Religion in Southeast Asia: An Encyclopedia of Faiths and Cultures

I

ILETO, REYNALDO C.

A leading scholar on religion and anticolonial movements in Southeast Asia, Reynaldo C. Ileto was born in 1946. He has incorporated historiography with literature, discourse analysis and critical theory in analyzing the Philippine revolution, the first anticolonial and pro-independence conflict of the region. His particular focus has been on the revolution from the end of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twentieth centuries. His groundbreaking work, Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840–1910, was cited in 2009 as among the 10 “Most Influential Books on Southeast Asia” by an international body commissioned by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Born and raised in Manila, he earned a bachelor’s degree at the Ateneo de Manila University before pursuing an MA and PhD in history at the Southeast Asia Program of Cornell University in the United States. Ileto held teaching positions at the University of the Philippines, James Cook University, and the Australian National University before taking up a professorship at the Southeast Asian Studies Program at the National University of Singapore (NUS) in 2002. Ileto has also held a number of distinguished positions including the Tañada Chair at De La Salle University (Manila), the Burns Chair in History at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, and senior fellowships at Kyoto University and Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. Following his retirement from the NUS in 2012, Ileto continued to hold an adjunct appointment at the Australian National University.

Ileto analyzes the Spanish and American colonization of the Philippines from a critical, postcolonial perspective. In Pasyon and Revolution (1979), Ileto discussed how Tagalog peasantry engaged with Friar-imposed vernacular Passion epics, and argued that this provided the sentimental and ideological framework on which emancipatory projects of postcolonial nationalism formed “from below” in the nineteenth century. Ileto’s path-breaking contribution was to examine how the trope of Christ’s suffering and sacrifice was seen in terms of local moral-philosophical notions of debt of interiority (utang na loob), empathy (damay), power (kapangyarihan), and light (liwanag). Rising above the narrow-minded exclusionary nationalist historiography of his period, Ileto shifted the focus of emancipatory postcolonial nationalism from the elites to the religious masses.

In the latter part of his career, Ileto is also known for his polemical critique of American orientalist scholarship about the Philippines. Throughout his teaching career, he took seriously his task as a mentor and encouraged the younger generation to pursue serious research on the imperialist discourses that continued to pervade much of postwar scholarship on Philippine history and society. In recognition of his distinguished contributions, he was awarded a number of honors, among which are the Harry Benda Prize, the Ohira Prize, the Philippine National Book Award, and the Fukuoka Asian Culture Prize. In 2012, the Ateneo de Manila University conferred the prestigious Gawad Tanghal ng Lahi award on Ileto in recognition of his contributions to the study of Filipino cultural and social life.

Julius Bautista

See also: Christianity; Colonialism; Education; Morality; Nationalism; Orientalism; Philippines; Postcolonial Theory; Singapore; Study of Religion.

INDONESIA

The Republic of Indonesia (Republik Indonesia) is a country in Southeast Asia, straddling the equator whose capital city, Jakarta, is the most populous city in Southeast Asia. Its neighbor to the north is Malaysia, and to the east is Papua New Guinea. The country has approximately 17,000 islands, of which 6,000 are inhabited; 1,000 of these are permanently inhabited, according to the U.S. Department of State. The country has 33 provinces with over 206 million people in 2000; this increased to 238 million in 2010, of which 51.17 percent are male and 49.83 percent female. Indonesia is the world’s fourth-most populous country after China, India, and the United States. The population distribution of the larger islands are: the island of Sumatra, which covers 25.2 percent of the entire Indonesian territory and is inhabited by 21.3 percent of the population; Java, which covers 6.8 percent of the territory and is inhabited by 57.5 percent of the population; and Papua which covers 21.8 percent of the territory and is inhabited by 1.5 percent of the population.

Indonesia is the country with the largest Muslim population in the world—203 million adherents. Indonesia is followed by Pakistan (174 million), India (161 million), and Bangladesh (145 million). During the last three decades of 1971–2000, Muslims have increased in population. The percentage of Muslims increased from 87.51 percent in 1971 to 88.22 percent in 2000. The percentage of Christians has also increased, from 7.39 percent in 1971 to 8.92 percent in 2000 (Suryadinata et al. 2003). The other religious groups, according to the 2000 census, are Hindus, 1.81 percent; Buddhists, 0.84 percent; and others, 0.20 percent (Suryadinata et al. 2003). Indonesia is a multiethnic society with more than 1,000 ethnic/subethnic groups, but only 15 of these groups reach more than 1 million. The two largest ethnic groups, based on the 2000 census, are Javanese, 41.71 percent; and Sundanese, 15.41 percent. These are followed by Malay, 3.45 percent of the total population; Madurase 3.37 percent; Batak, slightly more than 3 percent; and Minangkabau, 2.7 percent (Suryadinata et al. 2003). Indonesia’s national motto, “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika” (“Unity in Diversity”; literally, “many, but one”), articulates the diversity of ethnicity and cultures, and the understanding of religion that shapes the country.

Muslims bowed in prayer at the Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta. Over the last several decades, the Muslim population has steadily increased in Indonesia. (hasim/iStockphoto.com)

Pribumisasi Islam (Indigenization of Islam) is an attempt to de-ideologize Islam and locate it within the framework of the pluralistic Indonesian society. With pancasila as the national ideology, every socioreligious group has equal right to contribute to the Indonesian state and society with their own values. In this connection, Islam should be one of the complementary components of the state, and Muslims should develop a national consciousness. Pribumisasi encourages the understanding of Islam in accordance with the local context. It affirms that religion that meets the contemporary demands will not be uprooted from the Indonesian culture and tradition.

Bambang Budiwiranto

The popular belief systems in Indonesia before the arrival of Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity were animism and dynamism, which believe that all creatures such as mountains, sea, stone, trees, and human beings have soul and power. Such power sometimes is useful and sometimes is dangerous. Hinduism was introduced to Indonesian at around the second century by Indian traders. Sri Agastya is one of the known leaders who introduced Hindu to the community. The Kingdom of Kutai in East Kalimantan is proof that the influence of Hinduism had existed in Indonesia since the fourth century. Since the eighth century, Hinduism developed in Bali, and until today, Bali is known as the island of gods. The Prambanan temple is one of the known Hindu temples in Yogyakarta. The golden age of the Hindu-Javanese civilization was during the Majapahit Kingdom in the fourteenth century.

Buddhism was brought to Indonesia around the fourth century when Indian traders arrived on the islands of Sumatra, Java, and Sulawesi. Around 423 CE, Monk Gunawarman came to Java to spread Buddhism. One of the known kingdoms that embraced Buddhism was Kaling or Ho Ling which had a woman queen, Ratu Sima. The world’s largest Buddhist monument, Borobudur, was built by the Kingdom of Sailendra, and around the same time, the Borobudur temple also was built. The temple is considered one of the “Seven Wonders of the World.” Many tourists, not only Buddhists or Hindus but also other religious adherents, come to visit these temples every year.

There are several theories about when Islam was introduced to Indonesia. One of them is that Islam came to Indonesia in the seventh century, and it gives the evidence that there is a trader community from the Arab region in Baros village at the coast of North Sumatra. Further, the first kingdom run by Muslims, at around the ninth century, was in Perlak (Hasymy 1993). Another theory explains that Islam came to Indonesia from Gujarat in India, and yet another states that the religion spread through the west coast of Sumatra and then developed to the east in Java in the thirteenth century. This period saw kingdoms being established with Muslim influence, namely Demak, Pajang, Mataram, and Banten. By the end of the fifteenth century, 20 Islam-based kingdoms had been established, reflecting the domination of Islam in Indonesia until the present time, although some of these kingdoms do not have any power. Today, the majority of Muslims live in Java and Sumatra, which comprise almost two-thirds of the total Indonesian population. Around 98 percent of Muslims in Indonesia are Sunni followers. There are other sects such as Syiah and Ahmadiyya.

Woodward (2001) argues that the current phenomena of Indonesian Islamic thought can be classified into five variants: (1) indigenized Islam, in which a group formally identifies itself as Muslim, but in practice, tends to syncretize religion with local cultural systems; (2) the traditional Sunni Islam of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), which highlights the classical, legal, theological and mystical texts, and whose adherents usually come from pesantren (Islamic boarding houses) and rural areas and accept a local culture as long as Islamic values are not contested; (3) the Islamic modernism of Muhammadiyah, which concentrates on modern education and social agendas and rejects mysticism, and whose adherents are mostly from the urban areas; (4) Islamist groups, which promote a highly politicized and anti-Western interpretation of Islam, whose discourse centers on jihad and shari’a law, and who are most commonly found on university campuses and in large urban areas; and, (5) Neo-modernism, which tries to discover an Islamic foundation for many types of modernity including tolerance, democracy, gender equity, and pluralism, and whose adherents are concerned more with Muslim values and ethics than with the law. NU was established in Surabaya in 1926 to strengthen traditional Islam. This organization is seen as traditionalist due to its being supported by people in the rural areas. Pesantren in this classification refers to NU-affiliated pesantren. It has a membership of approximately 40 million (Saeed 2005). Muhammadiyah is an Indonesian Islamic organization representing a reformist socioreligious movement and advocating ijtihad (creative interpretation of the Qur’an and Hadith). The movement, founded in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan in the city of Yogyakarta, is one of the two largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia and has 30 million members (Saeed 2005). Although the leaders and members of Muhammadiyah are often actively involved in shaping the politics in Indonesia, it is not a political party

In terms of the way Indonesian Muslims understand religious texts, there are three categories: literalist, moderate, and progressive/contextualist. The literalist category usually tends to have literal and conservative ideas and to represent Islamist groups. The last category, the progressive/contextualist, refers to the “liberal” orientation, of which the majority of followers are neo-modernist. The moderate category spans the position between the other two. The term “progressive/contextualist” refers to the neo-modernist orientation that usually employs a contextual approach and has a liberal progressive orientation. According to Abdullah Saeed, neo-modernists espouse three dominant ideas:

First, neo-modernists assert that the Qur’an was a text revealed at a certain time and in a certain context and circumstances, which it reflected and responded to. This idea de-emphasises the total “otherness” of the Qur’an that the classical tradition stressed so strongly. Second, they argue that the Qur’an is not exclusively a book of law but an ethical-moral guide, with both particular and universal dimensions. The particular dimension is limited in scope and is essentially a reflection of the context in which the Qur’an was revealed: the cultural, historical and legal aspects directly related to the situation in Arabia at the time. The universal dimensions are related to areas that are not bound by [the] specific context of seventh-century Arabia. The third idea relates to [the] emphasis that classical Muslim scholars placed on certain aspect of the Qur’an, and which neo-modernists argue should be re-thought. (Saeed 2005, 9)

The Neo-modernists, who are committed to the idea that the worth of a human being is measured by the person’s character (Safi 2003), argue that Muslims need to learn and adopt Western advances in education, science, and politics to strengthen and modernize the Muslim community. Neo-modernism combines knowledge and respect for classical learning with receptivity to modern ideas, including Western influences (Barton 1995). Progressive Muslims have produced a growing body of literature that reexamines Islamic tradition and addresses pluralism issues on both theoretical and practical levels (Esposito 1998).They argue that a fresh interpretation of Islamic sources and a reformulation of Islam is urgently needed (Esposito 1998). Based on their philosophies and strategies, it may be suggested that pembaharuan (the movement toward the renewal of Islamic education, doctrine, and practice in order to make them more participatory and inclusive for Muslims in the contemporary society) is closely allied to the philosophy and strategies proposed by activists in the gender equality movement in Indonesia. It is important to note that in this context, the affiliation to various organizations and the orientation of people’s thought do not always coincide. For example, not all people from NU or the Muhammadiyah organization have moderate orientation.

Like other religions, Christianity, both Catholicism and Protestant, was also brought by immigrants, specifically the Portuguese, Dutch, and English, starting from the sixth century. The main areas of mission were in eastern Indonesia, such as in Maluku, North Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara, Papua, and Kalimantan. Later, Christianity spread from the coastal ports of Borneo, and missionaries arrived among the Torajans on Sulawesi. Parts of Sumatra were also targeted, most notably the Batak people, who are predominantly Protestant today (Aritonang 2004). Three provinces in which Protestants make up more than 90 percent of the population are Papua, Ambon, and North.

In terms of the country’s basic religious condition, pancasila, belief in the one and only God, is the first principle of Indonesia’s philosophical foundation. According to the law, the Indonesian constitution guarantees freedom of religion as stated in Article 29: “(1) The State shall be based upon the belief in the One and Only God, (2) The State guarantees all persons the freedom of worship, each according to his/her own religion or belief.” However, the government recognizes only six official religions (Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism). The law requires that every Indonesian citizen hold an identity card that identifies that person with one of these six religions. Indonesia does not recognize agnosticism or atheism, and blasphemy is illegal. Because of that, religious values and the interpretation of religious texts are quite influential aspects on the country’s political, economic, and cultural life. In 1965, there was a conflict between the Indonesian government and the Indonesia Communist Party in which thousands of people were killed. One of the results of this tragedy was that President Suharto issued the New Order law, according to which every citizen has to have an ID card that mentions their religion. This policy impacted on the increasing number of people who converted to one of the six official religions.

Since independence, Indonesia has had the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA), which has the responsibility for tolerance among religious adherents as well as their practices. Many of the state religious schools and universities are under MORA management. At the nongovernmental level, the country has Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) or Indonesian Ulema Council. MUI’s members consist of representatives from religious organizations such as NU, Muhammadiyah, Syarikat Islam, Perti, Al Washliyah, Math’laul Anwar, GUPPI, PTDI, and DMI dan Al Ittihadiyyah. Lately, MUI issued a fatwa about “deviant sects” such as Ahmadiyya and syiah, creating discrimination in the society against these organizations. Another tragedy happened on August 2012, when the local community attacked and burned the residence of a Syiah’s follower. Two people were killed and hundreds lost their houses in that event. Yet another tragedy was the terrorist bombing on October 12, 2002, at a nightclub in Bali that killed more than 200 people, mostly tourists.

Alimatul Qibtiyah

See also: Ahmadiyya; Animism; Atheism/Agnosticism; Buddhism; Christianity; Communism; Hinduism; Islam; Localization of Hinduism in Indonesia; Muhammadiyah; Nahdlatul Ulama; Oka, Gedong Bagus; Pesantren; Shari’a.

Further Reading

Aritonang, S. J. Sejarah Kristen dan Islam di Indonesia. Jakarta: Gunung Mulia, 2004.

Barton, G. “ ‘Neo-Modernism’: A Vital Synthesis of Traditionalism and Modernism in Indonesia Islam.” Studi Islamika 2, no. 3 (1995): 1–75.

Esposito, J. L. Islam and Politics. 4th ed. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1998.

Hasymy, A., ed. Sejarah Masuk dan Berkembangnya Islam di Indonesia. Medan: PT Almaarif. 1993.

Saeed, Abdullah. Approaches to the Qur’an in Contemporary Indonesia, 107–34. London: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Safi, O. Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism. Oxford: Oneworld, 2003.

Suryadinata, L., A. Ananta, E. Arifin, and Nurvidya. Indonesia’s Population: Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; IG Publishing, 2003.

U.S. Department of State. “U.S. Relations with Indonesia.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2748.htm (accessed November 14, 2013).

Woodward, M. “Indonesia, Islam and the Prospect of Democracy.” SAIS Review 21, no. 2 (2001): 29–37.

INTERRELIGIOUS RELATIONS AND DIALOGUE

Most of the Southeast Asian nations have one religion as a significant majority with a scattering of other religious traditions. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei, for instance, are dominated by a large Muslim majority, whereas Thailand and Indochina are predominantly Buddhist in character. The Philippines is mostly Roman Catholic, with a significant minority of Muslims in the island of Mindanao. Further, in all these countries, there are a number of tribes that follow their tribal religious heritages that have not received the national recognition they deserve. In most of these countries, religious and ethnic identities are closely related so that interreligious issues also become interethnic issues.

There were periods of time in Southeast Asian history when religious traditions living side by side in mutual respect and tolerance was taken for granted. But the advent of religions with exclusive claims and evangelistic zeal, and the increased use of religious sentiments for political ends have radically changed the situation, calling for conscious efforts to promote interfaith relations and dialogue.

S. Wesley Ariarajah

By and large, Southeast Asia has had interreligious harmony for much of its postcolonial history. More recently, however, the use of religious or ethnic identities for political purposes has resulted in tensions and conflicts. In response, governments and interested groups in many of the Southeast Asian countries have been making attempts to promote interreligious harmony and dialogue through interfaith forums and conferences.

Malaysia and Singapore are good examples of countries where religious and ethnic identities are closely interrelated such that interethnic issues also become interreligious issues. In Singapore, most of the people of Chinese origin are Confucians, Buddhists, Daoists, or those who had converted to Christianity from these traditions. Those of Indian origin are predominantly Hindus, and those of Malaysian extraction are mainly Muslim. While religious freedom is ensured to all, the government of Singapore has instituted programs to hold these communities together. They serve to promote interreligious, interethnic, or interracial harmony. They are also described as attempts to promote multiculturalism.

Malaysia has had a long period of multicultural and multireligious harmony among its predominantly Muslim population with significant-minority Christian, Buddhist, and Hindu populations. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, some of the political elements in Malaysia began to emphasize the Malay ethnicity and the Islamic character of Malaysia, creating fears and uncertainties among the other ethnic and religious minorities. An example of this tension is the controversy over the Arabic term for God, Allah. Since the name is not a proper name of a God but simply denotes a Higher Being in the Arabic language, it was used by both Christians and Muslims to denote the reality that they called “God.” A faction of the Muslim community began to insist that the term Allah is the word for the God whom Muslims worshipped, and Christians should be barred from using that word. Soon it became a major controversy that had to be dealt with in the courts of law. The notion that Malaysia is a Muslim country that belongs to the Malays was used as a political tool and had some currency for a while. But recognizing the social chaos this can bring in a multireligious nation, the government created a ministerial department to bring about dialogue and understanding between the various ethnic/religious communities so that peace and stability of the country might be preserved. There are also other Christian and Islamic initiatives to promote interfaith relations and dialogue in Malaysia.

At the time when Indonesia became independent from Dutch rule, it had over 85 percent Muslims but with significant Christian, Buddhist, and Hindu populations on its different islands. There was also an attempted Communist revolution that threatened the stability of the nation. The major actors in the postindependence movement, however, were more interested in building a united nation than in building a nation based on an ethnic or religious identity. This was a priority because Indonesia comprises over 17,500 islands of a number of tribes speaking a great variety of languages. The new nation was built by developing a common language, Bahasa Indonesia, and five commonly agreed norms or principles, called pancasila. The five principles, variously translated, comprised of belief in one God, commitment to justice and humanity, nationalism or loyalty to the nation, democracy, and social justice. Under these five principles, Islam, Roman Catholic and Protestant forms of Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism were officially accepted as the religious traditions of Indonesia. Even though many other tribal and ethnic religious practices persist, accepting these four religions officially resulted in interreligious harmony in the nation. Recently, some political elements made an attempt to radicalize the Islamic community with the call to declare Islam as the official religion of Indonesia. The attempt to radicalize the Muslim community resulted in periodic conflicts where some Christians and churches came under attack. But the program of the radical elements did not receive wide support. The principles of pancasila and the continued government recognition of the multireligious reality of Indonesia have helped the nation to hold together. There are also a number of institutions that seek to promote Christian-Muslim dialogue in Indonesia. The Institute for Interfaith Dialogue in Indonesia (INTERFIDEI), established in 1991, has regular programs of education, research, and publications that focus on interfaith relations.

Thailand, which is among the few Asian countries that did not come under Western colonization, remains 97 percent Theravada Buddhist but with minority presence of all other religious traditions such as Christianity, Islam, Mahayana Buddhism, and a number of tribal religions. Historically, there had been periodic tension between successive kings of Thailand and Roman Catholic missions. The country was sometimes closed and other times open to Christian missionary work from outside. Buddhism is the official religion of Thailand today, even though there is religious freedom for the other minority religions. Christian missionary activity continues to raise tension from time to time. At one point, there was organized Buddhist opposition to attempts at indigenization by Christian churches. They were seen as ploys toward evangelization and were opposed on the ground that it would lead to confusion and deception.

When the borders of Thailand as a state were defined, it included a significant number of Muslims with a Malay Islamic heritage in its southern region. Despite many attempts to integrate them, the Muslim community in the south has maintained their identity. In the 1960s, this group was radicalized and began to advocate for a separate state for the Muslim minority, leading to conflict with government forces. More recently, there have been clashes between Buddhists and Muslim groups in the south of the country, leading to the call to pay greater attention to interfaith relations and the political issues behind them. Some of the Thai Buddhist leaders have been in the forefront in the international scene in Buddhist-Christian dialogues and in conversations on “engaged Buddhism” that call Buddhism to be more engaged on questions of social justice and human rights.

Human and political rights are also the main issues in neighboring Myanmar (Burma), which had a prolonged civil war since its independence in 1948 resulting in military dictatorship since 1962. Nearly 90 percent of Myanmar’s population are Theravada Buddhists. However, 4 percent of the population are Christians, and another 4 percent, perhaps 6 percent, are Muslims. The military dictatorship recognizes Buddhism as the religion of the nation but keeps it under its strict surveillance. Muslims and Christians, whose identities are closely identified with tribal identities, and the other tribal religions see themselves as suppressed minorities. Opportunities for interfaith relations are limited.

Buddhism is also the dominant religion in the Indochina nations of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Historically, from about the first century BCE, Hinduism from India had spread into most of Southeast Asia, leaving its cultural heritage in Thailand, Myanmar, all of Indochina, and Indonesia. Even today, the island of Bali in Indonesia remains Hindu in character, and there are large ruins of ancient Hindu temples in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The Theravada school of Buddhism eventually established itself in Laos and Cambodia as the majority religious tradition. Vietnam, with the influx of Chinese from mainland China, has a mixture of Mahayana Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism; although after its Communist history, most Vietnamese today may claim that they have no religious affiliation. With the arrival of the French in Indochina, Roman Catholicism also found significant expression. Today one can encounter most forms of Christianity as small minorities. Cambodia hosts a number of interfaith events and has an active interfaith group that seeks to promote understanding and harmony among the religious communities. Interreligious relations, however, has not been a major priority in Indochina, which has until recently been experiencing great turmoil at the political front.

The religious situation of the Philippines, also a nation made up of islands, was dominated by tribal religions in its early history. From the thirteenth century, however, Islam began to exert its influence from Malaysia and Indonesia. The arrival of the Spanish from the sixteenth century resulted in the Philippines gradually becoming the only Christian-majority country in Asia, with nearly 80–85 percent of the population embracing the Roman Catholic faith. Eventually many other forms of Christianity also found expression, and there is freedom of practice for all religions. The second-largest island of the Philippines, Mindanao, in the eastern part of the country, however, remained predominantly Islamic and refused to accept its incorporation into the modern state of the Philippines. The armed struggle for the independence of Mindanao from the Philippines has also taken the form of conflict between Christians and Muslims. A number of Christians and Muslims seek to separate the political struggle from its religious dimensions and work toward promoting Christian-Muslim relations. Both in the capital, Manila, and inside Mindanao, organizations set up by Christians and Muslims seek to promote interfaith relations and solidarity across the political divide.

It is important to recognize that in all these Southeast Asian countries, there is an ongoing “Dialogue of Life” in which people relate to each other easily across the religious divides. Further, since Buddhism, which is the majority religion in a number of countries, is nonexclusive and is practiced more as a way of life and a cultural home rather than a religion with clearly defined doctrines, interfaith relations in these countries has not been a problem.

It is significant that unlike in other parts of Asia and the world, in a number of the Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Cambodia, the governments themselves take initiatives or even set up government departments to promote interfaith relations. This has mainly to do with the fact that, as stated earlier, religious and ethnic or racial identities are closely related and interreligious conflicts can easily turn into interethnic conflicts that would have wider implications for the nation and in the region. Further, in most of these countries, some of the religious minorities are economically more powerful than their numerical strength suggests. Holding the diverse religions in harmony, therefore, is a priority national interest to the governments concerned.

Even though there are no robust interfaith movements in the Southeast Asian countries, they are fully involved in the regional and global interfaith movements such as the Asian and the World Conference on Religion and Peace, the Parliament of World’s Religions, and the dialogue initiatives taken by the regional Buddhist organizations, the Christian Conference of Asia, and the Roman Catholic Federation of Asian Bishops Conference. Thai, Cambodian, and Vietnamese leaders often represent the Buddhist religious tradition in international dialogue forums because they represent the earliest forms of Buddhism, unlike the North and North Eastern Mahayana traditions. Indonesian Muslims are increasingly recognized in international interfaith conferences as representatives of the largest Islamic nation in the world that also presents a face of Islam as distinct from the Islam in the Middle East. A number of universities in the United States and Europe have interfaith initiatives and exchange programs in which Southeast Asian religious traditions actively participate.

Despite the periodic tensions and conflicts incited by radical elements and the low intensity wars for independence in some parts of its nations, Southeast Asia, on the whole, has a record of good relations among its peoples of different religious traditions.

S. Wesley Ariarajah

See also: Buddhism; Cambodia; Christian Conference of Asia; Christianity; Colonialism; Communism; Confucianism; Daoism (Taoism); Engaged Buddhism; Ethnicity; Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conferences; Hinduism; Human Rights; Indonesia; Islam; Koyama, Kosuke; Laos; Malaysia; Minorities; Myanmar (Burma); Nationalism; Oka, Gedong Bagus; Philippines; Religion and Society; Religious Discrimination/Intolerance; Singapore; Vietnam.

Further Reading

“Engaged Practice” (resources). http://www.dharmanet.org/lcengaged.htm (accessed September 20, 2014).

Islam, Syed Serajul. The Politics of Islamic Identity in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Cengage Learning Publications, 2004.

Leinmeyer, Cindy. “Religion Southeast Asia.” http://www.niu.edu/cseas/outreach/pdfs/origins_religion.pdf (accessed September 20, 2014).

Ong, Aiwah. “The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia.” Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia, July 30, 2005.

ISLAM

Islamization of Southeast Asia

Islam is a religion revealed to the Prophet Muhammad and its teachings are rendered to the Qur’an. About 250 million people in Southeast Asia embraced Islam and live in the “Muslim archipelago” of Indonesia, Malaysia, South Thailand, and the southern Philippines.

Muslims offer prayers as they gather against violence carried our by suspected separatist militants in Narathiwat on February 7, 2014. More than 5,900 people, mainly civilians, have been killed in the conflict waged by insurgents seeking greater autonomy from Buddhist-majority Thailand, which annexed the region a century ago. (Madaree Tohlala/Getty Images)

During the 1970s and 1980s, the Indonesian New Order attempted to restrict political Islam due to its insistence on establishing an Islamic state. The programs of the New Order included the introduction of a “Marriage Law” to remove Islamic law from the domain of Muslim marriage and divorce. The military was summoned to suppress religious extremists. The government affirmed that pancasila, and not Islam, would be the sole basis for political parties and mass organizations.

Bambang Budiwiranto

Islam was brought to Southeast Asia by Muslim traders from the Arabian world and India in the seventh century. The Sufi teachers intensified the Islamization process after the twelfth century. They introduced Islam to rulers, married with their families and achieved political power. Pasai became the first Muslim kingdom in Sumatra in 1300, followed by Malacca in the 1400s. These kingdoms accelerated Islamization in inland areas.

Compared to Africa and the Arab Peninsula, Islam in Southeast Asia has distinctive characteristics. First, Islam was spread by using the method of penetration pacifique toward the people and there was almost no conquest that was common in the Arab Peninsula. Second, Islam in Southeast Asia is the least Arabicized version of the religion. The Muslim priests presented Islam to the people by stressing the suitability of Islam for local cultures and by avoiding any radical changes in belief and religious practices. It was Islamic mysticism that facilitated the mixture of Islam with pre-Islamic cultural forms.

The Portuguese occupation of Malacca in 1511 caused an interruption in the Islamization process. The Muslims had to spread their faith in the other parts of the archipelago. In Java, the spread of Islam was associated with Wali Sanga, such as Sunan Kalijaga of the Demak kingdom that replaced the Majapahit kingdom in 1527. The Mataram Sultanate of Yogyakarta encroached upon Java, and its ruler, Sultan Agung, sought religious legitimation from the authorities in Mecca. In the fourteenth century, some sultanates established themselves in the southern Philippines. In 1500, the Islamic societies in Sumatra, Java, Sulawesi, and Moluccas were established, and ethnic groups such as the Cham in Cambodia and Arakanese in Myanmar were converted to Islam.

When Sufi teachers came to the archipelago in the seventeenth century, they stressed the importance of the Islamic legal aspect. They became religious advisers for sultans such as Nurruddin Al-Raniri and Sultan Iskandar Muda of Aceh. They urged the sultans to implement the Islamic law. They also wrote books on aqa’id, fiqh, and tasawwuf, influencing the development of Islam.

The Era of Colonialism

With the exception of the southern Philippines and South Thailand, Islam was, by and large, co-opted and controlled by colonialism. In Malaya, the British applied the noninterference policy in religious affairs. The British left the control of religion and customs to sultans and regional chiefs. However, the British broke its policy and the British law was enacted as the law for the Malay states after the establishment of Straits Settlements (Penang, Singapore, and Malacca) in 1826. The Malay sultan continued in the office, but his power was controlled by the British Residents who acted through legislative councils, and the sultan had to adhere to their “advice.” The Residents regulated Islam only related to public affairs. The effect was to secularize the state and to divorce religion from state functions.

Pan-Islamism and local revolts waged under the banner of Islam caused the Dutch to apply a special policy on Indonesian Islam. The Dutch distinguished between Islam as religion and Islam as politics. The former dealt with rituals such as prayers, fasting, and pilgrimage to Mecca. This “Islam” was tolerated because it would not endanger Dutch colonialism. However, “political Islam” was repressed.

The Dutch also implemented “the reception theory,” in which Islam was allowed legal consequence only to the extent permitted by adat (local custom). Islam was subordinated to local culture. In 1882, the Dutch issued “priest-court regulation,” administering family law such as marriage in Java and Madura. The policy on performing hajj, however, had a positive impact on Islam. Muslims absorbed Islamic modernism and spread it to Indonesia. Muhammadiyah, established in 1912, was inspired by Islamic modernism. It focused on social and religious renewal.

In 1565, Spain interrupted the expansion of Islam in the Philippines and transformed it into a Christian nation. For about 300 years, the Spaniards failed to impose their rule over the southern Philippine Muslims (Moro) except to demand the acceptance of Spanish sovereignty by Sultan Sulu in Jolo and some datus (heads of clans) of the southern Mindanao. The United States replaced Spain as the colonial power in the Philippines in 1898, and, as the armed struggle of the Moro people diminished, they gradually recognized the American power. The American colonialism tried to integrate Muslims under the Philippines government. The Moro people refused the plan and asked the United States not to include Mindanao and Sulu in the Philippines. Although America allowed Muslims to observe their religion, it promoted the de-Islamization of the Moro people’s way of life.

The Era of Postcolonialism

Islam became Malaysia’s official religion, and the rulers of the state are the guardians of Islam and of Malay customs. Although Muslims constitute only half of the population, Malaysia is a Muslim country. The Malays are identified as Muslims. Those from non-Malay ethnic background, whenever they become Muslims, are said to become Malay (masok Melayu).

Unlike Partai Islam se-Malaysia (PAS), which strives for the implementation of the shari’a law, UMNO, the ruling party, is concerned with Malay nationalism. After the 1969 riot in which rural people demanded equal position in economy, UMNO’s concern shifted. It implemented the New Economic Policy (NEP) to increase the opportunity of Malays and bumiputera for them to participate in economic activities. This policy also emphasized the promotion of Malay culture and Islam.

The demands from PAS, ABIM, and a new generation have encouraged the government to promote Islamization in Malaysia. The government uses Islamic symbols and rhetoric and relates them to its political programs. The government has equated Islam with modern values, established Islamic institutions, and increased its involvement in Islamic international forums. The government co-opted young leaders of ABIM by incorporating them into the government body. It also co-opted the opposition (PAS) by implementing Islamization programs in economic and social aspects.

By defending its pluralistic society, Malaysia is still able to become a Muslim state. It maintains Chinese and Indian ethnic cohesion and, at the same time, supports Islamization and Malay identity. Compared to other Muslim countries in the Middle East, Malaysia recognizes and tolerates with ease the rights of the minority groups.

Indonesia

Islam is not the state ideology of Indonesia, although Muslims constitute a majority in the country. This sparked a debate among the Muslim leaders who led the war against the government. Darul Islam proclaimed an Islamic state in West Java, Aceh, and South Sulawesi in the 1940s. During the period of parliamentary democracy in the 1950s, the religion-based political parties brought back the idea of an Islamic state. However, this effort failed and caused antagonistic relation between Islam and the state.

During his regime (1968–1998), Suharto contained “political Islam” and forced Islamic political parties to fuse into one party (PPP) and to adopt pancasila as their ideology. This caused the marginalization of Islam from national politics. In the 1970s, young intellectual Muslims promoted cultural Islam that revitalized the religion through nonpolitical activities such as intellectual, educational, and social transformation. This movement was easily accepted by Muslims and the state. In the 1990s, the government began to accommodate Islam by sponsoring activities such as the establishment of the Muslims Intelligentsia Association and Islamic banks. The government also recruited Muslim leaders as state officials. This was the honeymoon period between Indonesian Islam and the state.

Islamic political parties flourished after the fall of Suharto in 1998. Although they participated in the 1999, 2004, and 2009 general elections, they never won. The nationalist parties such as PDIP and Demokrat, who supported non-Islamic issues, won the elections. Although Islam played an important role in social life, Muslims channeled their political preference to non-Islamic parties. This showed that Islamic issues were not attractive to Muslim voters. Islamic political parties formed a coalition with Demokrat both in parliament and the government.

The Southern Philippines

The Philippine government tried to integrate the Moro people into the educational and legal system but neglected the reality that Islam had an important place in the Moros’ way of life. It also induced the migration of Christian people to the South. As a result, the Moros became a minority and are marginalized.

In the 1950s, Muslims from the Middle East came to the region to teach Islam. They also sent young Moros to pursue university studies in Egypt. This raised the Moro people’s awareness about their local situation. The Moros’ refusal to the integration programs caused the government to intensify its discrimination and repression programs. In 1968, the army massacred young Moro recruits in Corregidor Island. This was followed by the killing of Muslims in Cotabato, Lanao, and Zamboanga. Such repression triggered the emergence of secession among the Moro people as the best way to maintain their cultural and religious identity. Under the leadership of Nur Misuari, the Moros established the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and conducted an open war after President Marcos declared martial law in 1972. The Tripoli agreement that recommended autonomy for the Moros was signed by MNLF and the government. Instead of implementing the autonomy, the government conducted a plebiscite referendum.

The government appeased the Muslims by allowing them to hold positions in the bureaucracy, formulating an educational system that accommodated Islamic identity, enacting family law and building centers of Islamic studies in Mindanao State University and University of the Philippines. In the 1980s, the government improved the madrasah (Islamic school) system and recognized Islamic holidays. The government also granted autonomy to 10 provinces in the framework of national unity. The Moderate Muslims who were satisfied with the solutions joined the government, including Salipada Pendatum, who then formed the Muslim Association of the Philippines (MUSAPHIL).

Nur Misuari, the Moro leader, prepared Moro graduates from Arab universities as the new MNLF generation. They were exposed to radical movements in the Arab world during their study. Other secessionist organizations emerged such as MILF (the Moro Islamic Liberation Front) and its Abu Sayyaf faction. These groups aim at establishing an Islamic state by means of armed struggle. The government cracked down on MILF in 2000, and a peace talk between the government and MILF was held in 2001.

South Thailand

The Muslims in Patani, Narathiwat, Yala, and Saiburi of Thailand have struggled for long to maintain their Islamic and cultural identity. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the Thai government has launched an assimilation policy requiring Muslims to adopt the Thai way of life. In 1938, the Phibun Songkhram regime compelled the Muslims to use the Thai language and adopt Thai names and customs, and it banned the Islamic family law and traditional dress. The Muslims were also restrained from holding bureaucratic positions.

The Muslims opposed the policy and signed a petition in 1947 to demand autonomy for their provinces. This petition proposed that Muslims should have their leader, Malay should be recognized as a formal language and used in pondok (Islamic boarding schools), the Islamic law should be implemented, and all revenues should be allocated to the local people. In response, the government detained Haji Sulong, an Islamic Religious Council president, and repressed Muslims, forcing them to become refugees in Malaysia. This move stimulated protest from Malaysia and Singapore. Haji Sulong finally was sentenced to seven years in jail, but served only three and a half years. In 1954, Haji Sulong mysteriously disappeared together with his oldest son and other three followers.

The Phibun regime changed the policy, recognized religious freedom, permitted the use of Malay in schools, and appointed a Muslim as an adviser to the government on Islamic affairs. However, in the 1960s, the government gave land to the Thai people who were migrating to the south. This was to marginalize the Muslims and to increase the presence of Thai immigrants in the region.

The Muslim community was dissatisfied with the government that treated them violently. This caused the rise of separatist organizations such as Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) that aim at establishing an Islamic state. Led by young intellectuals, PULO has networks in Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and West Asia and a guerilla training center in the Middle East. It conducted military operations in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat. Although PULO has support from the Islamic conference organization, many view the Pattani problem as a Thai domestic affair.

The Radicalism Issue

The 2002 Bali bombing that happened in the Muslim archipelago, which was dominated by tolerant Muslims, shocked the world. The event caused concern that Southeast Asia would be the emergent hotbed of the international terrorism network. In relation to its global war on terror, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Cambodia cooperated with the United States and allowed their troops to battle with terrorist suspects. Indonesia and Thailand, however, would not cooperate with the United States in combating terrorist suspects.

Initially, Indonesia did not believe that terrorist suspects existed in the country. However, after members of the Malaysia Militant Group and Jamaah Islamiyyah (JI) were detained by Malaysia and Singapore, Indonesia arrested Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. He was accused of having connections with the Bali Bombing suspects who had links with Al-Qaeda. Ba’asyir was also accused of leading the Indonesian JI. Currently, Indonesia has an antiterror special force that has raided terrorist suspects in Java, Sulawesi, and Sumatra.

Radical movements, however, do not represent Islam in Southeast Asia. They are led by the Afghan war veterans and linked to the international terrorism network that uses Islamic fundamentalism as an ideology.

Bambang Budiwiranto

See also: Ahmadiyya; Aisyiyah and Nasyiatul Aisyiyah; Alatas, Syed Hussein; Attas, Syed Muhammad Naquib al-; Colonialism; Feminism and Islamic Traditions; Fundamentalism; Indonesia; Maarif, Ahmad Syafi’i; Malaysia; Minorities; Muhammadiyah; Muslimat NU; Nahdlatul Ulama; Pesantren; Philippines; Pilgrimage; Rais, Muhammad Amien; Shari’a; Siddique, Muhammad Abdul Aleem; Sisters in Islam; Sufism; Thailand; Wahid, Abdurrahman; Wali Sanga (Wali Songo).

Further Reading

Azra, A. The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia: Network of Malay-Indonesian and Middle Eastern Ulama in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries. Crow Nests, NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2004.

Drewes, G. J. W. “New Light on the Coming of Islam to Indonesia?” In Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia, edited by A. Ibrahim, S. Siddique, Y. Hussein, et al., 7–19. Singapore: ISEAS, 1985.

Esposito, J. L., and J. O. Voll. Islam and Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Hefner, R. W. “South-East Asia from 1910.” In The New Cambridge History of Islam, edited by F. Robinson, vol. 5, The Islamic World in the Age of Western Dominance, 591–622. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Hooker, M. B., ed. Islam in South-East Asia. Leiden and New York: Brill, 1988.

Houben, V. J. H. “Southeast Asia and Islam.” ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 588 (2003): 149–70.

Majul, C. A. The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines. Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, 1985.

Noer, D. “Contemporary Political Dimension of Islam.” In Islam in South-East Asia, edited by M. B. Hooker, 183–215. Leiden and New York: Brill, 1988.

Ricklefs, M. C. “Islamization in Java: Fourteenth to Eighteenth Centuries.” In Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia, edited by A. Ibrahim, S. Siddique, and Y. Hussein, et al., 36–43. Singapore: ISEAS, 1985.