4. Marx, Capital, vol. 3 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Press, 1962), 772. In his earliest writings, Marx had spoken of "political forms" corresponding to "economic relations." Marx and Engels, "The German Ideology," in MECW, vol. 5,195ff.
5. Marx, "The Jewish Question," in MECW, vol. 3, 155.
6. Ibid., 153.
7. Ibid., 151.
8. Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," in MECW, vol. 3, 272.
9. Marx, "The Jewish Question," in MECW, vol. 3, 149-53.
10. Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts," in MECW, vol. 3, 271.
11. Marx, Capital, vol. 3, 798ff.
12. Ibid., 800.
13. Marx and Engels, "The German Ideology," in MECW, vol. 5, 47.
14. See the discussion in Ralph Milliband, Marxism and Politics (New York: Oxford University, 1977), chap. 1.
15. Engels, "Introduction" to Marx, "The Civil War in France," in Marx and Engels, Selected Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Press, 1955, hereafter MESW), 485.
16. Marx, "The Civil War in France," in ibid., 520-21.
17. V. I. Lenin, "The State and Revolution," in Collected Works, vol. 25 (Moscow: Progress, 1964), 419; see 418, 451ff.
18. Ibid., 421.
19. See the discussion in Alfred G. Meyer, Leninism (New York: Praeger, 1962), chap. 9.
20. Leon Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed: What is the Soviet Union and Where is it Going? (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1937), 51.
21. Ibid., 278.
22. J. V. Stalin, "Report to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party," in Problems of Leninism (Moscow: Foreign Languages Press, 1953), 792-95.
23. Stalin, "Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress," in Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Press, 1955, hereafter SSW), 381.
24. See Mao's recognition of his debt to Stalin, "On New Democracy," in Selected Works, vol.2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1964, hereafter MSW), 345-47.
25. Ibid., 355.
26. Ibid., 350.
27. Mao, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," in MSW, vol. 2, 330.
228 Marxism, China, and Development
28. Stalin, "The Prospects of the Revolution in China," in SSW, vol. 8, 382.
29. Mao, "On the People*s Democratic Dictatorship," in MSW, vol. 4, 412-13.
30. See Mao, "On New Democracy," in MSW, vol. 2, 346ff., 373.
31. Mao, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," in MSW, vol. 4, 414.
32. Mao, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," in MSW, vol. 2, 323-25.
33. Ibid., 320-23, 325.
34. Mao, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," in MSW, vol. 4, 417-18.
35. Mao, "On New Democracy," in MSW, vol. 2, 350ff.
36. Ibid., 351-52.
37. Georg Lukacs, Lenin: A Study on the Unity of His Thought (London: NLB, 1971), 25, 27, 35, 68.
38. Meyer, Leninism, 96.
39. Mao, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," in MSW, vol. 4, 419.
40. Ibid., 411,413.
41. As typical, see "Never Forget the Class Struggle," Liberation Army Daily, 4 May 1966, republished in English in The Great Socialist Cultural Revolution in China, vol. 1 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), 20-28; "Mao Zedong's Thought is the Telescope and Microscope of our Revolutionary Cause," in ibid., vol. 3,11, 15-16.
42. "Long Live the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," Red Flag [Hongqi), 8 November 1966, in English in ibid., vol. 4, 13.
43. Mao, "On New Democracy," in MSW, vol. 2, 380-81.
44. Tang Tsou, "Back from the Brink of Revolutionary-feudal Totalitarianism," in Victor Nee and David Mozingo, eds.. State and Society in Contemporary China (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell, 1983), 84.
45. See Pierre Perrolle, ed.. Fundamentals of the Chinese Communist Party (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences, 1976), 78.
46. See Michel C. Oksenberg, "Policy Making under Mao, 1949-1968: An Overview," in J. M. Lindbeck, ed., China: Management of a Revolutionary Society (Seattle: University of Washington, 1971), 79-115.
47. See the discussion in Edward Friedman, "The Societal Obstacle to China's Socialist Transition: State Capitalism or Feudal Fascism," in Nee and Mozingo, eds.. State and Society, 164ff.
48. Gordon White, "The Postrevolutionary Chinese State," in ibid., 28ff.
49. Chen Erjin's volume is available in English as China Crossroads Socialism: An Unofficial Manifesto for Proletarian Democracy (London: Verso, 1984); The Li 2^engtian, Wang Xizhe, and Chen Yiyang discussion is found in English in Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen, and Jonathan Unger, eds.. On Socialist Democracy and the Chinese Legal System: The Li Yizhe Debates (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1985).
50. Chen Erjin, China Crossroads Socialism, 87; see 108.
51. Chan, ed.. On Socialist Democracy, 58, 61, 69, 77ff.
52. Ibid., 83.
53. See "Introduction," in ibid., 12.
54. Chen Erjin, China Crossroads Socialism, 199; See Chan, ed., On Socialist Democracy, 63.
55. Some of the vast dissident literature of "unofficial journals" and wall posters containing the common criticisms of the political system of Communist China is catalogued in English in Catalog of Chinese Underground Literature (Taipei: Institute of Current China Studies, 1981), 2 vols.
Marxism, Maoism, and Political Democracy 229
56. See Lin, ed., What They Say, 18, 31.
57. Wang Xizhe, "Strive for the Class Dictatorship of the Proletariat,'* in Chan, ed.. On Socialist Democracy, 137-38; see 133-41.
58. Chen Erjin, China Crossroads Socialism, 98.
59. Ibid., 106ff., 113.
60. Wang, "Strive for the Class Dictatorship," in Chan, ed., On Socicialist Democracy, 151ff.
61. Wang, "Mao 21edong and the Cultural Revolution," in ibid., 180; see 142ff., 178-80.
62. Li, Chen, and Wang, "On Socialist Democracy," in ibid., 83.
63. Wang, "Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution," in ibid., 195; see 210.
64. Ibid., 187.
65. Ibid., 188, 194,202,239.
66. Ibid., 259.
67. Ibid., 222, 291.
68. Ibid., 237.
69. "Interviews with Li Zhengtian Comparing Wang Xizhe*s Views with his Own," in ibid., 157-62.
70. See Li Zhengtian, "Lawless Laws and Crimeless Crimes," in ibid., 163-75.
71. Chen Erjin, China Crossroads Socialism, 192-93, 224; Chen quoted Engels to the effect that, "[Cjomplete self-government on the American model... is what we too must have. How self-government is to be organized and how we can manage without a bureaucracy has been shown to us by America and the First French Republic," in ibid., 158.
72. Wang, "Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution," in Chen Erjin, China Crossroads Socialism, 254.
73. Dong Fureng, "Concerning the Forms of China's Socialist Ownership," Economic Research, [Jingji yanjiu] 1 (1979): 21-28.
74. See People's Daily, [Renmin ribao] 1 (February 1983): 3.
75. Hua Sheng, Zhang Xuejun, and Lo Xiaopeng, "China's Ten Years of Reforms: Looking Back, Reflection and Prospect," Economic Research 12 (1988): 17-18.
76. "Manifesto of the Thaw Society," in Lin, ed.. What They Say, 21; "It Could Happen in the Year 2000," in ibid., 63.
10 Sun Yat-sen and Political Democracy
The fact that China was overwhelmed by Maoism had little to do with the vigor or coherence of its revolutionary Marxism. Massive disorder, hyperinflation, institutional failings, civil strife, foreign invasion, and the displacement of vast populations bred the desperation and the search for stability and security that opened the passage to Mao Zedong and his followers. Whatever Mao's ideas, they were not even clear to Western sinologists, many of whom dismissed the notion that Mao might be anything other than an agrarian reformer—or had any intention of imposing his own variant of Stalinism on the Chinese people. Certainly there were few who believed he would attempt "proletarian dictatorship" in so backward an environment as mainland China.
Whatever sinologists of the period may have believed. Maoism was one of those mimetic responses so common after every successful revolution. After the Bolshevik Revolution, the twentieth century has seen any number of imitations. Communist parties made their appearance in abundance, but were of most consequence in the less-developed peripheral nations. Intended to overthrow industrial capitalism where there was precious little industrial capitalism, these "Marxist" movements were mspired by a reactive nationalism that made their enemy not capitalism, per se, but "international imperialism." Led by a self-selected "vanguard," these movements, wherever successful, imposed themselves on exhausted populations and brought with them all the now-familiar trappings of developmental dictatorship. The hegemonic party sought to fully control the economic and political circumstances of subjects, to inculcate in them the apposite revolutionary virtues, to legitimize the enterprise by identifying a "universal genius" to lead them, to undertake the community's rapid industrialization, and to foster the militarization of society with "people's militias" and guerrilla enthusiasms.* These move-
ments have left a roster of "Maximum Leaders," "Saviors," and "Great Leaders" in their train, together with failed economies and a history of political abuse unprecedented in modem history.
Before the wave of revolutions that followed that of the Bolsheviks, revolutionaries everywhere had mimicked the French and American revolutions and sought the creation of what Marxists were later to call "bourgeois" representative political institutions as substitutes for those of the traditional autocracies they opposed. "Liberals" in Germany and Italy during the nineteenth century sought such ends, and similar efforts, with the same intention, were undertaken in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America. "Progressives" in the "civilized" West anticipated the worldwide proliferation of representative government—and the imposition of American "democracy" in the colonial Philippines at the commencement of the twentieth century typified the process.
Sun Yat-sen was one of those revolutionaries active at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries who identified with the pre-Bolshevik ideals of the French and American revolutions. Early exposed to British and American political institutions and philosophic ideals. Sun never surrendered his conviction that only some variant of representative democracy could ensure China's future. Toward the very end of his life, speaking to a Chinese audience, he admitted that he had been, and remained, a "worshipper" at the altar of "the American Constitution."^ Whatever the qualifications he introduced, Sun*s most fundamental political convictions remained those of the American Revolution. That is not to say that, as a Chinese nationalist, he did not fmd elements of his belief system in the moral and political traditions of China. Shortly before his death, a Russian visitor asked Sun to identify the intellectual inspiration of his revolutionary doctrine. Without hesitation and apparently with complete conviction, Sun responded that his thought was "a development and a continuation of the ancient doctrines of Confucius."^
While the issues involved are complicated, a case can be made that Sun found cognitive and normative inspiration in the writings of China's antiquity. Whatever the case. Sun conceived political modernization as fully compatible with some of the doctrines articulated in the works of traditional China"*—and in 1928 Richard Wilhelm, the prominent German sinologist, identified Sun's principal achievement as having produced a "living synthesis of the fundamental principles of Confucius and the needs of our time."^
Sun Yat-sen and Political Democracy 233
Whenever Sun gave expression to his political convictions, he almost invariably sought to couch them in terms of traditional intellectual content. Thus, when he spoke of his concern for the "livelihood" of the people m his reform memorial to Li Hungzhang in 1894, he invoked the Ancients for support.** More than that. Sun, unlike Mao Zedong, held that politics invariably rests on a moral foundation or it is not politics at all.'' Unlike classical Marxism—which dismissed morality, in general, as a function of developments in the economic base of society and as a fiction imposed by those who sought the exploitation of the masses*— Sun held moral principles essential to governance. Sun argued that rulers must legitimate rule through a normative appeal to ends. He spoke unself-consciously of Confucian "aims" as the ultimate justification for the rule of some over others.^
That is not to suggest that Sun was a "political idealist." He understood government in very practical terms. Sun was aware that since time immemorial, governments, of necessity, have performed mundane functions and defended themselves against insurrection.^® He argued that defense of the community and the maintenance of conditions that allowed for sustenance were the essentials of group life. Groups, held together by bonds of affinity, sought defense and sustenance through a suitable allocation of resources. Arrangements once established for resource mobilization and control tend to persist. Elites are established and there is continuity in their relationship to the ruled majority.
For Sun, a variety of forms of government could discharge minimum functional and normative essentials of rule. Geographic, demographic, political, and economic circumstances shaped the form and longevity of particular forms of rule. Although Sun, himself, appeared convinced that sovereignty, in some normative sense, belongs to the people in their entirety, ^^ he was prepared to recognize that autocracies, hereditary monarchies, and simple tyrannies have long existed. What Sun argued was that modem developments recommended representative democracy—not necessarily because of its moral superiority, but because it offered the highest probability of success and survival in a highly competitive modem world.
Representative democracy was understood as essential to enlisting the full involvement of the people in the reconstruction of China. *^ As revolutionaries, Sun and his followers became advocates of representative democracy because without democracy the ends of revolution could not be attained.*^
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In the feudal regimes of the past, rulers sought the noninvolvement of subject populations. Monarchs and their minions sought little more than the extraction of requisite taxes and compliance behavior from their inferiors. ^^ Sun argued that modem governments, on the other hand, required far more from people than tax remittance and simple compliance. For that reason passive obedience to political control was hardly adequate to modem needs. What revolutionary China needed was unqualified citizen involvement and that could be obtained only through the extension of political rights—the opportunity for everyone to directly participate in sovereignty.^^
For Sun, it was not enough to acknowledge that the "sovereignty of the country be vested in the people."^^ He saw the commitment to popular sovereignty contributing to the sense of community that would be necessary if China were to manifest that cohesion and power of resistance necessary for survival in the modem world.'^ Sun conceived democracy as essential to Chinese nationalism.
In fact, one of the principal reasons Sun advocated political democracy, and regular rotation in elective office, was to reduce or remove the potential for what in China had always been intemecine competition for hereditary political privilege.** Elective office offers any citizen the opportunity to compete for office under mle-govemed conditions, reducing the potential for factional conflict.
Given his assessment. Sun sought the institutionalization of a West-em form of representative democracy in China. He sought continuity in institutions and mle in law. He conceived individuals as institutional role holders and administrators of public law.*^ As early as 1904, Sun told his American audiences that he anticipated a govemment for post-dynastic China that would be modeled on that of the United States.^®
When, in the mid-1920s, Sun made his case for representative democracy, he outlined plans for a govemment of five branches: a legislative, executive, judicial, examination, and censorial (or control) yuan. The function of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches were those familiar to political systems in Westem democracies. Sun's proposed examination yuan was designed to administer civil service tests to public functionaries and the censorial (or control) yuan was the agency charged with censure, audit, and the trial and impeachment of failed officials.
The divisions of govemment were based on the separation of powers that had been made familiar in the West through the work of Montesquieu.
Sun Yat-sen and Political Democracy 235
For Sun, the checks and balances implied in the separation of powers were necessary in order to ensure that government would not "degenerate into despotism."^*
For Sun, all major officials in government service would hold elective office for specific terms, chosen through contests settled by universal suffrage. Voters would not only enjoy suffrage, but the right to recall, referenda, and legislative initiative.^^ The entire system was identified with the most advanced representative democratic systems in the West.
Political and civil rights would be assured and would include the rights of voluntary association and assembly. Freedom of expression and religious worship, together with the right to publish without prepublication constraints, were to be accorded constitutional assurance."
The rights of association, assembly, and free expression afforded the formal preconditions for the existence of political parties. Sun insisted that when he spoke of "rule by the people," he understood that to include a role for competition between political parties. "Without parties," he maintained, "politics would become increasingly unresponsive... until a representative system could no longer be maintained and would gradually collapse into tyranny."^^
Political parties would constitute one set of voluntary associations that would serve as conduits for the aggregation and articulation of public concerns. In the same context Sun spoke of labor organizations, cooperatives, chambers of commerce, business associations, fraternal groups, and educational assemblies as among the varied and many organized bodies into which citizens would sort themselves in order to influence public affairs.^^
None of this is notable in any theoretical sense. However much Sun may have liked to characterize his conception of representative democracy as uniquely Chinese, there is little that would distinguish it from the political systems already extant in the industrialized democracies. Sun did urge that executives and legislators, once elected, be provided the opportunity to implement policy with "full power." He conceived that as somehow singularly Chinese. But given the structure of relations between the various branches of government he proposed, it is hard to imagine how Sun's "Chinese democracy" could be much different from the representative democracies of the West—not particularly notable for their "power."
Sun spoke of a "powerful government" presumably having capacities that would distinguish it from "old style" Western democracies. The
236 Marxism, China, and Development
government Sun sought to provide for the Chinese would be a **high capacity" instrument that would be, nonetheless, "fully controlled" by the sovereign people. Given the institutional constraints built into the anticipated separation of powers and the public right to initiative, referendum, and recall, however, to argue that the "powerful government" Sun proposed would enjoy advantages not available to Western democracies is unconvincing.
Explicit in the institutional arrangements of representative democracy Sun proposed were the checks and balainces and popular initiatives that served as irreducible constraints on free action of authorities. Sun nowhere recommended an alternative institutional structure for the democracy he advocated that would provide the government special capacity. The institutional structure of his proposed government was by-and-large indistinguishable from those in the Western democracies.
Since publics invariably are composed of multiple interests and concerns, and Sun provides for their aggregation and articulation in voluntary associations and political parties, those interests and concerns would find conflicting expression in an elective legislature or in an independent judiciary. That alone would ensure that government could not act, in any conceivable circumstances, with complete freedom or "unlimited power."
Whatever the ultimate character of the representative democracy Sun anticipated, he understood that a protracted period of preparation would be required before the largely peasant population of China would be adequately schooled for representative government. He proposed that the Chinese revolution would have to traverse three stages: "The first would be the period of military rule (junzheng), the second, the period of tutelage (xunzheng), and the third, the period of constitutional government (xianzheng) . "^^
The first stage in the sequence would involve the imposition of martial rule in order to stabilize a situation that was clearly in critical disorder. Sun pointed to the protracted crisis that followed the antidynastic revolution as grounds for the employment of military force in the service of the nation. It would be necessary to "obliterate" the remnants of the old system and secure the territorial integrity of China threatened by local warlords and their international allies.^^ That would be the period in which revolutionary government would be "all-powerful."
Revolutions invariably seek to stabilize postrevolutionary environments. This would be particularly true in a situation as complicated as
Sun Yat-sen and Political Democracy 237
that which followed the overthrow of a system that had endured thousands of years. The presence of large bodies of armed men, the intervention of foreign governments presumably in defense of their particular interests, and the rise of a multiplicity of aggressive political parties all conspired to create a particularly unstable set of circumstances in China after 1912. By the mid-1920s, Sun was convinced that only the suppression of the most aggressive warlords and the assimilation of the most recalcitrant political opposition would make it possible to embark on a constructive program of political and economic development and modernization in China.
Only when the proposed military government had stabilized the situation could the revolution proceed to the second stage: tutelary rule by a single party. Martial rule would be abolished as rapidly as possible in order to preclude the possibility that the military, accustomed to too long a tenure, might come to dominate society.^* Rule should fall entirely to the revolutionary party. The military should be returned to the barracks and made subordinate to civilian control.
Tutelary government would be erected on the basis of a provisional constitution. Its objective would be to assist in the education of citizens to the responsibilities of self-govenmient. District governments would be established. Citizens in those districts would be accorded suitable political and civil rights that would allow the election of local governments responsive to their immediate needs.
Local governments would undertake a population census, residence registration, the creation of a local police force, and the establishment of educational and health delivery services. Local governments would undertake to construct the necessary communications and transport infrastructure and prepare the rudiments of preliminary economic development.^'
Under the arrangements of political tutelage, the revolutionary party would establish schools for political training. Students would be enrolled in every local district and provided extensive training in local government. They would then serve as instructors for the peasantry. They would create the occasion for popular meetings and the public expression of local concerns.^
Unlettered masses, long subject to the constraints of a dynastic system that left them ill equipped for self-rule, would be trained for political responsibilities by a dominant party. The party, in effect, would create
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the state.^^ Only after the pericxl of military rule and political tutelage would representative democracy make its appearance in postrevolu-tionary China.
It is evident, in retrospect, that Sun did not appreciate the amount of time that would be required to establish security and educate peasants to political responsibility. In his original speculations. Sun spoke of years, perhaps a decade, to conclude the interval of both military rule and political tutelage. In retrospect, the Kuomintang—the Nationalist political party that conceived itself his heir—did not seriously consider the possibility of introducing constitutional government to China until 1945, at the end of the Second World War.
For two decades, between Sun's death in 1925 and the end of the Second World War, China remained under political tutelage. Political rule was exercised by the Kuomintang as a dominant, if not a single, party. The constraints on political freedoms and civil rights during the entire period are well known. For about two decades, postdynastic China remained under an authoritarian system that severely restricted citizen's rights and assured the undisputed continued tenure of the Kuomintang.
In the mid-1930s an attempt was made to draft a constitution, but the effort was ineffectual. The reunification of China under the Kuomintang in the late 1920s had been only partially successful. Kuomintang authorities had only partial control over some of the major provinces— and former warlords continued to exercise considerable local and regional independence. On the borders, the Japanese had already made their first aggressive moves and in 1937 they undertook invasion in earnest.
Throughout this entire period, the Communist party fielded major paramilitary and guerrilla units that taxed resources and the determination of the Nationalist government. Military countermeasures occupied the government and there was little preoccupation with providing democratic representation for the masses of China. Only with the end of the Second World War was serious consideration given to the creation of a government for China that would incorporate the democratic intentions of Sun Yat-sen.
In 1947, under considerable international pressure, a formal constitution was promulgated, and the Republic of China, after two decades of domestic strife and international conflict, attempted to proceed to what Sim Yat-sen had identified as the "stage of constitutional government."
Sun Yat-sen and Political Democracy 239
"Constitutional government" was attempted at a time when the Com-mimist forces under Mao Zedong were advancing toward definitive victory on the Chinese mainland. As a consequence, the new constitution's emergency clause— which allowed that all freedoms and rights accorded might be restricted by law "for reasons of averting an imminent crisis, maintaining social order, or advancing the general welfare"—was invoked and the government operated as an emergency regime. A set of regulations known as the "Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion" was adopted by the National Assembly in 1948 and in 1949 a State of Siege was declared. Under the "Temporary Provisions," the president was permitted to "take emergency measures to avert an imminent danger to the security of the State or of the people ... without being subject to ... procedural restrictions."^^ For all intents and purposes, by 1950 the Republic of China had lapsed back into martial rule.
The collapse of Nationalist resistance against the armies of Mao Zedong on the Chinese mainland reduced the Republic of China to the island territory of provincial Taiwan and the associated territories of the Pescadores, Matsu, and Quemoy. The forces remaining to Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Taiwan, transferring the seat of government "temporarily" to the provincial capital of Taipei.
Immediately prior to the transfer, the dispirited and disorderly troops of the Kuomintang pillaged the island in the last effort to supply their beleaguered comrades still on the mainland. Corruption was a supplementary drain on whatever remained of the island's assets. Hyperinflation had eroded the value of currency and there was every evidence of imminent financial collapse. In February 1947 there were uprisings against the Kuomintang authorities on Taiwan that were put down with conspicuous savagery.
The circumstances on the mainland continued to deteriorate and by the end of 1949 the decision was made by the surviving Kuomintang leadership to withdraw, together with combat-capable units, to the island of Taiwan. More than 1.5 million functionaries and combatants removed to Taiwan to reorganize a government in the general disorder.
The island of Taiwan was about 240 miles long and 90 miles at its widest point. Roughly the size of Massachusetts and Connecticut combined, and with a population of approximately 7.5 million in 1950, the island had one of the highest population densities in the world, with an
240 Marxism, China, and Development
annual crude growth rate of about 3.5 percent. Characterized by an essentially traditional economy, in 1950 the per capita income of the largely illiterate population on the island was about $100. The main crops were sugar, pineapple, and rice. There were few mineral resources, and Taiwan's marginal light industries and infrastructure had been badly damaged by Allied bombings during the closing years of the war.
These were the circumstances into which the Kuomintang government thrust itself in 1949. Given the proclamation of a state of siege, martial law initially imposed comprehensive curfew restrictions on the population. Commodity prices were regulated and inventories controlled. Security inspection and personal identity checks for travelers were required; private possession of "arms, ammunition, or dangerous articles'* was prohibited; and capital punishment was threatened for "spreading rumors or provoking fear, opposing the government or inciting to riot." Counterfeiting, using force during a robbery, committing arson, creating impediments to traffic, interfering with communications, disrupting water supplies, or damaging gas or electric facilities and services were all identified as capital offenses, together with work stoppages or strikes by students.^-'
These constraints on civil and political rights reflected the measure of threat perceived by the remnants of the Kuomintang. The combat units that had made their way to Taiwan were dispirited, malnourished, and diseased. Much of their heavy equipment had been abandoned and support facilities on Taiwan and on the small offshore islands, at best, were meager.
On the mainland of China, Communist forces had mobilized about 300,000 troops to be sealifted in motorized junks and transports displacing in excess of 200,000 tons. The Kuomintang authorities expected massive violence to settle down on the island, to be followed by the extinction of the Republic of China.
On 5 January 1950, President Harry Truman announced that the United States would no longer provide aid to the anti-Communist forces on Taiwan. In anticipation of that announcement, the Department of State circulated a confidential memorandum to its information officers announcing the imminent fall of Taiwan.^ Neither the United States nor the Conmiunist forces on the mainland expected the heirs of Sun Yat-sen to resist the anticipated attack for very long.
The situation in the Taiwan Strait was dramatically altered by the June 1950 invasion of South Korea by troops from Communist North
Sun Yat-sen and Political Democracy 241
Korea. The United Nations declared the invasion an "act of aggression*' and international, largely American, forces were dispatched to provide aid to South Korea. The United States assumed the responsibility of containing communism in Asia—and the Nationalists on Taiwan became beneficiaries.
The United States put together a consortium of similarly disposed nations in East and Southeast Asia to resist the expansion of Asian com-mimism, and because of its strategic location and political support, Taiwan became a forward outpost on the defense perimeter of the consolidating "free world." Chinese Communist involvement in the Korean conflict intensified U.S. strategic interest in Taiwan. The American military conceived the island as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier,*' critical to the defense of Asia and of logistical value to the defense of the Pacific rim. In May 1951, Washington dispatched a Military Assistance Advisory Group to Taiwan, positioning the Seventh Fleet between the island and the Chinese mainland. U.S. ground forces were stationed on the island to serve as a trip wire to ensure U.S. engagement in the event of attack.
In December 1954, a mutual defense treaty was signed between the United States and the Republic of China on Taiwan. Together with the passage of the "Formosa (i.e., Taiwan) Resolution" early in 1955, the security arrangements between the United States and the Republic of China provided Taiwan substantial insulation against attack by the forces of Mao Zedong.
It was in this context of reasonable security that the government of the Republic of China commenced its program for the economic and political development of Taiwan. The members of the National Assembly and the legislative, executive, judicial, control, and examination yuans, elected in 1948 on the mainland, were ordered to take up their duties in the new "temporary" capital in Taipei. Below this national structure, a fully operational provincial government was assembled. By December 1951 a Provincial Assembly was inaugurated, establishing the first elements of local self-rule for the island *s population. By 1959, an "Organic Law of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly** provided for the election of assembly members by direct popular vote for renewable terms of four years. Below the provincial level, all local offices were to be filled by popular suffrage as well.
By the end of the 1950s, the authorities on Taiwan had assembled a multitiered system of government, a "national" government that contin-
242 Marxism, China, and Development
ued the fiction of ruling all of China, together with a provincial and a local government occupied with the immediate affairs of the people of the island.
The constitution of 1946-1947 had not been very specific about the composition and powers of provincial or local assemblies. The executive yuan, therefore, established the "experimental" elements of provincial and local governments, with the provincial government empowered to *'pass regulations concerning the rights and obligations of the people; approve the provincial... budget;... review proposals of the provincial government; hear administrative reports; consider petitions from the people.*'^^ These powers were restricted by review procedures reserved to the executive yuan and by the central government's power to settle disputes between the Provincial Assembly and the provincial administration.
Below the level of the provincial government, in an echo of Sun*s program of educating peasants for self-government, elective assemblies of the counties, cities, townships, and rural districts exercised wide-ranging control over local affairs. Their regulatory power was exerted within the laws and regulations of the provincial and central governments, but their control over local concerns was very substantial.
Representatives to the Provincial Assembly and the local assemblies were chosen in general, competitive elections that evolved very quickly from disorganized and at least partly manipulated forms into better organized and increasingly fair contests. The elections enjoyed a high level of popular involvement, and there was every evidence that during the 1950s and 1960s the electorate took suffrage rights very seriously.
By the end of the 1960s, the political system on Taiwan had evolved into one that featured a relatively democratic subsystem characterized by contested elections for elective offices in local and provincial communities. Unlike anything that had happened on the mainland, a fledgling Western-style democratic political system had begun to make its appearance on the island of Taiwan. For the first time in their history, the citizens of a Chinese state were voting for representatives who would serve in political bodies charged with responsibilities of significance.^^
Literally from the moment of the inception of the government of Taiwan and associated territories, the Nationalist authorities behaved in a maimer dramatically different than they had on the mainland. A number of factors contributed to the change.
Sun Yat-sen and Political Democracy 243
Displaced from the mainland, transferred to a community only recently freed from Japanese occupation that had lasted since the turn of the century, the Kuomintang had no direct ties to extant vital interests. The authorities did not have immediate obligations to any discrete economic or political forces in the resident population. They exercised seamless control.
Those who departed the mainland for "temporary" sojourn on Taiwan had left everything behind and had every reason to make a success of the island venture. The most dedicated followers of the Kuomintang accompanied the die-hard followers of Sun Yat-sen. When decisions were made to assign responsibilities in the newly organized administration, revolutionary ideologues like General Chen Cheng were chosen to assume the most demanding tasks.-'^
Chen Cheng was chosen to serve as governor of the island in a decision that embodied something more than simple bureaucratic choice. It had become evident to the leaders of the Kuomintang that Taiwan might have to serve as a support base for its forces for some considerable time in what would evidently be a conflict of attrition with the mainland forces of Mao Zedong. If it were to serve in such a capacity, the island would have to be not only economically viable, but internally stable and secure. Taiwan would have to be economically developed and its population would have to be supportive of an exacting program of anti-Communist initiatives as well.
Chen recognized that the forces of Mao Zedong had exploited grievances on the mainland to the disadvantage of the Kuomintang.^* He was determined that that would not happen again. But more than that, what was required was not only the resolution of economic grievances and economic rehabilitation; it would be necessary to actively engage the population. Compliance behavior would not be enough. Had that been the goal, the Japanese had left behind all the elements of a successful population management policy. Chen and the leadership of the Kuomintang sought revolutionary dedication. What the leadership of the Kuomintang sought was a reform and reanimation of the Kuomintang itself. The party was to be reconstructed.
Whatever his failures, there has never been any doubt that Chiang Kai-shek was devoted to the ideas of Sun Yat-sen.^' His son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who was later to serve as premier and subsequently as president of the Republic of China on Taiwan, has left an account of the initial period of the Kuomintang*s reestablishment on Taiwan.
It is clear that as a consequence of the trauma of defeat on the mainland, the Nationalist leadership in 1950 undertook a critical review of past policies and past failures. Chiang Kai-shek himself made regular reference to Sun Yat-sen, to his ideological prescriptions, and to the fact that in the past Kuomintang policies often had been uncertain, and not infrequently derailed by the self-interest and corruption of administrators.^ What was needed was a total reform of the party, a rededication of purpose, a purging of its membership, and a reconstruction of organization. A "new foundation'' was to be laid for the revolutionary transformation of that part of China that remained under the control of the party. The task was seen as "completing the revolutionary mission of Dr. Sun.*' "History," it was insisted, "should begin" with the recommitment of the Kuomintang to revolutionary purpose on Taiwan.^'
By the fall and winter of 1950, the reform of the Kuomintang and the rededication to revolutionary purpose had proceeded to the point of the promulgation of "the Kuomintang's political doctrines for the present stage." Those doctrinal commitments included "fulfilling the democratic intentions of [Sun Yat-sen's] Three Principles of the People."*^ To that end, Chiaing Kai-shek had already recommended that democratic practices be introduced at the local level in Taiwan and by August 1950 the executive yuan had already formulated the "Taiwan Provincial and City Autonomy Guidelines," and preparations were made to undertake a census that would serve as the foundation for registration lists and afford the occasion for instruction on regulations and practices concerning the election of representatives to village, town, county, and city councils. By the fall of 1950 about 10,000 representatives had been elected in the first election in the Republic of China on Taiwan.
Since 1950, local self-government in Taiwan, ranging from the subdistrict to the provincial level, proceeded through a series of legislative enactments that standardized election practices that included provisions for both election and recall.^^ There are few today who deny that local elections in Taiwan represent anything other than exercises in self-governance.
Assisting in this process of emergent democratic practice has been U.S. interest in the fate of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Throughout the entire period of conflict between international communism and the noncommunist community, Taiwan has been considered a factor of some significance to the stability and security of East Asia. Since Taiwan re-
Sun Yat-sen and Political Democracy 245
mained a recipient of U.S. assistance even after the termination of direct aid in the mid-1960s, the authorities in Washington have always sought to have evidence of Taipei's commitment to political democracy in order to respond to any criticisms that support had been extended to "foreign dictatorships.**
Just as influential, perhaps, had been the fact that after 1950 many, many Chinese from Taiwan sought degrees in advanced studies in institutions of higher learning in the United States. In the course of those studies, they came under the influence of democratic sentiments and observed democratic practices. It seems reasonably certain that those advanced students, those sentiments and those practices exercised some influence on the development of political democracy in Taiwan.
While these developments afford clear evidence of the influence of democratic ideas and ideals on those charged with the governance of Taiwan, the central issue that has preoccupied critics has been the authoritarian character of the "national government**—that collection of institutions and the representatives that staffed them—that transferred with the Kuomintang to Taiwan. Progress toward representative democracy continued at the provincial and local levels on Taiwan since the early 1950s; the central concerns of domestic and foreign critics collected around questions of representation on the national level.
The central government in Taipei was understood by the Kuomintang to represent all of China's provinces, including those that were "temporarily** occupied by the forces of Mao Zedong. Elected in 1948, in elections that left a great deal to be desired, the representatives in the National Assembly and the legislative yuan that followed Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan continued to exercise legislative and control functions thereafter without having to face any further elections. Because the communists "occupied** the mainland, national elections were "postponed.**
By the mid-1960s, the number of members of the National Assembly had dwindled from 2,961 to 1,488. Of the original 759 members elected to the legislative yuan on the mainland, only about half that number remained members and they were already in their sixties. The National Assembly and the legislative yuan continued to function although they had become increasingly nonrepresentative.
Because the Kuomintang insisted that its sojourn in Taiwan was only temporary, the institutions of the "national government** had to be retained intact until new elections could be administered in a reunited China.
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Whatever the rationale, however, by the mid-1960s it was clear that something had to be done if all semblance of representativeness was not to be lost. To disband the "long parliament*' did not recommend itself; it would be construed an abandonment by the Kuomintang of the claim to represent all of China.'*^
In the late 1960s, a solution was sought through "emergency supplementary elections" and executive appointment to fill the increasing number of vacancies. The first such election, in 1969, added fifteen new members to the depleted National Assembly, eleven to the legislative yuan, and two to the control yuan. Given the large membership in those bodies, those small additions through election and appointment had only marginal impact on representativeness.
By the early 1970s there was increased agitation for more effective representation at the national level. By that time the representatives selected in 1948 were becoming increasingly aged and infirm and represented neither the population of Taiwan nor, after more than twenty years, a constituency on the mainland of China.
When Chiang Ching-kuo became premier in 1972, he ordered new supplementary elections. In 1978, further elections were undertaken. The original members of the 1948 National Assembly and legislative yuan were not required to stand for re-election, but more representatives from the local population were added to the two bodies.
In May 1980, a "Public Officials Election and Recall Law*' was promulgated to provide the conditions for specifically national elections. The rights and responsibilities of candidates were specified in that portion of the law that provided the legal foundation for dissident "nonparty," that is, non-Kuomintang, participation. Elections of public officials were to be conducted by direct and secret ballot (art. 3), with election commissions composed of inspectors-at-large to protect against any violation of voting procedures (arts. 6, 7, 11, 12). The procedures for casting and counting ballots were carefully stipulated to ensure the integrity of the vote (arts. 57-64).
About one quarter of the seats in the legislative yuan were placed in competition together with 6.5 percent of the seats in the National Assembly. Of the 403 candidates that entered into competition, 254 were members of the Kuomintang. In general, the campaign was conducted on bread-and-butter issues: the shortage of suitable housing, the absence of effective labor regulation, the need for pollution control, and other
Sun Yat-sen and Political Democracy 247
matters of general welfare. The government was remarkably tolerant of criticisms bruited by dissident candidates/^
Over 65 percent of the eligible voters went to the polls in the December 1980 elections. There were no serious complaints of irregularities. Overall, the Kuomintang won about 80 percent of the contested seats, 63 of the available 76 in the National Assembly, and 56 of 97 in the Legislative Yuan. Several "nonparty" candidates polled large pluralities, and some of those who had been most vociferous in their criticisms of the government won seats.
Whatever the progress toward increasing representativeness, in the early 1980s the vast majority of representatives in the National Assembly remained those elected a generation earlier on the Chinese mainland.^^ The National Assembly was seen as a tool of the Kuomintang. Too large to deliberate effectively, composed of incumbents most of whom were too old to be politically active, the Kuomintang dominated its activities.
The National Assembly is charged with the responsibility of selecting the president, who, in turn, is formally charged with the formulation of state policy. The president is commander-in-chief of the armed forces and nominates or appoints virtually all important officials of nonelec-tive bodies. The president is responsible for resolving disputes between and among the five branches of government. Finally, he exercises emergency powers.
Since the Republic of China on Taiwan remained under some variant of emergency constraint throughout most of the 1980s, the president commanded imposing political power. The National Assembly, responsible for the selection of the president, served a critical function in the Republic.'*'^ That it was not an elective body prejudiced the representative character of the entire system.
The legislative yuan is the premium lawmaking body in the republic. It also approves the national budget (submitted by the executive yuan) and amends the constitution. The legislative yuan also approves the appointment of the premier, confirms executive yuan policy statements, and serves as a check on the judicial, control, and examination yuans. It hosts twelve standing committees including Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, National Defense, and Economic Affairs. Unless the legislative yuan is representative, it would be impossible for the government of the republic to be representative.
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The judicial yuan, composed of a Council of Grand Justices and three levels of lesser courts, is directed to interpret the laws (with the council charged with the responsibility of interpreting the constitution). Members of the judicial yuan are appointed by the president with the approval of the control yuan. Until well into the mid-1970s, the criticism was that the judicial yuan, particularly the Council of Grand Justices, was subject to influences emanating from the ruling party.
Beyond that, the republic's judiciary was considered unresponsive. Between 1950 and 1975, the Council of Grand Justices received 110 applications submitted by individuals for judicial review of the constitutionality of legislature enactments, but only one resulted in a constitutional ruling. The other applications were rejected either as frivolous or for not meeting procedural or jurisdictional requirements."**
Since the mid-1970s, the judicial yuan, the Council of Grand Justices, and the administrative courts in Taiwan have shown considerably more independence. Progressive change has been slow, but persistent. At the same time, the constraints that arise from the emergency regulations that had been in force since January 1950 had been gradually reduced. By the mid-1970s there had been a series of revisions in the restrictions and by the early 1980s less than 0.29 percent of all criminal cases were affected by the existence of emergency regulations."*^
By the time of his death in 1975, Chiang Kai-shek had supervised the construction of a multitiered system of government. The Kuomintang continued to dominate the political process, but beneath the structure of what was essentially one-party rule, an elaborate system of representative institutions permitted popular rule for local subdistrict, district, county, municipality, and provincial populations and gave evidence of potential for democratic change.
By the end of the 1970s, Chiang Ching-kuo had succeeded to the presidency of the republic. He brought with him an openness, a tolerance of opposition, and a populism that had been unknown under his father. He brought with him more than sentiment and symbol. He brought substance as well. By the elections of 1986, the nonparty opposition in the republic had doubled the number of its members in the legislative yuan. While still a small minority, the dissidents were active in the legislature. In July 1987 Chiang responded to the growth of domestic opposition to authoritarian rule by supervising the revocation of martial law first imposed in 1950.
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The end of martial law removed the military from any direct role in dealing with the civilian population. It also mcreased the range of permissible political behavior, enhancing the breadth of press freedom and increasing the rights of organized labor. President Chiang Ching-kuo, seventy-seven and in poor health, hoped to leave a legacy of increased representative democracy to a maturing Republic of China on Taiwan.
The widening latitude of political and civil freedoms required institutionalization. Before his death in January 1988, Chiang began a process of systemic reform that was irreversible. In the judgment of many, Chiang Ching-kuo "saw his mission as creating a framework for subsequent social and political development."^
One of the most substantial efforts made by Chiang in the service of democratization was in reforming the institutional workings of the party. Chiang undertook to increase inner party democracy in a reform as comprehensive as that of the 1950s. He not only undertook to suppress corruption and nepotism within the ranks of the party, he sought to make the party more responsive to public demands.^* Those changes put in motion in the 1970s continued after Chiang's death.
The death of Chiang Ching-kuo accelerated the changes. The rate of party reform increased under public pressure. Already in evidence in 1987, May 1988 saw political unrest in Taiwan of a magnitude that had never been experienced on the island since the homicidal violence of 1947. There was a broad-based demand for more effective democratic representation. As the population on Taiwan became increasingly affluent, the demand for adequate representation became insistent.
Lee Teng-hui, who succeeded Chiang to the presidency, had little choice but to continue the process already begun by his predecessor. Under his stewardship, the "Civic Organizations Law" was promulgated, allowing for the legal establishment of opposition parties that hitherto had been disallowed by the constraints of special emergency legislation.
Chiang Ching-kuo had overseen several revisions of the Election and Recall Law of 1980. In January 1989, under the administration of Lee Teng-hui, the legislative yuan enacted a new revision of the law. It responded to the changed political environment. It was intended to accommodate expanded popular political involvement under conditions that would assure both adequate representation and suitable supervision.
While there were complaints from members of the Kuomintang and the increasingly well-organized opposition, in general the procedures
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established the ground rules for competitive national elections to be conducted in December 1992." At the same time, provisions were made for the retirement of "senior parliamentarians**—those who had held seats in the National Assembly and the legislative yuan since the late 1940s. The National Assembly and the legislative yuan were to be elected in their substantial entirety by the population of Taiwan.
By the beginning of the 1990s, the Republic of China on Taiwan completed the transition to an essentially competitive representative democracy. By that time competitive elections had been conducted for a "second** National Assembly and a "second** legislative yuan, marking the end of the Republic of China *s "long parliament**—that had survived since the loss of the mainland to the forces of Mao Zedong.
In May 1992, the National Assembly, newly elected by the general population, adopted amendments to the constitution that shifted power from the appointive control yuan to the popularly elected National Assembly. The new amendments anticipated changes in the procedures for electing the president of the republic, provided for the direct election of Taiwan's provincial governor, and established a special tribunal of justices to render independent judgment concerning charges of sedition made under national security laws.^^
In the election of the legislature of the Republic of China on Taiwan in 1992, 72 percent of the republic's eligible voters cast ballots. Nearly 9.7 million voters participated. The Kuomintang garnered 53 percent of the total vote and its opposition, the Democratic Progressive party, won 31 percent. The Nationalists won 103 of the 161 contested seats, decreasing the dominant's party*s representation from 74 percent to 63 percent of the total.^ In December 1992, the Far Eastern Economic Review editorialized that "this year saw Taiwan... confirm [its] steady march towards representative government with [an] election of historic proportions.*'^^
There were charges of vote buying, of ballot-box stuffing, of the inordinate role of money in the process, and occult political influence, but the election had made it manifestly clear that Taiwan had reached a threshold above which it would only be defined a modem representative democracy. The Republic of China on Taiwan had attained a level of political maturation few less-developed countries ever achieve. The republic had long since ceased being a single-party dictatorship, or a dominant-party state, and had taken on most of the criterial properties of a
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two-party competitive political system. The Kuomintang had finally achieved the ends sought by Sun Yat-sen almost a century before.
What had transpired was the lagged political development that followed the economic maturation and industrialization of the Taiwanese economy. By 1992, the Republic of China on Taiwan had developed into one of the major trading nations of the world. It was characterized by a modem skill- and service-intensive economy that suffered a rate of unemployment below that of frictional displacement. One quarter of all families in the republic owned their own cars, 99 percent of all households owned colored television sets, 99 percent owned refrigerators, 95 percent owned telephones, and 90 percent owned washing machines. Literacy was universal and about 600,000 citizens attained education at a level above secondary school. In 1991, 3.5 million citizens, of a population of 20 million, traveled abroad for vacations.
More than 20 percent of the entire population of Taiwan belonged to voluntary nongovernmental social and professional organizations. Agricultural groups, labor organizations, free professional associations, and fishermen's agencies served as direct lines of communication to political and governmental bodies. Hundreds of newspapers competed for the 70 percent of the households that regularly purchased daily papers.
By the beginning of the 1990s, the Republic of China on Taiwan was a major economic force in East Asia. It possessed one of the largest reserves of foreign exchange in the world. It was a major foreign investor throughout East and Southeast Asia.
All of that had produced an assertive, educated, self-possessed population, prepared to express itself, pursue its own corporate interests, and act with independence. It was a population long exposed to democratic sentiments. As students, the citizens of the Republic of China had learned of the ideological commitment to representative democracy that was part of the belief system of Sun's followers. In its pursuit of foreign trade and investment, the Nationalist government had exposed the citizens of Taiwan to influences from the industrialized democracies. Democracy had become an intrinsic part of the political culture of the Nationalist state.
Together with all that, the United States continued to exert pressure that could only move the political leadership in Taiwan along the trajectory of political maturation. Administrators of U.S. aid agencies during the 1960s and U.S. academics acting as consultants and participants in
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cultural exchanges throughout the 1970s and 1980s all contributed to an atmosphere of acceptance of democratic ideas.
Whatever factors contributed to the outcome, by the beginning of the 1990s Sun Yat-sen*s Republic of China, confined to the island of Taiwan and associated territories, had become, by-and-large, a representative democracy. Having supervised the transformation of a traditional economy into one of the most modem and successful in Asia, the Kuomintang had created a political reality advocated by Sun Yat-sen as early as the first years of the twentieth century.
By the beginning of the 1990s, the Kuomintang had discharged the responsibilities it had assumed upon the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925— in a province of the China he sought to modernize. Against all the expectations of many experts on Chinese affairs, the followers of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek brought industrialization, prosperity, equity, and political democracy to a Chinese population for the first time in China's millennial history. As the cult of Mao Zedong was being dismantled on the Chinese mainland. Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek gained new stature as social and political revolutionaries, transforming a province of what had been a dynastic, traditional system into a modem, industrial democracy.
On Taiwan, contemporary discussion now tums to what remains for the Kuomintang. Reality has grown beyond its inherited ideology. On Taiwan, the Kuomintang appears no longer to have revolutionary aspirations or responsibilities. Its tasks are those of a competitive political party in a competitive political environment.^ It must respond to the issues that engage the interests of a well-informed, reasonably affluent, modem population. The issues it will address are issues of health delivery, pollution abatement, labor legislation, and old-age security for the people of Taiwan. They are the concerns of only a fragment of the total population of China in its entirety.
Only one issue remains of the revolutionary inspiration of Sun Yat-sen: the reunification of Taiwan and the mainland of China. Dedication to a united China remains an insistent and irrepressible feature of Kuomintang commitments.^^ With the retreat to Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek had made that commitment central to loyalties of the Kuomintang. Chiang Ching-kuo, in a demonstration of ideological continuity and filial piety, insisted on the same commitment. The Kuomintang entered the decade of the 1990s still advocating reunification under Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People.^^
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As Maoism on the mainland of China lapsed deeper and deeper into an intellectual and ideological torpor, the followers of Sun Yat-sen provided evidence of the merits of Sun's vision. Sun's advocacy of rapid industrialization and economic modernization through international cooperation, together with infrastructural expansion, agricultural modernization, intersectoral capital transfers, and export-fueled growth pursued in an atmosphere of class collaboration, found confirmation in the history of the Republic of China on Taiwan.
More than that. Sun advocated representative democracy as the only proper political form for a modem nation. Long considered by critics an empty vision in the hands of the authoritarians of the Kuomintang, representative democracy has come to the Republic on Taiwan.
Among those inspired by the thought of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Ching-kuo was one of the most notable. His commitment to the political vision of Sun was reinforced by his devotion to his father, Chiang Kai-shek. Whatever else he was, Chiang Kai-shek was devoted to the memory and the vision of Sun Yat-sen—and Chiang Ching-kuo was his father's son. Piety and political investment made him a spokesman for the reunification of China in conformity with the ideological agenda of Sun's Three Principles of the People.
Toward the end of the 1980s, old and in ill health, Chiang Ching-kuo sought to set the Kuomintang and the Republic of China on Taiwan on a course that would lead to the realization of the ideals of both Sun Yat-sen and his father. In those years, Chiang initiated the reforms that would mature into the competitive democratic system of the 1990s. More than that, Chiang significantly altered the relationship between the political leadership in Taipei and the regime in Beijing. Only someone of the stature of Chiang could have embarked on so vast a change.
In 1987, in the year before his death, Chiang Ching-kuo not only lifted all the martial law constraints, but relaxed the political restrictions on travel to the Chinese mainland by the citizens of the Republic of China on Taiwan.^^ The subsequent flood of tourists brought thousands of Chinese businessmen from Taiwan to the mainland. Bilateral trade across the Taiwan Strait escalated dramatically and the relationship between the two Chinese political entities, separated by ideology and a long history of hostility, was forever changed.
By the time Chiang Ching-kuo introduced these reforms, the political and ideological environment on the Chinese mainland itself had been transformed. Maoism had been discredited in Beijing's 1981 party reso-
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lution on the history of the Communist party, and it had become clear that Deng Xiaoping was prepared to open the People's Republic to influences from abroad, influences that took the form of capital investments, skill transfers, and joint ventures. More and more of the innovations introduced by Deng were those of economic and international strategies recommended by Sim Yat-sen.
If Sun had suffered from "illusions** concerning international capitalism, Deng seemed to suffer no less. If Sun sought "foreign experts** and "foreign technology** in his drive to develop China*s retrograde economy, Deng has done no less. If Sun was prepared to allow foreigners to embark on joint ventures in China and export their products for profit, Deng was prepared to allow no less. What Deng was determined not to allow was the political democratization of Communist China.
Unlike Lee Teng-hui, Deng Xiaoping is the heir of a set of notions concerning political rule that conceives popular representation "counterrevolutionary** in principle. For Deng, political democracy is an anachronism, a vestige of a "bourgeois** past. Rule, for Deng Xiaoping, is rule by an elite possessed of cosmic truth—the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong thought. While sufficiently "pragmatic** to follow the market to correct the malfunctions of the flawed economy he inherited from Mao, Deng has refused to countenance the possibility of competitive elections, party opposition, or interest group articulation.
For the regime in Taipei the circumstances were radically different. Not only did the inherited ideology anticipate the eventual emergence of a competitive representative democracy in the Republic of China, its entire growth strategy was predicated on the nation's participation in a domestic and international market economy. That alone ensured the flow of information and the articulation of interest-based differences that legitimately influenced resource allocation, investment decisions, production goals, and marketing options. The mechanisms through which all this transpired were ultimately given formal political expression in the representative democracy that now prevails in the Republic of China on Taiwan.
With the advent of major market influences in the economy of mainland China, the authorities in Beijing will have to face the prospect of increasingly emphatic regional, class, gender, cohort, and functional differences that will press for adequate representation. That pressure can
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be resisted. Such pressure has been long deflected in many of Asia's growing economies. But the costs of resistance will probably mount, and it will become more and more evident that what the People's Republic requires is an effective means of group representation. What will result, in all probability, is an approximation of the representative system that has consolidated itself on Taiwan.
The years will bring to those in power on the Chinese mainland a recognition that the "Taiwan experience" has a general applicability. In outline. Sun Yat-sen was correct in anticipating a functional growth and developmental strategy for an economically backward China. More than that, he was correct in appreciating what would be required of an attendant political system.
Over the years, the leadership of Communist China has been compelled to jettison almost all the Marxist-Leninist baggage that has weighed it down since the 1920s. By the 1990s, that leadership found itself faced with the final, and perhaps most portentous decision: how to modify the prevailing political system to better facilitate the modernization of China. By the mid-1980s, it was already clear that political difficulties on the mainland did not bode well for the continuity of the Communist regime. The "democracy" movement had already created major tensions and had the potential to destabilize the extant system. The violence of 1989, while it temporarily halted the processes of disintegration, could not stop what appeared to be an inevitable progression.^
Before his death, Chiang Ching-kuo seems to have understood much of that. He created the avenues for the flow of outside influence to the Chinese mainland. It was his decision that brought millions of Chinese from Taiwan to the mainland—to be followed by billions of dollars in investment and trade—to lubricate the passage to the People's Republic of market instrumentalities that could only bring down the system left behind by the passing of Mao 21edong.
Chiang Ching-kuo had been charged by his father with the responsibility of reuniting a divided China on the basis of Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People.^* The changes that had overtaken Marxist socialist systems everywhere had their irresistible impact on Mao's China as well. By the early 1980s, the mainland Chinese themselves recognized the nonviability of the nonmarket economy they had inherited from the old regime. In their search for a way out, they found themselves on a path familiar to the followers of Sun Yat-sen. Chiang Ching-kuo seems
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to have imagined that the leaders of both parts of China might conclude the ensuing passage together.
Notes
1. There are any number of discussions concerning these developments; among the best is John H. Kautsky, Communism and the Politics of Development (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968). See the discussion in A. James Gregor, The Fascist Persuasion in Radical Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 1974).
2. Sun Yat-sen, "Five Power Constitution (July 1921)," in Fundamentals of National Reconstruction (Taipei: China Cultural Service, 1953), 22.
3. Wou Sao-fong, Sun Yat-sen: Sa vie etsa doctrine (Paris: Les Presses universitaires de France, 1929), 41.
4. See, in this regard, Chen Li-fu, The Confucian Way: A New and Systematic Study of the "Four Books" (Taipei: Commercial Press, 1972), ii, 5.
5. Richard Wilhelm, Introduction to Tai Tschi-tao, Die geistigen Grundlagen des Sun Yat-senismus (Beriin: Wuerfel, 1931), 8.
6. Sun, "Memorial to Li Hungzhang on a Plan to Save the Nation,** in Guofu quanji [The Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen] vol. 3 (Taipei: Kuomintang Party History Committee, 1973, hereafter GQ)^ 1-11; see the discussion in Gregor, "Confucianism and the Political Thought of Sun Yat-sen,** Philosophy East and WestTtly 1 (January 1981): 55-70.
7. Sun, The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen (New York: AMS Press, 1974, reprint of the 1931 Wuchang edition), 185-87.
8. See the Discussion in Gregor, "Marxism and Ethics,** Philosophy and Phenom-enological Research vol. 38, no. 3 (March 1968), 22-40.
9. Sun, Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary: A Programme of National Reconstruction for China (London: Hutchinson, n.d.), 99.
10. Sun, Triple Demism, 216ff., 260ff.
11. Sun argued that the notion of popular sovereignty was part of the traditions of Chinese antiquity. He was fond ojf citing Confucius's Book of Rites, chap. 8, art. 1, no. 2., where it is said, "When the great virtue prevailed, the Empire [sovereignty] was accessible to everyone.** Sec Sun, Triple Demism, 233 and editor*s note 2.
12. Sun, "Self-Govenunent as the Basis of Reconstruction,** in Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, 128-32.
13. Sun, Triple Demism, 242.
14. See the discussion in ibid., 260ff.
15. See the discussion in ibid., 274ff.
16. Sun, "History of the Chinese Revolution,** in Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, 99; Triple Demism, 352.
17. See Sun, Triple Demism, 271.
18. Ibid., 250-51.
19. See the discussion in Sun, Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, 38, and the appeal to U.S. and European institutional models for China, 79.
20. Sun, "The True Solution of the Chinese Question,** in GQ, vol. 5, 121.
21. Sun, "The Foundation for the Construction of the Republic of China,** in GQ, vol. 2, 179.
Sun Yat-sen and Political Democracy 257
22. Sun, "Fundamentals of National Reconstruction for the National Government of China,** in Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, 9; Triple Demism, 392-93.
23. Sun, "The Primer of Democracy,** in GQ, vol. 1, 668; "Religion and Politics,** in GQ, vol. 2, 321.
24. Sun, "The Essential Meaning of Political Parties is to Create Happiness for the Nation and Wellbeing for the People," in GQ, vol. 2, 334.
25. Sun, "The Kuomintang's Political Program of 1924,** in Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, 56.
26. Sun, "History of the Chinese Revolution,** and "Statement on Fundamentals of National Reconstruction,** in Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, vol. 2, 83.
27. Sun, "The Northern Expedition Statement of the Chinese Nationalist Party,** in Guofu quanji [The Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen] (Taipei: Chinese Academy, 1974), 767.
28. Sun, "The History of the Chinese Revolution," in GQ, vol. 2, 121.
29. Sun, "The History of the Chinese Revolution," in Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, 84ff.
30. See Sun, "Self-Govemment as the Basis of Reconstruction," in ibid., 129-49.
31. Sun, "Statement on the Formation of National Government," in ibid., 161.
32. See "Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion," in y4 Compilation of the Laws of the Republic of China, vol. 1 (Taipei: n.p., 1967), 43.
33. See Declaration of the State of Siege, Taiwan Peace Preservation Command 19 May 1949. An English translation is available in Peng Ming-min, "Political Offenses in Taiwan: Laws and Problems," China Quarterly 47 (July-September 1971): 472.
34 Ralph N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1978), 7.
35. Arthur J. Lerman, Taiwan's Politics: The Provincial Assemblyman's World (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978), 26.
36. See the discussion in ibid., 238ff.; John F. Copper, Taiwan's Recent Elections: Fulfilling the Democratic Promise (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 1990), 4ff.
37. See W. G. Goddard*s characterization of Chen Cheng in The Makers of Taiwan (Taipei: China Publishing, n.d.), 125-43.
38. Chen Cheng, Land Reform in Taiwan (Taipei: China Publishing, 1961), 47, 90.
39. See the discussion of Chiang*s general political and economic convictions in A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, "Chiang Kai-shek, China, and the Concept of Economic Development," in Proceedings of Conference on Chiang Kai-shek and Modern China, vol. 3 (Taipei: China Cultural Service, 1987), 616-35.
40. See Chiang Ching-kuo, Calm in the Eye of a Storm (Taipei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprise, 1978), 120-22, 125, 155-56; see 10, 16, 29, 53, 94ff., 220, 230, 253, 298, 406.
41. Ibid., 231,236, 273, 302-03,406.
42. See Chen San-ching, "The Reformation of the Kuomintang in 1950 and the ROC*s New Deal Implemented in Taiwan," in Proceedings of Conference on Chiang Kai-shek and Modern China, vol. 5, 130; confer 130, 139.
43. See Kao Yu-jen, "The Development of Local Self-Govemment in Taiwan," in ibid.. 164-77.
258 Marxism, China, and Development
44. Sec the discussion in Wei Yung, "PoUtical Development in the Republic of China on Taiwan,** in Hungdah Chiu, ed., China and the Question of Taiwan (New York: Praeger. 1973), 99-101.
45. See the discussion in John F. Copper, "Taiwan's Recent Elections: Progress Toward a £>emocratic System,** Asian Survey 21, 10 (October 1981): 1029-39.
46. Sec John F. Copper and George Chen, Taiwan's Elections: Political Development and Democratization in the Republic of China (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 1984), chaps. 4, 5, 6, and 7; John F. Copper, Taiwan's 1991 and 1992 Non-Supplemental Elections (New York: University Press of America, 1994).
47. See Copper, Taiwan: Nation State of Providence? (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990), 59-60.
48. See Jyh-pin Fa, A Comparative Study of Judicial Review Under Nationalist and American Constitutional Law (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 1980), 103ff.
49. See Thomas A. Metzger, Report on Martial Law and Political Development in the Republic of China in Taiwan (Taipei: Kwang Hwa, 1983), 2.
50. See "Taiwan,** Asia Yearbook 1989 (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1989), 230.
51. See Clough, Island China, 61-62.
52. John F. Copper, Taiwan's Recent Elections: Fulfilling the Democratic Promise (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 1990), 17-20.
53. "National Assembly Passes 8 Amendments,** Free China Journal 29 (May 1992): 1. See "Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China,'* in ibid. 23 (June 1992): 7.
54. Susan Yu, "KMT Maintains Power Grip; DPP Grows Stronger," in ibid. 22 (December 1992): 1.
55. "Monkey Business," Far Eastern Economic Review 24-31 (December 1992): 3.
56. See the report of discussion in Shih Chih-yu, "KMT's Nature Subject to Debate," Free China Journal 14 (July 1992): 7.
57. See "*One Country, Two Areas' Decreed ROC Law," in ibid. 21 (July 1992): 1.
58. "National Day Address by Lee Tung-hui, President of the Republic of China, October 10 1992," and ibid., 13 (October 1992): 7.
59. See the discussion in Maria Hsia Chang, "Taiwan and the Mainland," Global Affairs 7, 3, (Sununer 1992): 14-28.
60. See the discussion in John Woodruff, China in Search of its Future: Reform vs. Repression, 1982-1989 (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1990); see Lincohi Kaye, "Disorder under Heaven," Far Eastern Economic Review 157,23 (9 June 1994): 22-30.
Conclusions
By the middle of the last decade of the twentieth century, much of the substance of Marxism, in the form that it had reached China, had been swept away. On the Chinese mainland, "Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought" was more honored in the breach than in the observance. The economic system of mainland China had assumed more and more of the features of that which had marshaled the energies of the people of the Republic of China on Taiwan and guided them from more or less traditional agrarianism to full industrial maturity. In large part, Maoist economic policies had been abandoned in the People's Republic of China.
What remained of Marxism in mainland China was the hegemonic rule of the Communist party—and that found its inspiration in Stalinism rather than Marxism. Stalinism had made unitary party rule a necessity. The forced industrialization of a complex economy on the basis of a nonmarket "plan" necessitated bureaucratic control of resource allocation, output goals, distribution, information, and foreign trade. It also necessitated coercion, compulsion, and manipulation. As the economy entered the phase of intensive, rather than extensive, growth, the onmi-present bureaucracy began to prove increasingly dysfunctional. The mismatch between dictatorship and effective economic and industrial maturation had begun to test the viability of the system.
In the mid-1990s, the dictatorship on the mainland of China found itself circumstanced in many ways like the Soviet dictatorship of the mid-1980s. The needs of the economy could no longer be met by bureaucratic initiatives. It was the market that provided the energy and the guidance for growth. At best, the dictatorship had become increasingly artificial and irrelevant. At its worst, it became the vehicle for privilege and corruption. The most balanced assessment was that an "authoritarian" Communist party might conceivably provide the con-
259
260 Marxism, China, and Development
tinuity and stability that rapid economic growth and industrial maturity seem to favor, but it could no longer exercise the control that typified the Maoist period.
By the mid-1990s, it was no longer the totalitarianism of Stalin that recommended itself to post-Maoist China, it was the authoritarianism that had been a feature of the economic growth and industrial maturation of Taiwan. But recourse to that kind of authoritarianism would require a fundamentally different rationale than that provided by the quaint Marxism of "Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought.*' It would be a rationale that anticipated the emergence of a representative and increasingly pluralistic political system that would address the increasingly diverse needs of a rapidly growing market economy. Its features would be more like those found in the developmental nationalism of Sun Yat-sen than anything in the Marxism of Joseph Stalin or Mao Zedong.
While economic reality compelled the abandonment of the central instrumentalities of nonmarket governance, the authorities in Beijing continued to insist on dictatorial control of the political system. Sun Yat-sen, like most modem commentators, anticipated a radical incompatibility between the demands of a growing and diverse economy and the rigidities of dictatorship. Sun argued that any kind of authoritarianism must proceed, through stages, to some manner of accommodation with the diversity of interests that progressively emerge with the expansion and maturation of a market economy. As early as the late 1970s and the first years of the 1980s, domestic critics in the People's Republic appealed to Beijing for a "socialist democracy," a system that would be sensitive to the cry for personal and group security and to the demand for respect of the rights of voluntary association, interest articulation, and mobility. By the first years of the 1990s, dissidents on the mainland were calling for a representative democracy not unlike that advocated by Sun Yat-sen almost a century ago. Not infrequently, his name was invoked.
By that time it had become clear that Marxism, in whatever guise, had not served China well. Marxism had been shaped, refashioned, and "creatively developed" to fit circumstances for which it was intrinsically unsuited. Enough has been written about the factors that influenced its appeal and ultimate acceptance to provide something like an appreciation of how it came to dominate Chinese life for much of the twentieth century. The nature of the traditional regime, the form in which
Conclusions 261
Marxism reached China, and the circumstances in China at the conclusion of the First World War all conspired to make the doctrine attractive to the radicals produced by the disintegration of a dynastic system thousands of years old. The Bolshevik disposition to treat the Chinese seriously, as equals and potential allies, clearly influenced the original reception accorded Marxism in its Leninist form. Under the circumstances, even Sun Yat-sen was prepared to find merit in Leninism, as a form of anti-imperialist nationalism sharing affinities with his own.
Some form of "anti-imperialism" was attractive to the Chinese, given their doleful experience with the European powers since the Opium Wars. Unhappily, it was the anti-imperialism of Mao Zedong that came to dominate Chinese behaviors for more than a quarter century. We have not yet begun to calculate its costs. Sun Yat-sen *s response to imperialism, on the other hand, was clearly more thoughtful, responsible, and productive of positive consequence. Beijing's contemporary dealings with the advanced industrial democracies reflect more of the thought of Sun Yat-sen than that of Mao Zedong. The fact is that there is more Sun Yat-sen in the overt international trading and commercial behavior of post-Maoist China than there is Marx, Lenin, Stalin, or Mao.
What has been attempted here is the provision of an outline of the series of transformations that mark stages in the doctrinal history of Marxism in China. An effort has been made to suggest why some elements of classical Marxism, however modified, survived the transfer from Western Europe, through the Soviet Union, and into China—and others did not. Whatever did survive was almost always betrayed in the passage. The Marxist conception of the determinant role of "material life conditions" early gave way to the political primacy of ideas, will, and ideological commitment. In an environment of primitive material life conditions it is not difficult to understand why China's revolutionaries chose to emphasize the transformative potential of factors that were cost free.
It is easy to understand why Maoism abandoned the conviction that a mature industrial base and a proletarian majority were preconditions for the advent of socialism. Mao made a virtue of necessity and discovered that in being "poor and blank" China would, more readily than others, give itself over to socialism. As the first Marxists suggested, political thought will probably be no more sophisticated than the economic and social environment out of which it grows.
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For all the talk in all the books about the Marxism of Chinese Communism, there was precious little Marxism in Mao Zedong thought. Compared to the rich European tradition of Marxist reflections, Chinese Marxism has always been extremely primitive.
Granting that, there is, as we have seen, a doctrinal continuity in Chinese Marxism that can be traced back to the earliest Marxism. Like all the political systems that identify themselves explicitly as "Marxist," Chinese-Marxism made recourse, with almost compulsive insistence, to nonmarket arrangements to operate its economy. Like the Soviet Union and its satellite economies, the Maoist productive system was administratively controlled. However decentralized, and however much the information gathering and coordination infrastructure was savaged in the tempestuous years of Mao*s "great leaps,*' it was clear that the Chinese economy under Mao was in thrall to nonmarket forces—with "politics in command." Mao had "demarketized" and "deprivatized" the economy of the Chinese mainland.
By 1956, Mao Zedong had dismantled the market economy in China. All the key institutions of such an economy were gutted: private property and "material incentives" were deemed "counterrevolutionary." There could be no market, and as a consequence, there was no market-based information that might govern the allocation of the factors of production or the coordination of inputs—and there was no functional guide to the distribution of product or the measure of quality.
Whatever else governed Mao's decision to demarketize and deprivatize his developmental program, it clearly had its intellectual origins in the doctrinal legacy of the first Marxists. The Marxism of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels identified the "free exchange of commodities for profit" as the bone and sinew of the offending capitalist system. For the young Marx, capitalism was an economy based on the "individual exchange" of commodities for profit—and it was in that "free" exchange that the "anarchy of production" and the subsequent "misery" of the modem world was rooted.*
Capitalists, it was argued, in producing commodities for exchange, "crush the workers," compensating them "neither more nor less" than is sufficient for "minimum subsistence." Having distributed such meager and frequently irregular compensation, inadequate effective demand would result in cycles of "prosperity, overproduction, stagnation and crisis."^ Driven by a lust for personal profit, capitalist production is un-
Conclusions 263
dertaken for a "market whose requirements are unknown." No individual producer could predict consumer demand. Production, as a result, could only be "irrational** and "unregulated.**^
The first Marxists proposed a radical solution. Friedrich Engels spoke of a postrevolutionary society in which private property would no longer confound the collective aspirations of humankind. Production in an alternative socialism would be for use, not profit. Without private property and private greed clouding reality, it would "be easy to be informed about both production and consumption.** Socialism would find it "easy to calculate how much is needed,** making it a "trifling matter to regulate production according to needs.** "Rational organization** and "regulated distribution'* would follow. The first Marxists thus conceived planning for a modem industrial economy to be an eminently simple task—"a trifling matter.*' Such an alternative would be the "rational" substitute for the irrationality of the system predicated on the exchange of goods for private profit.
If capitalism was understood to be the private employment of the means of production in the pursuit of private gain, socialism would be the "common use of all the instruments of production and the distribution of all products by common agreement." Socialist society would be one in which "industry [was] carried on in common and according to plan.'"* To call any other arrangement "socialist" was dismissed as a snare and a delusion. Both Marx and Engels made the abolition of the voluntary exchange of commodities in the open market the irreducible minimum of their socialism. Production and distribution in accordance with a nonmarket plan became the Imchpin of socialism. That became one of the central tenets of the Marxist vulgate.
The conmiitment to a planned economy took on a special urgency as Marxist revolutionaries seized command of primitive, only partially industrialized, economies. More concerned with output and modernization, Marxists abandoned any conception of "production and distribution of all products by common agreement." What they sought was "primitive capital accumulation"—something the original Marxists assumed had long since been accomplished by the enterprisory bourgeoisie.
Whatever "creative developments" collected around the notion of a nonmarket economy, it soon became very clear that the administratively contrived "plan" became an article of faith among Marxist elites. Abandonment of the market allowed the revolutionary party to insinuate it-
264 Marxism, China, and Development
self into every aspect of public and private life. It allowed the party to extract revenue, allocate resources, restrict mobility, control information, ration welfare, fix prices, measure out employment, and govern access to education. Politics, rather than "impersonal forces," would command life lived in common. In affect, abandonment of the market provided the party every advantage in the pursuit of long tenure.
Planning in a nonmarket economy became so central a component of Marxist regimes that even the most unsophisticated lifted it to the level of an article of faith. In the retrograde North Korea of the "Great Leader" Kim II sung, the argument is:
In capitalist society production cannot grow steadily, because the process... is periodically inteirupted and much social labor wasted owing to overproduction. ...In socialist society, however, all the labor resources and natural wealth...can be utilized in the most rational way, and production can be raised continually according to plan The socialist state controls coordinately and carries out production and distribution, accumulation and consumption according to plan.'
Given the centrality of planned production and associated planned prices, there would be no commodities sold in socialist society. Kim II Sung maintains that once the transition is made to a fully socialist society, the term commodity would no longer be employed. There would no longer be "commodities" for sale, there would only be "products" available for use. Like all the Marxists who preceded him, Kim identified a socialist economy as one in which the "law of value," the "law" governing commodity exchange in capitalist society, "will ... cease to operate."^
In the long history of Marxism, the one element that has invariably surfaced in every Marxist regime has been the commitment to administrative planning in a nonmarket environment. At the same time, each such regime, and each planning effort, has always found itself haunted by the "law of value." Allocatively neutral pricing and administrative planning have systematically failed because effective planning requires meaningful cost and price data. It is clear that the arbitrariness of nonmarket pricing under either imperative or indicative administrative planning is far greater than that in any economy characterized by a market-governed pricing system. It has been very difficult for Marxist economies to assess utility and scarcity costs without calculable money flows that can serve as a common denominator. Marxist systems have failed to find an alternative to market measurement in money as a guide to allocative felicities and effective distribution.^
Conclusions 265
As it becomes increasingly clear that the inaccuracy of much of the information circulating in nonmarket administrative systems results in incoherence in allocative decisions and massive departures from optimality, Marxists have attempted to substitute some one or another "Marxist" measure as a pricing mechanism. When the inefficiencies and waste of nonmarket planning become a threat to the system, Marxists almost invariably call up the *iaw of value" as a corrective. Units of "socially necessary labor" are pressed into service to provide a measure of value equivalence in the nonmarket exchange of producer or consumer goods.
Even Kim II Sung, aware as early as 1969 that socialism suffers "wastage of machines, equipment, raw materials and other industrial supplies,"* recommended "temporary" recourse to the "law of value"—the exchange of commodities in terms of the "objective" measures of "socially necessary labor" involved in their production. At some stage or another, all Marxist nonmarket economies have sought refuge in some variant of the "law of value" in the effort to introduce some rationality into systems that have shown themselves to suffer "chronic, unavoidable, and ineradicable" inefficiency and waste as a consequence, in large part, of an irrational pricing system.^
Whether planning is taut or decentralized, issued in imperative detail or provided in broad material output measures, the absence of rational pricing has driven socialist systems first into a "Marxist" appeal to measures of value in terms of "socially necessary labor," and, finally, when such measures prove totally inadequate, back to the market. The process of returning to the market has gone further in the People's Republic of China than any other Marxist system without systemic collapse.
Now that the Communist authorities on the mainland of China seem prepared to abandon nonmarket planning in substantial sectors of the economy and allow pricing and growth to be increasingly market governed, there is less and less Marxist inspiration to be found in their system. The institutional structure of the Chinese Communist party remains Leninist, of course, but until very recently, so was that of Sun Yat-sen*s Kuomintang.
In general, recourse to the market seems to signal the effective end of Marxist systems. The market carries certain functional requirements with it that have implications for the political system. There must be a relatively free flow of information potentially available to all participants if
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the market is to operate with any real efficiency. Markets, moreover, produce interests that seek expression, and organized interests attempt to influence system-relevant political decisions.
Some authoritarian systems tolerate, and sometimes welcome, these conditions. This is particularly true if the authoritarian systems are preoccupied with economic efficiency or imagine themselves to be transitional to an anticipated representative democracy. The regime in Singapore represents the one and that on Taiwan the other.
"Epistemocracies," as a particular subset of authoritarian systems, on the other hand, can only be intolerant of anything that allows significant decision making to devolve on those outside the immediate control of the hegemonic party. Parties that conceive themselves as possessed of some universal and impeccable "Truth," are ill disposed to allow anyone other than the "vanguard" to assume responsibility. "Epistemoc-racies" characteristically conceive themselves as permanent dictatorships, which, in their most fully developed form, appear as totalitarianisms.
The appearance of market elements threaten the integrity and continuity of totalitarian systems. As the Soviet Union embarked on reforms that included some free-market exchanges. Western Kremlinologists began to speak of what had been totalitarianism, as an "administered society." Market functions appear to erode totalitarian controls. The market harbors the germ of pluralism that is structurally incompatible with totalitarianism. ^°
Totalitarianism, as a system, seems to have had its origin in the "primitive socialist accumulation" that post-Leninist Bolshevism found necessary upon the initiation of its drive for economic growth and development. Classical Marxism had anticipated that socialism would inherit the mature industrial system of capitalism. Instead, Bolshevism was the heir to economic desolation and industrial backwardness. Post-Leninists convinced themselves that economic rehabilitation, economic growth, and industrial development required a massive "primitive accumulation of capital," and a transfer of assets from the agrarian to the modem sector. To accomplish that, while reducing the population to compliance, necessitated the creation of a state machine capable of comprehensive control. The totalitarian state and the "dictatorship of the proletariat" followed.
Totalitarian dictatorship had the clear virtue of assuring certain tenure to a self-selected political ruling class. The Marxism of Stalin and
Conclusions 267
Mao responded to imperatives entirely unanticipated by Marx and Engels. Rather than the broad-gauged democracy of the founders of Marxism, "primitive socialist accumulation" appeared to require hierarchical political control. Totalitarianism became the political form of nonmarket systems in forced development. Eventually, and particularly at the stage of intensive development, market strategies urge themselves on increasingly impaired systems, and political totalitarianisms begin to display evidences of disintegration. When the nonmarket economy gives undeniable and overwhelming evidence of failure, totalitarians seem compelled to allow the tentative reemergence of a market-governed pricing system. Thus, elements of a market economy emerged throughout East-em Europe before the collapse, and have reemerged in mainland China, the Socialist Republic of \^etnam, and Castro's Cuba as well. Everywhere, socialist nonmarket economies have demonstrated their nonviability. Economically impaired Vietnam has sought foreign investment in its growing market-driven sectors. Cuba has begun overtures to attract foreign capital and foreign technology. There has been the suggestion that rational pricing might be introduced in at least some sectors of the economy in an effort to reduce the allocative irrationality and suboptimality that seriously impair Cuban economic life. There is more than Bukharinism in all that.
Many decades ago. Sun Yat-sen anticipated much of this. He rejected the Marxist analysis of the market economy in its entirety. ^^ His developmental strategy was predicated on the conviction that "all matters that can be and are better carried out by private enterprise should be left to private hands which should be encouraged and fully protected by liberal laws.'*^^ The state—in principle, a representative democracy—would be charged with the responsibility of facilitating trade and the free flow of commodities.^^ Economic activity in the developing China, Sun anticipated, would be guided, in its substantial entirety, by market signals.
Sun was convinced that there were no discernible limits to the development of industrial capitalism. *^ Having rejected Marxism, he remained fiilly convinced that increases in production in market-governed circumstances would continue and that would "increase the wealth of the capitalists and make it possible for the workingmen to receive higher salaries. Thus, the capitalists improve the living conditions of the workingmen and increase their productivity*' at the same time.'^ This would be accomplished in a political environment in which the widest possible sale
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of products would be facilitated and in which the free flow of information would permit private industries to allow production to follow market signals. For Sun, the "center of great industries** was "based on a society of consumers.**^^
Within the domestic and international market structure, Sun advocated a program of economic growth and development that he identified—recognizing national variations—with those that carried the United States, Germany, and Japan from traditional agrarian pursuits to industrial maturity.*^ Its components are familiar to most comparativists, and are to be found in the writings of those "neo-merchantilists** and "protectionists" who preceded Sun.
Sun advocated extensive land reform and modernization in the agrarian sector;^* intensive development of the transportation, communications, and educational infrastructure;'^ state sponsorship and subsidized establishment of selected heavy industry ;^° tariff protection for infant industries;^' foreign exchange earnings to underwrite the purchase of producer goods;^^ and the massive transfer of capital, technology, and management skills from the advanced industrial nations, attracted to an enterprise-friendly environment possessed of an abundance of low-cost labor.^^ It was a program pursued with evident success by Sun*s followers in Taipei. After the passing of Mao Zedong, almost all of it has appeared in one form or another in the reformed and reforming economy on the mainland of China. The "socialism with Chinese characteristics** advocated by Deng Xiaoping has begun to look remarkably like the ^minsheng socialism** of Sun Yat-sen.
The post-Maoist economic reforms on the mainland of China began with the critical reforms in the countryside. Begun initially as a local experiment, the "responsibility system** in the rural areas very quickly spread to involve the vast majority of peasant families. With the dismantling of the Maoist conmiunes, the responsibility contracts with farm families looked more like the "land to the tillers*' program of Sun Yat-sen than anything conjured up during the period of Marxist enthusiasms.
The responsibility contract extended to families in the Chinese countryside imposed few restrictions on the rural household other than the provision of a quota of produce, at state prices, to the central authorities. What resulted was something like the extension of qualified private property rights through a state lease of land. The limits of property rights were qualified by the principle of state ownership and the dura-
Conclusions 269
tion of the lease. In some instances the responsibility contract entered into was binding for half a century and contracted rights were transferable or heritable. Such contracts had the legal appearance of landhold-ing fee simple.
As the results of releasing the energies of the rural population became evident in escalating productivity, something like "responsibility contracts" were introduced into the modem sector of the economy. There was a growing realization that "socialized risks*'—in a system that neither rewarded success nor punished failure—impaired incentive, stunted initiative, and thwarted rational calculation.
Early in the 1990s, Communist Chinese economists such as Li Yining and Hua Sheng had begun to recommend that private ownership in state enterprises be made available through the sale, purchase, and transfer of equity shares. The consequence would be that the operation of enterprise would be the responsibility of those prepared to pay for any mistakes made as long as there was a promise of reward for success.^* Some elements of private property, private profit, and competition were to be reintroduced into the state economy of the Chinese mainland. It had become evident to the leaders of Communist China that efficiency and productivity require allowing "all matters that can be and are better carried out by private enterprize... should be left to private hands which should be encouraged and fully protected by liberal laws."^ The increasing acknowledgment of contractual responsibilities and the extension of fundamental property rights protection in the sale of equity shares, reflect a recognition that the recommendations made by Sun Yat-sen three quarters of a century ago held the promise of success in the effort to modernize the economy of the Chinese mainland.
The presence of foreign capital in direct investment and joint ventures in Communist China has made it essential that the authorities in Beijing formulate codes for the judicial protection of contractual obligations, comprehensible procedures for resource allocation, a price structure that allows responsible calculation, and a formula for profit repatriation. These changes became increasingly inclusive and detailed as more and more enterprise capital settled on the mainland. China's erstwhile Marxists have been compelled to promulgate, for the first time since the seizure of power in 1949, a body of civil law calculated to introduce security, stability, rationality, and property rights into an economy substantially bereft of all four.^^ What all this carries in its
270 Marxism, China, and Development
train is the ultimate separation of economic management from political power.^^ The intended and unintended consequences of allowing market elements to reappear in the economy of the mainland seem clear enough. They are apparently so evident that economists on the mainland of China anticipate that, over time, decisions in the economy will become less and less frequently "subject to the subjective will of government officials.**^*
By the early 1990s, the coastal cities of Guangzhou, Hangshou, Shanghai, Nanjing, and Tianjin had already taken on many of the features of a competitive market economy. Fewer and fewer goods passed through the hands of "planners." In 1978, about 700 kinds of producer goods had been allocated by state plan. In 1991, that number was below 20. In the nonstate sector of the economy, resources and producer goods more and more frequently responded to market signals than state directives. It was estimated at the end of the 1980s that almost 56 percent of all industrial inputs and almost 40 percent of outputs were bought and sold outside the state plan, reflecting something like their market prices.
These developments have stimulated the growth of small and medium-sized nonstate industrial firms in the countryside. In little more than a decade, commencing in the early 1980s, the 1.5 million nonstate rural firms increased to 19 million firms. Energized by an expanding competitive market, together with increasing security of initiative, property, and profit, the output of rural enterprises grew at an estimated annual rate of 30 percent. By the early 1990s, rural nonstate industry accounted for about 40 percent of the mainland's industrial employment, more than 25 percent of its total national industrial output, and 25 percent of total industrial exports.
By every measure—productivity, efficiency, innovation, and return on investment—China's state sector remained vastly inferior in performance to the growing private sector. China's industrialization and economic growth, by the early 1990s, was taking place largely outside the state plan. The impression was abroad that what Deng Xiaoping was supervising was the creation, not of socialism, but "capitalism with Chinese characteristics."^' By the end of 1992, the official Communist press reported that, in the future, it would be the "market" rather than "planning" that would "regulate economic life."^
By 1991, all this was being sustained by infusions of foreign capital—about $22 billion by best estimate. In 1992, 27,000 joint ventures,
Conclusions 271
with a total worth of $30 billion, were authorized by Beijing. By that time, foreign-financed ventures accounted for about 25 percent of China's total manufacturing exports.
The major share of these developments took place along the littoral belt stretching from Guangdong to Shandong—a region of almost 300 million inhabitants. About 75 percent of all foreign investment in this region originated among the Chinese in Hong Kong and the Republic of China on Taiwan.^^ TTie "overseas Chinese" community had established itself as a presence on the mainland. Within that presence, elements of Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang surfaced. At the time, Beijing acknowledged as much.
When the Chinese mainland erupted into political violence in June 1989, the authorities in Beijing charged Taipei with provoking the situation and providing material and moral support to the dissident democracy movement.^^ There is evidence that the Chinese from Taiwan exercise measurable influence in the labor unions of Hong Kong—and Hong Kong is understood to be an intrinsic part of the People's Republic of China. That such influences from Taiwan will increase during the 1990s seems likely.
Even where the influence from Taipei is not direct, the fact that entrepreneurs from Taiwan have established profitable relations with enterprising elements of the People's Liberation Army is of some significance.^^ The armed forces of the People's Republic constitute the last defense of the Communist regime. Should their loyalty be compromised not only by direct economic concerns but by a recognition that the system on Taiwan has much to recommend it, the consequences could be incalculable.
By the early 1990s, so many avenues of potential influence connected island China with mainland China, that it would be hard to imagine that the Chinese from Taiwan and the ideas of Sun Yat-sen would have no impact on the future of the People's Republic. Even without the physical presence of the Chinese from Taiwan, the ideas that contributed to developmental success on the resource-poor and densely populated Taiwan could only be of particular fascination to the post-Maoists on the mainland of China.
In fact, by the beginning of the 1990s, the economy on the Chinese mainland had begun to display many of the properties of the 1960s economy of Nationalist Taiwan. With rapidly escalating industrial pro-
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ductivity, the expansion of small and medium-sized industries in rural China, and the furious pace of export sales, domestic per capita productivity on the Chinese mainland mounted dramatically.
Like the Nationalist government on Taiwan at the commencement of its drive to industrial maturity, the government of the People's Republic of China owns major industrial assets in the expanding economy. In the mid-1950s, the Nationalist government on Taiwan owned 90 percent of the island's industrial assets, producing 55 percent of the island's manufacturing yield. As the nonstate, market-governed economy grew up around the state-owned and state-controlled sector, the significance of state ownership declined precipitously. By the early 1990s, Taiwan's state-owned companies owned only 20 percent of the island's total assets, producing a scant 10 percent of total industrial exports.
Similarly, in the late 1970s, almost 80 percent of Communist China's total industrial output was supplied by state firms. By the early 1990s, they provided less than half the total output. Estimates are that that figure will be reduced to about 25 percent by the end of the century.
Neither the authorities in Beijing, nor those in Taipei, have found it necessary to sell off state-owned enterprises to foster the growth of the private sector; they have simply allowed economic growth to take place around them. The predictable result on Taiwan was the rapid decline in the importance of the state sector as the bulk of growth occurred in the market-governed economy. Little less can be expected on the Chinese mainland.
The declining significance of the state in the rapidly expanding and modernizing economy of the Chinese mainland carries implications with it. With the diminishing role of the state, more and more welfare benefits—employment and income critical among them—will escape bureaucratic and Communist party control. As long as the Communist party remained the repository of almost all the material benefits available, it enjoyed recruitment success and the abiding loyalty of its members. Once the nonstate sectors of the economy offered more potential benefits, the allure of party membership and party loyalty seems to have substantially diminished.^ When members chose to remain in the party, or new members were recruited, they all too often exploited membership in order to further their nonstate economic interests. The consequence was a recognition by the party that its coherence had been jeopardized and its ideological integrity compromised.^^ There was talk among commu-
Conclusions 273
nists that the "guiding ideologies" that governed the People's Republic were becoming "outmoded. "^^ By the end of 1992, members of the Central Advisory Commission of the Communist party of China warned the party's leadership that, in their judgment, "society is moving toward a complete rejection of the basic theories of Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought. "^^
By the mid-1990s, the Communist regime on the Chinese mainland was facing a series of developments totally unanticipated by Marxist theory of whatever variant. A commodity market, predicated on competitive exchanges involving literally billions of discretionary decisions by nonstate agents, is ill suited to hegemonic political rule. A competitive economy invariably produces articulate interest groups that seek to influence the political decisions that will shape their options and opportunities. If the growing number of aggregate interests are not to allow themselves to be thwarted by traditional Chinese influence peddling and corruption, they will insist on negotiating in a law-governed order that must become increasingly responsible to constituencies. In general, governments that seek to optimize long-term economic growth and development allow interest articulation, the freedom of association, and the freedom of speech implied by both. They recognize that material conflicts of interest must be resolved in an arrangement that affords at least the promise of fair and prompt resolution. Sun Yat-sen had allowed for such developments in the sense that he was the advocate of pluralism and political democracy.
As has been suggested. Sun's political views were shaped by his experience in the industrial democracies. He particularly favored the constitutional arrangements in the United States. Not only did he find the Constitution of the United States particularly noteworthy, he appeared to appreciate the important role played in such a system by voluntary associations in creating a political environment conducive to economic growth and industrial development.
Sun regularly spoke of voluntary associations as potentially significant political actors. At critical junctures, he recommended that they play a central role in the resolution of problems.^* At other times. Sun advocated a kind of advisory corporativist council, composed of representatives of producer and consumer alliances, so that government bodies could employ it as a resource in assuming economic, as distinct from purely political, functions.^^ So important were economic associations
274 Marxism, China, and Development
that the entire notion of the voluntary organization of private interests was accorded explicit constitutional protection.^ On Taiwan, when, in the late 1980s, the rights of voluntary association were codified in public law, the final step from emergency rule to representative democracy was executed.
With the changes taking place on the Chinese mainland, the regime in Beijing will have to make some arrangements to accommodate the growth of economic, regional, or sectoral interests. With the emphatic growth of social and economic differences, the fiction that the Communist party can speak unambiguously for everyone in the People's Republic can no longer be maintained with any credibility. With the increasing growth and diversity of the economy, and the increasing variability and assertiveness of associated interests, the leadership of Communist China will be pressured to provide those interests some means, other than through bribery and corruption, to communicate their concerns to those in authority. Complaints of party corruption and self-serving interventions in the economy by officials had become pandemic in the People's Republic by the mid-1990s.
The alternative to personal influence and corruption would be the institutionalization of means for interest aggregation and articulation— a major step in the direction of representative democracy. Should the People's Republic put the "dictatorship of the proletariat" behind itself, it will have abandoned the last major feature inherited from the Marxism-Leninism of Mao Zedong. At that point, the economic and political system of mainland China will look remarkably like that anticipated by Sun Yat-sen.
It seems clear that Asia, in its entirety, has had difficulty making the transition from one or another form of traditional or modern authoritarianism to representative democracy. Only Japan concluded a successful, if troubled, transition some time ago.
Of the half-dozen East Asian countries that have increased their per capita gross national product the most rapidly over the past two or three decades, by the early 1990s only the Republic of China on Taiwan managed to negotiate the distance between authoritarianism and a system that shares the cardinal features of Western democracy. The Republic of Korea remains on an uncertain threshold. Indonesia continues to be ruled by a military junta. Singapore has not been able to fully shake off the authoritarianism that shepherded it from poverty to development. Hong
Conclusions 275
Kong, though provided with much of the substance of civil and political rights, remains a product of colonial authoritarianism.
Given that history, the future of mainland China remains uncertain. What seems clear is that there will be systemic changes in its political system to accommodate those already manifest in its economy. With the passing of the old guard—the last representatives of Conmiunist China's fabled "long march*'—the political leadership of Communist China will have to conform to the new requirements generated by the rapidly growing market-governed economy. A new generation, having witnessed the disintegration of Marxist socialism everywhere in the world, would find solace in the "Chineseness" rather than the Marxism of the emerging system. The sole remaining socialism that shares demonstrable similarities with that emerging on the mainland of China is the ""minsheng socialism" of Sun Yat-sen.
At critical junctures in its revolutionary history, the Communist party of China has sought to identify itself with the revolutionary thought of Sun Yat-sen. Throughout the 1930s and early 1940s, Mao Zedong regularly advertised the Communist party as the true heir of the ideological legacy of Sun. It is not at all unlikely that in the foreseeable future the reformed and reforming Communist party might make similar recourse. It would thereby conclude the search for a legitimating rationale for a system that was no longer either Marxist or Maoist—and it would facilitate the ultimate reunification of the two Chinas.^^ What might well emerge is an evolving representative democracy—a political administration designed to facilitate the growth and development of what will probably be the largest market-governed economy in the world. It would be the China anticipated by Sun Yat-sen in 1904:
The whole country would be open to foreign trade; railroads would be built; natural resources would be developed; the people would be richer and their standard of living would be higher; the demand for foreign goods would be greater, and international commerce would be increased a hundred fold above its present rate/^
It would be a China in which "the great power of government" ultimately would be placed entirely "in the hands of the people," in a system of multiparty, competitive representation, insulated by constitutionally protected civil and political liberties, that would assure universal suffrage, referendum, recall, and legislative initiative.*-*
276 Marxism, China, and Development
That the passage from the present flawed system to that of the future will be very difficult and time consuming is attested to by everything we know of economic and political development.'^ Nonetheless, by the mid-1990s there were already forces in motion that seemed to assure the final outcome.
Notes
1. Karl Marx, "The Poverty of Philosophy," in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, vol. 6 (New York: International Publishers, 1976, hereafter MECW), 137.
2. Marx, "Speech on the Question of Free Trade," in AfECW, vol. 6, 460, 462-63.
3. Friedrich Engels, "Speeches in Elberfeld, February 8, 1845," in MECW, vol. 4, 243.
4. Engels, "Principles of Communism," in MECW, vol. 6,348,353; "The Free Trade Congress at Brussels," in MECW, vol. 6, 289; "Speeches in Elberfeld, February 8, 1845," in MECW, vol. 4, 251, 289.
5. Kim II Sung, On Some Theoretical Problems of the Socialist Economy (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Press, 1983), 2-3.
6. Ibid., 12-13.
7. See the discussion in Oskar Morgenstem, in National Income Statistics (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1979), 44.
8. Kim, On Some Theoretical Problems, 17-21.
9. See Nikolai Shmelev and Vladimir Popov, The JUrning Point: Revitalizing the Soviet Economy (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 81; see chap. 5.
10. See the discussion in Jan Prybyla, Market and Plan Under Socialism: The Bird in the Cage (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1987), 260ff.
11. See the discussion in Sun Yat-sen, "The Social Question: Refutation of the Socialistic and Marxist Solutions," in The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen, ed. Paschal M. D'Elia (New York: AMS Press, 1974, reprint of the Wuchang Edition, 1931), 403-43; see particularly 470ff.
12. Sun, "The International Development of China," in Guofu quanji [The Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen] vol. 5 (Taipei: Kuomintang Party History Committee, 1973, hereafter GQ), 135.
13. Ibid.
14. Sun, Triple Demism, 435.
15. Ibid., 429.
16. See the discussion in ibid., 431, 442ff.
17. See ibid., 325, 427, 532ff.
18. Ibid., 486-503; Sun, "Fundamentals of National Reconstruction for the National Government of China," in Fundamentals of National Reconstruction (Taipei: China Cultural Service, 1953), 9; Sun, "How To Develop Chinese Industry," in ibid., 190.
19. Sun, Triple Demism, 408ff., 426, 469, 495ff., 498ff; Sun, "International Development of China," in GQ, vol. 5, 129, 135, 143, 216, 317ff; Sun, "Fundamentals of National Reconstruction," in Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, 9; Sun, "First Steps of Lx>cal Self-Govemment," in ibid., 68ff.; Sun, "Foundation for Rebuilding the Chinese Government," in ibid., 115.
Conclusions 277
20. See Sun, Triple Demism, 469, 472, 536; Sun, "International Development of China," in GQ, vol. 5, 321; Sun, "How To Develop Chinese Industry," in Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, 192.
21. Sun, TYiple Demism, 528-33.
22. Ibid., 520ff.; Sun, "International Development of China," in GQ, vol. 5, 306.
23. Sun, TYiple Demism, 475; Sun, "International Development of China," in GQ, vol. 5, 129, 133, 135ff., 181, 185,239, 297, 300, 303, 309ff., 333; Sun, "International Development of China," in Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, 185-91.
24. See Nicholas D. Kristof, "Selling China on 'Public* Privatization," New York Times 8 (January 1989): 8f; Kristof, "In Beijing a Bold New Proposal: End State Ownership of Industry," in ibid. 10 (January 1989): Al, A6.
25. See discussion in Seven N. S. Cheung, Will China Go Capitalist? (Lxjndon: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1986).
26. See Xu Pengfei, "Establishing a New Order of the Socialist Commodity Economy," in James A. Dom and Wang Xi, eds.. Economic Reform in China: Problems and Prospects (Chicago, 111.: University of Chicago, 1990), 36; China's Foreign Economic Legislation (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1982, 1984), 2 vols.
27. See the suggestions in "China Reforms Said Snarled by Politics," Washington Times 11 (January 1989): A9.
28. See "Lifting of Price Controls in Focus," China Daily 13 (July 1988): 4.
29. See the discussion in "China: The Titan Stirs," The Economist 28 (November 1992): 3-20.
30. People's Daily 23 (November 1992): 2; see "Beyond the Juncture, China Moves Toward Market Economy," Semi-Monthly Talks 21 (10 November 1992): 17-18, as translated in Inside China Mainland 15, 2 (February 1993): 58-59.
31. "China: The Titan Stirs," The Economist 28 (November 1992): 15.
32. See Shi Wei, "What Has Happened in Beijing?" Beijing Review (26 June-2 July 1989): 15.
33. See the discussion in "War Machine takes Capitalist Road," broadcast on "Fujian, Voice of the Strait," 11 July 1992, translated in Inside China Mainland 14, 9 (September 1992): 74-75.
34. See Hsi-sheng Ch*i, Politics of Disillusionment: The Chinese Communist Party under Deng Xiaoping, 1978-1989 (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1991).
35. See the translation of "'Left' Document Warns Against Perversion of Party Mores," The Trend Monthly (Hong Kong) (June 1992), translated in Inside China Mainland 14, 8 (August 1992): 29-33.
36. An essay in the 9th issue of the bulletin of the Central Communist Party School, Party School Tribune Monthly, by Zhang Aiming, translated in Inside China Mainland 15, 1 (January 1993): 7-10.
37. "Letter Claims Left is Right," translated in Inside China Mainland 14, 7 (July 1992): 16ff.
38. See the 7th of Part I Point of the "Kuomintang's Political Program of 1924," in Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, 55.
39. Sun, "First Steps in Local Self-Govemment," in ibid., 73.
40. See the 6th point of Part II of the "Kuomintang's Political Program of 1924," in ibid., 58.
41. See Wei Wou, KMT-CCP Paradox: Guiding a Market Economy in China (Indianapolis, Ind.: University of Indianapolis, 1993) and the discussion of some of the technical issues attending reunification of Taiwan and the Chinese mainland;
278 Marxism, China, and Development
Himgdah Chiu, Koo-Wang Talks and the Prospect of Building Constructive and Stable Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law. 1993).
42. Sun, "The True Solution to the Chinese Question," in GQ, vol. 5, 118ff.
43. Sun, TYiple Demism, 388-400.
44. See the comments in "A Bearish Voice: Economist Milton Friedman Sounds Warnings on China," Far Eastern Economic Review 11 (November 1993): 5.
Africa, 128 Aganbegyan, Abel, 89 Agricultural prices, 90-91 American revolution, 232 Amin, Samir, 128 Amdt, H.W., 142 Asia, 128
Big character posters, 221, 226 Bolshevik Revolution, 51, 53-59, 71,
93, 109, 163, 211-12, 214, 266 Bourgeoisie, 47-53, 62, 83, 130-31,
149-51, 153,215-16 Bukharin. Nikolai I.. 59-63. 74, 117,
177-78
Capital, 91, 102-3
Capitalism, 50-51,64,175-76,178-79,
187-91, 194, 209, 215-16, 262-63 Capital (Marx), 66
Central Cultural Revolution Group, 83 Chen Cheng, 243 Chen Duxiu, 11 Chen Erjin, 219-20, 222, 225 Chen Yiyang, 219 Chen Yun, 9 Chiang Ching-kuo, 243, 246, 248-49,
252-53, 255 Chiang Kai-shek, 166,243-45,248,252 China. See People's Republic of China Chinese Conmiunist Party: criticism of
Mao Zedong, 17-41 Civic Organizations Law, 249 Civil War in France (Marx & Engels),
49 Clements, Kevin, 197 Cold War, 183-84 Collectivization, 78-80 Conmiodity production, 109-11
The Communist Manifesto (Marx & Engels), 130-31, 141
Conununist Party: Chinese, 82-83,167, 180, 218-19; Soviet, 180, 212-13
Consumption, 102
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Marx), 31-32
Council of Grand Justices (Republic of China), 248
Cuba, 267
Cultural Revolution, 9-10, 12, 17-19, 38, 41, 83-86, 99. 182-83. 224
Dai Jitao. 192
Democratic centralism. 216-17
Deng Xiaoping, 9, 83,92-93,200,221,
226, 268. 270; General Program of
1975. 100-101, 104-8, 112, 254 Dependency theories, 129, 185-86,
194-97 Developing countries. 127-29.185-90,
195 Dobb. Maurice. 3 Dong Funai. 108 Dong Furen. 94
Eastern Europe, 2
East Germany, 2
Economic planning, 91-92
Election and Recall Law, 249
Eleventh Plenum of the Ninth Party Congress, 101
Elites, 233
Enmianuel, Arghiri. 128
Engels. Friedrich: on bourgeois-proletariat split, 130-31; on ideas and consciousness, 31; on imperialism, 175-77, 191; on industrial development, 136-41; leftist themes in writ-
279
280 Marxism, China, and Development
ings of, 19-23; on means of production in socialist economy, 5-8, 37-38,263; on nationalism, 156-57, 162; on necessity for industrialization, 28-38; on proletarian revolutions, 34-35; on replacing bourgeois relations of production with socialism, 47-53; on revolution, 25-26 England, 154, 177
Famines, 80
Far Eastern Economic Review, 147,250
Five-YearPlan(s),79, 81
Forced labor camps, 67
Formosa Resolution, 241
Fourier, Charles, 20
Free trade, 134-42
French revolution, 232
Gang of Four, 19, 83, 92, 99-101 General Program of 1975 (Deng),
100-101, 104-8, 112,255 German Ideology (Marx & Engels), 26 Germany, 156, 161, 177, 188, 191, 268 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 1 Great Leap Forward, 79-82, 84 Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,
9-10, 12, 17-19, 38, 41, 83-86, 99,
182-83, 224
Hamilton, Alexander, 132-34, 197
Han Zhiguo, 116
Heinzen, Karl, 35
He Jianzhang, 102
He Wei, 108
Hilferding, Rudolf, 177-78
Hobson, J.A., 187-90
Hong Kong, 271, 274-75
HuaGuofeng, 92,99-101
HuaSheng. 118,269
Hu Hanmin, 153, 190, 192
Imperialism, 175-90, 261 Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (Lenin), 178-80 Imperialism (Hobson), 187-90 Indonesia, 274 Industrial development, 136-41, 154
Jalee. Pierre. 129
Japan, 177, 268, 274
Jiang Qing, 83, 99-101, 224
Jianshe, 192
Joffe. A.A., 164
Joint ventures, 269-1 \
Kautsky,Karl.26,33,51 Khrushchev. Nikita, 8, 86, 94, 103-4 Kirkup, Thomas, 33 Korean War, 240-41 Kosygin, Alexei, 104 Kuomintang, 192, 194, 238-56
Laissezfaire liberals, 134-42, 165-66
Lai Tmg, 193
Lange, Oskar, 3
Latin America, 128
Law of value, 71-76. 86-95. 111. 113-16
Lee Teng-hui, 249
Leftists (Maoist). 18-24, 41, 93, 100
Leftists (Soviet), 59, 74
"Left-Wing" Communism-an Infantile Disorder (Lenin), 23
Lenin, V.I., 61, 81, 88, 222; on democratic centralism, 216-17; on free markets, 8; on imperialism, 178-81; on nationalism, 158; on necessity of revolution in the West, 53-57,62; on political democracy, 211-12; on socialism in Soviet Union. 23-33; on Sun Yat- sen, 148
Leninism, 58, 73
Liang Qichao, 160
Liberman, Evsei, 103-4
Li Chengrui, 102
Li Dazhao. 11
Li Hongzhang, 151
LinBiao, 19,219-20
List, Friedrich, 134-42, 154-56, 197
Liu Guoguang, 113
Liu Shaoqi, 9, 19, 39, 83, 101, 103
Liu Suinian, 102
Liu Wenpu, 103
Li Yining, 169
Li Zhengtian, 219, 224-25
Lukacs, Georg, 216
Luo Rongqu, 117
Luo Ruiqing, 83
Luo Xiaopeng, 118
Index 281
Luxemburg, Rosa, 177-78
Manchu dynasty, 149, 152, 194
The Manifesto of the Communist Party (Marx & Engels), 47-48
Maoism, 8-13,41, 85, 168-69; conflict with Soviets, 104; economic alternatives to, 99-118; late period in, 90-91, 183, 253; and political democracy, 213-26
Mao Zedong, 8-13, 239, 243, 275; on bourgeois dictatorships, 213-19; Chinese Communist critique of, 17-41, 117, 221-25; death of, 99; economic policy of, 77-95, 262; on imperialism, 180-83; Marxist education of, 33-41; on nationalism, 158-59, 162-63; on Sun Yat-sen, 155. 166-67
Mao Zedong thought, 17, 106,217,262
Market economy, 109, 262-72
Market price, 114-16
Martov, Julius, 58
Marx, Karl: on bourgeois-proletariat split, 130-31; on ideas and consciousness, 31; on imperialism, 175-77, 191; on industrial development, 136-41; on law of value, 71-76, 86-95, 111. 113-16; leftist themes in writings of, 19-23; on means of production in socialist economy, 5-8, 37-38, 263; on nationalism, 156-57,162; on necessity for industrialization, 28-38; on political forms and economics, 207-11; on replacing market economy with socialism, 47-53,126; on revolution, 25-26, 34-35; on value/price relationship, 72-73, 87-88
Marxism, 1, 81; dismissal of morality in, 233; and law of value, 71-76, 86-95, 111, 113-16; and political democracy, 207-13; transformation of in China. 259-76; transformation to ideology of development and modernization, 125-42; and twentieth century revolutions, 231-32
Meiji government, 196
Mensheviks, 58
Min bao, 191-92
Muenzer, Thomas, 22
National Assembly (Republic of China).
245-47. 250 Nationalism, 156-65 National System of Political Economy
(List), 134-42 Nemchinov, V., 103 Neo-Marxism. 184-87 Neo-Stalinism, 223 NEP (new economic policy), 56-57 The New Economics (Preobrazhenskii),
63 North Korea, 264
On Contradiction (Mao), 38
On Proletarian-Democratic Revolution (Chen Erjin), 219
On Socialist Democracy and the Chinese Legal System^ 219
Output (industry and agriculture), 79, 84.91.101,270
Ouyang Yuansong, 109
Owen, Robert, 20
Paris Conunune, 49, 211
Peasants. 34
The Peasant War in Germany (Engels). 22,34
Peng Zhen, 83
People's Republic of China: economic relations with Soviet Union, 182; economy after Mao, 103. 200, 259-76; land per capita in, 81; political dissent in, 221; real growth in, 102, 200
Planning, 91-92
Plekhanov. Grigorii. 57-58
Political democracy: and Maoism. 213-26; and Marxism, 207-13; and Sun Yat-sen, 231-56
Poverty of Philosophy (Marx & Engels), 49
Preobrazhenskii, Evgenii, 63-65, 74-76,94, 110
Productive relations, 84
Proletariat, 130-31
Proudhon, Pierre Joseph, 20
Provincial Assembly (Republic of China), 241-42
282 Marxism, China, and Development
Prybyla, Jan, 3
Public Officials Election and Recall
Law, 246 Purges, 82-83, 212-13
Qing dynasty, 149, 153, 194, 215
Red Guards, 219, 224
Reglar, Steve, 8
Report on Manufacture (Hamilton), 132-33
Representative democracy, 233-37
Republic of China, 147, 166, 239-56; economic development of, 199,251, 255; governmental/political system of, 241-53; history of, 239-40
Republic of Korea, 274
Resolution on the History of the Communist Party of Chinay 17-18
Revolutions, 51-52; Bolshevik, 51, 53-59, 71, 93, 109, 163, 211-12, 214; and socialism, 24-28; in twentieth century, 231-32
Ricardo, David, 133
Rightist errors (Maoism), 20-21
Right (Soviet), 59
Riskin, Carl, 84
Saint-Simon, Henry, 20
Sanmin Zhuyi, 154, 192
Schram, Stuart, 81
Shih Chien-sheng, 147
Sik, Ota, 2-3
Singapore, 274
Smith, Adam, 133
Socialism, 51, 63-64
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 267
Soviet Union, 262; backward post-revolutionary economy of, 53-59; economic reform in after Stalin, 86-90, 103-4; economic relations with China, 182; economic stagnation in, 1-5; growth in under Stalin, 111
Stalin, Joseph, 3, 94. 158-59, 181; cult of personality of, 29-33; forced collectivization program of, 65-67; on law of value, 86-90; as model for Maoist economic policy, 81-82, 84, 162-63; purges of, 212-13
Stalinism, 32-33, 41, 76, 94, 127, 163, 168, 259
State and Revolution (Lenin), 51,211-12
Steel production, 79
Sung, Kim II, 264-65
Sun Yat-sen, 11, 180, 187, 275; on industrialization and modernization, 141-42, 147-69, 190-201, 252-55; on political democracy, 231-56; rejection of Marxism, 267-68; on voluntary associations, 273-74
Sun Yefang, 8, 94-95, 113-14
Taiwan, 147,166,199,239-56. Seeabo
Republic of China Temporary Provisions Effective During
the Period of Communist Rebellion,
239 Teng Weizao, 108 Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central
Committee, 92-93, 95, 101, 180 Third World countries, 127-29,185-90,
195 Three Principles of the People (Sun),
152, 163-64 Totalitarianism, 218, 266-67 Trotsky, Leon, 59, 63, 65, 109, 212-13 Truman, Harry, 240 "Hitelary government, 237
Ultra-leftism (Maoism), 19, 22-24, 93,
218 United Nations Charter, 127 United States, 154, 188, 191, 241, 251.
268
Value and price, 71-76 Vietnam. See Socialist Republic of Vietnam Voluntarism, 78-80 Voluntary associations, 273-74
Wang Hongwen, 83, 99 Wang Xizhe, 219, 221-25 Wealth of Nations (Smith), 133 Weitling. Wilhelm. 20 Wilhelm. Richard, 232 Wittfogel, Kari, 149-50 World Bank. 127
World War II, 127 Zeng Qixian, 102
Wu Qungan, 102 Zhang Chunqiao, 83, 99
Zhang Xuejun, 118 Xingqi pinglutiy 192 Zhang Zhuoyuan, 101-2
Xue Muqiao, 94. 101. 113-14. 116 Zhan Wu, 103
ZhaoRenwei, 113 Yan Fu, 160 Zhou Shulian, 95
Yao Wenyuan, 83, 99, 224 Zhu Zhixin, 192
■I