CHAPTER 1

Marching Into Captivity

The eighteenth century was period of frequent conflict as the European powers jostled for continental supremacy, at the same time expanding their overseas empires, while attempting to limit the imperial ambitions of their rivals. The century saw France, Spain and Holland arrayed as frequent enemies of Great Britain. The War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714), the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748), the Seven Years War (1756–1763) and the American Revolutionary War on the side of the American colonists were all clashes in which these nations fought against Britain. Each war was characterized by conflict on land and sea across the globe, and resulted in many prisoners of war arriving in Britain. As the century progressed, armies and navies became larger, and consequently the numbers of prisoners taken became greater.

The extent of the conflict during the American Revolution prompted an attempt at regulating the business of repatriating prisoners of war. Exchange of prisoners had always been erratic, but in 1780 a treaty was agreed between Britain and France stating that vigorous attempts would be made to exchange all prisoners of war as speedily as possible after capture, man for man, rank for rank. If there were no prisoners of equal rank to exchange, then the numbers would be made up of a proportion of lesser ranks, or a cash equivalent could be substituted.1

This treaty was regarded as the gentlemanly way to conduct prisoner of war affairs, but it only worked when there were gentlemen on both sides who could reach an agreement. However, 1789 saw events in France that changed the situation. The French Revolution removed French gentlemen from the scene, either by guillotining them or forcing them to flee for their lives. While these momentous events were changing the social and political climate in that country, they were also to change the conduct of war.

Prior to 1789, European conflict was conducted in a ‘civilized’ manner between monarchs who, while pitting their relatively small but professional armies against each other, respected their mutual positions as heads of state. The French Revolution, under the banner liberté, égalité, fraternité, overturned the idea of royal and aristocratic privilege. This had two immediate effects. First, the French were infused with a national fervour to export their revolutionary principles to the rest of Europe. Second, this forced the nations of Europe to co-operate against a common foe. War was about to be waged on a scale never seen before.2

The Revolutionary War began in 1792 with the French demonstrating the effectiveness of a levée en masse by fighting off an Austro-Prussian alliance, at the same time as the abolition of the monarchy by the National Convention in Paris. 1793 began dramatically with the execution of Louis XVI in January; the following month resulting in France declaring war upon Britain, Spain and the United Provinces (Holland). While countries such as Spain and Holland later found themselves allied to France, Great Britain remained an implacable foe until the short-lived peace resulting from the Treaty of Amiens in 1801.

War between Britain and a France now under the First Consul Napoleon Bonaparte (he became Emperor in 1804) erupted in 1803. Again Britain found herself at war, actively or otherwise, against most European nations as alliances were made and broken. This war lasted until the defeat of the Emperor in 1814. After a short-lived exile to Elba he returned to claim the French throne, only to be finally defeated in the Waterloo campaign of 1815.

To understand how the war prison system developed in Britain, it is important to look at the events and activities that generated the reason for its existence: prisoners of war. During the period 1792–1815, over 200,000 prisoners of war arrived in Britain. Of this total, 122,440 were taken during the Napoleonic Wars 1803–15. The highest prisoner population in any one year was 72,000 in 1814.3

During the Revolutionary War the British Army fought an abortive campaign in the Low Countries during 1793–94. This generated prisoners, some of whom were sent to Britain while others remained in Holland (on board some prison hulks in the Scheldt) and in Germany awaiting exchange. Aside from this conflict and an Anglo-Russian invasion of Holland in 1799, the British Army was not to campaign again on the continent of Europe until the Peninsula War in 1808.

Nineteenth century historians viewed the British Army as a projectile fired by the Royal Navy, and in the 1790s many such firings took place as colonies belonging to France and her allies were attacked. Islands in the West Indies, Malta, French settlements in India and the Dutch colony at the Cape of Good Hope all fell to combined operations mounted by the British.4 While the politicians gained valuable bargaining counters at future peace negotiations and British merchants gained new markets to be exploited, the Admiralty acquired thousands of prisoners of war, men, women and children, soldiers, sailors and civilians. Although many of these were held locally until exchanged, the majority were transported to Britain to fill the land prisons and hulks.

The West Indies was a rich source of captives. One prison ship was stationed at Martinique but found to be insufficient for the numbers being taken, but as the authorities there regarded their prisoners as being ‘troublesome brigands and Negros taken in arms’, they were only too glad to transfer responsibility to the naval authorities in Britain. Sir Ralph Abercrombie sent 4,000 such prisoners to Britain from this theatre in 1796.5

When the Dutch enclave at the Cape fell in 1796 many soldiers and civilians were taken prisoner. The Governor, Abraham Sluysken, was sent to England to reside on parole at Hambledon, Hampshire, together with his staff and servants.6 Occasionally a campaign produced captives who did not spend time in Britain, such as when a British army ended Napoleon’s dreams of oriental conquest in Egypt in 1801. The French troops involved were fortunate in that they were allowed to return to France and no doubt the Admiralty shared their relief, as by this time the war prison establishment had expanded dramatically.

While the army captured enemy nationals in large batches as French, Dutch and Spanish territory fell, the Royal Navy was generating a constant flow of inmates for the prison depots as soon as hostilities began. Upon war being declared between Holland and Britain in 1796, the Admiralty immediately detained enemy ships sitting in British ports. This resulted in a large haul, for there were seven Dutch warships berthed in these ports at the time, one in Ireland, one at Leith, and five at Plymouth. This was a typical occurrence. Throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars many merchant vessels and some warships were ‘detained by the Admiralty’ when they were in Britain’s harbours on the assumption of hostilities.7

The Royal Navy attacked enemy warships and merchant vessels whenever and wherever they could be found. During the blockade of the French and Dutch coastline many small vessels were captured such as whalers and local civilian craft. There was a restriction on attacking coastal fishing vessels as these were part of the local community. War was waged against nations, not local inhabitants who often supplied the Royal Navy with intelligence and fresh produce, although this limitation was ignored if the fishing vessel was found to have an armed soldier on board. This prohibition did not apply to the fishing and whaling fleets that operated in the North Sea and around Greenland; these were national fleets supplying the nation at war and so were legitimate targets. Coastal vessels supporting the commerce of France were often escorted into Portsmouth and Plymouth with the naval officers concerned receiving prize money and the captured French men and boys a berth in the hulks (many youths were taken to sea to learn the profession).8

The Admiralty had an ambivalent attitude towards individuals of neutral countries onboard enemy ships, and enemy nationals’ onboard neutral vessels. In May 1796 their Lordships were inundated with requests from the Danish, Prussian and Swedish Consuls to release their nationals who were taken prisoner on board Dutch vessels. Earlier that year Mr Dobree, the Agent for prisoners of war on Guernsey, informed the authorities in London that he had detained some American vessels that had arrived partly navigated by Frenchmen. He wished to know if they should be regarded as captives or set free. The reply was:

Orders have been given for detaining as prisoners of war all Frenchmen who may be found onboard neutral vessels arriving in the Ports within His Majesty’s dominions.9

Taking captives from neutral vessels was hardly an approach that would win friends abroad.

There was a further reason for closely examining the crews of all vessels, both enemy and neutral. Nobody loves a traitor to their country, least of all the British during the war with Revolutionary France. Revenue cutters often captured French privateers in the Channel such as the Rose Revenue Cutter that boarded one such vessel and found that the Master and most of the crew were actually British. The ship was taken to Plymouth where it was ordered that a strict examination be made of the crew, and any found to ‘be subjects of His Majesty’ should be properly secured and not regarded as simple prisoners of war. The French Corvette La Revanche was captured while under the command of a sailor named Cooper, and a detailed investigation performed to ascertain whether he was American or British.10 This sort of legal quibble was to have serious consequences during the latter part of the Napoleonic War.

The war with Revolutionary France came to an end with the signing of the Treaty of Amiens in 1801. The Admiralty lost no time in returning to the continent the many thousands of prisoners of war in England and instigating the dismantling of the prison establishment. However, it was fortunate that only a few of the older hulks had been broken up by 1803, as by then relations between Britain and France had deteriorated, resulting in the resumption of hostilities. Immediately the Royal Navy began snapping up prizes upon the oceans, with large numbers of prisoners coming from enemy vessels in the Channel, as the Navy enforced a blockade of French ports.

Napoleon’s proposed invasion of England generated an increase in sea traffic as vessels for this enterprise were constructed and moved along the coast. French efforts involved the construction of invasion craft not only in and around the Channel ports such as Boulogne, Ambleteuse and Calais, but as far east as the Rhine, in Dutch ports and Toulouse. These vessels were assembled on the Channel coastline, and the Royal Navy attempted to disrupt this shipping whenever it could, bringing some of the erstwhile invaders to England, but not in the victorious manner they had envisaged. The Emperor’s invasion hopes were postponed indefinitely by the campaign of Trafalgar in which 7,500 prisoners of war, both French and Spanish, were taken.11 The year 1805 also saw the Admiralty planning a new prison in the windswept Dartmoor countryside, to accommodate the increasing naval harvest of prisoners. The structure was intended to be more economical to run compared to the equivalent number of hulks.

The principal nationalities taken at this time were French, Spanish and Dutch. While the majority was taken at sea, occasional large hauls resulted from the capture of enemy colonies throughout the world, especially in the West Indies which was a major theatre of the war. However, the year 1808 saw the Spanish rise up against their erstwhile allies the French, giving Britain an opportunity to attack the French on the continent. Thus began the campaign in the Iberian Peninsula, which was to generate on occasion an overwhelming number of captives. The conflict involved successful sieges such as Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, generating 1,100 and 3,700 prisoners respectively. Many enemy soldiers were taken during or immediately after the battles in Spain and Portugal, one example being the Battle of Salamanca at which over 7,000 prisoners were captured.12 The constant maneuvering of the British, Portuguese and Spanish forces resulted in a continuous flow of prisoners to Lisbon and from there to England. The battles and sieges may have generated large numbers of prisoners, but the constant patrols and skirmishes produced a steady trickle of captives.

It was not only British operations that generated captives. The Spanish Juntas did not have the facilities (both practical and administrative) to confine large numbers of prisoners of war, and so Spanish forces handed the majority of enemy soldiers taken by them over to Britain. Although the Spanish held many French prisoners on hulks in Cadiz and on the island of Cabrera, the treatment afforded them was so minimal that from 1810 many of them were sent to England. Spanish guerrilla activity produced captives, both from the military and from the large civilian population following the French armies such as Bernard Tolede, a French hotel manager ‘taken by the inhabitants in Spain, 11th November 1812’.13

The numbers of prisoners being shipped from Lisbon to English ports necessitated an increase in the prison ship establishment. Dartmoor Prison, planned to house the many prisoners arriving during the invasion scare, was finally ready for receiving prisoners in early 1809. This and the re-opening of Portchester Castle in 1810 were fortuitous, as by this time it was obvious that the Iberian Peninsula was to be a major theatre of war. Even this did not immediately alleviate the over-crowding problem in the prisons. That year Wellington was requested not to send any more prisoners from the Peninsula to England for the time being, as there was no room for them. He replied by sending 20,000 French captives to England in 1810–11, as he simply did not have the resources to house, feed and guard them in Spain or Portugal. His problem was compounded by the large numbers of soldiers deserting from French service. Wellington wrote:

Two battalions of the Regiment of Nassau, and one of Frankfurt having quitted the enemy’s army and passed over to that under my command … I now send these troops to England.14

Many of the soldiers in the French Armies were drawn from throughout the French Empire and satellite nations, and included Germans, Italians, Poles and Swiss troops. As the war dragged on, many thousands of such men were captured in battle or as a result of desertion from French service.

While the war at sea included naval engagements both large and small that generated inmates for the war prisons of Britain, there was a continuous sea-going conflict fought by both sides against enemy trade. Naval vessels did capture enemy merchantmen, but the latter were also at considerable risk from privateers.

Privateers were privately owned and armed vessels issued with a licence, or letter of marque, to attack enemy merchant shipping. Such vessels operated from both British and French ports, and were provided with large crews to man the prizes they took. As soon as war was declared in 1793 both sides fitted out privateers to raid the enemy shipping lanes to destroy their commercial capacity and capture seamen, thus weakening the enemy’s naval power.

As French and Dutch colonies fell into British hands, the market for goods manufactured in France and Holland diminished so merchants in these countries turned to financing privateers to maintain their trading interests. As Britain acquired new colonies, so British commerce benefited from these markets. More merchant vessels plying the seas meant more French privateers were fitted out to attack them, and this in turn resulted in increased activity by the Royal Navy to combat the menace. With the decline in overseas trade for France, more goods were sold in Europe, which meant an increase in French coastal shipping. This produced more prizes for the Royal Navy and for the many privateers operating from the ports in southern England and the Channel Islands.

From 1793 to 1797 an increased naval blockade of France further reduced the markets available to French merchants, many of whom invested in privateering. This threat to British trade did not reach serious proportions until 1797, thereafter gradually declining until 1802. French privateer activity never reached the same level during the period 1803 to 1815 as it did the previous decade, the peak being in 1807–08.15

The year 1797 caused many problems for the Admiralty in relation to prisoners of war. This year saw the mutinies at Spithead and the Nore, and news of these events encouraged French merchants to invest in privateering ventures, their reasoning being that these mutinies would seriously affect Britain’s capacity to enforce the naval blockade and to wage war at sea. 1797 saw a peak in the number of French privateers fitted out and launched into the Channel. 1797 also saw a peak in the number of French privateers captured by the British. The previous year had generated 2,448 privateer crewmen for the war prisons; in 1797 a total of 7,094 were taken, while the following year the number had dropped to 5,894, declining still further until 1801.16

What the French failed to understand was that while the main British fleets were temporarily incapacitated, those ships maintaining the blockade of the French coast – the frigates, cutters and sloops – were largely unaffected by the mutinies and continued their patrol of the Channel. The fact that more privateers were venturing forth from French ports only served to hand prizes to the Royal Navy on a plate. Revenue Cutters in the Channel also captured such enemy vessels.

Ships of the Royal Navy employed a number of ruses to ensnare enemy privateers, as generally the latter were faster and more maneuverable. Cinema-goers will be familiar with one method used by the Royal Navy to capture privateers, which was to pretend to be a merchant ship by displaying a total lack of discipline and a casual attitude in handling the ship. The guns were hidden and most of the crew below deck. When the unsuspecting privateer was within range, the covers were thrown off and the crew rushed on deck to open fire. By this time it would be too late for escape and the privateer would become a prize to line the pockets of the jubilant British seamen. The film Master and Commander (based upon the books by Patrick O’Brian) sees Captain Jack Aubrey employing this technique to lure the French privateer Acheron within range of his hidden guns. This was an effective and common technique utilized in the English Channel and the West Indies. Another ruse was to fly the flag of a friendly or neutral state until the privateer came within range. This flag was then run down and the naval ensign hoisted.17

When a privateer was taken the first act was to put a prize crew on board and secure the enemy crew in the hold. The vessel was sailed to the captor’s home port, and this included not only mainland Britain and the Channel Islands, but bases in the West Indies and Canada. Many French privateer crewmen were disembarked at British ports in the West Indies prior to being transferred to England.18

On arrival in Britain the seamen were sent to the nearest land prison or prison ship with space for them, while the officers were conveyed to London under guard to be examined by the Admiralty. They were asked questions to elicit who they were, the origin of their ship plus details of their voyage and cargo, which were confirmed by the ships papers if they had not been thrown overboard. It was important to establish the nationality of the crew, who could be from throughout the French coastal ports, northern Europe, the Mediterranean and North America. Most, however, were usually categorized as ‘French’ or ‘Dutch’ in the General Entry Books for Prisoners of War depending on the nationality of their ship. Occasionally British sailors joined the crew of French privateers and capture by the Royal Navy could find them on trial for treason.19 Soldiers taken on land or at sea were categorized according to the army in which they were serving, so German soldiers captured in Spain were categorised as ‘French’.

Napoleon’s Berlin Decree of November 1806 inaugurated the Continental System, ordering that Britain was to be blockaded; all trade with her should cease; British nationals and goods were to be seized; and no ship was to be allowed to enter a French port after leaving a British one. This was the French response to the failure of peace negotiations and the British order of the previous May that declared that the European coast from Brest to the River Elbe was formally blockaded. The Royal Navy virtually closed all ports (i.e. those from which British commerce was excluded) to neutral shipping which had failed to first call at a British port and pay duty on their cargoes. A British Order in Council of 7 January 1807 was an effort to prevent neutrals from carrying goods between French ports. This activity against each nation’s trade encouraged French merchants to fit out privateers, many of which then fell victim to the blockade by the Royal Navy.

Napoleon’s Milan Decree of 1807 outlawed all neutral shipping that submitted to British rules. The principle neutral nations at that time were Denmark and the United States of America, both countries that prospered through their neutrality. The Danes had suffered many of their merchant vessels being detained by the Royal Navy during 1805 and 1806 when they were suspected of carrying enemy property or contraband. If these vessels were proved to have been engaged in trade that could benefit the enemy, the cargo, and in some cases the ship itself, were condemned as a lawful prize and the captors being awarded prize money. This was an arrangement that suited the Royal Navy to the detriment of the Danish merchant community and Anglo-Danish relations.20 In the summer of 1807 the British Government took the decision to strike against the Danes, launching an attack on Copenhagen. This was to prevent the Danish fleet from falling into the hands of Napoleon and swelling his naval forces. While this aim was dramatically achieved after a bombardment of the city and dockyard, it led to seven years of war with what remained of the Danish Navy in the Baltic region. Many thousands of Danes, both soldiers and seamen, became captives of the British, although these two countries had better diplomatic relations when it came to the exchange of prisoners compared with the situation between Britain and France.

American maritime trade also suffered considerably from the French Decrees and British Orders in Council, as American vessels were barred from any direct traffic between the West Indies; any colony of a belligerent; and any but its own or a British port. There were many in the USA who were prepared to go to war to maintain the right to free trade.21 To enforce the regulation of trade, the Royal Navy was empowered to stop and search any ship on the high seas. If that was not bad enough in American eyes, there was also the serious quarrel over impressment.

Britain experienced a continual shortage of seamen to man her ships. Vessels of the Royal Navy had a reputation for harsh conditions and indefinite service on board, and whenever possible many British seamen deserted to the American merchant service where the conditions and treatment were better. Indeed, many American ship owners positively welcomed deserting British seamen, finding such experienced sailors an asset to their vessels. The British response was the search of neutral ships and the seizure of any crewmen considered Britons. It was often difficult to identify British nationals and many American seamen were impressed in ‘error’. Frequent complaints were lodged by the United States over the impressment of its nationals.

Public opinion in the USA finally forced President James Madison to sign a declaration of war against Great Britain on 18 June 1812. The Americans had as their war aims the restoration of maritime rights; an end to impressment; the final destruction of the Indian threat to the frontier lands (this threat often being materially supported by Britain) and the annexation of Canada.

This act had three effects that influenced the prisoner of war population held by Britain. First, the resulting land campaign in Canada generated many prisoners. Second, American privateers attacked British merchant vessels in the West Indies, the Atlantic and even around the coast of Britain. Third, those American seamen who had been pressed into service on board His Majesty’s ships immediately gave themselves up as prisoners of war. The records contain many entries regarding such seamen. Charles Parditt ‘gave himself up on board HMS Ocean, being an American subject’ in November 1812. HMS Aboukir lost four of her crew in this way in the same month, and the situation was the same on board many other ships of the Royal Navy.22

In July 1812 six American merchant vessels arrived in Portsmouth harbour unaware that their country was now at war with Britain. These ships were ‘detained by the Admiralty’ and their crews passed into captivity. The Leonidas was one such example. Her captain, Benajah Liffingwell, was allowed to reside on parole at Odiham, Hampshire, while his crew was sent to the hulks at Chatham. The ship’s cook, Thomas Wood, was discharged a few months later as he had been born in Newcastle, Northumberland. Although he was technically still a British subject (at that time Britain did not recognise the right of an individual to change their nationality), his age (55 years) and the fact that he had never served in the Royal Navy did not class him as a traitor.23

The American invasion of Canada and the naval activity on the Great Lakes produced a regular harvest of prisoners of war, many of whom were confined in the Americas, but many found themselves transported to Britain, a fact that caused controversy in the United States. Regular exchange of prisoners of war took place in the Americas between British and US forces, but the distance across the Atlantic precluded any regular exchange cartels. American prisoners were shipped to Britain as the facilities for their confinement were more extensive and efficient there. Public opinion in the Unites States considered this to be a harsh policy, as once an American arrived in Britain as a prisoner his chance of exchange was minimal. The lack of regular exchange cartels returning these prisoners from Britain gave rise to the infamous Dartmoor massacre which will be related in a later chapter. American prisoners in Britain were also taken in the Atlantic or around the European coastline as they attempted to trade with the continent.

While merchant vessels and privateers were considered fair game for attack and capture, fishing vessels of all the belligerents were officially left alone as the attitude was that governments waged war on each other, not on local communities. The privateer owners of Guernsey however, had other ideas. In 1796 these ships were seizing French fishing vessels ‘with an avidity too common to their interested dispositions’. The Admiralty ordered the release of these vessels and their crews as fishermen were not to be regarded as prisoners of war. The proprietors of the privateers insisted that they were only carrying out their instructions, although they backed down when the Admiralty threatened to withdraw their letters of marque. It has to be noted however, that fishing vessels with a soldier on board were considered military craft and their crews sent into captivity.24

Their Lordships could also be merciful to fellow seamen who became prisoners of war through no fault of their own. In 1796 the merchant vessel D’Hiver from Cherbourg was driven ashore and wrecked near Shoreham. Instructions were given for the crew to be immediately returned to France.25

The principle events related thus far were responsible for generating the bulk of the prisoner of war population in Britain. However, captives came from many other sources. Britain’s allies handed over prisoners for safekeeping, as Britain’s war prison system was regarded as the most efficient of the time, and as British gold financed her allies’ participation in the conflict, accepting responsibility for captives was another means of supporting their war effort. During the Peninsular conflict both Spain and Portugal sent French prisoners to the British, and even detained American vessels and their crews, although these countries were not involved in the Anglo-American War. During the Waterloo campaign the Prussian Army sent nearly 7,000 French captives to reside in Dartmoor Prison and the surrounding parole depots.26

It would be wrong to assume that all the prisoners of war residing in Britain were French or American. Napoleon’s Empire stretched over many countries, while other European nations were allies of France at one time or another. The war prisons of Britain contained captives from Austria, the Balkans, Denmark, France, the myriad German States, Holland, Italy, Naples, Poland, Prussia, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States of America. Prisoners were of Caucasian, mulatto and negro stock. Many women and children were taken prisoner in enemy colonies, on board merchant vessels, and in the wake of the armies fighting on the Continent, but were not regarded as combatants. Aside from their families, the staff and servants of senior military and civilian officials passed into captivity.

Prisoners even came from the ranks of the British army and navy. Private Fremeaun was serving in His Majesty’s 90th Regiment of Foot in 1811; being French he was discharged and imprisoned at Chatham. His story had a happy ending, as he applied to the Admiralty for liberty since he was not in the French service and had committed no crime. He also produced certificates from two British officers giving him a good character.27

When a soldier or sailor became captive his initial treatment was at the hands of the military and naval force who acquired him. Generally there was no personal animosity between British soldiers and sailors and their opposing counterparts. Any rough handling that an enemy prisoner of war received at the hands of his British captors was usually due to the common soldier or seaman’s desire for plunder, rather than aggression towards a vanquished foe. Once a prisoner had been taken, the attitude towards him was usually indifference or occasionally sympathy for the plight of a fellow serviceman. Private William Wheeler wrote an account of his military adventures during the Peninsular campaign. When wounded he was conveyed to hospital via a Spanish boat in the company of other injured soldiers, including a number of Frenchmen. He soon struck up a friendship with a French corporal with whom he shared a blanket, and they passed the time with songs, anecdotes and pipes of tobacco.28

The successful storming of the citadel of Badajoz resulted in some of the worst excesses committed by British soldiers whilst on campaign. The men ran riot in the town, venting their anger and bloodlust upon the inhabitants and any French soldier rash enough not to have surrendered. The enemy soldiers who laid down their arms were quickly (and probably gratefully) marched from the citadel. Edward Costello wrote:

We saw a number of Frenchmen guarded by our soldiers, coming over the bridge. They were the prisoners taken in the Fort San Christobal which but a hour or two previously had surrendered. These were soon surrounded by our men, who began examining their knapsacks, from whence a number of watches, dollars etc. were quickly extracted …29

British officers were courteous and sympathetic towards their captured counterparts whenever circumstances permitted, as Surgeon James McGrigor recalled at Badajoz.

In one street, I met General Phillipon, the governor, with his two daughters, holding each by the hand; all three disheveled, and with them were two British officers, each holding one of the ladies by the arm, and with their drawn swords making thrusts occasionally at soldiers who attempted to drag the ladies away. I am glad to say that these two British officers succeeded in conveying the governor and his two daughters safely … to the camp.30

On campaign the British usually treated their prisoners of war correctly. Costello wrote of the Peninsula campaign that the military would not hesitate to use force ‘to preserve our French prisoners from being butchered by the Spanish and Portuguese irregulars’.31

Senior officers taken prisoner were treated with the greatest respect. Admiral Villeneuve was allowed to wear his sword, retain his staff officers and given some choice as to his town of residence after surrendering at Trafalgar. General Ruffin was mortally wounded at the Battle of Barrosa in March 1811 and taken prisoner. When he died on board HMS Gorgon off Plymouth on 15 May of that year he was conveyed to Portsmouth where he was buried with full military honours at what is now the garrison church, although the gravestones are too weathered to locate his exact burial site.32

Prisoners of war were initially held in the nearest convenient castle, monastery or town, until arrangements could be made to transfer them to Lisbon for transport to England. The rank and file marched under escort, while the officers often faired somewhat better. Baron Lejeune tells how after he was stripped naked by Spanish irregulars he was clothed, provided with money and entertained by British officers before being sent in a carriage to Lisbon.33

There were usually sufficient troops available for the escort of small numbers of prisoners, and they could be transported on board supply ships unloading in port. Whilst in transit the prisoners were guarded by either marines or soldiers depending on what troops were available. Captives crossing the Atlantic from the West Indies were often guarded by soldiers being sent home due to ill-health, as was the case in 1796 when fifteen transports arrived at Plymouth with nearly 2,000 negroes captured in the French service. The guard had been provided from the 15th, 21st, 34th, 46th, 3rd Battalion 60th, and 61st Regiments, and comprised officers, NCOs, drummers and invalids. Their ill-health at the start of the two-month voyage had been exacerbated by a shortage of medical supplies, and the troops were noted as having ‘been sickly on the passage … upwards of one hundred of them have died’. On disembarkation it was noted that many of the prisoners had smallpox.34

If the prisoners of war were conveyed by naval transport they were landed at a Port near a prison depot, which meant Portsmouth, Plymouth or Chatham. Later in the war prisoners were sent directly from Lisbon to Perth Prison via Leith, Scotland. Privateers landing captives did so at their home port, handing their charges over to the naval or military authorities there. On board these ships the prisoners were confined in the hold and guarded by the privateer crew themselves.

Once in Britain a prisoner would be guarded by the military who escorted their charges to the assigned place of confinement. Officer prisoners were allowed a passport plus expenses and traveled by coach to their parole depot. Prisoner rank and file were usually marched to the depots, but on occasion the canal system was used to transport them to depots inland such as Norman Cross. The journey from the coast to Land Prisons far inland could take some days, with the prisoners being lodged in barns and other large buildings on route. On the wall of the White Lion public house in Stevenage is a plaque noting that French prisoners were lodged overnight in the barn at the rear of the building, as they were being marched north along the Great North Road (now the A1) to Norman Cross. Subsistence of such prisoners was in the hands of the local inhabitants who were always diligent in submitting their expenses for supplying food, straw for bedding and candles.35

A large body of foreign prisoners always excited interest amongst the inhabitants of a country town or village through which they passed, and the soldiers had to be especially vigilant in keeping the two populations apart. The Reading Mercury of 13 October 1800 reported that bands of 300 and 600 French prisoners of war passed through the town. The same newspaper recorded that 500 Frenchmen halted at Reading on their way to Norman Cross in June 1806, while seven years later a local diarist wrote that a large party was marched down London Street and lodged in the stable at the Saracen’s Head Inn, ‘presenting a very miserable appearance’.36

Once at a Prison Depot, the prisoners were in the care of the Transport Office of the Admiralty.

Notes

1   State Paper: For the Exchange of Prisoners of War Between Great Britain and France. Published in the Morning Chronicle, 27 September 1798. This is a version of the agreement that was first established in 1780.

2   Haythornthwaite, Philip J. The Napoleonic Source Book (New York, 1990).

3   Abell, Francis. Prisoners of War in Britain 1756–1815 (London, 1914), p.10.

4   Fregosi, Paul. Dreams of Empire: Napoleon and the First World War, 1792–1815 (London, 1989), p.29–43.

5   TNA:PRO WO40/8. War Office Unnumbered Papers 1796.

6   NMM ADM/MT/415. Admiralty Letters 19 February 1796.

7   ibid. 16 February 1796.

8   NMM ADM/MT/416. Admiralty Letter 4 October 1796.

9   NMM ADM/MT/415. 16 February 1796.

10   NMM ADM/MT/416. July 1796.

11   Clayton, Tim & Craig, Phil. Trafalgar: The men, the battle, the storm (London, 2004), p.363–367.

12   Gates, D. The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War (London, 1986), p.331 and 358.

13   TNA:PRO ADM103/612. List of Parole Prisoners L-Z.

14   Gurwood, Lt.Col. J. Selections from the Dispatches and General Orders of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington (London, 1851). Dispatch 856, 14 December 1813.

15   Crowhurst, Patrick. The French War on Trade: Privateering 1793–1815 (Gower Publishing, 1989), p.1–24.

16   ibid. p.207–209.

17   ibid. p.38–39.

18   NMM ADM/MT/416, 4 October 1796.

19   ibid. July 1796.

20   Munch-Petersen, Thomas. Defying Napoleon: How Britain bombarded Copenhagen and seized the Danish Fleet in 1807 (Sutton Publishing, 2007), p.38–59.

21   Reilly, Robin. The British at the Gates (London, 1976), p.25–35.

22   TNA:PRO ADM103/342, General Entry Book of American Prisoners of War 1812–15.

23   ibid.

24   NMM ADM/MT/416, 4 October 1796.

25   NMM ADM/MT/415, 10 February 1796.

26   TNA:PRO ADM103/144, General Entry Book of American Prisoners of War at Gibraltar, 1812–1815; ADM103/145, General Entry Book of French Prisoners of War at Gibraltar, 1803–1813; ADM103/98, 99, 100, General Entry Book of French Prisoners of War at Dartmoor Prison, 1815.

27   TNA:PRO ADM105/52, Prisoners’ Applications, 1811.

28   Liddell Hart, Captain B.H. (Ed.), The Letters of Private Wheeler 1809–1828 (The Windrush Press, Stroud, 1993), p.145–147.

29   Costello, Edward. The Adventures of a Soldier or Memoirs of Edward Costello (London, 1841), p.175–176.

30   McGrigor, James. The Autobiography and Services of Sir James McGrigor; Late Director General of the Army Medical Department (London, 1861) p.276.

31   Costello, ibid. p200.

32   Pescott Frost Collection, p121.

33   Lejeune, Baron Louis François. Memoirs of Baron Lejeune (London, 1897) p103.

34   WO40/8. War Office Unnumbered Papers 1796.

35   NMM ADM/MT/415. The Mayor of Penzance submitted a bill of £3 12s 8½d to the Admiralty for providing supper for 12 French officers and 62 Common Men, carriage of their baggage, candles to illuminate their meal, 40 bundles of straw as bedding, and expenses for men carrying the straw and serving supper. These prisoners were from the captured Privateer Courer, brought into Penzance by HMS Porcupine.

36   Childs, W.M. The Town of Reading during the Early Part of the Nineteenth Century (London, 1910) p.60.