Religion in Southeast Asia: An Encyclopedia of Faiths and Cultures

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MAARIF, AHMAD SYAFI’I

Ahmad Syafi’i Maarif is a leading Indonesian thinker who had served as the chairman of Muhammadiyah, one of the largest organizations in the country. Born in 1935 in West Sumatra, Indonesia, through his family and schooling, he had become acquainted with the teachings of reformed Islam. Even as a devout Muslim deeply rooted in his religious tradition, he became convinced that the peaceful coexistence of humankind was the aim of true religion. While conferring on him, in 2008, the Ramon Magsaysay Award for Peace and International Understanding, the Magsaysay Committee commended Syafi’i’s role in guiding Muslims to embrace tolerance and pluralism as the basis for justice and harmony in Indonesia and in the world at large.

As an idealistic young man growing in the young nation of Indonesia, Syafi’i worked initially with the Islamic party of Masyumi. During this period, he was committed to the radical view of establishing an Islamic state, and he wrote a number of articles espousing these views. As democratic forces receded in that country, Masyumi was dismantled and Sukarno ascended to almost absolute power; the space for freedom and democracy, however, was severely restricted. Syafi’i went to the United States for higher studies where he met the Pakistani reformist thinker Fazlur Rahman who was then a lecturer at the University of Chicago. Rahman, perhaps more than any other person, influenced his subsequent political and religious thinking. Enamored by the depth of Rahman’s knowledge and his deep commitment, Shafi’i discarded his fundamentalist views and became convinced that Islam can be the path of peaceful coexistence with fellow human beings.

Syafi’i returned to Indonesia a transformed man. He became an advocate of Islamic pluralism that affirmed that his country’s model of pancasila—in which both believers in all religions and nonbelievers as well could participate—alone is viable to guide the society forward in the path of peace and justice. As a keen student, he was also determined to probe the spiritual and philosophical roots of the backwardness of his people. He realized that poverty bred radicalism and therefore, a commitment to social justice—and not any vague notion of the establishment of a religious state—should be the concern of faith communities. He was particularly critical of the way religious symbols were exploited for material benefits. In this context, he saw young people as the greatest hope to foster tolerance and in combatting the forces of bigotry.

While Syafi’i had his critics, he soon rose to be one of the leading religious and social thinkers of Indonesia. As the three-decade-long dictatorship ended and the country was posed on a process of democratization in the 1980s, he assumed the leadership of Muhammadiyah with around thirty millions members and supporters. As the chairman of Muhammadiyah during the tumultuous 1990s, he led the civil society in the path of moderation, tolerance and pluralism.

Despite his immense popularity in Indonesia, Maarif stayed away from political office. He founded the Maarif Institute for Culture and Humanity as an organization that is rooted in Islamic values and promotes interreligious dialogue and cooperation. He is also a Senior Lecturer at the Yogyakarta State University in Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

Jesudas M. Athyal

See also: Fundamentalism; Indonesia; Interreligious Relations and Dialogue; Islam; Muhammadiyah; Rais, Muhammad Amien; Secularism.

MALAYSIA

Malaysia was formed in 1963 when peninsular Malaya, which gained independence from Britain in 1957, was joined with Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore in 1963 (with Singapore departing the federation in 1965). Sabah and Sarawak are commonly referred to as East Malaysia, whereas peninsular Malaysia is referred to as West Malaysia. The capital city of Malaysia is Kuala Lumpur.

A census in 2010 found that Malaysia had a population of 28.3 million, of which 71 percent live in urban areas. According to that census, the majority ethnic group was Bumiputera, at 67.4 percent. Translated, Bumiputera means “sons of the soil,” and this category is in turn composed of Malays, who constitute 63.1 percent of the total population; and an array of aboriginal groups, among the largest of which are Ibans, who constitute 30.3 percent of Sarawak, and Kadazan/Dusun, who make up 24.5 percent of Sabah. Malaysians with Chinese ancestry make up 24.6 percent of the population, and those with Indian ancestry 7.3 percent of the population.

The largest religious group in Malaysia is Muslims, at 61.3 percent of the population. Other religious groups include Buddhists (19.8 percent), Christians (9.2 percent), and Hindus (6.3 percent). Also present is what is sometimes referred to as Daoism or Confucianism, or “Chinese traditional belief.” While there is a high degree of correlation between ethnic and religious affiliations so that it is a common assumption that Malays practice Islam, most Indians practice Hinduism, and the Chinese practice Christianity or Buddhism, it is also the case that the ethnic and religious identities overlap. There are, for example, large numbers of Malaysians with Chinese and Indian ancestry who are Muslim, which is the religion associated with the Malay ethnic group. Islam is also the official religion of Malaysia; however, other religions including Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Sikhism have vibrant communities as well as religious festivals officially recognized as holidays.

Bangladeshi Muslims living in Malaysia offer a prayer during the first day of Eid al-Fitr, which marks the end of the fasting month of Ramadan in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. (AP Images/Lai Seng Sin)

There has been a strong tradition of interreligious camaraderie, such as when the end of Ramadan (known as Hari Raya) coincides with Deepavali or Chinese New Year, which constitute the portmanteau celebrations of Kongsi Raya and Deepa-Raya, respectively. Malaysia is also host to one of the largest celebrations of the Hindu festival of Thaipusam, which draws to the Batu Caves temple in Selangor thousands of participants, many from overseas.

Islam in Malaysia

Politically, Islam is the most salient religion. According to historians, Islam was introduced to the Malay Peninsula in the fifteenth century as a result of Muslim traders from India, Persia, and South Arabia who conducted their business in trading ports in Southeast Asia including Malacca. Conventionally, Malacca is said to have been settled by inhabitants of present-day Singapore, who fled to what became Malacca around 1400. The leader, Paramesvara, was likely to have been of the Hindu faith but converted to Islam upon his marriage to the daughter of a ruler from Sumatra, who had himself converted to Islam.

While in Islam, a fatwa may be regarded as a legal opinion or declaration, in Malaysia, fatwas have the force of law. According to the Federal Territories Syariah Criminal Offences Act of 1997, any Muslim who gives, propagates, or disseminates any opinion concerning Islamic teachings, Islamic law, or any issue, contrary to any fatwa shall be guilty of an offense. Punishments include fines, jail, or both. However, because shari’a law is a state matter and not a federal matter, a fatwa in one state may not be in effect elsewhere. Malaysians can find out about fatwas in effect in different states through the official online government “e-Fatwa portal.”

Julian CH Lee and Caryn Lim

Because Islam is embedded in the settlement myth at the root of Malaysia, and because it is so closely associated with the majority ethnic group of the country, in contemporary Malaysia, Islam has played significant roles in the social, political, and legal realms. Legitimacy of this presence is founded, according to some, in the mention of it in the constitution of Malaysia. Article 3 of Malaysia’s constitution states that “Islam is the religion of Federation.” It goes on to state that “other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation.” Furthermore, the constitutional definition of a Malay person is someone who, in addition to being a person who speaks the Malay language and who “conforms to Malay custom,” also “professes the religion of Islam.”

Other Religions

Whereas on the whole, Muslims constitute the majority in population, in the East Malaysian states of Sarawak and Sabah, Christianity is significantly represented, with about 38 percent and 33 percent of the populations identifying as Christian, respectively. The dominance of Islam in terms of both presence and political power is thus much less pronounced. In comparison with peninsular Malaysia, the different religious milieu in Sabah and Sarawak may be attributed to the divergent histories of migration and the significant indigenous population in this region. Christian missionaries who arrived with European colonialists from the sixteenth century onward successfully proselytized many indigenous groups in Sabah and Sarawak, whose traditional beliefs are often described by Christianity as animistic. According to the 2010 census, less than 2 percent of the population today fit into the category of religion that combines what are labeled “folk” or “tribal” religions with Chinese religions such as Daoism and Confucianism.

In the context of the significant political and legal impacts of Islam in Malaysia (described in further detail below), a number of organizations have sought to protect the interests of non-Muslim Malaysians and have called for greater interfaith dialogue and cooperation. Of particular significance is an umbrella body that seeks to represent their interests in the social and political arenas—the Malaysian Consultative Council for Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism and Taoism (MCCBCHST). This council has been vocal in advocating for improved recognition of the rights of non-Muslims in Malaysia and arguing against an array of circumscriptions placed on non-Muslims including restrictions on the construction of places of worship, the translation of religious texts into the Malay language, and on the above-mentioned ability for Malaysians to officially convert from Islam to another religion.

Religion and Politics

Religion and politics are increasingly intertwined in Malaysia, owing in part to the above-noted correlations between ethnic and religious identities and to the often sectarian nature of political groups. Regularly contested are a number of issues that appear related to the bearing of Islam on state and society. These include the position of Islam as provided for in the constitution, the secular organization of the state, and the application of shari’a law and its effects on non-Muslims.

The meaning of the constitutional mention of Islam is contested. Some Malaysians espouse a greater formal role for Islam in society and argue that these and other constitutional mentions mean that the tenets and values of Islam should guide and inform Malaysian society, government, and law. Proponents of this view would include an array of Islamic civil society groups, Parti Islam SeMalaysia (the Islamic Party of Malaysia), and, increasingly, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), from which Malaysia’s prime ministers have all come. Among their arguments is that Article 3 of the constitution is not a meaningless article and that Islam must be central to Malaysian society and government.

However, there are Malaysians who contest this point of view and argue that the country is, in effect, a secular nation. Evidence assembled in support of this position includes the argument that, as recognized in a judicial precedent (in the case of Che Omar bin Che Soh), the reference to Islam in Article 3 does not suggest that Malaysia is an Islamic state, but that for the purposes of ceremonies of state, Islam should be the religion used. Other support is drawn from comments made in the 1980s by Malaysia’s first prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, who oversaw the transition to independence and who denounced attempts to emphasize the prominence of Islam in the constitution in a manner not intended by those who drafted it.

A further contestation in Malaysia relates to the ability of Malaysians to officially convert from Islam to another religion. Whereas non-Muslim Malaysians may legally convert to Islam, the reverse is increasingly not the case, with judicial precedents in recent years, such as in the case of Lina Joy v. Majlis Agam Islam Wilayah & Anor, finding that those officially registered as Muslims could not freely convert from Islam without the express permission of the Shari’a Courts in Malaysia. Those who disagree with this finding argue that Article 11 of Malaysia’s constitution protects freedom of religion, and that having to apply to the Shari’a Court is an undue impediment to this freedom.

Arguments in defense of this finding are sometimes founded in a conservative orthodox view that conversion from Islam is not permissible. Other arguments are founded in Article 160 of the constitution. As noted above, it notes that a Malay person is by legal definition a Muslim. Therefore, with respect to Malay persons, conversion is by definition impossible. Dissenters from this view argue that the definition in Article 160 exists only for interpreting the law when it refers to Malay persons and that it is not prescriptive.

The official recognition of a Malaysian’s religion as Islam has a number of legal consequences. These include being subject to shari’a law. Shari’a law applies only to Muslims and in addition to enabling an array of benefits, such as access to some charitable funds, also subjects Muslim Malaysians to laws that seek to regulate the conduct of marriage, divorce, moral behavior, and issues of testate, among other things. These laws, for example, enable polygamy and proscribe khalwat (close proximity between unmarried and unrelated men and women). The legal and religious interpretations of Islam in Malaysia largely follow the Shafi’i madhab (school of law).

The salience of Islam in Malaysia has also led to the pursuit of Islamically orientated businesses. Malaysian businesses and research institutions have made significant investments in developing Islamic banking products and developing the commercial production of goods that are Halal (permissible for consumption). The local, regional, and global market for these products is considerable and growing, and Malaysia has sought to become a leader in the development of Islamic financial services and global hub for the production of Halal goods.

Julian CH Lee and Caryn Lim

See also: Buddhism; Christianity; Colonialism; Confucianism; Daoism (Taoism); Ethnicity; Freedom of Religion; Globalization; Hinduism; Interreligious Relations and Dialogue; Islam; Religious Conversions; Religious Discrimination and Intolerance; Secularism; Shari’a, Singapore; Thaipusam.

MELANESIAN RELIGION

Melanesia is a region of islands and states east of Indonesia and north of Australia; it includes East Timor, West Papua (under Indonesian control), Papua New Guinea (PNG), Bougainville, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, New Caledonia, and Torres Strait in northern Australia. Broadly speaking, this is where Muslim Asia meets the Christian and kastom-influenced Pacific, where there are profound differences in culture and belief.

The term kastom is a Tok Pisin/Bislama word derived from our understanding of the English word “custom,” which is defined by the Pocket Oxford Dictionary as a practice that has become habitual, established usage. In using the term kastom, the most important of all terms relating to Melanesian religion, what is referred to is a full range of indigenous philosophy and spiritual movements whose principles may not have changed for millennia, or may have reached back to the old beliefs and reconstituted themselves after an unhappy period of contact with rival theologies such as Christianity. They are not necessarily traditional, often fusing a mix of ideas with a modern organization or Christian syncretism.

Group of women during church service, Mindre, Papua New Guinea, Melanesia. (Heiner Heine imageBROKER/Newscom)

In a Melanesian (and Pacific generally) context, kastom refers to a wide range of traditional and cultural practices that cover daily life, religious and chiefly duties, community obligations, material culture, trade, warfare, sexuality, and all the other traditions that make this region distinct. But unlike our more secular notion of “custom,” kastom is imbued with a spiritual undercurrent, as if the ancestors are always watching. It is their gaze, hovering within the system of tribal law, which gives kastom lo (traditional law) its power. Around the world, where Christianity has taken hold, it is usually the end of ancestral spirits, officially at least. In Melanesia, this is not so—both remain powerful currents in society.

Melanesia is, like Africa, host to literally thousands of tribes and languages. New Guinea Island alone has one-quarter of the world’s languages, and Vanuatu in particular is the most linguistically diverse country, per capita, on earth, with more than 120 languages for just 270,000 people. With such cultural diversity, it is no surprise that there is also great religious and spiritual diversity. Professor Gary Trompf has declared that Melanesia is “home to the most complex religious panorama on earth.”

Melanesia is a dynamic religious region where belief systems ebb and flow and experimentation is widely practiced. Today it is a region with strong foundations of kastom, cult, cargo cult, and new religious movements, together with a long-running current of Christianity and syncretic Christian movements. Islam is also on the rise with thousands of highlanders in Papua New Guinea having converted in recent years and a growing umma in every Melanesian country.

Since its introduction more than 100 years ago in most places (and less than 40 years ago in others), Christianity was quickly adopted and has had more impact on Pacific communities than any other global faith. The vast majority of Melanesians (and other Pacific islanders) identify themselves as Christian. They draw from a range of Christian traditions including Catholicism, Anglicanism, and Seventh-day Adventism but recent decades has seen a steep rise in Pentecostal and evangelical groups with a more distinctly Pacific flavor, such as the South Seas Evangelical Church. Yet it appears that Christianity has reached its high-tide mark in the Pacific now, and a range of other faiths, including Buddhism, Bahá’í, and Islam, are putting down roots.

Islam is the fastest growing of these new faiths, reflecting a global pattern, and is likely to increase its membership due to its offer of new pathways to wealth and services as well as some cultural similarities such as polygamy. Importantly, Islam and traditional Melanesian kastom share the same notion that belief is a total way of life, a 24/7 practice, where daily life cannot be separated from belief. This contrasts with secular governments and a “Church on Sunday” approach for much of Christianity in the region.

In parts of Melanesia, Islam has deeper roots—such as in western coastal communities of West Papua that have been in contact with Indonesian and Arabic traders for centuries. In Fiji, the British brought Indians to work on sugar cane plantations more than 100 years ago, thus establishing both strong Hindu and Islamic communities in Fiji that remain. However, one of the challenges for Islam is that pigs are revered across Melanesia, symbolic of wealth and status for Big Men. They are used in trade, gifted for kastom ceremonies and reconciliation, and pig tusks even appear on the Vanuatu flag.

What makes Melanesia unique, beyond its adoption of global monotheistic faiths, is its wealth of kastom beliefs and practices. This is rooted primarily in rituals related to ancestral worship and appeasement and management of tabus and environment. Melanesia is also famous in anthropology and theology for its curious range of “cargo cults,” millenarian movements that sought to win “whitemen’s goods” by claiming it was delivered by their ancestors and white people were intercepting the “cargo” destined for the indigenes. Although churches and colonial administrations dismissed many such nativistic movements as “cargo cults,” in fact many of these movements became the seed for nationalist movements that would win independence for their nations. Many cults remain active today, such as the John Frum movement in Tanna, Vanuatu. Kastom and cult movements continue to play an important role in both triggering conflict and ending conflict through kastom reconciliation movements. Many contemporary conflicts in Melanesia, such as the struggle for independence in West Papua and Bougainville, protection of kastom land on Guadalcanal in the Solomons, and indigenous rights in Fiji, have the spiritual backing of important kastom and cult movements.

It is also worth noting the role of women since Melanesia is perhaps the only place left on earth that is largely matrilineal—it is women who own the land, not men. This influences the important role women play in kastom and religious movements in order to preserve land rights.

Since Melanesian philosophy is usually dynamic and constantly evolving rather than, say, the timeless, all-encompassing, all-time consciousness of the (Australian) Aboriginal Dreamtime, it can even be said that what we see today as kastom movements are sometimes in fact anti-kastom. That is, they are a new form, different to both traditional ancestor worship and Christian theology, but often blending their traditional spirit world with some of the organizational elements of Christianity.

Underlying this inherent religious dynamism, the Papua New Guinean statesman and philosopher Bernard Narakobi pointed out that Melanesians are not and have never been slaves to their cultural practices, if they believed these were obstructing them. He added that the Melanesians liberate themselves by establishing new communities with new hopes and future. The most popular conception of Melanesian philosophy is the Melanesian Way, a term of uncertain origin and hazy meaning, but one that is widely used to describe Melanesian responses to life. It was popularized by Narakobi in his book of the same name. It is hard to say if it is much different from the Pacific Way, which seems grounded in similar values. If it can be boiled down to a simple idea, it is perhaps a deep belief in building consensus and tolerance. To allow everyone to have their say on a matter and build consensus towards a community decision is the Melanesian Way. To show pride in kastom during a ceremony is the Melanesian Way. To be inclusive and tolerant of differences is the Melanesian Way.

Narakobi wrote eloquently on the fundamental philosophical foundations of his culture but understood the limitations of definitions. According to him, Melanesians are a spiritual people. Even before Christians came onto those shores, the people there felt and knew the forces of a source greater than themselves. Further, Narakobi affirmed that this was their divine power, the Melanesian Way. This vision sees the human person in his or her totality with the spirit world as well as the animal and the plant world. Such a human person is not the absolute master of the universe but an important component in an interdependent world of the person with the animal, the plant, and the spiritual. However he came to be, the Melanesian is.

Ben Bohane

See also: Ancestor Worship; Bahá’í Faith; Christianity; Colonialism; Ethnicity; Globalization; Hinduism; Islam; Papua New Guinea; Sexuality; Spirit Mediumship; Women.

MESSIANIC MOVEMENTS

The term “messianic” has transcended its original Judaic origins to encompass anything that involves redemption by a Davidic kingly figure. Hence, messianic movements are popular movements propelled by reverence and obedience to a divinely inspired leader who is seen as a liberator by the movement’s adherents. It may be emancipation from foreign domination or alleviation from socioeconomic hardships.

In Southeast Asia’s recent history, several messianic movements rose more often in reaction to the region’s colonial experience. As the various peoples in the region grappled with the new order, some of them turned to their own past and spiritual legacy and longed for a savior from their pantheon of demigods, heroes, and kings. Still, there were some who melded these ancient beliefs with the Christian religion brought by their colonial masters and mined them for symbols that resonated with their own milieu.

The Philippines

During the 300-year Spanish colonial period in the Philippines, countless local messianic movements sprouted, led by charismatic leaders who promised that their groups, usually with indigenous religious influences, offered better living conditions in the near future. Only a few of these movements sought independence from Spanish rule. Among these was Tamblot, a babaylan or spiritualist from the island of Bohol, who led a revolt in 1622 in response to the Jesuits’ growing influence in his area. There was Tapar from the neighboring island of Panay, who declared himself “God Almighty” in 1663 and appointed two of his aides as “Christ” and the “Holy Spirit” and later led his followers in attacking the town centers.

One notable messianic movement during the Spanish period was the Confradia de San Jose, a religious group open only to Filipinos that was formed in 1840 in Tayabas province by Apolinario dela Cruz, also known as Hermano Puli, who assumed a religious persona as he led his followers in challenging the local authorities. After a bloody battle with the Spanish authorities, Dela Cruz was betrayed by his followers. He was later executed by the government.

During the American period, messianic and nativistic movements broke out in several places in the archipelago. They were generally referred to as “colorum” from the Latin phrase et saecula saecolorum (“world without end”). Just like their predecessors in the Spanish era, these groups were characterized by religious devotion, hero worship, superstitious belief, and followers who believed that a messiah will come to deliver them from their current hardships.

The Guardia de Honor started as a lay group organized by the Dominicans. The Dominicans, however, lost control of this group in northern Luzon as a local anitero or animist Julian Baltazar (Apo Laqai), took over, assumed religious powers and prophesied that Judgment Day was coming soon. Even as the Dominicans cut off links with the Guardia de Honor by 1882, the group became stronger as it continued to attract followers. It refused to fight alongside the revolutionary forces during the Philippine Revolution, instead waging its own battles against the Spanish authorities, with Apo Laqai being venerated as “God Almighty,” his successor, Antonio Valdez as “Christ” and another associate as the “Holy Spirit.” Supported by the peasants in northern and central Luzon, it also resisted American authorities until the U.S. Army surrounded the group’s stronghold in Central Luzon on March 1901, defeated them, and captured the leaders, who were later executed.

Tracing its roots to another religious group, the Santa Iglesia was reorganized by Felipe Salvador in Luzon and fought alongside Aguinaldo’s forces. His exploits led to claims of mystical prowess and paved the way for more recruits among the different and warring ethnic groups of Luzon and who fervently believed that their amulets would protect them from the enemy’s bullets. The Santa Iglesia remained resistant even to the American civil government, getting involved in clashes with the constabulary even as Salvador strengthened his mass base, until his capture and eventual execution in 1912.

A peasant-religious movement called Dios-Dios sprouted in the islands of Leyte, Samar, and Bohol in the 1800s. By the time of the Americans, members of this group, especially in Leyte and Samar, became recognizable with the red trousers that they wore, hence becoming more popularly known as the Pulajanes or “Reds.” Groups of Pulajanes in these islands were led by so-called “popes” (i.e., Papa Pablo, Papa Dagohob, etc.) who organized attacks against constabulary forces and even regular army troops, massing their machete-wielding men in a frenzy-filled melee. They were also involved in kidnappings and arson attacks. A long war of attrition between U.S. Army regular troops and local constables against the Pulajanes ended only in 1911 when Papa Otoy, the last of the “popes,” was killed in battle.

In 1925, a shopkeeper on the island of Panay, Florencio Entrencherado, claimed semidivine powers and proclaimed himself as Florencio I, emperor of the Philippines. Two years later, he led his 10,000 followers on an abortive insurrection.

Lao PDR

The Hmong is an ethnic minority group that settled not only in Laos, but also in Vietnam and parts of Thailand. In the past hundreds of years, messianic movements arose out of the local population in response to the control of French colonial masters and of ruling ethnic groups. One scholar described the Hmong worldview as seeing a close connection between deities and legendary Hmong kings. Majority of the masses eagerly awaited the coming of a chosen one, usually marked by supernatural abilities, who would lead them out from subjugation and reestablish a Hmong kingdom.

One such example was Paj Cai Vwj, born in a Hmong settlement in northern Vietnam. As a young man, he claimed a connection to Huab Tais, a legendary Hmong messianic hero. Soon, thousands of Hmongs joined his call for rebellion in 1918, also known as the Paj Cai Revolt or “Madman’s War,” against French colonial officials and Lao and Tai opium tax collectors.

The coming of Christian missionaries to Southeast Asia also resulted in the majority of Hmongs being converted to Christianity. Messianic leaders soon rose, especially in the middle of the twentieth century, combining elements of the Christian faith and animist beliefs. Some of the shamans claimed the imminent return of a Hmong messiah. Several claimed to be incarnations of Jesus Christ. There was even a trio that branded themselves as the “Father, Son and Holy Spirit.” There were countermovements, too, as seen in one self-proclaimed “Hmong King” who proclaimed a war against Christian missionaries.

The Cold War also served as a backdrop to several messianic movements. As the Vietnam War gripped Indochina, a prophecy that a messiah garbed in American military uniform distributing rifles would come circulated among the Hmongs.

A Hmong farmer who claimed he experienced divine revelation, Shong Lue Yang, developed the Pahawh script in 1959, enabling the Hmong language to be written down. With his divine claims, he announced that whoever uses this writing script would be saved from the hardship of the war. Taking on the title of “Savior of the Common People,” Shong Lue Yang later on found himself caught between the two sides in the Laotian Civil War.

Myanmar

Among Myanmar’s Karens, messianic movements have also played a major part in their long history of struggle against the government. The Karen National Union and its military arm, the Christian-led Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), have been waging an insurgency for more than half a century. One of the groups it supports is a semi-independent unit composed of around 200 child warriors known as “God’s Army,” led by young twins named Luther and Johnny Htoo in the 1990s and the early part of the twenty-first century. The then 12-year-old twins were revered by their followers for their supposed supernatural abilities and immunity to bullets and mines.

One of KNLA’s breakaway factions composed mostly of Buddhists formed the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), one of the hallmarks of which is its “militant nationalism,’ heavily influenced by messianic elements. The majority of its members look forward to the arrival of a powerful Buddha-like political figure, who is believed to prepare the advent of Maitreya, the future Buddha.

George Amurao

See also: Ahmadiyya; Colonialism; Ethnicity; Laos; Minorities; Missionary Movements; Myanmar (Burma); Nationalism; Philippines; Spirit Mediumship; Vietnam.

MINORITIES

While no generally agreed-upon definition of “minorities” exists, the United Nations Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities had defined the term as a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, is in a nondominant position, and whose members possess ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population. Minorities exist in almost all countries and are often subjected to discrimination and marginalization. There have been attempts in modern times to codify laws that would protect minorities. During the period between the First and Second World Wars, when minority rights were being universally acknowledged, the fear was expressed that including the minorities also in any official statement of rights might jeopardize the fragile state structures, especially of the emerging nations. Consequently, the clause on “minority rights” was not initially included within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, at a later stage, a limited clause ensuring the rights of minorities were included as Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Apart from such formal international covenants, it is also assumed that the modern liberal democratic setup is an antidote against any threats to minorities. This has been proven to be a mirage, as the “tyranny of the majority” often leads to the marginalization and suppression of minority voices, pointing toward the need for special provisions to protect the minorities. Minority rights, in the ultimate analysis, needs to be seen as civil rights and human rights that are not determined by a majority vote but considered as inalienable.

Southeast Asia presents a picture of marked contrasts with regard to the minorities. Entire states, such as Papua New Guinea, are composed of minorities. The wider region is not only the meeting point of diverse Eastern civilizations such as Indian and Chinese, but also the scene of religions and cultures that evolved and consolidated themselves during the period of colonialism. While Indonesia as a country has the largest number of Muslims in the world, the Philippines is over 90 percent Christian, and Buddhism is the majority religion of several countries including Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Burma. In all these places, religious minorities account for a significant number of the population. The region is also dotted with ethnic and linguistic minorities, making Southeast Asia the crowded marketplace of various minorities. Most Asian countries have laws that protect the faith, practice, and cultures of the minorities, but in practice, the minority groups tend to be viewed as second-class citizens. The majority faith and culture of a country is often portrayed as the norm, a yardstick the other citizens are expected to reach. There are even overt attempts, such as in Indonesia, which is consciously implementing policies of forced assimilation, also called “Indonesianiza-tion.” By overt or covert means, the majority communities often lay out the ground rules for the minorities.

Religious Minorities

The office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights describes religious minorities as people who are victims of systematic discrimination and exclusion from key sectors of society, who experience publicly fueled prejudices and vilification based on national myths, who are often the subjects of acts of vandalism and desecration, and who experience prohibition or disruption of religious ceremonies, threats, and acts of violence. The term “religious minority” is broadly construed to cover all relevant groups of persons, including traditional and nontraditional communities or large and small communities. In modern times, the term “religious minorities” has also been extended to cover atheistic and nontheistic believers, too, along with racial, ethnic, and religious minorities.

In the Southeast Asian context, violations against religious minorities are often perpetrated by states or by nonstate actors, often in a climate of impunity, and they may originate from different political, religious, ideological, or personal motives. Even as Myanmar (Burma) emerges from decades of military rule and suppression of human rights into an era of democracy and freedom, the subjugation of the minority communities continue as a lingering reality. In this Buddhist-majority country, it has been alleged that the security forces often collaborate with Buddhist monks in attacking Muslim, Christian, and other minority groups. Unfounded fears that Muslims would force their religion on Buddhists and try to “steal” Buddhist women and that the Christians are agents of the United States are often expressed to justify such violence. The state machinery either is silent about these attacks on the minorities or tacitly supports it. Indonesia presents a different picture. While the country has made great strides in consolidating a stable and democratic government after five decades of authoritarian rule, Indonesia is not yet a bastion of tolerance. The authorities often fail to crack down on the extremists that target the minorities. Even though freedom of religion is guaranteed by Indonesia’s constitution, blasphemy laws and regulations against proselytizing are routinely used to prosecute the minorities who include not only mainline groups such as Christians and Buddhists, but also atheists, Bahá’ís, and members of the Ahmadiyya faith, an Islamist reformist movement. The country has over 150 religiously motivated regulations restricting the rights of the minorities, and these are used routinely to trample upon the rights of religious and ethnic minorities.

Ethnic Minorities

Southeast Asia is home to a large diversity of ethnic groups that are highly heterogeneous and distinct from each other. Ethnic “majorities” and “minorities” are relational terms, as groups that are majorities in one context and during a particular period tend to be minorities in a different time and place. Yet, one of the casualties of modernization and globalization is a tendency to homogenize ethnic groups and to present them before the visiting tourists as museum pieces, frozen in time. With regard to tourism and several other areas, economy plays a major role in the insecurity experienced by the ethnic minority groups in Southeast Asia. The Chinese minorities becoming the target of riots in different parts of the region since the 1960s points toward the social and political backlash economic success could bring. The relative economic success of the large-scale Chinese and Indian immigrant groups in countries such as Malaysia too has given rise to local resentment and discrimination. Elsewhere, there are also sociopolitical factors. In Indonesia, ethnic and religious minority groups have long protested the Javanese-dominated central government, which was well known for its corruption during the three-decade rule of General Suharto. The country’s military also had exploited sectarian and ethnic rivalries to maintain control and prevent any close scrutiny of its human rights abuses in the past. Burma is yet another state where the authoritarian regime exploited ethnic conflicts for its own advantage. The renewed effort of several Southeast Asian governments to counter radical and “terrorist” forces too ends up targeting the minorities in the region. In the name of fighting the Islamist militants, the authorities in the Philippines often also turn against the opposition activists. Indonesia is also a case where, following the terrorist bombing of Bali in 2002, the government labeled several critics as “terrorists.” The rights of not only religious but also ethnic minorities are routinely trampled in large parts of Southeast Asia.

Ecological and environmental concerns too play a key role in the lives of minorities. According to the 2012 annual report of the Minority Rights Group International, the growing demand for natural resources across Southeast Asia threatens to endanger the lives of various minority groups. In the long-running armed conflicts in various parts of the region over the control of land and natural resources, the minority groups often end up being displaced from their habitat so as to make room for developmental projects. The minorities and the indigenous communities often lack the political clout and the financial and legal resources to counter these onslaughts.

New Religious Movements

New Religious Movements (NRMs) are defined as ethical, spiritual, or philosophical communities of modern origin that are often located in the midst of religious groups that are both dominant and traditional. NRMs usually emerge as an expression of protest or frustration at established religions and cultures, and they espouse approaches based on a novel way of perceiving spirituality, religion, or philosophy. Of the tens of thousands of NRMs worldwide, most are located in Asia and Africa. The Sathya Sai Baba movement in Singapore can be considered as an NRM that offers a novel path to spirituality in the multicultural environment of the city-state. In the urban pluralist context of Singapore, the Sai Baba movement transcends the traditional boundaries of Hinduism and appeals to a cross-section of people, cutting across the religio-cultural and linguistic divide. Another case, in a Christian setting, is the NRMs of the Philippines, which include Neo-Pentecostal groups. During the last few decades, Pentecostalism has moved from the margins to the mainstream, making deep inroads in the country, especially among the ethnic minority groups, and in the process redefining the religiosity of the masses. Pentecostalism has a pan-regional appeal, as it includes roughly 43 percent of Asian Christians. How the traditional and mainline churches would deal with this challenge, especially as the Pentecostal sweep appeals most to the minority groups, becomes a significant question.

The European and American colonization of most parts of Southeast Asia left an indelible imprint on the situation of the minorities in the region. In several cases, the colonizers reduced the status of the indigenous people to minorities, resulting in the widespread destruction of their religions, cultures, and languages. Despite the diverse ways in which colonialism alienated the minorities, however, the presence of the colonizers also ensured a certain protection for the minority groups, especially against the onslaught of the local and national dominant groups. The collapse of colonialism following the Second World War and the ascendancy of the dominant nationalist groups to power in the various Southeast Asian nations, in that sense, also resulted in a deeper level of alienation for the minorities. In the Burmese context, the postcolonial period coincided with a history of systematic persecution of the minorities. The direct and indirect role played by the various dominant Buddhist monastic groups in the riots against the Muslims and the Christians point towards the systemic manner in which the minority groups are internally victimized.

Jesudas M. Athyal

See also: Buddhism; Cambodia; Christianity; Colonialism; Ethnicity; Hinduism; Indonesia; Islam; Laos; Myanmar (Burma); Philippines; Religion and Society; Religious Discrimination and Intolerance; Sathya Sai Baba Movement; Singapore; Thailand.

MISSIONARY MOVEMENTS

Missionaries—people who travel from their home base to other places and propagate their faith, by word or deed—have been a historical reality in all societies, including Southeast Asia. While there is a general impression that the missionaries were primarily Christians, that is not the case, and certainly not in Southeast Asia. There were also Buddhist, Hindu, and Muslim missionaries that worked in various countries. During the Common Era, Buddhism, which had originated in the Indian subcontinent, spread by sea to the north of Southeast Asia and from there to the east coast of China. Buddhism contributed significantly to cultural change in Asia, in the form of new social identities, new languages, and new institutions. The great Buddhist scholastic traditions built up monasteries and other places that emerged as key centers of learning. The itinerant Buddhist monks and other scholars contributed also to the growth of languages, especially by their work of translation. Even as Buddhism weakened in India, it flourished in Southeast Asia, and the region emerged as the center of the Theravada Buddhist tradition. The faith also developed distinct national and regional identities. As Buddhism reached Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and other places in Southeast Asia, it developed its own particular form, indigenous to those places.

The Phnong montagnard people in northeastern Cambodia celebrate a Catholic mass in a bamboo church. The mass is led by French missionary Gerald Vogin. (Yvan Cohen/Getty Images)

It has frequently been pointed out that the missionaries often colluded with the colonial powers to have dominion over the local people. Jacob S. Dharmaraj noted that colonizers and missionaries sailed on the same boat and that gun and gospel were carried on the same ship. This may be an extreme view, but there is a fair amount of consensus among historians, especially in Southeast Asia, that the missionaries in general supported the process of the colonization of the non-Western world.

Jesudas M. Athyal

Trade played a key role in the spread of Islam in Southeast Asia. As early as the eleventh century, the Islamic faith is believed to have reached Indonesia. During the next two centuries, Islam was consolidated in that country. The religion reached Malaya and parts of Philippines by the fourteenth century. Today, Islam is the most widely practiced religion in Southeast Asia. Hinduism is not a proselytizing religion, and there was little overt missionary activity in Southeast Asia. The religion spread largely as merchants and traders from India traveled to other places. Hinduism took roots in some places in Indonesia, notably Bali, Central Java, East Java, and Lampung provinces. In Malaysia and Singapore, Hinduism is the principal religion of the Indian immigrants. There are sizable Hindu populations in Myanmar, Thailand, and a few other places as well.

The Christian missionary work in Southeast Asia went parallel to the Western colonization of the region, lending support to the theory that the process of colonization was the colonization of non-Christian peoples by Christian nations. Historians and other scholars acknowledge the role of individual missionaries who worked selflessly in serving the people. There were also missionaries who tried to work out the meaning of their faith in a specific culture. However, the criticism has been raised that the Christian missionary enterprise in Southeast Asia, in general, undermined the local cultures and religions. One of the characteristics of the new self-confidence of the emergent Christian leadership in Asia, therefore, was the rejection of the missionary pattern. Bishop Emerito Nacpil of the Philippines called on the mission societies to leave the churches in Asia alone for some time so that they could discover themselves and their ministry to the people and cultures of Asia.

While many of these criticisms are valid, a subaltern perspective would insist that the complexities of the Southeast Asian situation need to be sufficiently appreciated. A careful look at the history of the missionary movement in the region will reveal that the relationship of the missionaries with the colonial powers was often far from being cordial. Some scholars have pointed out that the commercial interests of the Western political powers in the region often clashed with the inclination of the missionaries to serve the local people. In particular, the translation of religious and secular literature to the local languages by the missionaries is important. Translation and vernacular renewal not only had a profound impact on the cultural and social renaissance of the indigenous people, but also played a role in empowering the people in their anticolonial struggles.

While traditionally, the Christian missionary work in Southeast Asia was carried out by mainline churches, such as the Roman Catholics and Anglicans, in the modern times, the Pentecostals and the other independent groups are playing a leading role. Pentecostalism has, in particular, appealed to the racial and ethnic minorities and social classes of Asia who lack political or ideological power. According to John Mansford Prior, a missionary priest in Indonesia since 1973, Pentecostalism is an urban phenomenon and is likely to be a growing one with the urbanization of the Asian societies. The people who have been uprooted from their villages and cultures, and who are somewhat insecure in the cities as migrants, join the new charismatic and Pentecostal communities because there they find warm fellowship.

While reviewing the missionary movements in Southeast Asia, the primary question is what impact it had on the wider society. Any generalization of the work of the missionaries would be too simplistic and inaccurate. The rich contributions many of them made, especially in the areas of health care, education, and social uplift, has been widely acknowledged not only within their own religious communities, but also by the wider society and the state. But there are also valid questions about how at least some of the Western missionaries played a role in the alienation of the Asian people from their cultures, values, and moorings. While rejecting the doctored history that undermines the role of the missionaries in the cultural rejuvenation and the awakening of the indigenous people, there is the need to critically review that period. Like all other phases in human history, the missionary movement too will be scrutinized closely and judged for its contributions and shortcomings.

Jesudas M. Athyal

See also: Buddhism; Christianity; Colonialism; Diaspora; Ethnicity; Hinduism; Indonesia; Islam; Nacpil, Emerito; Nationalism; Papua New Guinea; Philippines; Siddique, Muhammad Abdul Aleem.

MORALITY

The term morality is used to refer to the system of notions concerning the rightness or goodness of human behavior as assessed according to accepted norms. The issue of morality has been a central concern of social scientists since the time of Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber. At the turn of the nineteenth century, Durkheim put forward his understanding of morality as the totality of shared rules according to which individuals, by adhering to them, recognize themselves as belonging to a society. He viewed religion as one means of instilling morality into society’s members. Weber’s renowned work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, examined the moral impetus that Protestant religious ethics gave to profit-seeking labor and postulated that religion altogether would ultimately become redundant as societies modernized. Secular rationality, he believed, would inevitably come to replace religion as the dominant source of meaning and moral guidance.

Colonialism and its corollary, the discipline of anthropology, brought a growing awareness in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe of the diversity of cultural formulations of good and evil, right and wrong, and the plurality and historical specificity of moral systems. It became evident that moral and religious systems are not always forces of cohesion, but can also give rise to divisiveness and internal contestation. Furthermore, in many parts of the so-called developing world, modernity, far from replacing religion with rationality, has been attended by the intensification of religious fervor and of spirit propitiation.

The great religious diversity of Southeast Asia, where Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, and numerous highland animistic traditions have coexisted for centuries, makes this region a particularly rich ground for observing the relationship between religion, morality, and power. Throughout the region, religious schemes of moral order have always been interlaced with concerns about power: strength and protection, individual potency, and the powers of nature. The classical state in Southeast Asia did not arise spontaneously out of local notions of righteous leadership but was a cultural import that made ritual claims to moral supremacy. James Scott (2009) has argued that the Hinduized idea of the universal monarch provided the ideological apparatus for defining “civilized” life—sedentary wet-rice cultivation in lowland villages, acknowledgment of a social hierarchy and kingship, and profession of a major salvation religion (Buddhism, Hinduism, or, in the Philippines, Christianity). The monarch was often credited with access to cosmic power, which he could channel into the world to ensure prosperity and order. The proper behavior of the king governed therefore not only the human, but also the natural world. Moral order, legitimized by religious discourse and ritual, would thus have emanated from the powerful center through the valleys of the kingdom. From the lowland, state-centric perspective, recalcitrant nomadic highlanders who refused to submit to state control represented the opposite of civilized and morally ordered life; they were considered wild, savage, and sometimes even subhuman.

However, where colonial powers became established, they tended to undermine the divine status and religious legitimation of Southeast Asian monarchs. (The notable exception was Thailand, which was never colonized.) In their efforts to introduce their own secular moral order, with measures such as judicial and educational reforms arising from enlightenment philosophy in Europe, the colonial officials became the new, self-appointed custodians of morality. Although regional conflicts meant that the monarchs themselves may have deemed it politic to submit to the ambiguous protection of a colonial power, peasants often felt more threatened than protected by their foreign overlords and religious figures such as Buddhist monks, with their moral credibility and plentiful numbers, figured among those who led popular anticolonial uprisings.

After the Second World War and the wane of colonial influence, a new moral order was imposed upon many Southeast Asians with the advent of Communism. Once again, morality was enforced from above in ways that now departed radically from or even inverted long-held norms. The individual’s primary moral responsibilities were to be shifted from family to the state and from religion to productivity. In 1960, the government of North Vietnam proclaimed that its policy of the Marxist-Leninist ideology must absolutely dominate the moral life of the people of the country, becoming their ideology and the basis on which a new morality can be built. In Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, the people found themselves subjected to a more or less brutally enforced moral system that was grounded in radically secular ideology and was largely intolerant of religious alternatives as well as monarchical authority. Once again, the highlands became areas of refuge and resistance.

In the late 1980s, as the Cold War was drawing to a close and command economies were yielding to global pressures for liberalization, the collectivist morality of the Communist era began to shift. Throughout the region, the dawn of a capitalist ethos in Southeast Asia gave rise to new moral uncertainties. While religion was recovering in countries such as Cambodia, it was also being subjected to a wave of new consumerist values. These values have affected not only formal religion, but also the numerous spirits that populate Southeast Asia.

Among other things, the transition to a market economy brought droves of young Southeast Asian women into the labor market to work in the factories that began mushrooming in urban areas. The anthropologist Aihwa Ong has famously argued that in Malaysia, this release of large numbers of women from their traditional moral spheres and their exposure to the gaze of male supervisors made them both vulnerable to and potential causes of moral disorder and that this found expression in mass spirit possession. One way to redeem the moral credentials of these women was to reinforce their Muslim identity by holding Islamic classes on factory grounds. Another was for women to veil themselves. However, the moral appropriateness of the use of veils by Muslim women in Southeast Asia has been a source of contention, with some arguing that the veil protects women’s increasingly commodified bodies from the objectifying male gaze, while opponents, including the Malaysian and Indonesian governments, formerly rejected it as a Middle Eastern tradition and that had no basis in either Islamic or local mores.

The degree to which religion should be subordinated to the powers of secular government or, conversely, government should defer to the moral authority of clerics continues to rankle in the region. In Thailand, although monks continue to legitimate the state with their performance of rituals, particularly for the monarch, who remains a powerful symbol of moral order and continuity, many of these monks are internally conflicted about their sympathies in the ongoing friction between working-class “red shirts” and elite, traditionalist “yellow shirts.”

Elsewhere, the cooptation or intimidation of religious figureheads by powerful elites, such as has taken place in Cambodia, can make it difficult for them to act as mouthpieces for ordinary people or to put a moral brake on power holders. The resulting tensions occasionally erupt, for instance in 2007, when Buddhist monks led massive demonstrations against military rule in Myanmar and the government responded with violent crackdowns.

When the clergy seems impotent to help people deal with the rapidly changing present and precarious future, the powers of sorcerers, spirit mediums, shamans, and astrologers may fill the moral vacuum. This seems particularly evident in countries undergoing a transition from a command economy to a free-market system. For example, the 1980s’ Đi Mó’i (“renovation”) reforms in Vietnam sparked such an explosion of popular religious activity that it obliged the post-Communist state to recognize and frame this as part of the nation’s cultural identity. This revival of spirit powers is echoed in other parts of Southeast Asia and has been seen by scholars as providing arenas for people to make moral negotiations about the rapid social, political, and economic changes taking place around them.

The absorption of Asian (as well as other) countries into the global market has created tensions between moral and economic values throughout the region. Governments find themselves caught between the demands of human rights defenders and those of businessmen and investors. On the one hand, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the United Nations’ 2005 declaration of its “responsibility to protect” citizens from states that disregard the rights of their citizens have positioned the leaders of developing nations under the moral scrutiny of the international community. On the other hand, however, the so-called developing nations are pressured to open up their natural and human resources to foreign markets while at the same time ensuring the political stability that investors want. This means that although the new system of competition over resources excludes many groups from benefits and leaves them feeling vulnerable and unprotected by their governments, international as well as national elite interests in stability often outweigh moral considerations. The suppression by Asian governments of protests over inequality has therefore tended to be accepted as necessary for the greater good of stability.

Indeed, in the 1990s, some Asian leaders, particularly Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad of Malaysia, reconciled their desire to bring about economic progress while silencing opponents by appealing to culture and morality. They argued against the universality of human rights and claimed there were specifically “Asian Values” that differed fundamentally from Western values. Among other things, these values supposedly included the foregoing of individual freedoms for the benefit of the collectivity: family or nation.

The Asian Values debate lost momentum after the financial crisis of the late 1990s, but moral anxieties continue to surface in other ways, and frequently through the medium of religion. Identity politics have been played out in bloody intercommunal strife between Buddhists and Muslims in both Myanmar and southern Thailand in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Strict interpretations of Islamic codes of conduct have also been gaining both political and popular support. In 2010, three women were caned in Malaysia for having committed adultery, and in 2013, the sultan of Brunei introduced tough shari’a laws for various moral transgressions: punishments were to include stoning to death for adultery, severing of limbs for theft, and flogging for violations ranging from abortion to alcohol consumption.

Despite the introduction of democratic election procedures in most Southeast Asian countries, it would seem that religion is set to continue playing an important role in the moral legitimacy of the region’s leaders.

Alexandra Kent

See also: Brunei Darussalam; Buddhism; Cambodia; Christianity; Colonialism; Communism; Globalization; Hinduism; Humanism; Islam; Laos; Malaysia; Myanmar (Burma); Philippines; Religion and Society; Sexuality; Shamanism; Shari’a; Singapore; Spirit Mediumship; Uplanders; Vietnam; Women.

MUHAMMADIYAH

Muhammadiyah is a Muslim organization that was established on November 18, 1912, by Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, about 33 years before Indonesia gained independence from Dutch colonialism. Muhammadiyah is an Arabic term that means “the followers of Prophet Muhammad.” The long-term vision of Muhammadiyah is to uphold and uplift the teaching of Islam to establish the true Islamic society.

Many scholars categorize Muhammadiyah as a modernist and reformist Muslim movement because of its ability to combine theological purification and social reformation. Muhammadiyah practices an Islamic teaching based on the two main sources of Islam: Al-Qur’an (Qur’an) and As-Sunnah (Prophet Traditions). Muhammadiyah’s mission of da’wah (Islamic propagation), therefore, strives to purify Islam from the practices of takhayyul (fancy), bid’ah (innovation) and khurafah (superstition). These practices, according to Muhammadiyah, are not only theologically “un-Islamic,” but also sociologically irrational and contributing to the backwardness of Muslim societies. Therefore, Muhammadiyah theological reformation, from its formative years, has been accompanied by concrete and transformative social actions on the ground. In other words, Muhammadiyah aims to develop both personal and social pieties.

Muhammadiyah uses pragmatic ways to achieve its goals, including adopting the Western educational system. The first Muhammadiyah school sparked controversy among conservative ulama (Muslim scholars) because it integrated “secular” subjects such as mathematics, geography, foreign languages, and biology with “Islamic” subjects, which were the only subjects taught in traditional Islamic schools (pesantrens). Muhammadiyah also built other social services such as orphanages, clinics, and micro-credit institutions for the poor, all of which were organized using modern, rational-type bureaucratic principles. To expand its da’wah, Muhammadiyah created autonomous organizations, namely Aisyiyah (a women’s organization), Nashiatul Aisyiyah (a young women’s organization), Pemuda Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Youth), Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Student Association), Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah University Student Association), and Tapak Suci Putra Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Martial Arts).

In 1978, James L. Peacock published a seminal book on Muhammadiyah that placed the organization as the largest modernist Muslim movement in Southeast Asia, perhaps in the world. This conclusion is, most likely, still valid given the fact that Muhammadiyah grew even faster since the publication of the book. In 2010, Muhammadiyah claimed to have 25 million members with branches all over Indonesia. It had 16,860 schools (from nursery/kindergarten to high school), 186 tertiary education institutions (universities and technical colleges), 284 health service units (hospitals and clinics), 509 orphanages, 868 micro-credit/finance institutions and 11,959 mosques and mushalla (small places for worship). Although Muhammadiyah is not a political party, with its large membership and extended social services network, the organization has been a very strong political force in Indonesia and Southeast Asia at large.

Raja Antoni

See also: Ahmadiyya; Aisyiyah and Nasyiatul Aisyiyah; Education; Indonesia; Islam; Maarif, Ahmad Syafi’i; Nahdlatul Ulama; Pesantren; Rais, Muhammad Amien; Reform Movements; Religion and Society; Women.

MUSIC

In Southeast Asia, music has always been a traditional medium for humans to establish a connection with nonhuman world(s). The practices of ancestor worship and offerings to various entities (spirits, deities, the deceased) are still performed through vocal and/or instrumental music. The musical aspect of these rituals, though often neglected, remains coessential to the religious rite.

In rural Southeast Asia, music may be part of rituals that aim to heal the community, prevent illness, sing for the rice and other crops, propitiate and praise the gods, ensure ancestorhood, and restore the balance between different worlds. Most of the time, it is combined with other artistic practices (dance, theater, narrative). Music may support various kinds of speeches. It is also considered to have its own efficacy. In the Toraja highlands of Sulawesi (Indonesia), ritual trances depend upon the songs that call the divinities to descend to the earth; at funerals, the deceased becomes an ancestor only if the hagiographic song that tells the story of his or her transformation is sung in a round dance (Rappoport 2011). Music for shamanism, magic, and curing implies a journey to other worlds. Whether it involves drumming, singing, or striking the gongs, music is performed to guide or accompany the traveler (shaman or patient) on his or her journey.

Musical forms vary from the most intimate chanted prayer to large gong-chime ensembles, differing according to place, from rural to urban settings. All Southeast Asian religions use speech in their liturgy. Ritual speech is usually transmitted through the vocalization that joins words, music, and acts. Words in rhythm, whether spoken, chanted, or sung (in narrative or lyric singing), are a form of address, a bringing into relation of humans, spirits, and gods.

Indonesian dancers perform traditional Bali music during a parade as part of a week-long independence celebration in Jakarta, Indonesia, in 2005. (AP Images/Irwin Ferdiansyah)

Musical instruments also take part in most rituals, whether from local or world religions. The importance of bronze instruments is known through the diffusion of the bronze drum of the Dong Son period (late fourth century BCE) from northern Vietnam throughout Southeast Asia (Miller and Williams 1998, 58). The snails, frogs, and geometrical designs of heavenly bodies, carved on the surface of some of them, suggest that they may have been played during rain-making ceremonies (Kunst 1949, 105). From Cambodia to eastern Indonesia, knobbed gongs and drums are the most widespread instruments used in various kinds of rituals. Invested with a magic power, their fabrication and preservation are treated sacredly. Considered as intercessors between humans and gods, musical instruments are held by many peoples of Southeast Asia to be the vehicles carrying the singer’s voice toward the spirits of the higher world. Thus, ritual specialists sometimes carry sonorous attributes, such as pellet bells, pellet drums, and clapper bells. Gongs are frequently arranged in sets (gong-chimes), in different kinds of ensembles, ranging from a few instruments to the large gamelan ensembles of Java and Bali, PĪ PHĀT ensembles of Thailand, and similar ensembles in Laos, Cambodia, and Burma.

The arrival of foreign religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Christianity) has influenced local musical idioms to various degrees. Excavated bronze, terra-cotta images, and a fairly extensive number of metallic as well as wooden and bamboo instruments depicted in the stone reliefs of Southeast Asian temples offer a picture of music and dance during the Hindu-Buddhist religious ceremonies. The oldest depictions of musical instruments on Hindu-Buddhist temples date back to the seventh century CE. In addition, Indian epics, such the Ramayana, Mahabharata, and Purana, have been adopted in many parts of Southeast Asian, from Cambodia to Indonesia, since the third century CE; they are still performed through dance, shadow puppetry, and masked theater, in syncretic rituals combining local cults with Buddhism. Performing music and theater is first and foremost an offering to the spirits (Giuriati 1999). But it can also be performed for religious and political matters. In Java, gamelan orchestras belonging to kraton palaces were used for religious purposes. Courtly music was used to promote Hindu-Buddhist teachings, but once rulers embraced Islam, two processes led to the hybridity of their music.

On the islands of Southeast Asia, the Muslim music complex is nowadays prominent. Islam brought its own instrumentation and musical modes, from the Middle East, from the thirteenth century CE. The most widespread instrument used for devotional songs are types of frame drum, the short-necked, pear-shaped lute gambus, and the double-reed aerophone serunai. Devotional genres with clear links to Sufism (qasidah, dikir, dabus) have developed in many places (Yampolsky 2001). The relation between Islam and music has attracted the attention of many scholars, as court and rural forms of music are waning due to competition from Western popular musical idioms mixed with local languages. Popular culture has become a major force in the dissemination of contemporary Islam (Harnish and Rasmussen 2011). Christianity, as well, has brought new musical idioms from the West, such as tuning, modes, harmony, melodic form, and syntax, through vocal music (hymns) or instrumental music (wind band instruments), to be performed not only inside the churches but also within local rituals, together with traditional music. In Indonesia, it has also led to new forms of Christian popular music, such as the Indonesian pop rohani (“Christian pop” music) that can be heard on the radio in buses and shops. Despite religious changes, however, many small Southeast Asian societies continue to perform their own ritual music at various religious occasions.

Dana Rappoport

See also: Ancestor Worship; Buddhism; Christianity; Dance and Drama (Theater); Hinduism; Indonesia; Islam; Laos; Popular Religion; Puppetry; Ritual Dynamics; Shamanism; Spirit Mediumship; Sufism; Uplanders.

MUSLIMAT NU

Muslimat Nahdlatul Ulama (Muslimat NU) was established on June 15, 1938, as part of the women’s wing of Nahdlatul Ulama, but officially Muslimat NU was validated by Muktamar NU (National Congress of NU) in 1946. Muslimat NU became autonomous from the NU organization in 1952. Its vision is the existence of a society that is committed to the welfare of all in Indonesia, that is inspired by Islamic teaching and that also has Allah’s blessing. The goals of Muslimat NU are to increase Indonesian women’s awareness as Muslims and as Indonesian citizens; to improve the quality, independence, and devotion of women; to increase women’s awareness of their duties and rights according to Islam; and to support NU’s goals. The adherents of this organization mostly come from the pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) in Indonesia, and geographically, the majority are grounded in rural areas (Jamhari and Ropi 2003). One of the important achievements of Muslimat NU after gaining autonomy in the 20th National Congress in Surabaya was that the organization challenged the pengadilan agama (religious court) that had discriminated against women in cases of polygamy, divorce, and inheritance. In 1959, Muslimat NU succeeded in removing the tabir (physical partition) between men and women in the National Congress (Jamhari and Ropi 2003). In the first election in 1955, 10 percent of the NU members in the Parliament were women from Muslimat NU. Another contribution was that in 1969, Pimpinan Besar Syuriah NU (the supreme religious leadership in NU) decided the main principles of family planning in Indonesia as recommend by Muslimat NU.

One of the well-known activists of Muslimat NU, Khofifah Indar Parawansa, was the minister of Women’s Empowerment of Indonesia during the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid. In response to the United Nations’ declaration of the Decade for Women and because of the demands of the local feminist nongovernmental organizations, she changed the name of the ministry from “Mentri Peranan Wanita” (Ministry for the Roles of Women) to “Mentri Pemberdayaan Perempuan” (Ministry of Women’s Empowerment). This meant that she shifted the paradigm from women as objects of national development to women as subjects of national development. The most significant contribution of Parawansa as minister was the Presidential Instruction on gender mainstreaming in national development. Gender mainstreaming is a major strategy to ensure that women and men gain equal access to, and participate equally in development (Surbakti 2012). This instruction, which applies to all ministries, armed forces, police forces, high courts, heads of local governments, and heads of all government agencies, aims to mainstream gender in the planning, formulating, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating of all national development programs. Together with other NU affiliate organizations such as Fatayat NU, Rahima, and FK3 (Forum Kajian Kitab Kuning), the Muslimat NU is deeply committed to the gender issue.

Alimatul Qibtiyah

See also: Aisyiyah and Nasyiatul Aisyiyah; Education; Feminism and Islamic Traditions; Indonesia; Islam; Muhammadiyah; Nahdlatul Ulama; Pesantren; Reform Movements; Religion and Society; Shari’a; Women.

MYANMAR (BURMA)

Myanmar (Burma) is a Southeast Asian country that borders India, Bangladesh, Laos, Thailand, and China, a country Rudyard Kipling described as a land quite unlike any other. The land Marco Polo referred to as “The Golden land,” a land of legend, golden pagodas, and glorious temples, has recently drawn global media attention resulting from the people’s response to authoritative military rule, including the emergence of minority ethnic liberation struggles and the “Saffron Revolution” of 2007, a protest struggle led by Buddhist monks. The country has also received attention as a consequence of the destruction caused by Cyclone Nargis in 2008. Media attention is also drawn to the figure of Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of the founder of Burmese independence in 1948, a Nobel Peace Prize winner, and prominent opposition political leader who spent 15 years under house arrest prior to her release in 2010. If identity is in part captured in a name, then we immediately sense a tension when discussing this ancient land. In 1989, the military junta renamed Burma “Myanmar,” an act that remains contentious and indicates the complexity of national identity in the midst of ethnic and religious diversity. The population of Myanmar is estimated at over 60 million, including multiple ethnic and linguistic groups of which Burman is the majority. The capital of Myanmar changed from Yangon/Rangoon to Nypyidaw in 2009. Speculation regarding this change in location is widespread, though the building of a spectacular new Buddhist pagoda to legitimize the change highlights the significance of the deep-rooted historical association of Buddhism within Myanmar.

Burmese monks pray together at Kha Khat Wain Kyaung monastery, which is one of the three largest in the country, on December 13, 2011 in Bago, Myanmar. Approximately 90 percent of the Burmese population practices Buddhism and the monks number well over 500,000. (Paula Bronstein/Getty Images)

Any study of Burma will be lacking if it fails to take into consideration the history of religion, in particular the deep roots of the Theravada Buddhist tradition, within the nation. Questions of political and cultural authority, education, and identity, must to some degree be observed through the lens of religion to be understood with any depth of meaning. The reality of religious, ethnic, and cultural diversity across the nation continues to be a cause of deep divide and tension in a land that has, until recently, sought to maintain national unity through the combined nexus of authoritarian, military, and traditional religious forces.

Adrian Bird

Although religious diversity exists within Myanmar and continues to shape contemporary tensions, it would be difficult to overstate the significance of Buddhism within both the history and present context of the land. The presence of Buddhism in Myanmar can be traced to the fifth century CE, and by the eleventh century CE, Theravada Buddhism had struck deep roots into the social-political, cultural, and religious fabric of Burma. In present-day Myanmar, Buddhism continues to play a critical role, to the point that political authorities seek essential legitimacy not primarily through “performance criteria,” such as their success in issues of human rights, economic development, and effective democracy, but rather in its capacity to fulfill the role of traditional Burmese kingship, including their role as protectors of the Buddhist faith. Political leaders therefore seek to emphasize their legitimacy and increase their credibility through establishing links with leading Buddhist figures. Although there have been various political strategies employed in postindependence Myanmar, none can ignore the significance of Buddhism, which lies at the heart of nationalist Burmese culture and identity. Melford E. Spiro argues that to be Burman is to be Buddhist. Without Buddhism, there could be no Burma, and those not Buddhist are for the most part considered as non-Burmese.

A national identity defined in religious terms becomes problematic for minority communities such as Christians, Muslims, or Hindus who are not part of the dominant ethnic Burman majority. Following independence, during Prime Minister U Nu’s political campaign to make Buddhism the state religion, reassurance was offered to religious minorities that this act would not diminish their citizenship or their freedom of religion. Despite this assertion, the act was vehemently opposed by many minority religious groups, highlighting an ongoing suspicion against the hegemony of Buddhist and political forces. From 1954 to 1956, the sixth Great Buddhist Council was held in Rangoon, affirming the fundamental status of Buddhism in Myanmar. Commentator Eugene Smith notes that hosting such a prestigious event undoubtedly highlights the government’s willingness and determination to promote Theravada Buddhism in Myanmar and in the world.

The cultural influence of Buddhism is witnessed in multiple ways, including art, literature, and architecture. While religion can be a significant component of culture, this does not necessarily imply that the people place great importance to it within their lives. Yet in Myanmar, the importance of Buddhism in people’s lives is evident in many ways, including the percentage of family income devoted to Buddhism, the high number of males who enter the Buddhist monastic sangha (community of monks), and the deep reverence afforded those within the sangha.

Within Myanmar, no single institution is more important than Buddhism. Buddhist monks are highly revered and have traditionally played a vital role within society, upholding the Buddha dhamma (the truth proclaimed by the Buddha), and essentially providing an avenue for the attainment of karmic merit among the laity. Education in Burma has historically been the responsibility of the sangha, though the influence of the sangha was undermined with the introduction of secular education and mission schools during British rule (1886–1948). Yet the influence of the sangha and of Buddhism remains central to postcolonial Myanmar. Indeed, Myanmar is considered by much of Theravadan Buddhist Southeast Asia as having been the “protector of the faith” during the era of British colonial imperialism.

Perhaps one of the most intriguing developments within Buddhism in modern times has been the rise of the vipassanā (insight) meditation under the leadership of Mahasi Sayadaw, which had a profound impact on lay Buddhists. Traditionally, the role of redressing moral decline within the country had been the responsibility of the Kings and the sangha. Yet the emergence of the vipassanā movement caused a shift in the dynamics of traditional roles, with greater responsibility now on the people themselves toward self-purification in order to stem the reality of moral decline in this World Age. This development remains significant and is a source of tension in modern Myanmar, in which the traditional kingship role of protecting the Buddhist faith has been adopted by a military leadership.

Although the status of Buddhism as the basis of the nation’s traditional culture remains unquestioned, minority religions continue to exist within the country. While Buddhism makes up 89 percent of the population, there are significant Christian (6 percent), Muslim (2.5 percent), and Hindu (> 1 percent) groups within the nation, which have a significant influence on the society as a whole. It is estimated that up to 90 percent of the Chin and Kachin in the western and northern part of the country, respectively, are Christian. Significant numbers of Christians are present also among the Karen, following the American Baptist Missionary presence in Burma during the nineteenth century. Foreign missionaries are no longer present in Myanmar, though long-term church ties to the outside world remain strong. Testimonies of widespread persecution against Christians, including the burning of churches and the use of labor to build pagodas on former Christian worship sites, exist in many Christian areas. Employment opportunities may also be restricted based on the double discrimination of ethnicity and religious affiliation. Lal Chhuangi argues that as long as the ethnic groups are denied religious freedom, ethnic equality, greater autonomy, innate rights, a federal system, and self-determination, there will be no peace, stability, or prosperity in Myanmar.

Muslims in Myanmar, including the Rohingya and the Panthay, face ongoing persecution and discrimination, often resulting in clashes with Buddhist and government groups. The Rohingyas, Sunni Muslims living along the border with Bangladesh, have been described by the United Nations as one of the most persecuted minorities, facing issues of forced migration and human rights abuses. These Muslims are considered by the nationalistic government to be Bengali, remnants of early-twentieth-century immigration movements under British rule, thus illegal immigrants of Myanmar with no legitimate claim to citizenship. This significantly impacts the lives of the Muslims in their day-to-day lives, restricting basic rights such as the right to travel and to own land, and is the cause of continuous tension and hostility between nationalist and Muslim groups.

Present-day Myanmar is at a political crossroads. Although a nominally civilian government replaced the military junta in 2011, the constitution established by the junta in 2008 entrenches the power and primacy of the military. President Thein Sein is a former military general and served as the prime minister of the state under the junta. The economy is one of the least developed in the world, suffering from the effects of decades of stagnation and ineffective management. Religious and ethnic conflicts remain a source of great tension, despite continued attempts to generate peace initiatives across ethnic and religious lines. The future of Myanmar depends largely on its ability to plot a course within the tension between modernity and deeply entrenched traditional modes of living, of which Buddhism plays a pivotal role.

Adrian Bird

See also: Buddhism; Christianity; Colonialism; Dharma/Dhamma; Ethnicity; Hinduism; Islam; Kyaw Than, U; Laos; Minorities; Missionary Movements; Nationalism; Religious Discrimination and Intolerance; Sayadaw, Mahasi; Thailand.

MYTH/MYTHOLOGY

The English word myth comes from the Greek muthos (“word” or “speech”), which owes its significance precisely to its contrast with the Greek word logos; the latter can also be translated as “word,” but only in the sense of a word that elicits discussion, an “argument.” Muthos in its meaning as “myth” is the word for a story concerning gods and superhuman beings. A myth is an expression of the sacred in words; it reports realities and events from the origin of the world that remain valid for the basis and purpose of all there is. Consequently, a myth functions as a model for human activity, society, wisdom, and knowledge. The word mythology is used for the entire body of myths found in a given tradition. It is also used as a term for the study of myths.

Reference to the sacred may prove problematic for some as defining the subject, “myth,” in terms of something that lacks clarity more than the term itself. However, the distinction between “the sacred” and “the profane” emphasized by the philosophically inclined French sociologist Emile Durkheim is based on a sober observation: all human traditions and societies heed the sacred and mark it in one way or another. Its ultimate or metaphysical reality is not the issue. The most general characteristic of the sacred is not that it is exalted, but that it is distinct from ordinary, profane, this-worldly everyday things. In communicating the sacred, a myth makes available in words what by no other means is available. Its words are different from other words; most generally they have an extraordinary authority and are in that perceivable manner distinct from common speech. The language of myth does not invite discussion; it does not argue, but presents.

In a number of instances, the myth is recited in a special archaic language, different from the vernacular. One such instance is a creation myth in the Ngaju-Dayak tradition (South Kalimantan, Borneo, Indonesia) featuring the water serpent, tambon, and the hornbill, bungai. Its unusual language is not meant to keep it secret, but rather serves to underline its significance, preserved by experts in the community. The narrative itself establishes not only the world at large, but at once, and within it, the land, orienting the villages and also their mirror-image counterparts in the heavenly realms; it creates the social divisions and their functions, as well as the principles of the legal system. As to the externals of its style, the myth is couched in lyrical poetry, as are many myths, including those expressed in vernaculars, in Southeast Asia.

A myth, whether its subject is the acts of deities or other extraordinary events, always takes us back to “beginnings of all things”; hence the cosmogony, the birth of the world, is a principal theme. The Ngaju-Dayak creation myth begins with the words: “It happened long ago, when everything was still in the jaws of the tambon; it was primeval time.” In each case, the world to which the myth transports us is very different from our own; it is in fact a time beyond any human being’s knowledge, and hence the events and realities dealt with are literally altogether different from facts humans are concerned with in their everyday lives.

Myth is one of the three forms of religious expression: that is sacred speech, sacred acts, and sacred places. As such, it occurs side by side in most traditions with sacred places or objects (or, in short, symbols) and sacred acts (that is, cult rituals). They can be expected to elucidate the entire religious life of a community, shedding light especially on the ritual acts and sacred objects that by themselves do not speak at all, or certainly not often or as clearly. For instance, a central temple or sacred grove may be of paramount significance in the life of a community, yet it is a chronicled myth that is most likely to explain this significance, its origin, its basis, and the reason for its pivotal role in the community’s life.

At first sight, myths have much in common with many other forms of folk tradition. They deal with “supernatural” events, as fairy tales do; they deal with extraordinary figures comparable to those in legends and sagas, and so on. The authority of myths, already referred to, is, however, clearly distinguishable from features in other narratives. Typically, the myth presents itself as telling its listeners of a time altogether different from the time of our experience (“In the beginning …” or “Before heaven and earth were created …”), whereas the typical fairy tale, no matter how wonderful its events, begins “Once upon a time …”—that is to say, a time like ours. The saga’s hero and the legend’s saintly protagonist are no doubt superior to all ordinary human beings, yet their time is shown just like the historical time of our experience.

Epics present a special case, for they are often a prime source of our knowledge of myths: the Mahabharata and Ramayana are famous instances in Southeast Asian history. Nevertheless, epics do not have the authority of myths. The myths they narrate in the body of their texts and the mythological references they make can be seen as part of an educational pattern: in this manner, people should understand the basic, authoritative models in the religious tradition.

As to their purpose, myths are not, contrary to traditional assumption, essentially etiological, understood in the sense of explaining origins or causes. Until recently, many scholars saw in myths prescientific endeavors to establish causes for the universe, natural phenomena, and everything else that occupies modern scientists, thereby overlooking the fact that this preoccupation with causality is a very precisely determined feature of modern history. Myths are not attempts at causality preshadowing nineteenth-century scientific discussion. A myth does something else, and something more encompassing than presenting a reasonable, or even prereasonable, explanation of things. This is the reason why the Romanian historian of religion, Mircea Eliade has rightly emphasized the cosmogony as the fundamental myth. In whatever cultural or religious tradition a creation myth is recited, it is paradigmatic in a special manner because of the many things to which its sheer force as a model is able to give birth.

David C. Scott

See also: Animism; Christianity; Ethnicity; Hinduism; Indonesia; Orientalism; Popular Religion; Postcolonial Theory; Ritual Dynamics; Study of Religion; Water Festivals.

M

MAARIF, AHMAD SYAFI’I

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MALAYSIA

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Myanmar

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MINORITIES

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MISSIONARY MOVEMENTS

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MUHAMMADIYAH

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MUSIC

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MUSLIMAT NU

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MYANMAR (BURMA)

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MYTH/MYTHOLOGY

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