By November 1963, John Kennedy and his top political advisers were deep in preparations for the 1964 presidential campaign, an election that he looked forward to with confidence. This time there would be no narrow mandate. Given the foundations he had laid, the next four years would allow him to make great strides at home and abroad.
Kennedy had even allowed himself to seriously consider what he would do after his second term was over. He would still be only fifty years old, much too young to retire. He would certainly write his memoirs. He had also given serious thought to starting and editing a new Washington newspaper, staffed with the best newsmen whom he would be certain to attract. And he had already begun discussions with Harvard officials about the establishment of the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, which he believed should be located there.
It was with the upcoming election in mind that Kennedy chose to go to Dallas in the third week of November 1963. It was a decision made despite the warnings of many of his party’s leaders who feared what might happen to the liberal Democratic president in a city that was home to many right-wing extremists. Only a month earlier, Adlai Stevenson had been mobbed and spat upon after delivering a United Nations Day speech to a Dallas crowd. In early November, Byron Skelton, a member of the Democratic National Committee from Texas, had warned that the city simply wasn’t safe for Kennedy and should be avoided. But the man who had narrowly escaped death both during the war and in more than one hospital regarded the threat of assassination as “one of the more unpleasant aspects of the job.” When Senator William Fulbright of Arkansas told him directly, “Dallas is a very dangerous place. … I wouldn’t go there,” and “Don’t you go,” Kennedy responded by stating that if any president ever reached the point where he was afraid to visit any American city, he should immediately resign.
As he rode through Dallas streets in an open convertible and was cheered wildly by thousands of onlookers—an enthusiastic reception reminiscent of the one he had received in Fort Worth the day before—it was obvious that the vast majority of Dallas residents were far from extremists. But at 12:30 p.m. central standard time on November 22, 1963, John Kennedy was struck by two sniper’s bullets and was pronounced dead at 1 p.m. At forty-six, he had become the youngest United States president to die.
As was the case with the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, most people clearly remember where they were when they heard the news of Kennedy’s assassination. His murder elicited an outpouring of emotion rivaled only by that after the assassination of Abraham Lincoln. Adlai Stevenson perhaps put it best when he said, “All of us will bear the grief of his death until the last day of ours.”
Less than an hour after Kennedy was officially pronounced dead, Lee Harvey Oswald, a former U.S. Marine who had defected to the Soviet Union, was arrested for the crime. Two days later, while being transferred from Dallas police headquarters to the county jail, Oswald himself was shot and killed by Dallas nightclub owner Jack Ruby. Arrested and convicted of murder, Ruby successfully appealed the verdict but then became ill and died before a new trial date could be set.
Oswald’s murder and Ruby’s death added to the complexity of the questions that had been on almost all Americans’ minds since the shots had been fired in Dallas. Did Lee Harvey Oswald act alone? If not, who was responsible for John Kennedy’s murder? Although the President’s Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, known unofficially as the Warren Commission, appointed by President Lyndon Johnson to investigate the crime, concluded that Oswald was the lone assassin, public opinion polls continued to indicate that an overwhelming number of Americans believed that Kennedy’s assassination was the result of a criminal conspiracy. A subsequent investigation by the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives came to the same conclusion as the polls. What both the polls and the House committee report also revealed was that among those who believed in a conspiracy theory, there was no agreement on who might have been involved or what their motives might have been. All of which spawned speculations that continue to be raised in books, articles, television documentaries, and private investigations.
Was, for example, Vice President Lyndon Johnson, out of a burning desire to become president, part of a conspiracy to kill Kennedy? Was the KGB, seeking revenge for the way the Soviet Union had been forced to back down during the Cuban missile crisis, responsible for the assassination? Did Fidel Castro, in response to both the Bay of Pigs invasion and American attempts to remove him, arrange the murder of the president? Was the Mafia, outraged at Attorney General Robert Kennedy’s unrelenting war against organized crime or by his brother’s affair with Judith Exner, the mistress of boss Sam Giancana, responsible for Kennedy’s death? Was the assassination the result of a conspiracy hatched by members of the nation’s military-industrial complex who could not tolerate Kennedy’s pursuit of a negotiated peace with the Soviet Union and an end to the cold war?
And there is another question that needs to be asked, one equally intriguing: Even if Kennedy had not been assassinated, would he, despite continual medical advancements, have lived long enough to complete a second term?
It is a legitimate question. To most of the world, Kennedy was the epitome of what he loved to term “vigor” (pronounced “vigah”), a model of glowing health and energy. It was a well-orchestrated lie. The history of illness that had plagued him throughout his childhood remained with him all his life. Kennedy, as a U.S. senator, as a presidential candidate, and as the president, was ill and in pain much of the time. Although the public was never aware of it, the man who projected such health and good humor relied heavily on drugs and pills, needed three hot baths a day, and spent many days in bed.
Much of the public knew that Kennedy had severe back problems. But what wasn’t known was that by the time he was thirty, he had developed a condition so serious that as a congressman on a visit to London in 1947 he became ill enough to receive the last rites of the Catholic Church. The doctor who attended him diagnosed his condition as a failure of his adrenal glands, known as Addison’s disease. At the time, the doctor told one of Kennedy’s friends, “He hasn’t got a year to live.”
While the doctor’s diagnosis of the disease proved correct, his timetable for Kennedy’s demise fortunately proved to be wrong. But for the rest of his life, Kennedy was forced to rely on a variety of strong medications for pain management. By the time he entered the White House, he was regularly taking heavy doses of cortisone both orally and through injection. He also had another form of cortisone implanted in his thighs and replaced several times a year. There is strong evidence that the Kennedy family kept a supply of cortisone in safe deposit boxes around the country and overseas so that he would have access to it wherever he traveled.
As one of his aides recalled, Kennedy “used more pills, potions poultices, and other paraphernalia than would be found in a small dispensary.”
Oddly enough, the man who, as an adult, received the last rites of the Catholic Church four times—and who, according to historian Richard Reeves, was “something of a medical marvel, kept alive by a complicated daily combination of pills and injections”—never let his physical ailments negatively affect the way he conducted his presidency. “He lived with pain,” William Manchester wrote, “though only those who knew him well could tell when he was suffering. … This image was a triumph of will.”
In death, John Kennedy became not only a martyr but also a cultural icon. Less than a week after the events in Dallas, thanks to an interview Jacqueline Kennedy gave to author and journalist Theodore H. White for a Life magazine article, the connection between the romantic Camelot myth and the Kennedy era was born. It remains etched in the public mind, never so eloquently expressed as by White in his book In Search of History. “The Kennedy administration,” he wrote “became Camelot—a magic moment in American history … when great deeds were done, when artists, writers and poets met at the White House, and the barbarians beyond the walls held back.”
The truth of the matter is that John Kennedy needed no myth to earn his place in history. Perhaps more than any other American president, he inspired a nation, symbolizing the hopes and aspirations of people everywhere. And he endowed us with a remarkable enormous legacy that, like the myths that surround him, endures.
Some fifty years after he envisioned it, the Peace Corps can boast of having had more than 210,000 volunteers working in 139 countries, and it is still growing. Although he did not live to see an American step on the moon, it was his vision and his determination that led us to the stars. By attaining the historic Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, he took the first steps toward steering the world away from self-destruction. Ultimately, he initiated the most meaningful civil rights legislation in the nation’s history. And he helped elevate the arts to a position they had never held in America.
For a president who served little more than three years, for a man with considerable physical and moral chinks in his armor, it is an enormous achievement. As William Manchester proclaimed, “[Kennedy’s] death was tragic, but his life had been a triumph, and that is how he should be remembered and celebrated, now.”
In March 1992, Representative Paul Findley of Illinois, wrote in the Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs, “It is interesting. … to notice that in all the words written and uttered about the Kennedy assassination, Israel’s intelligence agency, the Mossad, has never been mentioned.” Two years later in his book Final Judgment, author Michael Collins Piper actually accused Israel of the crime. Of all the conspiracy theories, it remains one of the most intriguing.
What is indisputable is that although it was kept out of the eye of both the press and the public, a bitter dispute had developed between Israeli prime minister David Ben-Gurion, who believed that his nation’s survival depended on its attaining nuclear arms capability, and Kennedy, who was vehemently opposed to it. In May 1963, Kennedy wrote to Ben-Gurion explaining why he was convinced that Israel’s pursuit of nuclear weapons capability was a serious threat to world peace.
May 18, 1963
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I welcome your letter of May 12 and am giving it careful study.
Meanwhile, I have received from Ambassador Barbour a report of his conversation with you on May 14 regarding the arrangements for visiting the Dimona reactor. I should like to add some personal comments on that subject.
I am sure you will agree that there is no more urgent business for the whole world than the control of nuclear weapons. We both recognized this when we talked together two years ago, and I emphasized it again when I met with Mrs. Meir just after Christmas. The dangers in the proliferation of national nuclear weapons systems are so obvious that I am sure I need not repeat them here.
It is because of our preoccupation with this problem that my Government has sought to arrange with you for periodic visits to Dimona. When we spoke together in May 1961 you said that we might make whatever use we wished of the information resulting from the first visit of American scientists to Dimona and that you would agree to further visits by neutrals as well. I had assumed from Mrs. Meir’s comments that there would be no problem between us on this.
We are concerned with the disturbing effects on world stability which would accompany the development of a nuclear weapons capability by Israel. I cannot imagine that the Arabs would refrain from turning to the Soviet Union for assistance if Israel were to develop a nuclear weapons capability—with all the consequences this would hold. But the problem is much larger than its impact on the Middle East. Development of a nuclear weapons capability by Israel would almost certainly lead other larger countries, that have so far refrained from such development, to feel that they must follow suit.
As I made clear in my press conference on May 8, we have a deep commitment to the security of Israel. In addition, this country supports Israel in a wide variety of other ways which are well known to both of us. …
I can well appreciate your concern for developments in the UAR [United Arab Republic]. But I see no present or imminent nuclear threat to Israel from there. I am assured that our intelligence on this question is good and that the Egyptians do not presently have any installation comparable to Dimona, nor any facilities potentially capable of nuclear weapons production. But, of course, if you have information that would support a contrary conclusion, I should like to receive it from you through Ambassador Barbour. We have the capacity to check it.
I trust this message will convey the sense of urgency and the perspective in which I view your Government’s early assent to the proposal first put to you by Ambassador Barbour on April 2.
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy
In his reply to Kennedy, Ben-Gurion defended his country’s development of a nuclear reactor for both peaceful and military purposes and suggested a time when Dimona would be ready for inspection.
Jerusalem, May 27, 1963
Dear Mr. President,
I have given careful consideration to your letter of May 19 and to Ambassador Barbour’s explanation of your policy in the conversations which I have had with him. Let me assure you, at the outset, Mr. President, that our policy on nuclear research and development has not changed since I had the opportunity of discussing it with you in May 1961. I fully understand the dangers involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and I sympathize with your efforts to avoid such a development. I fear that in the absence of an agreement between the Great Powers on general disarmament, there is little doubt that these weapons will, sooner or later, find their way into the arsenals of China and then of various European states and India. In this letter, however, I propose to deal not with the general international aspect on which you express your views so clearly in your letter—but with Israel’s own position and attitude on this question.
In our conversation in 1961, I explained to you that we were establishing a nuclear training and research reactor in Dimona with French assistance. This assistance has been given on condition that the reactor will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes. I regard this condition as absolutely binding, both on general grounds of good faith and because France has extended military assistance of unique value to Israel in her struggle for self-defence, from the Arab invasion of 1948 down to the present day.
In the same sense I informed you in 1961 that we are developing this reactor because we believe, on the strength of expert scientific advice, that within a decade or so the use of nuclear power will be economically viable and of great significance for our country’s development. I went on to add that we should have to follow developments in the Middle East. This is still our position today.
Between us and France there exists a bilateral arrangement concerning the Dimona reactor similar to that which we have with the United States in the reactor at Nachal Sureiq. While we do not envisage a system of formal United States control at the Dimona reactor which the United States has not helped to establish or construct, as in the case of the reactor at Nachal Sureiq, we do agree to further annual visits to Dimona by your representatives, such as have already taken place.
The “start-up” time of the Dimona reactor will not come until the end of this year or early in 1964. At that time, the French companies will hand the reactor over to us. I believe that this will be the most suitable time for your representatives to visit the reactor. At that stage they will be able to see it in an initial stage of operation, whereas now nothing is going on there except building construction.
I hope, Mr. President, that this proposal meets the concern expressed in your letter of May 19.
In 1961, you suggested the possibility that a visit be carried out by a scientist from a “neutral” country. This idea is acceptable to us, but a visit by an American expert would be equally acceptable from our point of view.
I appreciate what you say in your letters, Mr. President, about the commitment of the United States to Israel’s security. While I understand your concern with the prospect of a proliferation of nuclear weapons, we in Israel cannot be blind to the more actual danger now confronting us. I refer to the danger arising from destructive “conventional” weapons in the hands of neighboring governments which openly proclaim their intention to attempt the annihilation of Israel. This is our people’s major anxiety. It is a well-founded anxiety, and I have nothing at this stage to add to my letter of May 12 which is now, as I understand, receiving your active consideration.
Yours sincerely,
D. Ben-Gurion
Kennedy was far from satisfied with Ben-Gurion’s reply, particularly his attempt to stall any inspection in Dimona. In secret, private conversations with the prime minister and in the following letter, Kennedy pressured Ben-Gurion for earlier and more frequent inspections of the nuclear site.
June 15, 1963
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I thank you for your letter of May 27 concerning American visits to Israel’s nuclear facility at Dimona. I know your words reflect your most intense personal consideration of a problem that is not easy for you or for your Government, as it is not for mine.
I welcome your strong reaffirmation that the Dimona will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes. I also welcome your reaffirmation of Israel’s willingness to permit periodic visits to Dimona.
Because of the crucial importance of this problem, however, I am sure you will agree that such visits should be of a nature and on a schedule which will more nearly be in accord with international standards, thereby resolving all doubts as to the peaceful intent of the Dimona project.
Therefore, I asked our scientist to review the alternative schedules of visits we and you have proposed. If Israel’s purposes are to be clear to the world beyond reasonable doubt, I believe that the schedule which would best serve our common purposes would be a visit early this summer, another visit in June 1964, and thereafter at intervals of six months. I am sure that such a schedule should not cause you any more difficulty than that which you have proposed. It would be essential, and I take it that your letter is in accord with this, that our scientist have access to all areas of the Dimona site and to any related part of the complex, such as fuel fabrication facilities or plutonium separation plant, and that sufficient time be allotted for a thorough examination.
Knowing that you fully appreciate the truly vital significance of this matter to the future well-being of Israel, to the United States, and internationally, I am sure our carefully considered request will again have your most sympathetic attention.
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy
On June 16, 1963, Ben-Gurion, who had been Israel’s leader since its inception in 1948, resigned from office. Many believed his resignation was due in great measure to his dispute with Kennedy over Dimona. In a letter to Ben-Gurion’s successor, Levi Eshkol, Kennedy left no doubt as to what the U.S. response would be if “we were unable to obtain reliable information” about the intent of the Dimona project, a threat that, according to one conspiracy theory, led to Israel’s role in Kennedy’s assassination.
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
It gives me great personal pleasure to extend congratulations as you assume your responsibilities as Prime Minister of Israel. You have our friendship and best wishes in your new tasks. It is on one of these that I am writing you at this time.
You are aware, I am sure, of the exchanges which I had with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion concerning American visits to Israel’s nuclear facility at Dimona. Most recently, the Prime Minister wrote to me on May 27. His words reflected a most intense personal consideration of a problem that I know is not easy for your Government, as it is not for mine. We welcomed the former Prime Minister’s strong reaffirmation that Dimona will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes and the reaffirmation also of Israel’s willingness to permit periodic visits to Dimona.
I regret having to add to your burdens so soon after your assumption of office, but I feel the crucial importance of this problem necessitates my taking up with you at this early date certain further considerations, arising out of Mr. Ben-Gurion’s May 27 letter, as to the nature and scheduling of such visits.
I am sure you will agree that these visits should be as nearly as possible in accord with international standards, thereby resolving all doubts as to the peaceful intent of the Dimona project. As I wrote Mr. Ben-Gurion this Government’s commitment to and support of Israel could be seriously jeopardized if it should be thought that we were unable to obtain reliable information on a subject as vital to peace as the question of Israel’s effort in the nuclear field.
Therefore, I asked our scientists to review the alternative schedules of visits we and you had proposed. If Israel’s purposes are to be clear beyond reasonable doubt, I believe that the schedule which would best serve our common purposes would be a visit early this summer, another visit in June 1964, and thereafter at intervals of six months. I am sure that such a schedule should not cause you any more difficulty than that which Mr. Ben-Gurion proposed in his May 27 letter. It would be essential, and I understand that Mr. Ben-Gurion’s letter was in accord with this, that our scientists have access to all areas of the Dimona site and to any related part of the complex, such as fuel fabrication facilities or plutonium separation plant, and that sufficient time be allotted for a thorough examination.
Knowing that you fully appreciate the truly vital significance of this matter to the future well-being of Israel, to the United States, and internationally, I am sure our carefully considered request will have your most sympathetic attention.
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy
In March 1963, Kennedy was invited to attend Operation Sail, an event in which tall sailing ships came to the United States in a spectacular display of bygone days. In accepting the invitation, Kennedy described how important sailing had always been to him and what it had taught him.
From my first race on Nantucket Sound many years ago to my most recent outing as a weekend sailor, sailing has given me some of the most pleasant and exciting moments of my life. It also has taught me something of the courage, resourcefulness and strength required of men who sail the seas in ships. Thus, I am looking forward eagerly to Operation Sail. The sight of so many ships gathered from the distant corners of the world should remind us that strong, disciplined and venturesome men still can find their way safely across uncertain and stormy seas.
John F. Kennedy
No world leader knew the meaning of “stormy” better than Nikita Khrushchev, who had sailed with Kennedy to the brink of nuclear war. On October 10, 1963, Kennedy received the most optimistic communication from Khrushchev that the chairman had ever sent him. For the president, whose thoughts were turning increasingly toward reelection, the long telegram, expressing Khrushchev’s belief that the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty “should become the beginning of a sharp turn toward broad relaxation of international tension” could not have been more welcome. Tragically, it would also be the last letter Kennedy ever received from the Soviet chairman.
MOSCOW, OCTOBER 10, 1963, 6 P.M.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
TODAY IN THE THREE CAPITALS—MOSCOW, WASHINGTON AND LONDON, CARRYING OUT THE FINAL ACT IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDERWATER—THE RATIFICATION INSTRUMENTS OF THE ORIGINAL PARTIES TO THIS TREATY, THE SOVIET UNION, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND GREAT BRITAIN HAVE BEEN DEPOSITED.
THUS THE NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST BAN TREATY HAS COME INTO FORCE. THIS UNDOUBTEDLY IS A SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS WHICH BRINGS JOY TO ALL PEOPLES. TOGETHER WITH THE SOVIET UNION, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND GREAT BRITAIN THE NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST BAN TREATY HAS BEEN SIGNED BY MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED STATES. IT CAN BE SAID WITH ASSURANCE THAT THIS TREATY HAS FOUND WARM RESPONSE AND APPROVAL AMONG ALL PEOPLES OF GOOD WILL.
IT HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY NOTED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF OUR COUNTRIES THAT THE TEST BAN TREATY IS IN ITSELF A DOCUMENT OF GREAT INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE AND THE HOPE HAS BEEN EXPRESSED THAT THE CONCLUSION OF THIS TREATY WILL HAVE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE, ON RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES. ACTUALLY, THE CONCLUSION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST BAN TREATY HAS INJECTED A FRESH SPIRIT INTO THE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE SHOWING THAT NO MATTER HOW COMPLICATED CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, NO MATTER HOW GREAT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOCIAL SYSTEMS OF OUR STATES, WE CAN FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL MANKIND, IN THE INTERESTS OF MAINTAINING PEACE IF WE MANIFEST THE NECESSARY PUSH … TOWARD THIS END.
BUT, IT IS UNDERSTOOD, AGREEMENT ON BANNING EXPERIMENTAL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS WITH ALL ITS IMPORTANCE FOR PEOPLES, IN ITSELF DOES NOT SOLVE THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM OF OUR EPOCH—DOES NOT ELIMINATE THE DANGER OF WAR. NOW IT IS NECESSARY—AND OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE SPOKEN OUT IN FAVOR OF THIS—TO DEVELOP FURTHER THE SUCCESS THAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED, TO SEEK SOLUTIONS OF OTHER RIPE INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS. …
PEOPLES EXPECT THAT OUR GOVERNMENTS WILL NOW MANIFEST STILL MORE PERSISTENCE AND CONSISTENCY IN THEIR FURTHER ACTIVITIES IN THE INTERESTS OF CONSOLIDATING PEACE. SO FAR AS THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS CONCERNED, INALTERABLY FOLLOWING THE COURSE OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE OF STATES, IT IS PREPARED TO EXERT NEW EFFORTS, TO DO EVERYTHING DEPENDENT ON IT IN ORDER THAT THE CHANGE FOR THE BETTER IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION WHICH HAS BEEN NOTED AS A RESULT OF THE CONCLUSION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST BAN TREATY SHOULD BECOME THE BEGINNING OF A SHARP TURN TOWARD BROAD RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION.
PERMIT ME, MR. PRESIDENT, TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR ITS PART WILL MAKE AN APPROPRIATE CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS WHICH IS DEMANDED BY THE INTERESTS OF WEAKENING INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS, THE INTERESTS OF INSURING UNIVERSAL PEACE.
RESPECTFULLY YOURS,
N. KHRUSHCHEV
In the weeks following John Kennedy’s assassination, Jacqueline Kennedy received some one thousand letters of condolence. Hundreds of letters from around the world also poured into the State Department. Many were addressed to Deputy Assistant Secretary Katie Louchheim, who, at the time, held the highest-ranking position in the department ever attained by a woman. Among the letters was the following from the Russian journal Soviet Woman.
November 28, 1963
Katie Louchheim,
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Public Affairs,
State Department,
Washington, D.C.,
U.S.A.
Dear Mrs. Louchheim,
We offer you our sincere condolences on the tragic death of the President of the United States America John Fitzgerald Kennedy, that outstanding statesman.
We Soviet people respected the late President as a man who contributed much towards the solution of disputed issues through negotiation on the international arena and who strove to promote mutual understanding and cooperation between our nations. …
Yours sincerely,
Maria Ovsyannikova
Editor-in-Chief
Journal “Soviet Woman”
Moskva, Kuznetski Most 22.
Another of the letters was sent by Mrs. William Leonhart, wife of the U.S. ambassador to Tanganyika.
Dear Katie:
I am afraid that I have not been able to concentrate on anything since the twenty-second. It still seems unreal. The effect on the Tanganyikans was like one great surge of grief, the President, as you have probably read, wept openly. He called a special session of his cabinet that night and declared Saturday a national day of mourning. Yesterday in his address to the Nation on the second Anniversary of Independence he again paid tribute to our President and the loss to the world. People continue to come in either here or at the Chancery, most just sit, don’t say much, just seem to want us to say it isn’t true.
Sincerely,
Pidge
Typical of the letters from ordinary citizens throughout the globe was the following from La Paz, Bolivia.
30 November 1963
Dear Friend:
With very great grief from the depths of my heart, I am sending you this letter to express my sincere condolences on the tragic death of the late President of the United States, John F. Kennedy.
This death—just when mankind was looking to him for its defense and for the defense of its sacred and inalienable rights, in a truly democratic regime—is a great tragedy for the whole world. My whole country has recognized it as such.
For his most worthy wife, Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy and his adorable children, I pray to God and the Holy Virgin that they be granted Christian consolation and blessings.
Sincerely,
A. Espinosa Schmidt
One of the first letters of condolence was sent to the new American president, Lyndon Johnson, by Nikita Khrushchev.
Moscow,
November 24, 1963
Dear Mr. President:
I am writing this message to you at a moment that holds a special place in the history of your country. The villainous assassination of Head of the American State John F. Kennedy is a grievous, indeed a very grievous loss for your country. I want to say frankly that the gravity of this loss is felt by the whole world, including ourselves, the Soviet people.
There is no need for me to tell you that the late President John F. Kennedy and I, as the Head of the Government of the socialist Soviet Union, were people of different poles. But I believe that probably you yourself have formed a definite view that it was an awareness of the great responsibility for the destinies of the world that guided the actions of the two Governments—both of the Soviet Union and of the United States—in recent years. These actions were founded on a desire to prevent a disaster and to resolve disputed issues through agreement with due regard for the most important, the most fundamental interests of ensuring peace.
An awareness of this responsibility, which I found John F. Kennedy to possess during our very first conversations in Vienna in 1961, laid down the unseen bridge of mutual understanding which, I venture to say, was not broken to the very last day in the life of President John F. Kennedy. For my own part, I can say quite definitely that the feeling of respect for the late President never left me precisely because, like ourselves, he based his policy on a desire not to permit a military collision of the major powers which carry on their shoulders the burden of the responsibility for the maintenance of peace.
And now, taking the opportunity offered by the visit to the United States of my First Deputy A.I. Mikoyan to attend the funeral of John F. Kennedy, I address these lines to you, as the new President of the United States of America in whom is vested a high responsibility to your people. I do not know how you will react to these words of mine, but let me say outright that in you we saw a comrade-in-arms of the late President, a man who always stood at the President’s side and supported his line in foreign policy. This, I believe, gives us grounds to express the hope that the basis, which dictated to the leaders of both countries the need not to permit the outbreak of a new war and to keep the peace, will continue to be the determining factor in the development of relations between our two States.
Needless to say, on our part, and on my own part, as Head of the Government of the Soviet Union, there has been and remains readiness to find, through an exchange of views, mutually acceptable solutions for those problems which still divide us. This applies both to the problems of European security, which have been handed down to the present generation chiefly as a legacy of World War II, and to other international problems.
Judging by experience, exchanges of views and our contacts can assume various forms, including such an avenue as the exchange of personal messages, if this does not run counter to your wishes.
Recently we marked the Thirtieth Anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. This was a historic act in which an outstanding role was played by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. We have always believed that, being a representative of one and the same political party, the late President John F. Kennedy to a certain extent continued in foreign policy Roosevelt’s traditions which were based on recognition of the fact that the coinciding interests of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. prevail over all that divides them.
And it is to you Mr. President, as to a representative of the same trend of the United States policy which brought into the political forefront statesmen, such as Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy, that I want to say that if these great traditions could go on being maintained and strengthened, both Americans and Soviet people could, we are convinced, look optimistically into the future. We are convinced that this development of events would meet the sympathy of every state, and indeed of every individual who espouses and cherishes peace.
I would welcome any desire on your part to express your ideas in connection with the thoughts—though they may, perhaps, be of a somewhat general nature—which I deemed it possible to share with you in this message.
Respectfully,
N. Khrushchev
Writing on “one of the last nights I will spend in the White House,” Jacqueline Kennedy sent Nikita Khrushchev a very special message.
Washington,
December 1, 1963
Dear Mr. Chairman President,
I would like to thank you for sending Mr. Mikoyan as your representative to my husband’s funeral. He looked so upset when he came through the line, and I was very moved.
I tried to give him a message for you that day—but as it was such a terrible day for me, I do not know if my words came out as I meant them to.
So now, in one of the last nights I will spend in the White House, in one of the last letters I will write on this paper at the White House, I would like to write you my message.
I send it only because I know how much my husband cared about peace, and how the relation between you and him was central to this care in his mind. He used to quote your words in some of his speeches—“In the next war the survivors will envy the dead.”
You and he were adversaries, but you were allied in a determination that the world should not be blown up. You respected each other and could deal with each other. I know that President Johnson will make every effort to establish the same relationship with you.
The danger which troubled my husband was that war might be started not so much by the big men as by the little ones.
While big men know the needs for self-control and restraint—little men are sometimes moved more by fear and pride. If only in the future the big men can continue to make the little ones sit down and talk, before they start to fight.
I know that President Johnson will continue the policy in which my husband so deeply believed—a policy of control and restraint—and he will need your help.
I send this letter because I know so deeply of the importance of the relationship which existed between you and my husband, and also because of your kindness, and that of Mrs. Khrushchev in Vienna.
I read that she had tears in her eyes when she left the American Embassy in Moscow, after signing the book of mourning. Please thank her for that.
Sincerely,
Jacqueline Kennedy