HAPPINESS
[30] NOW THAT WE HAVE SPOKEN OF THE VIRTUES, THE FORMS of friendship, and the varieties of pleasure, it remains to discuss in outline happiness, since this is what we state the end of human nature to be. Our discussion will be the more concise if we take up what we have said already. We said, then, that it is not a state; for if it were it might belong to someone who was asleep throughout his life, living the life of a plant, or, again, to someone who was suffering the greatest misfortunes. [1176b] If these implications do not meet with approval, and we must rather class happiness as an activity, as we have said before, and if some activities are necessary and desirable for the sake of something else while others are so in themselves, plainly happiness must be placed among those desirable in [5] themselves, not among those desirable for the sake of something else; for happiness does not lack anything but is self-sufficient. Now those activities are desirable in themselves from which nothing is looked for apart from the activity. And virtuous actions are thought to be such; for to do noble and virtuous deeds is a thing desirable for its own sake.
Pleasant amusements also are thought to be of this nature: [10] we choose them not for the sake of other things; for we are harmed rather than benefited by them, since we are led to neglect our bodies and our possessions. But most of the people who are deemed happy resort to such pastimes. That is why those who are convivial on such occasions are highly [15] esteemed at the courts of tyrants: they make themselves pleasant in the tyrant’s favourite pursuits, and that is the sort of man they want. These things are thought to be of the nature of happiness because people in power spend their leisure in them. But perhaps such people are no indication; for virtue and intelligence, from which virtuous activities come, do not depend on power. Nor if these people, who [20] have never tasted pure and generous pleasure, resort to the bodily pleasures, should these for that reason be thought more desirable; for boys, too, think the things that are valued among themselves are the best. It is reasonable, then, that, as different things seem valuable to boys and to men, so they should to base men and to upright men. Now, as we [25] have often maintained, those things are both valuable and pleasant which are such to the virtuous man; and to each man the activity in accordance with his own state is most desirable, and so to the virtuous man that which is in accordance with virtue. Happiness, therefore, does not lie in amusement: it would, indeed, be absurd if the end were amusement, and one were to take trouble and suffer hardship all one’s life in order to amuse oneself. For, in a word, [30] everything that we choose we choose for the sake of something else—except happiness, which is an end. Now to be busy and to exert oneself for the sake of amusement seems silly and utterly childish. But to amuse oneself in order that one may be busy, as Anacharsis puts it, seems correct; for amusement is a sort of relaxation, and we need relaxation because we cannot exert ourselves continuously. Relaxation [1177a] is not an end; for it is taken for the sake of activity.
The happy life is thought to be one of virtue, and it requires seriousness and does not consist in amusement. We say that serious things are better than laughable things and those connected with amusement, and that the activity of [5] the better—whether it be a part or a man—is the more virtuous; but the activity of the better is superior and thereby more of the nature of happiness. And any chance person—even a slave—can enjoy the bodily pleasures no less than the best man; but no one assigns to a slave a share in happiness—unless [10] he assigns to him also a share in life. For happiness does not lie in such pastimes but, as we have said before, in virtuous activities.
IF HAPPINESS IS AN ACTIVITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH VIRTUE, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be that of the best. Whether it be intelligence or something else that is thought to be our natural [15] ruler and guide and to take thought of things noble and divine (whether it be itself also divine or the most divine element in us), the activity of this in accordance with its own virtue will be complete happiness. That this activity is contemplative we have already said.
This would seem to be in agreement both with what we [20] have said before and with the truth. For this activity is the best (since intelligence is the best thing in us and the objects of intelligence are the best of knowable objects). Again, it is the most continuous, since we can contemplate more continuously than we can perform any action. And we think happiness must have pleasure mingled with it, and the activity of understanding is admittedly the pleasantest of virtuous [25] activities: at all events philosophy is thought to offer pleasures marvellous for their purity and their firmness, and it is reasonable that those who know will pass their time more pleasantly than those who inquire. And the self-sufficiency that is spoken of must belong most to contemplative exercise. For while a man of understanding, as well as a just man and the rest, needs the necessaries of life, [30] when they are sufficiently equipped with things of that sort the just man needs people towards whom and with whom he shall act justly, and the temperate man, the brave man, and each of the others is in the same case, but the man of understanding, even when by himself, can contemplate, and the more so the greater his understanding: he can perhaps do so better if he has collaborators—but still he is the [1177b] most self-sufficient. And this activity alone would seem to be cherished for its own sake; for nothing arises from it apart from the contemplating, while from practical activities we gain more or less apart from the action. And happiness [5] is thought to depend on leisure; for we are busy that we may have leisure, and make war that we may live in peace. Now the activity of the practical virtues is exhibited in political or military affairs, but the actions concerned with these seem to be unleisurely. Warlike actions are completely [10] so; for no one chooses to be at war, or prepares for war, for the sake of being at war: a man would seem absolutely murderous if he were to make enemies of his friends in order to bring about battles and slaughter. But the action of the politician is also unleisurely, and (apart from the political action itself) aims at power and honours, or at all events happiness, for himself and his fellow citizens—a happiness different [15] from political action, and plainly sought as being different. So if among virtuous actions political and military actions are distinguished by nobility and greatness, and these are unleisurely and aim at an end and are not desirable for their own sake, whereas the exercise of intelligence, which is contemplative, seems both to be superior in seriousness [20] and to aim at no end beyond itself, and to have its own pleasure (and this increases the activity), and if the self-sufficiency, leisureliness, unweariedness (so far as this is possible for man), and all the other attributes ascribed to the blessed man are evidently those connected with this activity, it follows that this will be the complete happiness for [25] man, if it be allowed a complete term of life (for none of the attributes of happiness is incomplete).
Such a life would be too high for man; for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so but in so far as something divine is present in him; and by so much as this is superior to our composite nature is its activity superior to that of the [30] other kind of virtue. If the intelligence is divine, then, in comparison with man, the life according to it is divine in comparison with human life. But we must not follow those who advise us being men to think of human things, and being mortal of mortal things. Rather, we must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and do everything to live in [1178a] accordance with the highest thing in us; for even if it be small in bulk, much more does it in power and value surpass everything. This would seem, too, to be each man himself, since it is the authoritative and better part of him. It would be absurd, then, if he were to choose the life not of himself but of [5] something else. And what we said before will apply now: that which is appropriate to each thing is by nature best and most pleasant for each thing, and so for man the life of the intelligence is best and pleasantest, since intelligence more than anything else is the man. This life therefore is also the happiest.
But in a secondary degree the life in accordance with the [10] other kind of virtue is happy; for the activities in accordance with this are human. Just and brave acts, and other virtuous acts, we do in relation to each other, observing what is fitting to each with regard to contracts and services and all manner of actions and with regard to the emotions, and all of these are evidently human. Some of them seem even to arise from [15] the body, and virtue of character to be in many ways bound up with the emotions. Wisdom, too, is coupled with virtue of character, and this with wisdom, since the originating principles of wisdom are in accordance with the moral virtues and correctness in the moral virtues is in accordance with [20] wisdom. Being connected with the emotions, the moral virtues will concern our composite nature; and the virtues of our composite nature are human: so, therefore, are the life and the happiness which correspond to these. The virtue of the intelligence is separate: let this much be said about it; for to describe it precisely is more than our purpose requires. It [25] would seem to need external equipment little, or less than moral virtue does. Grant that both need the necessaries, and do so equally, even if the politician’s exertions have more concern with the body and things of that sort; for there will be little difference there. But in what they need for the exercise of their activities there will be much difference. The liberal [30] man will need wealth for his liberal actions; the just man will need it for the returning of services (for wants are obscure, and even people who are not just pretend to want to act justly); the brave man will need power if he is to accomplish any of the acts that correspond to his virtue; and the temperate man will need opportunity—for how else is either he or any of the others to be recognized? It is debated, too, whether choice or action is more authoritative over virtue, which is taken to involve both. It is surely plain that its [1178b] completion involves both; but for actions many things are needed, and more the greater and nobler they are. But the man who is contemplating needs no such things, at least with a view to the exercise of his activity. Rather, they are, [5] one may say, even hindrances, at all events to his contemplation; but in so far as he is a man and lives with a number of people, he chooses to act virtuously: he will therefore need such aids to living a human life.
That complete happiness is a contemplative activity will appear from the following consideration as well. We suppose the gods to be above all other beings blessed and happy. [10] But what sort of actions must we assign to them? Acts of justice? Will not the gods seem ridiculous if they make contracts and return deposits, and so on? Acts of a brave man, then, facing up to what is frightening and confronting dangers because it is noble to do so?1 Or liberal acts? To whom [15] will they give? It will be absurd if they are to have money or anything of the kind. And what would their temperate acts be? Is not such praise vulgar, since they have no base appetites? If we were to run through them all, the circumstances of action would be found trivial and unworthy of gods. Still, everyone assumes that they live and therefore that they are active themselves: we cannot suppose them to sleep like Endymion. [20] Now if you take away from a living being action, and still more production, what is left but contemplation? Therefore the activity of god, which is especially blessed, will be contemplative; and so of human activities that which is most akin to this must be most of the nature of happiness.
This is indicated, too, by the fact that the other animals [25] have no share in happiness, being completely deprived of such activity. For while the whole life of the gods is blessed, and that of men too in so far as some likeness of such activity belongs to them, none of the other animals is happy, since they in no way share in contemplation. Happiness extends, then, just so far as contemplation does, and those to whom [30] contemplation more fully belongs are more truly happy, not coincidentally but in virtue of the contemplation; for this is in itself valuable. Happiness, therefore, must be a kind of contemplation.
Being a man, one will also need external prosperity; for our nature is not self-sufficient for contemplation—rather, our body also must be healthy and must have food and other [1179a] attention. Still, we must not think that the man who is to be happy will need many things or great things if he cannot be blessed without external goods. For self-sufficiency and action do not depend on excess, and we can do noble acts without [5] ruling earth and sea; for even with moderate resources one can act virtuously (this is manifest enough; for private persons are thought to do upright acts no less than the powerful—indeed even more); and it is enough that we should have so much as that; for the life of the man who is active in [10] accordance with virtue will be happy. Solon perhaps described happy men well when he said that they are moderately equipped with externals but have done (as he thought) the noblest acts and have lived temperately. For one can with but moderate possessions do what one ought. Anaxagoras also seems to have assumed that the happy man is not rich or [15] powerful when he said that he would not be surprised if the happy man were to seem absurd to most people; for they assess things by externals, since these are all they perceive.
The beliefs of men of understanding seem, then, to harmonize with our arguments. But while such things carry some conviction, the truth in practical matters is assessed [20] from the facts of life; for these are in control. We must therefore survey what we have already said, bringing it to the test of the facts of life, and if it harmonizes with the facts we must accept it, but if it clashes with them we must assume it to be mere words. Now he who exercises his intelligence and cultivates it seems to be both in the best state and most dear to the gods. For if the gods have any care for human affairs, [25] as they are thought to have, it would be reasonable both that they should delight in that which is best and most akin to them (and this is intelligence) and that they should reward those who cherish and honour this most, as caring for the things that are dear to them and acting both correctly and [30] nobly. And that all these attributes belong most of all to the man of understanding is plain. He, therefore, is the dearest to the gods. And the same man will presumably also be the happiest, so that in this way too the man of understanding will be especially happy.
1 The text of this sentence is uncertain.