The distinction between labor and labor power is a basic concept in Marxian economics and one of the central points developed by Marx in volume one of Capital. It is an especially fruitful theoretical insight that has profound implications for understanding the origin of surplus value, absolute and relative surplus value, relations between capital and labor, the labor process, the evolution of production technology, the role of management and supervision in the capitalist enterprises, and macroeconomic dynamics. Early in volume one of Capital Marx distinguishes between the capacity or potential to labor and the actual amount of labor performed, and introduces the term “labor power” to distinguish the former from the latter (1967a, 167, 171). The distinction is clear: labor power is the capacity or potential to produce, labor is actual production. The relation between the two is described as “labor-power in use is labor itself” (177). The difference between labor and labor power arises because worker effort is variable and they may work at a pace or intensity below their capacity.
The distinction between labor and labor power exists in all forms of production, but is especially important in capitalist production because laboring occurs in the context of the exchange of labor power for a wage. The commodity workers bring to market is labor power, which capitalist producers purchase as an input into production. Once purchased labor power belongs to the employer, and they consume it by putting the worker to work under their direction (Marx 1967a, 175–6, ch. VII). But unlike other commodities, what the capitalist purchases exists only as potential, and the quantity of labor they actually receive by consuming their purchase depends on the degree to which the worker exerts herself in production. There is then a unique aspect of the purchase and consumption of the commodity labor power: the capitalist purchases something that exists only as potential and what they ultimately receive from their purchase depends on their ability to extract labor from labor power.
Marx discovers the unique aspects of the commodity labor power in the first draft of Capital (Grundrisse, 1973, 275). There, for the first time (Nicolaus 1973, 20–1, 44–7), he identifies the distinction between labor and labor power (though he had not yet begun to use this new terminology consistently), and emphasizes the unique aspect of this commodity exchange.1
If we now further inquire how the exchange between capital and labor is different in content from simple exchange (circulation), then we find that ... In the exchange between capital and labor, the (sale of labor power for a wage) is an exchange, falls entirely within ordinary circulation; the (extraction of labor from labor power) is a process qualitatively different from exchange, and only by misuse could it have been called any sort of exchange at all. It stands directly opposite exchange; essentially different category.
The extraction of labor from labor power is a “different category” from simple commodity exchange in that it involves a contest that depends on the relative strength, planning, organization, and guile of the exchanging parties after the commodities have been exchanged and the purchaser seeks to consume their purchase. The difference between them is the difference between the sphere of circulation, which Marx mockingly calls “a very Eden of the innate rights of man”, and the “hidden abode of production” where conflict over the labor process is a driving force (1967a, 176). Frederick Taylor (1919, 10, 49–51), who famously used scientific methods to aid management in their efforts to extract labor from labor power, refers to this struggle evocatively as a “war” on the shop floor, and hence we have the contrasting images of the sale of labor power for a wage as a simple commodity exchange followed by a war between the exchanging parties over what that commodity will actually provide.
Marx’s definition of labor power has conceptual rigor but also raises several measurement issues. Labor power has two dimensions to it, duration and capacity. The duration of labor power is easily measured in units of time, and monitoring the amount of time a worker puts in on a job is routine in most workplaces. The capacities that a worker brings to the job, on the other hand, are not easily observed or measured. It is relatively uncontroversial to propose that some set of capabilities exist in a human being, but they may be context dependent, mutable, and their extent may not be fully known even to the individual who possesses them. The knowledge and skill of a worker is likely increasing over their lifetime while at the same time their physical capabilities first increase then decline after a certain age. But despite these difficulties, the idea that at a point in time a worker possesses a set of capabilities that can be exercised is valid.
Let Lp represent the quantity of labor power purchased from an individual worker. This is defined as,
where t is the units of time and α is an index (a unitless number) of this worker’s capacity to perform the function for which they are hired relative to the population. If an employer draws a large number of employees from a population of workers with varying capacities they can expect that their labor force will reflect the average capacity of the population, in which case α = 1 for this group of workers and Lp is simply a measure of duration.
A quantity of labor has three dimensions: duration, capacity, intensity. The first two dimensions are derived from its connection to labor power but the third results from the variability of worker effort levels. Indeed the critical distinction between labor and labor power is a consequence of the fact that worker effort levels are variable, and the actual amount of labor performed depends on the degree to which the worker exerts herself and exercises her skills and capabilities during the time period. In Marx’s words, “Increased intensity of labor means increased expenditure of labor in a given time” (1967a, 524). Output, and hence the firm’s profit, is maximized when the worker exerts maximal effort, but there are good reasons to expect that the worker chooses their effort level using criteria different from this. Marx (1967a, 331–2; 1972, 505) stresses an unavoidable “antagonism of interests” between the employer and the wage laborer, which is rooted in the worker’s inclination to choose an effort level favorable to their own well-being rather than profit maximization of the firm. The wage relation means that the level of intensity a worker exerts on the job does not benefit them directly, as it would if they were an independent commodity producer, but rather benefits the employer in the form of higher profits. It is in the interest of the employer to increase the intensity of work, but it is the worker who bears the cost of this in the form of increased toil.2 It is the variability of worker effort level coupled with the antagonism of interests between a capitalist employer and a hired laborer that makes the extraction of labor from labor power a ubiquitous problem in capitalism.
Following Bowles (1985),3 designate the worker’s effort level as l* (measured in labor per hour), and the total amount of labor performed L is defined as,
By isolating the distinct components of effort and duration of labor time definition (2) provides insight into several important points in Marxian economics.
The first and perhaps most basic theoretical consequence of the difference between labor and labor power is Marx’s theory of the origin of surplus value. Explaining the source of surplus value (and hence profit) requires explaining how a capitalist entrepreneur can purchase a set of commodities as inputs into production, pay for them at their exchange value, and yet end up with output worth more than the cost of the inputs. Equivalents are exchanged, money for labor power and nonlabor means of production, but once consumed in production these inputs produce a commodity whose exchange value exceeds its cost of production. In consuming these inputs something more must be created. Marx calls this something more “Mehrwert,” literally “more worth” or “more value” in English, and explains its origin this way:
We are, therefore, forced to the conclusion that the change originates in the use-value, as such, of the commodity, i.e., in its consumption. In order to be able to extract value from the consumption of a commodity, our friend, Moneybags, must be so lucky as to find, within the sphere of circulation, in the market, a commodity, whose use-value possesses the peculiar property of being a source of value, whose actual consumption, therefore, is itself an embodiment of labor, and, consequently, a creation of value. The possessor of money does find on the market such a special commodity in capacity for labor or labor-power.
(1967a, 167)
The consumption of labor power is the creation value because, by definition, it is the performance of (socially necessary abstract) labor that creates value. Since the cost of labor power is not determined by the amount of labor provided, it is possible for an employer to extract a quantity of labor that exceeds the cost of the labor power they purchase. Note, however, that in order for the consumption of labor power to provide more labor than was exchanged for it in the form of money both the duration Lp and intensity of work l* must be sufficient to achieve an expansion of value. Furthermore, since the creation of surplus value (and hence profits) involves these two factors, increasing the production of surplus value does also. Increasing surplus value absolutely consists of increasing Lp without a concurrent increase in the total wage payment or offsetting reduction in work intensity. Increasing surplus value relatively involves driving down the cost of wage goods, thereby driving down the cost of the real wage, or increasing l* so that more labor is provided per unit labor power. All of these are avenues for increasing surplus value and profits, but only one of them, increasing the level of effort l*, falls within the purview of this essay.
Marx notes4 that capitalists’ efforts to increase productivity by increasing the intensity of labor shapes the evolution of technology itself:
it by no means suffices for capital to take over the labor-process in the form under which it has been historically handed down, and then simply to prolong the duration of that process. The technical and social conditions of the process, and consequently the very mode of production must be revolutionized, before the productiveness of labor can be increased.
(1967a, 315)
This is an especially provocative insight in that it implies the techniques and methods of production are not autonomous technical phenomena independent of class relations, but rather are shaped by these relations.
The central place of conflict over the pace of work in capitalist enterprises was readily apparent in early inquiries into large-scale manufacturing establishments. Ure (1835), who studied manufacturing in the north of England six decades after Arkwright established his first mill in Cromford, concludes that Arkwright’s celebrated accomplishment in creating a water-powered loom is a secondary achievement to his success in subordinating millworkers to factory discipline.
The main difficulty did not, to my apprehension, lie so much in the invention of a proper self-acting mechanism for drawing out and twisting cotton into a continuous thread, as in the distribution of the different members of the apparatus into one co-operative body, in impelling each organ with its appropriate delicacy and speed, and above all, in training human beings to renounce their desultory habits of work, and to identify themselves with the unvarying regularity of complex automation. To devise and administer a successful code of factory discipline, suited to the necessities of factory diligence, was the Herculean enterprise, the noble achievement of Arkwright. Even at the present day, when the system is perfectly organized, and its labour lightened to the utmost, it is found nearly impossible to convert persons past the age of puberty, whether drawn from rural or from handicraft occupations, into useful factory hands. After struggling for a while to conquer their listless or restive habits, they either renounce the employment spontaneously or are dismissed by overlookers on account of inattention.
(15–16; quoted by Marglin 1974, 84–5).
Ure correctly identifies the importance of overcoming the workers’ resistance to this new way of working, but he underestimates the degree to which Arkwright’s technological innovation—replacing handicraft techniques with water-powered continuous-flow production—itself serves to impose factory discipline on workers and enable the employer to dictate the pace of work. No longer in control of the labor process, the millworker is regulated by the machine. This distinguishes them from craft workers who regulate the pace of labor themselves and hence are able to choose what Ure takes to be a “desultory” pace of work rather than a pace that reflects the wishes of their employer.
Several authors have developed the basic insight that capitalist employers use the technique of production itself to gain control over the production process and increase the pace of labor. Marglin (1974) studies the impact of class relations on the evolution of capitalist methods of production from pre-capitalist ones. In this development guild and handicraft production first evolve into the putting-out system, large-scale workshops subsequently emerge during the period that Marx (1967a, 336, ch. XIV) refers to as the era of “manufacture” (manufaktur), and finally modern capitalist production techniques arrive with mechanization and machine pacing. Marglin argues forcefully that each step in this evolution is a consequence not of technological superiority but rather is designed to substitute capitalists’ for workers’ control of the production process (Marglin 1974, 84). For example, he points out that large-scale workshops characteristic of the period of manufacture employed the same basic equipment and techniques used in home-based production, but removing the workers from their homes and gathering them under a single roof made it possible to directly supervise and discipline workers, something that formerly had been impossible. An important difference between a weaver working in their own home as a contractor and one selling their labor power and working in a large workshop is that the hired worker can be told the pace at which they will work. Productivity increases not because of any change in the physical production process, but rather it increases because the wage worker must take direction while the independent producer is free to work at their own pace. Only in a most perverted sense can the ability to compel a worker to work harder with the same equipment be called a technological improvement. But once factories do emerge independent producers, whose products compete with those produced by wage workers, are compelled to quicken their pace or else cease to be competitive. The market brings the products of different private laborers into competition with one another and in so doing imposes the same harsh discipline on them all.
Braverman (1974) focuses primarily on the era after the emergence of capitalism and analyzes the forces driving the transformation of the labor process from the early period of industrial capitalism to modern production. He emphasizes Taylor’s influence on industrial design during this period and finds three basic principles (112–21) driving this transformation: the “dissociation of the labor process from the skills of the workers,” which has come to be called ‘deskilling’; the separation of the conceptual aspects production from the execution of production; and the monopolization of knowledge about the production process in the hands of management. Together this ensemble of factors have the effect of changing the production process from something utilizing knowledge, methods and techniques developed by the direct producers themselves while engaged in independent craft or guild production, and hence under their control, to a routinized process under management control and requiring basic skills that can be acquired relatively easily. Gaining control over the labor process through these methods allows the capitalist employer to dictate the tempo and the outcome of production, makes individual workers relatively easy to replace, and eliminates wage premiums associated with skilled trades.
This transformation of the labor process also has important implications for the location choice of capitalist enterprises. Gordon (1977), Peet (1987) and Olsen (2010) all emphasize the importance of conflict between workers and capitalist employers in the choice of location and the use of relocation to increase management control of the workplace. Once employers no longer find it necessary to employ skilled workers with mastery of a particular craft, who may be localized in a particular area or region, it becomes possible to locate production wherever they find low wages and a ready pool of laborers. Firms and entire industries can become freed from the geographic areas that they were historically associated with, and with that comes freedom from the customary wages, rules, work norms, culture (including labor militancy), and expectations that are part of the social environment of these districts.5 In this way the struggle over control of the labor process—ultimately driven by the pressure to extract labor from labor power—influences the geography of capitalist production itself, and should be recognized as an important aspect of the development of neoliberal capitalism and globalization.
Deskilling, the separation of conception from execution, and the monopolization of knowledge proved to be successful ways for capitalists to gain control of the production process, and thereby increase the extraction of labor from labor power. But these methods encountered limits to their effectiveness especially with the rise of widespread unionization in the 1930s. Edwards (1979, ch. 8) argues that unions gave workers a means to bargain over conditions in the workplace and limited employer’s ability to use technical means to control every aspect of the production process. He finds that “technical control” utilizing the methods advocated by Taylor and identified by Braverman, which was widespread by the 1920s, was not in itself adequate to control production in the unionized workplace, and continuing efforts by management led to the emergence of “bureaucratic control” in the period after 1945. Edwards defines bureaucratic control as:
embedded in the social and organizational structure of the firm and is built into job categories, work rules, promotion procedures, discipline, wage scales, definitions of responsibilities, and the like ... In its most fundamental aspect, bureaucratic control institutionalized the exercise of hierarchical power within the firm. The definition and direction of work tasks, the evaluation of worker performances, and the distribution of rewards and imposition of punishments all came to depend upon established rules and procedures, elaborately and systematically laid out.
(Edwards 1979, 131)
But bureaucratic control, as identified by Edwards, did not replace technological control, it augmented it. One of the clearest manifestations of this growth of bureaucracy was the growth of supervisory and other nonproduction employees in capitalist enterprises over the postwar period. Gordon (1981; 1990; 1996, 46–51) consistently finds, using a range of different data sources and classifications of production/nonproduction or supervisory/nonsupervisory, that the size of the bureaucracy and the intensity of supervision in U.S. enterprises increased significantly in the period after 1947 before plateauing in the early 1980s.6
Edwards’s conception of bureaucratic control and Gordon’s empirical work on supervision also illustrate an important point made by Marx in Capital: that the supervisory and disciplinary functions of management (as distinct from its coordinating function) are also consequences of the antagonism of interests between labor and capital. Supervision and discipline are so ingrained in the capitalist workplace that it requires a historical perspective to recognize them as consequences of antagonistic production relations. Marx notes that the same antagonism of interests found in capitalism exists “in all modes of production based on the antithesis between the laborer, as the direct producer, and the owner of the means of production” (1967c, 384). He repeatedly points out the analogy between slavery and capitalism over this point (1967a, 332; 1967b, 382–90; 1972, 355, 507), and is scathing in his criticism of other economists for failing to recognize this similarity. In his analysis of the role of management in volume three of Capital (1967b, 382–90) he concludes that whenever production is based on antagonism between the direct producer and the owner of the means of production (as, for example, under slavery and capitalism) supervision and discipline become necessary to overcome worker’s resistance in production. In his words: “The greater this antagonism, the greater the role played by supervision” (Ibid., 384). Marx also looks forward to emerging production relations for contrast, and notes that “In a cooperative factory the antagonistic nature of the labor of supervision disappears, because the manager is paid by the laborers instead of representing capital counterposed to them” (Ibid., 387).
Marx’s conclusion that supervision and discipline are necessitated by the antagonism of interests between workers and their capitalist employers, coupled with his observation that this is eliminated in producer cooperatives, implies that there should be a reduction in the ratio of supervisory to production employees in worker-owned businesses. There is empirical support for this in Greenberg (1986), who studies plywood cooperatives in the Pacific Northwest of U.S. and finds that “The (worker cooperatives) are easily able to manage production with no more than two foremen per shift, and often with only one, whereas the (conventionally-owned plants) often require six or seven” (Greenberg 1986, 45–6).
The techniques to increase the intensity of labor considered thus far are largely changes to the firm itself. But from a Marxist perspective the enterprise always exists in a social context, both influenced by this context and influencing it at the same time. For example, Marx argues that during periods of rising unemployment “the pressure of the unemployed compels those that are employed to furnish more labor” (Marx 1967a, 640). The employed are compelled to increase their effort level because the threat of unemployment becomes both increasingly credible and costly for the worker. This is a remarkable insight that makes the labor extraction problem an important aspect of Marx’s theory of cyclical dynamics (Marx 1967a, 612–40).7
The role that unemployment plays in disciplining labor leads Kalecki (1943) to be skeptical that a capitalist economy can maintain full employment.8 He argues that unemployment is a persistent part of capitalism because without it the employer’s most important disciplinary device—the ability to fire an employee—loses its effectiveness. Unemployment is then necessary in a capitalist economy to allow employers to successfully extract labor power from labor power and maintain their class positions. This point is developed formally by Bowles (1985). In Bowles’s model the effort level a worker offers depends on both the cost of job loss and the level of surveillance or supervision by the employer, with the effort level positively related to both of these. The cost of losing a job depends on the probability of finding alternative employment if terminated, and is then inversely related to the level of unemployment. Since the cost of job loss is increasing with unemployment worker effort levels should be also.9
The evidence of whether labor productivity is countercyclical (rising during periods of decreasing output and rising unemployment), as is predicted by Marx’s approach, is mixed for the U.S. economy. During the period from 1947 to the early 1980s the conventional measure of productivity (output per worker) appears to be largely procyclical, rather than countercyclical. But in the decades since the early 1980s it appears to be largely countercyclical. This does not, in itself, call the Marxian link between unemployment and worker effort into question, but rather suggests that “labor hoarding”—the willingness of a business to keep more workers on their payroll than is necessary to meet the current demand for their product—may have been one of the rewards used by management during the era of bureaucratic control. In this interpretation the emergence of countercyclical movements in labor productivity is a symptom of the decline of bureaucratic control in the 1980s and the growth of the more ruthless forms of industrial relations characteristic of the era of neoliberalism.
The difference between labor and labor power is a fundamental concept in both theoretical and applied Marxian economics. Because the exchange of labor power for a wage is a ubiquitous feature of capitalism the labor extraction problem, arising out of the difference between labor and labor power, is also. The consequences of this problem are widespread and profound. Indeed the basic features of capitalist enterprises and aspects of the macroeconomy are all shaped in important ways by the firm’s need to overcome this problem in order to maximize the extraction of surplus value and profitability.
The effects of the labor extraction problem have only been partially explored, and there are a number of issues that could be usefully analyzed with more attention to this issue. I want to call attention here to two issues, but this is far from an exhaustive list. Consider first the question of the relationship between social relations and the productive forces in society. Cohen (2000 [1978], 134–5) and Cohen and Kymlicka (1988) express a strictly technological determinist position with admirable clarity and argue that (i) the forces of production develop autonomously and (ii) exert a deterministic influence over the remainder of the society, which conforms to these evolving forces. In contrast, the work considered in this essay suggests that the productive forces themselves are profoundly shaped by the prevailing social relations, and the relationship between them is characterized by reciprocal influence rather than autonomy and primacy/subordination. A second issue to consider involves progressive economic policy. The difference between labor and labor power, and the consequent labor extraction problem, make it possible to recognize the exchange of labor power for a wage as a social institution that is inferior to some form of collective worker ownership. Collective ownership eliminates the antithesis between the direct producer and the owner of the means of production, and thus offers the opportunity to eliminate the antagonism of interests at the root of the labor extraction problem. Advocates for progressive social change and policy makers have paid too little attention to this advantage from this form of enterprise.
1 Engels was the first to point out that Marx did not discover the labor/labor power distinction until the late 1850s (1976, 5–6). He considered this discovery so important that he posthumously revised some of Marx’s early writings to include this distinction.
2 It is, of course, true that a worker might find their work intrinsically rewarding, but it is unlikely that will continue when their employer imposes an increased pace and intensity of work and transforms the labor process itself through mechanization and minute specialization. Whatever charm the work holds for the worker is not the objective of capitalist production, which is designed and initiated to produce profits, not job satisfaction.
3 See also Gordon (1981).
4 This idea is developed in some detail in section IV of volume one of Capital (Marx 1967a).
5 In economic geography Vernon’s (1966) influential product cycle theory emphasizes changes associated with the introduction, maturation, and standardization of products to explain changing patterns of industrial location. He remarks that manufacturing processes that “receive significant inputs from the local economy, such as skilled labor” or “rely heavily on upon external economies” are less able to relocate in pursuit of lower production costs. What Vernon, and those influenced by his work, fail to recognize is that production technology is not static; the “standardization” of production involves decoupling it from local inputs and economies in order to achieve geographic mobility, and hence requires precisely the kind of changes emphasized by Braverman and subsequent Marxian literature.
6 Goldstein (2012) finds no such plateau in the 1980s. He shows managerial employment and wages increasing consistently from 1984–2002.
7 Goodwin’s (1967) formalization of Marx’s theory of cyclical dynamics assumes that labor productivity grows at an exogenously given rate. It is then only a partial representation of Marx’s overall theory of cyclical dynamics.
8 See also Boddy and Crotty (1975), which builds on Kalecki’s analysis of the political aspects of unemployment and Marx’s analysis of cyclical dynamics (including the impact of unemployment on productivity) to develop their theory of a political business cycle.
9 The same basic dynamics are present in Bowles 2005, ch. 8, though in that version of the model the cost of job loss is replaced by the value of the worker’s “fallback position.”
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