about politics, but the fact they were frightened to go to war was knowledge that had been kept from him. If only he knew a possible successor. He had had to turn down Reichenau since he considered him unreliable. He was not demanding a National Socialist, only somebody who would be faithful to, and blindly follow, his political aims. Schobert²¹⁹ was very passionate here, but in his opinion not sufficiently mature, and even Guderian was out of the question for various reasons; and he had a lot of enemies amongst the generals. Schmundt pleaded for Reichenau, but failed to convince F.

14 December 1939

F. and the visiting Himmler greatly irate about the allocation of divisional priests to the SS-Polizeidivision.²²⁰ Scathing remarks about military spiritual care. The pastors were viruses and agitators, closet reactionaries misusing religious belief in order to fish in dark waters. One had to consider how to abolish spiritual care altogether. Better to employ the clergy as drivers instead of pastors.²²¹ Hard words about Bishop Dohrmann: one knew only too well what circles he frequented and how closely he was tied up with the ‘Bekennenden Kirche’. These were Himmler’s words, and he went on to say that nobody was being accepted into the SS if he had not demonstrably abandoned the church.²²² F. would not go as far as that, but was not sparing with biting remarks directed primarily against the evan[gelical] Church, which was currently a threat to the state.

26 December 1939
Hymns and Carols

Back from our Christmas visits.²²³ We went to [Infantry Regiment] Groβdeutschland²²⁴ at Montabaur, to the Leibstandarte and Spicherer Höhen near Saarbrücken along the Westwall. The festivities of GD at Kloster Montabaur and also 75th Infantry Division at Saarbrücken were particularly impressive. Grim and anything but Christmassy were the Leibstandarte celebrations. Schmundt and I were surprised that even the F. talked about it for some time and for a change shared our opinion. In this connection he mentioned hymns and said there was nothing more uplifting than certain German hymns he knew. Bormann had tried to get him to issue a directive that Christmas carols should not be played or sung in F’s presence. He was very much opposed to this. ‘Silent Night’ was one of the finest carols ever, and irrespective of his views about the church he would never miss hearing this carol sung at Christmas Eve. Church leadership and cultural heritage was something else. He was at present at odds with the church leadership since they insisted upon remaining outside the state-political sphere. He would need to be stupid and ill-informed, especially in view of the spiritual values of the Catholic Church, if he failed to recognise what lay behind it. But even Luther and his movement had made enormous strides. As head of state, however, he was not going to let the church have a final say nor, what was worse, that church authorities prescribed what he had to do or permit within the state in which they enjoyed the rights of hospitality.