Formulating ethical principles that would provide the answers to all moral problems is a daunting, perhaps impossible, task that in any case lies beyond our aims. Some thinkers, however, have supposed they could offer one supreme moral principle to serve as the ultimate ethical guide, requiring us to perform all the actions we ought to perform and forbidding us from performing all the actions we ought not perform. We doubt that any of these suggested principles is entirely successful. Without exploring any of them in depth, however, we shall raise difficulties with the most discussed proposals, thereby seeking a better under standing of the nature of acting morally, a necessary condition for living well.
One principle common to many religious traditions is the Golden Rule. Its positive formulation, attributed to Jesus, is: “In everything do to others as you would have them do to you.”
1 The negative formulation, which appeared at least five centuries earlier, is attributed to Confucius and was later proposed by the Jewish sage Hillel. The latter puts it as follows: “What is hateful to you, do not to your neighbor.”
2 Is either of these the supreme moral principle?
Consider first the positive formulation. Granted, we usually should treat others as we would wish them to treat us. For instance, we should go to the aid of an injured person, just as we would wish that person to come to our aid if we were injured. If we always followed this rule, however, the results would be unfortunate. Masochists, for instance, derive pleasure from being hurt. Were they to act according to the principle in question, their duty would be to inflict pain, thereby doing to others as they wish done to themselves. Similarly, consider a person who enjoys receiving telephone calls, regardless of who is calling. The principle would require that person to telephone everyone, thereby reciprocating preferred treatment. Indeed, strictly speaking, to fulfill the positive formulation of the Golden Rule would be impossible, because we wish so many to do so much for us that we would not have time to do all that is necessary to treat them likewise. As Walter Kaufman commented, “anyone who tried to live up to Jesus’ rule would become an insufferable nuisance.”
3In this respect, the negative formulation of the Golden Rule is preferable, because it does not imply that we have innumerable duties toward everyone else. Neither does it imply that masochists ought to inflict pain on others, nor that those who enjoy receiving telephone calls ought themselves to make calls. While the negative formulation does not require these actions, however, neither does it forbid them. It enjoins us not to do to others what is hateful to ourselves, but pain is not hateful to the masochist and calls are not hateful to the telephone enthusiast. Thus, because the negative formulation does not prohibit actions that ought to be prohibited, it is not the supreme moral principle.
Let us next sketch two other standards of conduct, each of which has sometimes been thought to be the supreme moral principle. One was originally formulated by Immanuel Kant, who argues that the moral worth of an action is to be judged not by its consequences but by the nature of the maxim (the principle) that motivates the action. Right actions are not therefore necessarily those with favorable consequences but those performed from the duty of acting in accord with correct maxims. But which maxims are correct? According to Kant, only those that can serve as universal laws, because they are applicable without exception to every person at any time. In other words, you should act only on a maxim that can be universalized without contradiction.
To see what Kant has in mind, consider a specific example he uses to illustrate his view. Suppose you need to borrow money, but it will be lent to you only if you promise to pay it back. You realize, however, that you will not be able to honor the debt. Are you permitted to promise to repay the money, knowing you will not keep the promise? Kant proposes that the way to determine whether such an action is permissible is to universalize the maxim in question and see whether doing so leads to contradiction. The maxim is: “When I believe myself to be in need of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know I shall never be able to do so.” Can this maxim be universalized without contradiction? Kant argues that it cannot. “For the universality of a law which says that anyone who believes himself to be in need could promise what he pleased with the intention of not fulfilling it would make the promise itself and the end to be accomplished by it impossible; no one would believe what was promised to him but would only laugh at any such assertion as vain pretense.”
In other words, to make promises with no intention of keeping them would lead to the destruction of the practice of promising. Thus, because the maxim in question cannot be universalized without contradiction, that maxim is not morally acceptable and, consequently, any action it motivates is immoral. According to Kant, then, the supreme moral principle is: “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”
4This principle, unfortunately, prohibits actions that should be permitted. Although we might agree that the maxim of making insincere promises cannot be universalized, we can easily imagine cases in which a person ought to make a promise without any intention of keeping it. Suppose, for example, you and your family will starve to death unless you obtain food immediately, and a wealthy person offers to provide the food if you will promise repayment within twenty-four hours. Surely we would say, contrary to Kant’s principle, under these circumstances you ought to act on a maxim that cannot be universalized and make a promise you have no intention of keeping.
Kant’s insistence that proper maxims admit no exceptions leads him not only to disapprove actions that are appropriate but also to approve some that appear inconsistent. Maxims he sanctions may conflict, and in that case adherence to one involves the violation of another. In the preceding example, for instance, were you to act in accord with the maxim of never making insincere promises, you would violate another maxim affirmed by Kant, that of aiding those who are in distress. He argues that both maxims admit no exceptions, but because always abiding by both is impossible, Kant’s position is problematic.
Perhaps his proposal raises difficulties because it concentrates exclusively on the reason for an action and fails to take into account its results. Thus let us next consider a principle that focuses on consequences, one defended by John Stuart Mill. He was a leading advocate for the ethical position known as “utilitarianism,” according to which an action is right insofar as it promotes the happiness of humanity and wrong in so far as it promotes unhappiness. By the term “happiness” Mill means pleasure and the absence of pain. By “humanity” he means all persons, each valued equally. Thus Mill’s supreme moral principle is: Act in such a way as to produce the greatest pleasure for the greatest number of people, each person’s pleasure counting equally.
This principle avoids the pitfalls of Kant’s view, for whereas he admitted no exceptions to moral rules and was thus led to condemn insincere promises that saved human lives, the utilitarian principle is flexible enough to allow for any exceptions that increase overall happiness. Although Mill would agree that insincere promises are usually wrong, because they are apt to cause more pain than pleasure, he would allow that in some cases, such as that of the starving family, an insincere promise is morally justifiable, as it would lead to greater overall happiness than any alternative.
The flexibility of the utilitarian principle is advantageous but also flawed, for it permits actions that should be prohibited. Consider, for example, inhabitants of a city who each week abduct a stranger and place the unfortunate person in an arena to wrestle a lion. When the inhabitants of the city are challenged to justify this practice, they reply that although one person suffers much pain, thousands of spectators obtain greater pleasure from this form of entertainment than from any other, so the spectacle is justified on utilitarian grounds. Clearly Mill’s principle appears to yield an unacceptable implication. Other cases along similar lines likewise illustrate the laxity of utilitarianism. The sheriff who hangs an innocent person to satisfy the vengeance of the townspeople may maximize pleasure but nevertheless acts immorally. Also unethical is the teacher who awards all students A’s to maximize their pleasure and avoid causing anyone pain.
One way to try to salvage the utilitarian principle is to argue that not all pleasures are of equal quality, that, for instance, the pleasure of spectators at a lion arena is less valuable than that enjoyed by those at a piano recital. As Mill writes, “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to comparison knows both sides.”
5This move is dubious. Some individuals, knowing both sides of the question, would prefer to witness a struggle between human and lion rather than between human and keyboard. Even if only one knowledgeable individual had such taste, why should that person’s view be disregarded? Furthermore, Mill’s principle cannot be salvaged by the claim that attendance at a piano recital develops sensitivity whereas a visit to a lion arena dulls it, for, according to utilitarianism, actions are good to the extent that they produce pleasure, not to the extent that they produce sensitivity.
Perhaps given the complexities of the human condition, any search for a supreme moral principle is doomed to failure, but the analysis so far, even while omitting innumerable clarifications, qualifications, and countermoves, has at least succeeded in calling attention to one fundamental feature of morality. The positive and negative formulations of the Golden Rule, the Kantian principle, and utilitarianism all serve as reminders that a moral person is obligated to be sensitive to others. This insight motivates not only the biblical injunction to treat our fellow human beings as we wish to be treated, but also the utilitarian insistence that each person’s happiness is to count neither more nor less than another’s. The same theme is central to Kant’s view, a point he made explicit by claiming that the supreme moral principle could be reformulated as follows: “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.”
6 In short, the moral point of view involves taking into account interests apart from our own.
With this insight in hand, let us recall the cases of Pat the philosopher and Lee the surfer. Both treat others with respect and hence act morally. Can we conclude, therefore, that they live well? Not necessarily. Suppose both are fundamentally frustrated or angry. Suppose they regret many decisions they have made, resent how they have been treated by others, or rue what they consider to be a long series of misfortunes. Under those circumstances, even if their actions have been ethical, for them the results would be negative.
The key question is: what missing element has to be added to an ethical life to render it well-lived? We propose as the answer: happiness.
