On May 24 advancing Union troops discovered that Lee’s army was strongly entrenched near Hanover Junction just south of the North Anna River. Grant decided to again move to the southeast around Lee’s right flank and sent his forces across the Pamunkey River on May 27–28. Captain Charles Francis Adams Jr. commanded a detached company of the 1st Massachusetts Cavalry that served on guard duty at Army of the Potomac headquarters. Adams assessed the ongoing campaign in a misdated letter to his father, the American minister to Great Britain, in which he exaggerated the degree of harmony that existed at the time between Grant and Meade. By the end of May Grant had grown frustrated with Meade’s caution, while Meade resented Grant’s increasing role in making tactical decisions.
H.Q. Army of Potomac.
Hanover Town Va. 29 April/64.
Hon. C. F. Adams
London.
My dear Father
I have a leisure day at last, & the means of writing I mean to pay off a little of my heavy arrears to all of you in London. I have no letters from London since I left Brandey Station I don’t know what has become of them.—I suppose they were addressed to the regiment & went to it & may turn up; I sent you my present address in a letter to John, which he has probably forwarded. Two days ago I got two papers from Mamma,—please acknowledge them. I have only had two letters from John,—the latest of May 7th,—he speaks as though you were all well.
Meanwhile here we are.—South of the Pamunkey & only 16 miles from Richmond,—that Mecca & Jerusalem of this Army of the Potomac. As I look back over the campaign since the 4th of May, I don’t know where to begin to write I feel vexed out of all bounds with myself for neglecting at the start to provide myself with the few writing conveniences which would have enabled me to send you day by day an account of what was saw, felt, & heard. It is lost now, but I think I might have made a contribution to history, besides relieving some of your anxiety. Now I can’t tell you much, & that little won’t be of much value. The campaign to us here gradually unfolds itself. Grant & Meade discuss & decide, but keep their own counsel & no one knows whether tomorrow the Army is to fight, to march, or to rest. Meanwhile marching now seems to be the order of the day, &, since day before yesterday Head Quarters have moved thirty odd miles,—turning all the exterior lines of Richmond & bringing us down to the interior line of the Chickahominy. Here we rest for to-day. Up to this time Gen. Grant seems to have looked on this campaign in Va as one necessarily to be made up of the hardest kind of fighting, combined with all the Generalship which he could command, &, as we were numerically the strongest, we might as well do the fighting first as last,—pounding & manoevering at the same time. If this was his idea, I think the wisdom of it is becoming apparent. I cannot believe that his operations have been or now are conducted on any fixed plan, he seems to have one end in view,—the capture of Richmond & destruction of Lee’s army,—but I imagine his means to that end undergo daily changes & no man in this Army, but Meade perhaps, is even able to give grounds for a guess as to whether we are to approach Richmond from this side or from the other. Meanwhile, though Grant expected hard fighting, I have no idea that he expected anything like the fighting & the slaughter which took place in the Wilderness & at Spotsylvania,—he had never seen anything like it in the West, & the fierce, stubborn resistance we met far surpassed his expectation. Meade knew better what he had to expect, &, in fighting for him those battles, was I imagine of incalculable assistance to Grant. To-day, as near as I can see, results stand as follows,—these two great armies have pounded each other nearly to pieces for many days,—neither has achieved any real success over the other on the field of battle,— our loss has probably been greater than theirs, for ours has been the offensive,—but we have a decided balance of prisoners & captured artillery in our favor,—the enemy, I think, outfight us, but we outnumber them, &, finally, within the last three days one witnesses in this Army as it moves along, all the results of a victory when in fact it has done only barren fighting, for it has done the one thing needful before the enemy,—it has advanced. The result is wonderful,—hammered & pounded as this Army has been,—worked, marched, fought & reduced as it is,—it is in better spirits & better fighting trim to-day than it was on the first days fight in the Wilderness. Strange as it seems to me, it is, I believe, yet the fact, that this Army is now just on its second wind, & is more formidable than it ever was before,—this I see on every march & I attribute it to movement in advance after heavy, though barren, fighting. With the enemy it is otherwise. Heavier fighting, harder marching, & greater privations,—for with them deficiency in numbers was only to be made good by redoubled activity,— two men with them have done the work of three with us,—all these have led only to movements to the rear,—to the abandonment of line after line until now they find themselves with their backs against Richmond. Naturally this discourages troops,—particularly coming after as hard fighting as they know how to do,—& as a result we now get, as I am informed, from all sources but one story & that of discouragement & exhaustion,—the enemy is getting off his fight. What is to come next?—Will Lee try to revive the spirits of his men & the fortunes of his Army by taking the offensive?—Will he try to repeat the story of the Chickahominy & the six days fighting?—What does Grant mean next to do?—I have always noticed that when I try to divine the future of military operations, I am invariably wrong; & so I long ago gave up trying. Of a few things though I feel pretty sure,—Stonewall Jackson is dead,—Grant is not McClellan, nor is Meade McDowell,— Grant will not let his Army be idle, nor will he allow the initiative to be easily taken out of his hands & if Lee can outfight Meade he will do more than he was ever able to do yet when his troops were more numerous, in better heart & much fresher than they now are. Accordingly we find ourselves approaching the climax of the campaign,—under circumstances which certainly seem to me hopeful. The next few days will probably develop Grant’s final move,—the line on which he means to approach Richmond & the point at which he means, unless Lee out-generals him, to have the final fight. I don’t believe he will allow time to slip away or Lee to repair damages.—I do believe that while the Army is resting to-day, it is drawing breath for the great struggle & on the eve of great movements & decisive results.
Things meanwhile work in the Army charmingly. Grant is certainly a very extraordinary man; he does not look it & might pass well enough for a dumpy & slouchy little subaltern, very fond of smoking,—neither do I know that he shows it in his conversation, for he never spoke to me & doesn’t seem to be a very talkative man anyhow;—they say his mouth shows character,—it may, but it is so covered with beard, that no one can vouch for it. The truth is, he is in appearance a very ordinary looking man,—one who would attract attention neither in the one way or the other,—not knowing who it is you would not pronounce him insignificant,—& knowing who it is, it would require some study to find in his appearance material for hero worship, though there is about his face no indication of weakness or lack of force. He has not nearly so strong a head & face as Humphreys for instance, who at once strikes you as a man of force. In figure Grant is comical,—he sits a horse well, but in walking he leans forward & toddles. Such being his appearance however I do not think that any intelligent person could watch him, even from such a distance as mine, without concluding that he is a remarkable man. He handles those around him so quietly & well,—he so evidently has the faculty of disposing of work & managing men,—he is cool & quiet, almost stolid & as if stupid,—in danger & in a crisis he is one against whom all around, whether few in number or a great army as here, would instinctively lean. He is a man of the most exquisite judgment & tact,—see how he has handled this Army,—he took command under the most unfavorable circumstances,—jealousy between East & West, the Army of the Potomac & the Army of the South West,—that general feeling that the officers from the West were going to swagger over those here & finally that universal envy which success creates & which is always ready to carp at it. The moment I came to Head Quarters I saw that; though nothing was said, yet the materials were all ready for an explosion at the first mistake Grant made. All this has passed away & now Grant has this Army as firmly as ever he had that of the S.W. He has effected this simply by the exercise of tact & good taste, he has humored us,—he has given some promotions,—he has made no parade of his authority,—he has given no orders except through Meade & Meade he treats with the utmost confidence & deference,—the result is that even from the most jealously disposed & most indiscreet of Meade’s staff not a word is heard against Grant. The result is of inestimable importance,—the Army has a head & confidence in that head;—it has leaders & there is no discord among those leaders;—we seem to have gotten rid of jealousy & all now seem disposed to go in with a will to win.
At last we have gotten out of the Wilderness. That interminable outline of pines of all sizes which it seemed never would end has given way to a clearer & more cultivated country,—& now we come across the old Virginia plantation houses & can now & then see a regular clearing. The Wilderness was a most fearfully discouraging place,—an enemy always in front against whom the fiercest attack we could make made no impression,—incessant fighting day after day,—no progress forward,—& the hospitals cleared out only to be filled again, while the country was becoming peopled with graves. There the Army got very much discouraged & took blue views of life,—the straggling became terrible & you saw men the whole time & officers sometimes living in the woods or wandering round the country. At that time I take it Lee had accomplished his object & the Army of the Potomac was crippled,—it could not effectively have advanced. At that time however it experienced the great advantage of Grants presence & power for he at once re-enforced it by every available man round Washington thus at once restoring its efficiency, while but for his power & name the Administration would, as heretofore, doubtless have defended Washington at the cost of all the fruits of this Army’s fighting. Thus Lee found himself again opposed by a fresh army, & every new man who came up from the rear served to revive the spirits of those who had been here before. Now the Army is in capital condition & I feel once more sanguine,—but the telegraphs of the steamer which brings this will tell the whole story.
Meanwhile I hear not a word of your negotiation. What has become of it?—Is it not too late now?—or is it supposed that disaster or success will bring the rebels to your terms?—I do not even hear that that negotiation has as yet crept into the papers,—but after all, it is of less consequence now, for formerly it might have stopped bloodshed but now it can hardly be in time to do more than pave the way for conciliation,—since this month came in this war seems to have gone so far that now, in this last effort, either we must crush them or leave them so weak that little enough more blood will be left to shed. Pray keep me informed about this, & also do send me books & reading matter,—here at H. Q. I have time & even Shakespeare is getting read out.
As to myself I have little to say,—in this campaign I have been exposed hardly at all, in fact even less than I should wish, but casualties come very easily & no-one knows how or when he & bullets may be round together. Give my love to all, & in future I hope to write more frequently. Affy
C. F. Adams
May 29, 1864