While the fighting had stopped, the 3rd Egyptian army was still stuck in the Sinai, which Egypt did not tolerate. It was therefore necessary to fix the situation. To do this, Henry Kissinger tried to harmonize the Israeli and Egyptian policies, and to calm the situation, the US Secretary of State called on the State of Israel to ensure supplies to the 3rd army and called on the Egyptian President to demonstrate patience and moderation. Appealing to the USSR would not have helped the situation, as the future of the crisis lay in the hands of the Israelis. At this point, it is important to emphasize that although negotiations were taking place between Moscow and Washington during the conflict, from the end of October they were now taking place in Jerusalem and the Arab capitals.
Despite emerging victorious from the conflict, the Israeli leaders proved to be quickly distraught by the situation in which they found themselves. Even if victory was theirs, they could see that the political and diplomatic situation had changed significantly:
The Israelis no longer had the confidence that they had gained after the Six-Day War. Although they knew that they had to negotiate with the Arab countries, they failed when it came to making concessions. Whereas Henry Kissinger tried to quickly obtain a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, Golda Meir hesitated over the proposals to supply the 3rd army. The US Secretary of State then threatened to reduce the economic and political support given to the Israelis, and after lengthy discussions, the Israeli Prime Minister gave in. All that remained was to define the state that would monitor the free passage of the 3rd army. Israel decided to take the initiative, however Henry Kissinger had already suggested that Egypt take on the task or that the area fall under UN supervision. Therefore, the peace plan proposed by Henry Kissinger was still not suitable for Israel.
On the Egyptian side, Anwar Sadat was conciliatory and gave a glimpse of his intention to quickly reach an agreement. When Henry Kissinger told him that the Israelis had refused to give up control of the corridor, the Egyptian president, disappointed, finally accepted the conditions imposed by Israel. Satisfied with the conciliatory policy of Anwar Sadat, the US Secretary of State proposed to restore relations between Egypt and the United States. This agreement had a direct impact on Israel, which agreed a few days later to leave the control of the corridor, through which the 3rd army was supplied, to the UN forces. This shift reflected the fear felt by Israel of losing the Americans over the resumption of diplomatic relations that they held with Egypt. On 11 November 1973, the first agreement called the “Six Points” between Egypt and Israel was finally signed. It consisted of:
The belligerents met at the 101st kilometer of the Cairo-Suez road to sign the six-point agreement, but negotiations between Egypt and the Arab countries were partial. The agreements that resulted were both due to the intense US diplomacy and the flexible policy of the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. On 21 December 1973, new negotiations took place in Geneva, but they failed: at the beginning of 1974, the politics of the Middle East were once again compromised.
The Yom Kippur War caused a shock for Israel. The invincibility of the army and the infallibility of the intelligence services were called into question. Whilst having all the necessary information specifying that an Arab attack was imminent, Israeli intelligence officials made interpretation errors, which were intensified by internal malfunctions, and therefore did not operate correctly. Furthermore, in operational terms, the Israelis did not respect the rules of the art of war, such as the economy of forces and the concentration of means, by using aviation and tanks in an irrational manner.
Following these errors, Golda Meir announced her resignation in April 1974. She was replaced by Yitzhak Rabin, whose government would be challenged by numerous scandals. Forced to call for another election, Menachem Begin became Prime Minister of Israel. However, these events slowed down the new peace negotiations. This is why the Egyptian president, who hoped to reach an agreement soon, decided to personally go to Israel. Through this decision, Anwar Sadat became the first Arab leader to recognize Israel’s existence as a state. In 1978, US President Jimmy Carter (born in 1924) brought Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin together for a summit at Camp David. Discussions lasted more than ten days and led to an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. However, the signing of the truce raised a considerable amount of discontent within the Arab community, which did not hesitate to exclude Egypt from the Arab League. In 1981, Anwar Sadat was assassinated by members of the army who disapproved of the peace agreement with Israel.
Jimmy Carter, Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin during the signature of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty in Washington, 26 March 1979.
While the military victory lay with the Jewish state, the conflict provided the Arabs with a symbolic success. Using oil as a weapon and playing on the conflict between the two great powers, they were able to give a global character to this crisis and give new momentum to the Arab-Israeli struggle. Solidarity among the Arab countries gathered against Israel was finally found, which represented a great victory for them.
Due to the high-tech weaponry used, the Yom Kippur War remains the first high-intensity mechanized conflict since the end of World War II (1939-1945). Besides the fact that it demonstrated the importance of intelligence to counter a surprise attack, the Arab-Israeli conflict was also an opportunity to try out various weapons that had never been tested on the battlefield. This sophisticated technology had a great influence on the course of the conflict. Despite this, the importance of the human factor in the conduct of a battle was once again proven.