SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE
From its embryonic beginnings in 1939 to its scaled-up operations from 1940 and through to the end of 1942, Kendrick’s unit amassed volumes of information and thousands of recorded conversations from German POWs, covering all aspects of the war. It made a material difference to the intelligence picture being filtered through to the commanders of all fighting forces. At the beginning of 1942, Admiral Godfrey (head of naval intelligence) submitted a report on the state of intelligence and on the ineffectiveness of SIS ever since the Venlo incident of November 1939. He commented that SIS ‘leaves a great deal to be desired both in the quality of its agents and in the quality of information it produces’; he made no judgement on whether that was due to lack of funding in the period prior to 1939 or incompetence after the summer of 1939. He contended that, with the fall of France and the Low Countries in 1940, SIS struggled and lost a proper presence in Europe. Only by 1942 was it flourishing, with new organizations (which he does not name) set up ‘under the eyes of the enemy’ and doing well in Norway, Belgium, Holland and France. He added that ‘we are badly placed for intelligence from Germany’. This was due to strict security there and implementation of the death penalty, which made it hard to infiltrate any agents. Godfrey then argued that it was ‘special intelligence’ – i.e. intelligence coming from Kendrick’s sites and Bletchley Park – that had saved the situation until 1942.1
The hard-fought Battle of the Atlantic was one example: supremacy of the seas depended on good and early intelligence from ‘special intelligence’ sites. Britain faced a constant threat from U-boats and the risk of a German blockade to starve her into submission. The M Rooms brought details of a change in U-boat tactics and descriptions of the U-boat shelters at St Nazaire, which were simply not visible from RAF reconnaissance missions, as they were cut deep into the coast and could not be seen from above.2
The period between November 1943 and February 1944 was a busy time for the interrogators as the 36 survivors of the German battleship Scharnhorst, sunk on 26 December 1943, were brought to Latimer House, as were the survivors of nine sunken U-boats.3 Prisoners soon revealed the latest location of displaced German war industries, a large synthetic oil plant at Auschwitz and underground sites that could not be identified from aerial reconnaissance missions.4 Of particular value was information from prisoners on new underground factories in Germany and Czechoslovakia: for example, Mittelwerk Niedersachswerfen, near Nordhausen, which was manufacturing V-2 rockets, Junkers aero engines and jet propulsion units.5
Prisoners at Latimer House and Wilton Park carelessly gave up information on the Abwehr. Though the fact has never before been revealed, it is clear that, by the end of 1942, Kendrick had overseen the compilation of a comprehensive report that gave details of Abwehr headquarters, its sub-divisions and the structure of its base in Berlin, and an index of Abwehr personalities.6 A list assembled in April 1942 named 36 Abwehr individuals – including agents and their handlers – while another provided the names of a further 44 Abwehr operatives gleaned from interrogations.7 The reports contain physical descriptions of the agents, where they were based, who they were working with and in which country. Under Kendrick’s direction, the unit was able to reconstruct the structure of Abwehr I (Intelligence), Abwehr II (Sabotage, with a section on propaganda) and Abwehr III (Counter-espionage, with connections to the Gestapo). The information was analysed and indexed, with copies of reports kept in the reference library at Latimer House.
This is an example where CSDIC not only gathered information of direct relevance to the war, but intelligence on every aspect of Nazi Germany, including its secret service. Under Kendrick’s jurisdiction, his teams successfully mapped the structure and operations of the Abwehr – something that had perhaps eluded him in the 1930s. Without further declassified files for the 1930s, it is not possible to make a complete judgement on that.
Today, it is not a straightforward task to trace the impact of certain pieces of intelligence and their outcome for aspects of the war. This is primarily because much of the intelligence from CSDIC was disguised when it was sent to other departments, in order to prevent its true source from being revealed. In this respect, it paralleled Bletchley Park, where intelligence from decrypts had to be obscured to stop the Germans ever discovering that Enigma had been broken. However, it is possible to gain some understanding of how Kendrick’s operations played a crucial part in the Allied victory.
Rocket technology
In a previous book, The Walls Have Ears, I traced a direct link between the recorded conversations at Latimer House and Trent Park in the spring of 1943 and the Allied bombing of the weapon development site at Peenemünde.8 Those conversations were used to provide a detailed analysis of Hitler’s secret weapon programme. However, new evidence has emerged in recent research to support my earlier claims.
During 1942, two secret agents working behind enemy lines had sent back information about a German programme to develop long-range rockets.9 However, this had come from an untried source and British intelligence required further independent corroboration. In late 1942, the interrogating teams at Latimer House and Wilton Park were briefed about a possible German rocket programme and asked to gain information from prisoners of war. The breakthrough came at Latimer House on 11 March 1943, when two lower-ranking prisoners started speaking about rocket technology in their cell, following an interrogation.10 Kendrick and Felkin pored over the transcript. Kendrick then telephoned the Air Ministry on a secure line, while Felkin returned to the ‘Spider’ to brief the interrogators in the hope of gaining more information.
The intelligence coup came 10 days later at Trent Park. Events had taken a dramatic turn on the Russian Front: German Field Marshal von Paulus, in charge of the German 6th Army, which had been trying to take Stalingrad, surrendered to the Soviets on 2 February 1943.11 The German generals and senior officers at Trent Park listened in to radio broadcasts detailing the German military losses and became extremely pessimistic. Some believed that the war was now all but lost. On 22 March 1943, sitting by the fireplace in one of the drawing rooms, von Thoma whispered:
. . . but no progress whatsoever can have been made in this rocket business. I saw it once with Feldmarschall [Field Marshal] Brauchitsch, there is a special ground near Kunersdorf (?) [i.e. Kummersdorf] . . . They’ve got these huge things which they’ve brought up here . . . They’ve always said they would go 15kms into the stratosphere and then . . . You only aim at an area . . . If one was to . . . every few days . . . frightful . . . The Major there was full of hope – he said ‘Wait until next year and then the fun will start!’ . . . There’s no limit to the range.12
The chiefs of staff were immediately briefed.13 Von Thoma’s rocket statement was slender evidence, but ‘it represented a crucial point in the intelligence picture at that date’.14 The result of the dialogue, recorded in the M Room, was that any prisoner, of any rank, with knowledge of specially propelled aircraft was sent to CSDIC for interrogation and his conversations recorded.15
In the coming weeks, prisoners across all three of Kendrick’s sites talked about rocket technology, the V-1 and V-2.16 Evidence being gathered by British intelligence pointed to experiments with rockets on the Baltic coast. There was also some suggestion that, because their construction involved certain specific engineering challenges and they required special propellant fuels, experts would have to be employed. A request went out that any POW with general information on Peenemünde, or who had worked there, should be transferred to one of Kendrick’s sites for special interrogation. That included personnel engaged in the transport network who may have had knowledge of specialist equipment and parts being taken by rail and road, or knowledge of fuels or of any companies engaged in manufacturing the special parts.17 Prisoners captured in the Middle East or Mediterranean theatres of war who had knowledge of specially propelled aircraft were dispatched to the UK for interrogation.
Reports were still coming into MI6 from agents behind enemy lines, bringing information on solid emplacements on the coast of France, Belgium and Holland for guns with a range of 230 miles.18 Such importance was attached to V-weapon intelligence that a special committee had been formed in London, and the efforts to find out more information had assumed a status of ‘great urgency and importance’.19 The RAF was sent to reconnoitre the areas, and the results were to be delivered to MI6 and MI9 within a matter of days. Intelligence was required on four key areas of German technological development: very high-altitude aircraft; jet-propelled aircraft; turbine-driven aircraft; and pilotless aircraft.20 Photographs from new air reconnaissance flights over Peenemünde were analysed at RAF Medmenham, at Danesfield House in Buckinghamshire. The analysis confirmed the secret experimental site for the V-weapons, and it is possible to trace a direct link between the intelligence garnered from Kendrick’s sites and the bombing of Peenemünde on 17/18 August 1943.21
In the month before that night attack, intelligence was still emerging from German POWs at Kendrick’s special sites which demonstrated just how serious Hitler’s rocket programme was. It was deemed so urgent that information contained in two bugged conversations from survivors of U-607 was sent, by scrambler, by one of Kendrick’s officers, Major Rittner, across a secure telephone line to MI19.22 One of the prisoners – Jeschonnek by name – was the brother of General Jeschonnek (chief of air staff in Germany). He was in discussion with a certain naval POW named Gassauer.23 Rittner’s handwritten report, which has never been quoted before, is worth citing here because of its importance:
Gassauer suggests that the time for the invasion will be September. They are expecting a lot from the rockets. They have 200 kilos of explosives in them, and experiments are taking place on the Baltic, NE of Berlin. Jeschonnek has said that as soon as this new apparatus begins to be used, the war will be over. These are rockets with tremendous range and effect.24
This intelligence highlighted for the first time that, as soon as the V-1 was ready, Hitler intended to use it to support an invasion of Britain, in September 1943. The two prisoners confirmed that Hitler had not actually abandoned his plan to invade Britain, and he was close to making the V-1 fully operational in July/August 1943. It could have proved costly to ignore such intelligence, and its importance cannot be underestimated. Nothing could be left to chance by British intelligence in the fight against this enemy. The bugged conversations provided the final confirmation that Peenemünde had to be rendered non-operational by means of an intense night attack. The intelligence from Jeschonnek was considered to be insider information from the brother of the chief of air staff in Germany, and therefore reliable.
A few days before the RAF raid on Peenemünde, a special copy of the Daily Herald was mocked up, carrying a bogus article. In it, a ‘Swedish correspondent’ referred to the rocket weapon. The newspaper was casually left on a table in the house so that the generals would find it. This had the desired effect and was the subject of conversation between von Arnim and Colonel Wolters.25 The latter spoke of huge rockets that could be fired from Brussels or from the coast and that would fall on London, Dover, Plymouth and Portsmouth. Von Arnim added that a rocket projector barrel was ‘quite a simple thing . . . and similar to that used with the Nebelwefer (Do. Gerät) [Doodlebug]’.26
On 17–18 August 1943, pilots from Bomber Command carried out a first attack on Peenemünde. Codenamed Operation Hydra, this was the start of a much larger Anglo-American offensive against V-weapons, codenamed Operation Crossbow. It rendered the site non-operational and meant that the first V-1 did not fall on London until 13 June 1944, approximately a week after D-Day.27
References to the V-1 and V-2 continued to emerge in conversations at Trent Park from 1943 until the end of the war. The RAF periodically carried out bombing raids on Peenemünde and the mobile launch sites, whenever the locations of the latter were leaked by prisoners.
During 1944, the interrogation of prisoner Lauterjung was described by Lieutenant Colonel Pryor of the Air Ministry in a comment to Major Rawlinson (head of MI19) as ‘the corner stone in the whole structure which we have now built up concerning the mobile operation of the big rocket, and was therefore as near to being a war-winner as any single report I have met’.28 This comment supports a long-held belief, founded on my own research, that the intelligence on V-weapons gleaned from prisoners’ conversations could indeed be described as ‘war-winning’. Fleeting inter-service jealousy surfaced over this intelligence in a comment made by Major Le Bosquet of CSDIC to Rawlinson, after Pryor had admitted to owing his promotion entirely to this intelligence – intelligence that had come solely from CSDIC. As Le Bosquet wrote to Rawlinson: ‘the best way to win the war is to promote Colonel Pryor on the basis of other people’s reports!’29
Just how close the Allies may have come to losing the war, had the V-weapons not been discovered in time, is confirmed in the recent discovery of a report on the interrogation of a Dutch student and a party of Dutch escapists who entered Britain. They were interrogated at the Royal Patriotic School (MI19’s interrogation centre for civilians entering Britain during the war), where they disclosed that they had been told by a friend that Germany had a new weapon due to be used in August or September 1943. This weapon would surprise and defeat the Allies, and experiments using it had been conducted near Vienna.30
The attack on Peenemünde in mid-August 1943 was fundamental in halting Hitler’s deadly weapons programme. The direct consequence of the V-weapon intelligence from prisoners at Kendrick’s sites was twofold: it prevented a German invasion of Britain in September 1943; and it delayed Hitler’s rocket test launches, so that the secret weapon programme was not operational for a further nine months. Without this intelligence, it is doubtful that the Allies could have successfully mounted the D-Day landings. Indeed, failure to delay Hitler’s rocket programme in August 1943 could have cost the Allies the war, as Hitler could have invaded Britain and also used his V-weapons on any Allied forces in Europe (including in Sicily and Italy). He could have won the war via technology. That is the stark reality. It is no exaggeration to say that this intelligence coup thwarted Germany’s quest for weapons superiority.
In terms of technological and military intelligence, one of the most valuable prisoners to be ‘turned’ was Herbert Cleff, of the German army’s scientific civil service. The difficulty faced by Kendrick’s team when prisoners such as Cleff gave up details of new German technology was that certain government departments in Britain did not believe it was scientifically feasible and were inclined to reject the intelligence. As an experienced spymaster, Kendrick was persistent and encouraged his officers not to dismiss any information from prisoners. His instinct was to prove correct on many occasions – but especially in the case of Cleff.
Cleff was brought to Latimer House for detailed interrogation after his capture at the end of 1942. The interrogators called him ‘Peter’. Naval interrogator Donald Welbourn described him as ‘probably the most brilliant all-round engineer I have ever known, being skilled with his hands at anything from watch-making to general fitting, and being certainly the most original kinematician of his generation’.31 Because of his knowledge of tanks, Cleff was first processed by army interrogators. Then he was partnered in a cell with a stool pigeon masquerading as a Luftwaffe officer. Their conversations revealed that Cleff knew a lot about new planes and U-boats. What was recorded from their conversations was so startling that Cleff was interviewed by camp psychologist Lieutenant Colonel Henry Dicks to ascertain how he could be persuaded to cooperate further. Cleff’s brilliance and quick thinking meant that he managed to fool Dicks; but he soon found himself walking the fields around Latimer with Welbourn for the befriending treatment.32
Cleff was an interesting case because, in the end, it was personal tragedy that convinced him to work for the Allies. While at Latimer House, he received the news that his brother, whom he idolized, had been killed fighting in Russia. This news was a turning point for Cleff, who was prepared to help bring about the defeat of Hitler in whatever way he could. He opened up and explained how Germany could win the war: he knew the exact capability of the German war machine and what was being developed. He went on to give specific, if inexact, information to Felkin about U-boats that had high-speed turbines built by Brückner, Kanis KG in Dresden, and about a novel form of propellant that produced nothing but steam on combustion. He said that the same propellant was to be used in a new type of jet fighter. He admitted to Felkin that he knew of a new type of aircraft engine working on the ramjet principle. Within a few months, this was identified as the V-1.33
A few details of the V-2 were known to Cleff, but not yet enough to put British intelligence on full alert. He had knowledge of small, remote-controlled tanks and tanks with steam propulsion built by Henschel, as well as information on German gas turbines. Welbourn took him for lunch at the Maison Basque in Dover Street, Mayfair, to meet Sir Harry Ricardo, the designer of British tank engines in the First World War, who had also developed the sleeve-valve aero engines for the Second World War. Cleff and Ricardo discussed the German designs of diesel engines and new developments with German tanks. Cleff went on to provide a long list of new technology being used or in development by the Nazi regime. The information which he revealed about German gas turbines led Felkin and Welbourn to visit jet-engine scientist Frank Whittle at Brownsover Hall near Rugby. It was Whittle’s ingenuity and energy that drove forward the first gas turbines in Britain. Whittle took in all the information that had been gathered from Cleff and, most importantly, believed the intelligence to be possible. Welbourn recalled:
He [Whittle] was particularly fascinated by what we had to tell him about the ram jets, Düsen in German, for which we had no translation. He kept referring to them as aero-thermodynamic ducts, and in the car on the way back, faced with a lot of translation to be done, we shortened this to athodyd, the word remained current in the English literature until about 1950.34
A short time later, Kendrick hosted a luncheon for Whittle at Latimer House, at which Felkin, Commander Cope (head of the naval intelligence section) and Welbourn were present. Relaxing in wing-back chairs in the library afterwards, with cigarettes and a glass of wine, the men discussed the latest German technological developments. Welbourn explained to Whittle about the naval information that Cleff had given them and how the director of naval intelligence and torpedoes had already dismissed the possibility of high-speed U-boats. But Whittle understood the technology and believed that it could work. Later that day, he returned to his base and set his staff to work on the mathematics. Subsequently, he wrote a technical paper, in which he outlined how a submarine could be designed to do 20 knots submerged.35
A technical paper from a section of the Air Ministry that, in effect, told the Admiralty how to do its job was dynamite. It was important for this intelligence to be taken seriously and not be drowned in inter-departmental rivalry (something that had happened during the First World War, in a spat between London and a section of military intelligence at Folkestone). The cooperation between Cleff and Whittle offers a concrete example of a situation where Kendrick was instrumental in keeping matters on track and avoiding any escalation of inter-service rivalry. His ability in this respect would later be acknowledged in a letter to him from Crockatt, the head of MI9. Departmental rivalries had to be set aside, because the intelligence coming from Kendrick’s efficient operation demonstrated, without a shred of doubt, that the Germans were far advanced in the development of jet aircraft.
In the case of Cleff, his ‘turning’ to work for Kendrick’s officers, and the intelligence which he divulged, resulted in the Ministry of Aircraft Production authorizing Whittle to proceed with the development of the British jet projects. Without that, the Allies could not have developed sufficient countermeasures in time and Germany would have inched still closer to winning the technological war.
Cleff could not be held indefinitely at Latimer House. To transfer him to another POW camp was considered a waste of valuable talent. And so, in January 1944, he was assigned to Sir Claude Gibb (director general of armoured fighting vehicles) and worked on solving the design fault of suspension in the Morris tanks.36
Intelligence on Russia
There is a further – perhaps even less well appreciated – dimension to Kendrick’s role as spymaster: that of Russia. In 1943, British intelligence had precious little information on Russia; this was because Britain had not been conducting surveillance on its ally. That said, though an ally, Josef Stalin was not totally trusted by the West. It is not easy to pinpoint an exact moment when the Allies again become significantly concerned about future Russian intentions. Rather, the unease was one that developed gradually. The hard-fought Russian victory over the German forces at Stalingrad marked a turning point, signalling that Germany was not going to succeed in its designs on Russia. To assess the potential threat to the West from Russia, British intelligence needed crucial information on the Soviet Union’s fighting capability, frontline operations and technological advances.
The challenge for British intelligence was where to gain this information.And the answer came from Kendrick’s eavesdropping programme on Axis POWs of all ranks, but in particular the German generals at Trent Park. The bugged conversations took on fresh significance, as Kendrick briefed the interrogators on the need for intelligence about Russia: they had to ensure that the secret listeners recorded all prisoner conversations that mentioned Russia. Now it was a matter of amassing intelligence on Germany and Russia. This is an aspect of Kendrick’s work that has previously been overlooked.
The majority of the German generals being held at Trent Park had served on the Eastern Front and had been eyewitnesses to the fighting. They would supply the clues to building up a broad picture of Russia. They spoke freely among themselves about Russian forces, equipment and the battlefields, and were concerned that Russia was the real threat that Germany and Western Europe would face after the war. The first generals to arrive at Trent Park in May and June 1943 frequently discussed the effectiveness of the Russian T-34 battle tanks. The T-34 was admired for its speed, manoeuvrability, weaponry and armour. They chatted to each other about how the Russians were concentrating on the production of this one type of tank, and estimated that Soviet Union was turning out a thousand T-34s a month, compared to Germany, which was producing only around 300 to 400 tanks a month. They revealed how Germany had developed an effective weapon against the T-34, but would be unable to produce it in sufficient quantities to ‘mount a successful offensive against Russia that summer [1943]’.37
In response to the production of the new T-34, Germany was developing its Tiger tank; by the summer of 1943, it would be tested in the latest fighting against Russia.38 Although the Tiger tank had been used in North Africa, it had not been a success there because of the terrain. For that region, Cramer told his fellow generals, a quicker, smaller tank was needed. The Russians had now switched to heavy use of artillery and mines as the best defence against the Tiger tanks.39 The generals discussed the likelihood of an Allied invasion of Europe and how there was a lack of German tanks in western divisions, because they had been sent to fight in Russia.40 Personnel had been dispatched to France to recuperate and had been promised by the German High Command that tanks would follow for fighting there; but even after three months the tanks had not arrived.41 This, said the generals, had affected the German fighting capability in France.42
In terms of the state of Russian fighting forces, Cramer confirmed in conversation with General Georg Neuffer that, in spite of the filth and squalor in Russia, its troops were physically ‘of a very high standard and very brave indeed’.43 He also commented to the other generals that the Hungarian and Romanian troops fighting the Russians were ineffective, due to their poor equipment and the fact that they had saved their best troops to guard their own borders. Nor did the Hungarians and Romanians have a sufficiently developed munitions industry to manufacture weapons.44 Bassenge concurred with the view that the Russians were brave fighters and superior in manpower and materiel.45 He reckoned that the real danger for both Britain and Germany came from Russia and Japan.
Important insights came from von Arnim, who had served for two years on the Russian Front. He expressed the belief that if Germany had not attacked Russia in June 1941, Russia would have invaded Germany: ‘The Russian Front must hold or the whole of Europe will be overrun with Communism.’ He bragged to fellow generals that he had had access to German intelligence reports on Russia.46 The last report he had seen stated that the bread ration of Russian troops had been cut by a fifth, and millions of the population were starving. In these circumstances, a German blockade of Russia, he argued, would be more effective than an offensive. He knew that the Russians were sending boys as young as 16 to the front; though trained to fight, they were less tough.47 Russia had a shortage of infantry weapons and was relying on taking guns from the dead. Von Arnim revealed a complex picture of the fighting, because Soviet partisans near Bryansk, who had been fighting the Bolsheviks ever since the 1917 Revolution, were helping German troops against the Russian communists. His bugged conversations proved significant in gaining a reliable overview of the Russian situation because of both his first-hand experiences and his access to German intelligence reports.
Lieutenant General Gotthard Frantz (who had taken three weeks to learn that it was not Lord Aberfeldy’s duty to scour London shops for red-brown polish for his boots) proved useful in intelligence terms. Frantz told fellow officers that, while in Tunisia, he had received reports that vast concentrations of troops were being observed behind Russian lines on the Kursk–Belgorod sector.48 His interpretation was that Russian troops were preparing for the second front into southern France with Anglo-American forces. Von Arnim piped up that a plane had been sent to evacuate him from Tunisia to defend Italy, but he had said his duty was to stay with his men. Interestingly, the conversation shows that he may have disobeyed Hitler’s orders to help defend Italy from Allied invasion.
The Russian threat
Conversations at Trent Park in the autumn and winter of 1943 were taken up with the Russians, the state of German forces and whether Britain would be overtaken by Bolshevism.49 Whether they were in the pro-Nazi or the anti-Nazi camp, the generals were united in their belief that the real threat to Europe was Russia. Lieutenant General Theodor von Sponeck expressed his fear that Germany might make an alliance with Russia, which would mean Germany turning Bolshevik. Fear of Russia was a persistent theme in the conversations. The generals were unanimous in their belief that the next world struggle was likely to be between communist Russia and western capitalism. They argued that their only hope was to support western capitalism against eastern communism.50 This anxiety would seem all too familiar to Kendrick and his SIS colleagues, who had been monitoring the same threat in the 1920s and 1930s. Von Arnim argued that the only hope was for Germany to make peace with Britain and ‘form a bloc against the danger from the East’.51
The generals blamed Germany’s troubles entirely on Hitler and the Nazi regime. The decision to fight Russia, they said, was costing them the war; and Hitler had taken this action against the advice of his generals. They discussed whether they themselves could stage a coup; but it was agreed that such action would be difficult before the Allies had mounted an invasion. Any chance of success in this respect would only come in the final stages of the war, during the collapse of Nazi Germany.52
The conversations between the generals revealed that they still harboured the idea of world domination; they were planning for the next war, in the belief that Germany would recover to become a world power. The anti-Nazis thought, somewhat naively, that they could still hold on to power in post-war Germany. At no point before 1945 did any of the generals at Trent Park consider that they might face charges as war criminals. Their discussions led to an interesting final conclusion in an intelligence report:
The question of how to handle these men [the German generals] in such a way as to prevent them from leading yet another attempt at world domination, is one of the most important of those to be faced [by the Allies] after the war.53
By spring 1944, the generals were discussing the Russian advance towards Germany and the overwhelming power of Russia as the greatest danger facing Europe.54 They were frustrated that the United States was sending supplies to Stalin that enabled Russia to fight on and avoid being beaten by Germany. Von Thoma believed that the Russian strategy was to advance down the Romanian coast, take the oilfields and occupy Bulgaria; then make peace with Germany against the western democracies. Von Broich considered the danger from Russia to be very great: he feared Russia would rout Germany and turn the country communist.55 The answer, said Neuffer to Bassenge, was for German forces to withdraw from the Balkans, because Germany no longer had the strength to mount further attacks on the Russians there.56
Kendrick’s career had come full circle. The spymaster was once again monitoring the communist threat to western democracy, but this time from British shores.