1 · Melissus says that, if anything is, it is eternal, since it is impossible that [974a1] anything can come into being from nothing. For suppose that either all things or some things have come into being, in either case they must be eternal; for otherwise, in coming into being, they would do so out of nothing. For if all things come into [5] being, then nothing can pre-exist; whilst if some things were ever and others are added, that which is must have become more and greater, and that by which it is more and greater must have arisen out of nothing; for the more is not originally existent in the less, nor the greater in the smaller.
Since it is eternal, it is unlimited; for it has no beginning from which it has come [10] into being, and no end at which it ever ceased coming into being.
Being all and unlimited it is one; for if it were two or more, these would be limits for one another.
Being one it must be similar throughout; for if it were dissimilar, it would be several and therefore no longer one but many.
Being eternal and unlimited and alike throughout, the One is without motion; [15] for it could not move without passing somewhere else, and it can only pass either into that which is full or into that which is empty; but of these the former could not admit it, while the latter is nothing at all.
Such being the nature of the One, it is unaffected by grief and pain, and is healthy and free from disease, and cannot change either by transposition or by [20] change of form or by mixture with anything else; for under all these circumstances the One becomes many, and what is not is necessarily generated and what is is destroyed; but these are impossibilities. For, indeed, if it were maintained that any One is the result of a mixture of several constituents—suppose, that is, that things [25]were many and moved into one another, and that their mixture were either by way of the composition of the many in one, or, being due to the constituents fitting in with one another, resulted in their covering one another from view—then in the former case the constituents mixed would be easily discernible, if you separated them; whilst, if they covered one another, rubbing would reveal each constituent, [974b1] the successive layers being uncovered as the upper layers were removed. Now neither of these things happens. But according to Melissus it is only in these ways that many things could both be and also appear to us; and since these ways are [5] impossible, that which is cannot be many, and the belief that it is is erroneous, like many other fancies which are due to the senses; but argument does not prove either that things come into being or that what is, is many, but that it is one and eternal and unlimited and similar throughout.
Now surely one ought firstly to begin by taking not any and every opinion, but [10] those which are most firm. If, then, all our opinions are incorrectly conceived, it is perhaps quite wrong to adopt this doctrine too, that nothing can ever come into being out of nothing; for this is but a single opinion and an incorrect one too, which we somehow all of us1 have often been led to believe from our sense-perceptions. But [15] if not all that appears to us is false, and some beliefs even of objects of sense are correct, either one ought to demonstrate the nature of such a correct belief and then adopt it, or else demonstrate and adopt those which appear most likely to be correct; and these must always be more firm than the conclusions which are apt to follow from the arguments of Melissus. For supposing that we really had to do with two [20] contrary opinions, as Melissus thinks (for if there are many things, he says they must arise from what is not; and if this is impossible, what is, is not many; for, being ungenerated, anything which is, is unlimited, and therefore one), supposing this so, [25] still, if we admit both propositions equally, unity is no more proved than multiplicity, and it is only if one proposition is more firm than the other, that the conclusions following from it are better proved. Now, as a matter of fact, we do entertain both these beliefs, namely, that nothing can come to be out of nothing, and also that existents are many and are in motion; and of the two the latter is more generally credited, and every one would more readily give up the former opinion than this. [975a1] Now if it were the case that the two propositions are contrary to one another, and it were impossible that at the same time things should come to be of what is not, and there should fail to be a multiplicity of things, each of these views would refute the other. But why should his premisses be correct? Some one else might assert the [5] exact opposite. For he has not argued his case either by showing that it is a correct opinion from which he starts, or by taking a more firm opinion than that with which his proof is concerned. For it is usually considered more likely that things come to be from what is not than that there is not a multiplicity of things; it is confidently asserted about existents that things which do not exist come into being, indeed often have come into being, out of non-existents, and those who have asserted this are no [10] ordinary men, but some of those who are looked upon as sages. To being with, Hesiod says:
First of all in the world was Chaos born, and thereafter
Broad-bosomed earth arose, firm seat of all things forever
And Love that shineth bright amid the host of Immortals.2
All other things, he says, came into being from these, but these came into being out of nothing. Secondly, there are many who say that nothing is but all things [15] become, declaring that whatever becomes does not arise from existents; for then their statement that all things become would be false. So much, therefore, is clear, that there are some people of the opinion that becoming even out of non-existents is possible.
2 · But had we not better leave aside the possibility or impossibility of his conclusions, and confine ourselves to what may very well be a distinct problem—namely, whether these conclusions follow from the premisses which he takes, or [20] whether nothing prevents things from being otherwise. And first of all, granted his first assumption, that nothing can come to be from what is not, does it necessarily follow that all things are ungenerated? Or is there no reason why one thing should not have come to be out of another, and so on in an endless series? Or may it not go [25] on in a circular process, in such a way that one thing has come to be out of another, there thus being always something in existence, and all things having come to be out of one another an endless number of times? In that case, although it be agreed that nothing can come to be out of what is not, everything may very well have come to be. (And none of the attributes which are attached to the One prevents our calling [30] existents unlimited in Melissus’s sense of the word. For he himself attributes to the unlimited that it actually is, and is said to be, everything. And even if existents are not unlimited, there is no reason why they should not come to be by the circular process.) Further, if all things come to be and nothing is, as some declare, how can they be eternal? Yet he certainly argues as though the existence of something were [35] real and agreed. For, he says, if a thing has not come to be but is, it must be eternal, as though being were necessarily inherent in things. Moreover, however impossible it may be for what is not to come to be, or for what is to be destroyed, yet what prevents some existing things from having come to be and others from being eternal, as Empedocles also affirms? For after admitting all this, namely, that [975b1]
Out of that which is not can nothing come into being;
And whatsoever exists, no art nor device can destroy it;
For it will always abide, where’er ‘tis implanted, for ever,3
he yet declares that of existents some are eternal, namely, fire, water, earth, and air, [5] but that the rest of things come to be and have come to be out of these. For in his opinion there is no other process whereby existents can come to be,
Save the mingling of things and exchanging of things that are mingled;
This in the speech of men is called the work of Begetting.4
[10] But he denies that the being of the eternal things and of what really is, is the result of a process of coming to be; for this he considers impossible. For he says:
How could aught bring increase to the All and whence have arisen?5
But the Many come to be by the mixture and composition of fire and the other elements, and perish again when those elements are exchanged and separated; that [15] is, by mixture and separation many things are at any time, but by nature there are only four apart from the causes, or else only one. Or again if these elements out of the composition of which things come to be, and by the dissolution of which they are destroyed were from the first unlimited—which is what some affirm that Anaxagoras means when he says that things which come to be do so out of things that are always existent and unlimited—even so not all things would be eternal, but there [20] would be some things coming to be and having come to be from things that are, and passing by destruction into other modes of being. Furthermore, there is no reason why one form should not constitute the universe (as Anaximander and Anaximenes say, the former declaring that the universe is water, while Anaximenes says that it is [25] air, and as others say who have contended along these lines that the universe is one), and why this, but assuming various shapes and greater or less bulk—that is, by coming to be in a rare or dense state—should not make up the many unlimited objects which exist and come to be and compose the whole. Again, Democritus declares that water and air and each of the many things that exist are essentially the [30] same, but differ in their ‘rhythm’. Why should not the many come to be and be destroyed in this way, the One changing continually from being to being by the above-mentioned differences, and the whole becoming not a whit either greater or less? Furthermore, why should not bodies from time to time come to be from other bodies and be dispersed into bodies, and thus by dissolution the processes of generation and decay always balance one another?
[35] But if one were to make these concessions and allow that what is both exists and is ungenerated, how is its unlimitedness thereby more clearly demonstrated? For Melissus declares it to be unlimited, if it exists but has not come to be; for the beginning and end of the process of coming to be are, he says, limits. Yet what in his argument prevents a thing which is ungenerated from having a limit? For if a thing [976a1] has come to be, he contends that it has as a beginning that from which it began coming to be. Now why should it not have a beginning, even if it has not come to be—not, however, one from which it has come to be, but some other—and why should not existents, though eternal, be limited in relation to one another? Again, [5] why should not the whole, being ungenerated, be unlimited, but the things which come to be within it be limited by having a beginning and end of coming to be? Again, as Parmenides says, what prevents the universe, though it be one and ungenerated, from being nevertheless limited and
Like to the mass of a sphere on all sides carefully rounded,
Everywhere equally far from the midst; for Fate hath appointed
That neither here nor there should it either be greater or smaller?6 [10]
Now, if it has a centre and extremities, it has a limit though it is ungenerated; since if it be one and a body, as Melissus himself asserts, it has parts of its own as well, and these all alike. For when he says that the universe is similar, he does not use the term of similarity to something else (this is just the point that Anaxagoras7 raises in disproving that the unlimited is similar, i.e. that what is similar is similar to [15] something else, so that being two or more it would no longer be one, nor yet unlimited), but perhaps he means similar in relation to itself—in other words, that it is homogeneous, being all water or earth or something else of the kind. For he clearly holds that in this case it would be one; but each of the parts being a body is not unlimited (for it is the whole which is unlimited), and therefore they are limited [20] in relation to one another, although they are ungenerated.
Further, if it is both eternal and unlimited, how could it be one, being a body? For if it were heterogeneous,8 it would be many. Melissus himself contends that it would then be many. But if it is all water or all earth, or whatever this being is, it would have many parts (as Zeno, too, attempts to prove of that which is one in this [25] sense); its parts would then be many, being some of them smaller and less than others; so that in this way it would vary throughout, without any body being added to it or taken away from it. But if it has no body or width or length, how could the One be unlimited? Or why should there not be many, indeed innumerable, existents [30] of this kind? Further, if there are more existents than one, why should they not be unlimited in size, just as Xenophanes asserts that the depth both of the earth and of the air is unlimited? Empedocles shows this; for, as though certain people urged such views, he makes the criticism that, if this is the nature of earth and air, it is impossible for them ever to meet, [35]
If the depths of the earth are unbounded and ample the ether,
As the words that come forth from the lips of mortals unnumbered,
Empty and meaningless, say; they have seen of the whole but a little.9
Further, if it is one, there is nothing absurd in supposing that it is not similar everywhere. For if the universe is water or fire or something of that kind, there is no [976b1] reason why we should not suppose several kinds of this one being, each kind individually similar to itself. For there is no reason why one kind should not be rare and another dense, as long as the rarity does not involve a void. For in the rare there is not a void isolated in particular parts in such a way that of the whole part is dense [5] and part not dense (rarity then meaning that the whole is like this); but rarity is produced when the whole is uniformly full, but uniformly less full than in the dense.
But suppose it exists and is ungenerated, and suppose it were granted that for [10] this reason it is unlimited, and that more than one thing cannot be unlimited, and it must therefore be said to be one, and it is impossible. . . .10 For how, if what is unlimited is a whole, can the void, not being a whole, exist?
Now Melissus declares that it is without motion, if a void does not exist; for everything moves by changing its place. In the first place, then, this does not agree [15] with the opinion of many, which is that a void does exist, yet it is not a body, but is of the nature of the Chaos, as Hesiod describes it first coming into being in the birth of things, considering space to be a prime necessity for things which exist; and the void is, as it were, a vessel in which we expect to find an interior space. But even if there [20] is no void, why should it be less likely to move? For Anaxagoras, who devoted his attention to this subject, and for whom it was not enough merely to declare that a void does not exist, declares that things which are, are in motion, although there is no void. Similarly Empedocles says that they are ever in motion continually all through the period of aggregation, but that there is no void; for he says that
[25] Nought of the whole can be void; whence then could any be added?11
while when all has been aggregated into a single form, so as to be one,
Emptiness there is none, nor aught that is overflowing.12
For why should not things assume one another’s position and go through a circle of simultaneous movements, one thing taking the place of another, and that the place [30] of something else, and something else the first position? And what is there in what he has said that precludes a movement taking place in things, consisting in a change of form in an object which remains in the same position (what he, like every one else, terms alteration), as, for example, when white turns into black, or bitter into sweet? For the non-existence of a void and the inability of that which is full to [35] receive any addition does not at all preclude the possibility of alteration.
Thus neither are all things necessarily eternal nor is it necessarily unlimited (but many things are unlimited), nor is it one, nor similar, nor unmoved, whether it be one or whether it be many. If this is admitted, if there would be nothing in what he has said to prevent existents from being either transposed or altered; if there is [977a1] one thing, the movement is of the whole, which differs in quantity, and alters without the addition or abstraction of any body; while, if there is a multiplicity of existents, their movement is due to their mutual mixture and segregation. For it is not likely that the process of mixture is either a placing of elements one above [5] another, or a putting of them together, such as he supposes, by which either they are immediately distinct, or else they appear each distinct from one another, if the layers above one another are successively rubbed away; but they are so arranged that any part of that which is mixed comes into such a relation to any part of that with which it is mixed, that even the smallest particles would be found not merely placed together but mixed. For since there is no smallest body, every part is mixed [10] with every other part, just as the whole is mixed.
3 · Xenophanes declares that if anything is, it cannot possibly have come into being, and he argues this with reference to God, for that which has come into [15] being must necessarily have done so either from that which is similar or from that which is dissimilar; and neither alternative is possible. For it is no more possible for like to have been begotten by like than for like to have begotten like (for since they are equal, all the same qualities inhere in each and in a similar way in their relations to one another), nor could unlike have come into being from unlike. For if the stronger could come into being from the weaker, or the greater from the less, or the [20] better from the worse, or conversely worse things from better, then what is not could come to be from what is, or what is from what is not; which is impossible. Accordingly for these reasons God is eternal.
Now if God is supreme over all, he says that he must be one. For if there were two or more gods, he would no longer be supreme and the best of all; for then [25] each of the many, being a god, would likewise be supreme. For what God and God’s power means is that he is supreme and never inferior, and that he possesses supremacy over all. So far then as he is not superior, he is not God. Now if there were several gods, supposing they were superior to one another in some respects and [30] inferior in others, they would not be gods; for it is the nature of the divine not to be inferior. But supposing they were equal, they would not possess God’s nature, for God must be supreme; whereas that which is equal is neither better nor worse than that to which it is equal. So that if God be, and be of this nature, God is one only. For otherwise he could not even do whatsoever he wished; for if there were more [35] gods than one, he could not do so; therefore he is One only.
Being one he is similar in every part, seeing and hearing and possessing the other senses in every part of him. For otherwise the parts of God would be superior and inferior to one another; which is impossible.
Being similar in every part, he is spherical; for he is not of a certain nature in [977b1] one part and not in another, but in every part.
Being eternal and one and similar and spherical, he is neither unlimited nor limited. For what is not is unlimited; for it has neither middle nor beginning and end, nor any other parts, and such is the nature of the unlimited. But what is could [5] not be of the same nature as what is not. On the other hand, if things were several, mutual limitation would occur. But the One has no likeness either to what is not or to the many; for that which is one has nothing in which it can find a limit.
A One, then, of the kind which Xenophanes declares God to be can, he says, be neither moved nor unmoved; for immobility belongs to what is not (for nothing else [10] can go into it, nor can it go into anything else); while movement belongs to a plurality, for one body must move into another’s place. Now nothing can ever move into what is not, for what is not is nowhere. On the other hand, if it moved in the way [15] of things changing into one another, than the One would be more than one. For these reasons motion belongs to a pair of things, or any number more than one, while rest and immobility belong to that which is nothing. But the One is neither still nor is it moved; for it is similar neither to what is not nor to the many; but being [20] in every respect of this nature—eternal and one and similar and spherical—God is neither unlimited nor limited, neither at rest nor in motion.
4 · In the first place, then, Xenophanes also, like Melissus, assumes that what comes into being does so from that which already is. Yet why should not that which comes into being do so not from something either similar or dissimilar, but from what is not? Further, God is no more ungenerated than anything else, even if [25] we suppose that all things have come into being from something similar or dissimilar, which is impossible; so that either there is nothing except God or everything else is also eternal. Further, he assumes that God is supreme, meaning by this that he is most powerful and best. This does not seem to agree with the customary opinion, which holds that some gods are in many respects superior to [30] others. It was not, therefore, from accepted opinion that he took this admission about God. It is said that he understands the supremacy of God in the sense that his nature is superior, not in relation to anything else, but in his own disposition; since surely in relation to something else there would be nothing to prevent his excelling, [35] not by his own goodness and strength, but owing to the weakness of all others. But no one would wish to say that God is supreme in this latter sense, but rather that he is in himself as excellent as possible, and there is nothing lacking in him of what is good and noble; if this is so, his supremacy would perhaps follow. But even if there were more gods than one, nothing would prevent their being of this nature, all [978a1] possessing the greatest possible excellence and being superior to all else, but not to one another. Now there are, it seems, other things besides God; for he says that God is supreme, and he must necessarily be supreme over something.
But supposing that he is one, it does not follow that he sees and hears in every [5] part; for if he does not see in one part, he does not see worse in that part, but does not see at all. But perhaps perceiving in every part means that he would possess the highest excellence if he were similar in every part.
Further, if this were his nature, why should he be spherical, and why should he have that shape rather than any other, just because he hears in every part and is [10] supreme in every part? For just as when we say of white lead that it is white in all its parts, we merely mean that the colour whiteness is present in every portion of it, why should we not say similarly of God that sight and hearing and supremacy are present in every part, in the sense that whatsoever portion of him one takes will be [15] found to be possessed of these characteristics? But God is not necessarily spherical for this reason any more than white lead is.
Further, how is it possible that, being a body and having magnitude, God can be neither unlimited nor limited? For that is unlimited which, being capable of limitation, has no limit, and limit occurs in magnitude and multitude and any kind of quantity; and therefore any magnitude which has no limit is unlimited. Again, if [20] God is spherical, he must have a limit; for he has extremities, if he has a centre within himself from which they are at the greatest distance. But anything which is spherical has a centre; for that is spherical in which the extremities are equidistant from the centre. Now it is the same thing to say that a body has extremities, and that it has limits.…13 For if what is not is unlimited, why should not what is also be [25] unlimited? For why should not some identical attributes be assigned to what is and to what is not? For no one can perceive at this moment what does not exist, while something may exist at this moment without any one’s perceiving it;14 yet both can be the subject of speech and thought.…15 And what is not is not white; either, then, for this reason everything that is is white (this is in order that we may not assign an [30] identical quality to that which exists and to the non-existent), or else, I think, there is nothing to prevent anything which exists from being not white. And so what is would still more easily admit a negative predicate, namely, the unlimited, if, as was said just now, a thing is unlimited owing to its not having a limit; and so what is too either is unlimited or has a limit. But perhaps to attribute unlimitedness to what is [35] not is also absurd; for we do not call everything which has not a limit unlimited, just as we should not say that what is not equal is unequal. Again, why should not God, although he be one, yet be limited, though not by anything which is God. But if God is one only, then his parts also must be one only. Further, it is also absurd that if in [978b1] fact the many are limited in relation to one another, for this reason the One should not have a limit. For many of the same predicates belong to the many and to the One; being, for instance, is common to them both. It would therefore, perhaps, be [5] absurd if we were to declare that God does not exist for the reason that the Many exist, so that he may not be like16 them in this respect. Again, though God be One, why should he not be limited and have limits? Even as Parmenides says that, being One, he is
Like to the mass of a sphere on all sides carefully rounded [10]
Everywhere equally far from the midst.17
For the limit must be a limit of something, but not necessarily in relation to something else: that which has a limit does not necessarily have it in relation to something else (as when it is limited in relation to the unlimited which comes next to it), but being limited means the possession of extremities, and when a thing has extremities it need not necessarily have them in relation to something else. Some things, therefore, may happen both to be limited and to adjoin something else, while [15] others may be limited, but not in relation to something else.
Again, as regards what is and what is not being unmoved, we must say that to suppose that what is not is unmoved because what is is moved, is perhaps just as absurd as the cases given above. And further, surely one cannot suppose that not-moving and unmoved are the same thing, but the former is the negation of [20] moving (like not-equal, which can be correctly used even of the non-existent), while ‘unmoved’ is used of an actual state (as ‘unequal’ is used), and to express the contrary of moving (that is, being at rest), just as words with the negative prefix are generally used to express contraries. Not-moving is therefore true of the non-[25] existent, but being at rest cannot belong to the non-existent; similarly ‘unmoved’, which means the same thing,18 cannot belong to it. Yet Xenophanes uses ‘not moving’ in the sense of ‘being at rest’, and says that what is not is at rest because it undergoes no change of position. As we said above, it is perhaps absurd, if we attach some predicate to what is not, to assert that it does not apply to what is, especially if [30] the predicate used is a negation, such as ‘not moving’ and ‘not changing its position’. For, as has been said, it would preclude a number of predicates from being used of existing things: for it would not be true to say that many is not one, since the non-existent also is not one. Furthermore, in some cases the contrary predicates [35] seem to follow from the mere19 negations; for example, a thing must be either equal or unequal if it is a multitude or magnitude, and odd or even, if it is a number; similarly, perhaps, what is, if it be a body, must be either at rest or in motion. [979a1] Further, if God and the One do not move, just because the many move by passing into one another, why should not God also move into something else? For he nowhere states that God is one only, but what he says is that there is only one God. But even supposing God were one only, why should not the parts of God move into [5] one another and God himself thus revolve? For he will not, like Zeno, declare that such a One is many. For he himself asserts that God is a body, whether he calls it the universe or by some other name; for if he were incorporeal, how could he be spherical? Again, it would only be possible for him neither to move nor to be at rest if he were nowhere; but since he is a body, what would prevent this body from [10] moving, as has been said?
5 · Gorgias declares that nothing exists; and if anything exists it is unknowable; and if it exists and is knowable, yet it cannot be indicated to others. To prove that nothing exists he collects the statements of others, who in speaking about what [15] is seem to assert contrary opinions (some trying to prove that what is is one and not many, others that it is many and not one; and some that existents are ungenerated, others that they have come to be), and he argues against both sides. For he says that if anything exists, it must be either one or many, and either be ungenerated or have come to be. If therefore, it cannot be either one or many, ungenerated or having [20] come to be, it would be nothing at all. For if anything were, it would be one of these alternatives. That what is, then, is neither one nor many, neither ungenerated nor having come to be, he attempts to prove by following partly Melissus and partly Zeno, after first stating his own special proof that it is not possible either to be or not to be. For, he says, if not being is not being, then what is not would be no less than [25] what is. For what is not is what is not and what is is what is, so that things no more are than are not. But if not being is, then, he argues, being, its opposite, is not; for if not being is, it follows that being is not. So that on this showing, he says, nothing [30] could be, unless being and not being are the same thing. And if they are the same thing, even so nothing would be; for what is not is not, nor yet what is since it is the same as what is not. Such, then, is his first argument.
6 · Now it does not at all follow from what he has said that nothing is. For the proof which he and others attempt is thus refuted: if what is not is, it either is [35] simply, or else it is in a similar sense something that is not. But this is not self-evident, nor a necessary deduction; but if there are, as it were, two things of which one is and the other is not, you can truly say of the former that it is, but not of the latter, because that which is, is existent, but that which is not is non-existent. [979b1] Why, then, is it not possible either to be or not to be? And why should not both or either be possible? For, he says, not being, if not being were, as he thinks, something, would be just as much as being, while no-one allows that not being has any kind of existence. But even if what is not is not, yet it does not follow that what [5] is not is in a similar way to what is; for the former is something that is not, while the latter actually is as well. But even if he could say of it that it is simply (yet how strange it would be to say that what is not is), still granted that it were so, does it any more follow that everything is not rather than is? For the exact opposite seems then to become the consequent; since, if what is not is something that is and what is is something that is, all things are; for both the things which are, and the things which [10] are not, are. For it does not necessarily follow that if what is not is, what is is not. Even if one were to concede the point and allow that what is not is and what is is not, nevertheless, something would be; for the things which are not would be, according to his argument. But if being and not being are the same thing, even so it would not [15] follow that nothing is, rather than that something is. For just as he argues that if what is not and what is are the same thing, what is and what is not alike are not, therefore nothing is; so, reversing the position, it is equally possible to argue that everything is; for what is not is and what is is, therefore everything is.
After this argument Gorgias declares that if anything is, it must either be [20] ungenerated or else have come to be. If it is ungenerated, he assumes by the axioms of Melissus that it is unlimited, and declares that the unlimited cannot exist anywhere. It cannot, he argues, exist in itself, or in anything else (for, on the latter supposition, there would be two unlimiteds, that which is in something else and the something else in which it is); and, being nowhere, it is nothing, according to the argument of Zeno about space. It is not, therefore, ungenerated. Nor, again, has it [25] come to be; for, surely, he argues, nothing could come to be out of either what is or what is not. For if what is were to change, it would no longer be anything that is, just as also, if what is not were to come to be, it would no longer be a thing that is not. Nor, again, could it come to be, save from what is; for if what is not is not, nothing [30] could come to be out of nothing; while on the other hand, if what is not is, it could not come to be out of what is not for that reason. So if anything that is, necessarily either is ungenerated or else has come to be, and these are impossibilities, it is [35] impossible for anything to be.
Further, if anything is, either one or more things must be; if neither one nor more, nothing is. And there cannot be one thing because what is truly one, insofar as it has no magnitude, is incorporeal. (This he adopts from Zeno’s argument.) But if there is not one thing, there will be nothing at all; for if there is not one thing, there cannot be many things. But if there is neither one thing nor many things, he says, there is nothing.20
[980a1] Nor, he says, can anything move. For if it were to move it would no longer be in the same condition, but what is would not be and what is not would have come to be. And further, if it moves and is transferred to a different position, what is, being no [5] longer continuous, is divided, and, where it is divided, it no longer exists; and so, if it moves in all its parts, it is divided in all its parts, and if this is so, it ceases to exist in all its parts. For where it is divided, he argues, there it lacks being; he uses ‘divided’ to mean a void, as is written in the so-called ‘Arguments of Leucippus’.
These are the proofs which he employs to show that nothing exists.…21 For all [10] objects of cognition must exist, and what is not, if it really does not exist, could not be cognized either. But were this so, nothing could be false, not even (he says) though one should say that chariots are racing on the sea. For all things would be just the same. For the objects of sight and hearing are for the reason22 that they are [15] in each case cognized. But if this is not the reason—if just as what we see is not the more because we see it, so also what we think is not the more for that23 (and, were it otherwise, just as in the one case our objects of vision would often be just the same, so in the other our objects of thought would often be just the same) . . . ; but of which kind the true things are is uncertain. So that even if things are, they would be unknowable by us.
[20] But even if they are knowable by us, how, he-asks, could any one indicate them to another? For how, he says, could any one communicate by word of mouth that [980b1] which he has seen? And how could that which has been seen be indicated to a listener if he has not seen it? For just as the sight does not recognize sounds, so the hearing does not hear colours but sounds; and he who speaks, speaks, but does not speak a colour or a thing. When, therefore, one has not a thing in the mind, how will [5] he get it there from another person by word or any other token of the thing except by seeing it, if it is a colour, or hearing it, if it is a noise? For he who speaks does not speak a noise at all, or a colour, but a word; and so it is not possible to think a colour, but only to see it, nor a noise, but only to hear it. But even if it is possible to know things, and to express whatever one knows in words, yet how can the hearer have in [10] his mind the same thing as the speaker? For the same thing cannot be present simultaneously in several separate people; for in that case the one would be two. But if, he argues, the same thing could be present in several persons, there is no reason why it should not appear dissimilar to them, if they are not themselves entirely similar and are not in the same place; for if they were24 in the same place they would be one and not two. But it appears that the objects which even one and the same [15] man perceives at the same moment are not all similar, but he perceives different things by hearing and by sight, and differently now and on some former occasion; and so a man can scarcely perceive the same thing as someone else.
Thus nothing exists; and even if anything were to exist, nothing is knowable; and even if anything were knowable, no one could indicate it to another, firstly because things are not words, and secondly because no one can have in his mind the same thing as someone else. This and all his other arguments are concerned with [20] difficulties raised by earlier philosophers, so that in examining their views these questions have to be discussed.