Religion in Southeast Asia: An Encyclopedia of Faiths and Cultures

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NACPIL, EMERITO

Emerito P. Nacpil, retired bishop of the United Methodist Church in the Philippines, is one of the prominent Christian theologians in Southeast Asia. He had also been deeply involved in the ecumenical movement at the local, regional, and global levels. He made significant contributions to Christianity in Asia as an Asian theologian, teacher, and administrator in the field of theological education and through his leadership as a bishop of the United Methodist Church.

Nacpil was born in February 18, 1932, in Tarlac in the Philippines. After his bachelor of arts degree, he received a bachelor of theology degree from the Union Theological Seminary in the Philippines and proceeded to the Drew University in Madison, New Jersey, to secure his PhD in systematic theology and philosophy of religion. Returning home, Nacpil took up responsibilities at Union Theological Seminary, first as professor, then as the academic dean, and later as president. During this time, he also chaired the Board of Ordained Ministry of the Middle Philippines Annual Conference.

In 1974, Nacpil was invited to become the executive director of the Association of Theological Schools in Southeast Asia and dean of the Southeast Asia Graduate School of Theology. In these positions, he did much to strengthen theological education in the region. During this time, the Philippines Central Conference of the Methodist Church elected him as bishop in 1980. He was reelected in 1984 and 1988 and served as bishop until his retirement in 2000. By then he had served as bishop in all three Episcopal areas in the Philippines—Baguio, Manila, and Davao areas. Later he was elected as the president of the Council of Bishops of the General Conference, where he was able to make significant contributions to the discussions on contemporary issues faced by the Methodist Church as a whole.

Bishop Nacpil was also involved in regional and global ecumenism, serving on the Faith and Order Commission and the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches. From the perspective of Southeast Asia, what stands out most are the cutting-edge theological contributions he made at the conferences and consultations held in the Asian region. As the executive director of the association of theological schools in the region, he developed the concept of “Asian Critical Principle,” which advocated that one should seek to identify what is distinctively Asian and use this distinctiveness as the critical principle of judgment on matters dealing with the life and mission of the Christian community, its theology, and theological education. When globalization became a reality, he called for an “Expanded Asian Critical Principle” that can be applied to issues affecting the whole of Asia and the world.

Nacpil will also be remembered as one of the first among the “third world” theologians to call for a “moratorium” of Western missionary activity in Asia. He made this call in February 1971 at a consultation of Methodist missionaries and churches in Asia in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. In the presence of many of the missionary colleagues, he argued that the present structure of missionary engagement in Asia had to end and that the most missionary service that they can do under the present system was to “go home.” He was convinced that while the Western missionaries must go home, the churches in Asia should discover their mission and become fully engaged in it. These ideas are spelled out in Nacpil’s 1971 book, Mission but Not Missionaries. Among the many books he wrote and edited and the numerous articles he wrote, his volumes on Mission and Change (1968), The Human and the Holy: Asian Perspectives in Christian Theology (ed. 1978), and Jesus’ Strategy for Social Transformation (1998 and 1999) are very widely used.

S. Wesley Ariarajah

See also: Christianity; Christian Conference of Asia; Globalization; Kyaw Than, U; Liberation Theologies; Missionary Movements; Philippines; Simatupang, T. B.; Study of Religion.

NAHDLATUL ULAMA

Nahdlatul Ulama (also, Nahdatul Ulama), commonly shortened to NU, is the biggest Islamic organization in Indonesia. This organization represents most traditional Muslim communities, which claim themselves as Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama’ah (“The people of the tradition of Muhammad and the community”). Although most members of NU live in remote areas where most pesantren institutions (traditional Islamic educational institutions) are located, one of the leaders of the organization, K. H. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) became the third president of Indonesia. NU, along with the reformist and modernist organization, Muhammadiyah, has been regarded as the mainstream Islam in the country. The basic principles of NU, which are represented in three concepts—tawasuth (moderate), tasamuh (tolerant), and tawazzun (equal)—became the characteristics of Islam in the country. With the estimate of its membership as high as 30 million, NU will continue to play a significant role in shaping the image of Islam in the country and become a role model for moderate Islam around the globe.

Nahdlatul Ulama, which literally means “the Awakening of Islamic scholars,” was established by a number of ulemas (clerics) in Surabaya, East Java, on January 31, 1926. The establishment of the NU, led by Hadratussyaikh Hasyim Asy’ari and others, was triggered by the emergence of revivalist and modernist movements, which threatened the existence of traditional ulema with a variety of religious traditions that the revivalists and modernists viewed as containing elements of TBC, which stands for Tahayyul (myth), Bid’ah (heresy), and Churafat (superstition). The direct tension between the traditionalist and the modernist Muslims in Indonesia has appeared since 1912, when K. H. Achmad Dahlan, along with other modernist Muslims, proclaimed the first modern Islamic organization called Muhammadiyah. As a reaction to this organization, along with the spread of Wahhabism (the religious movement known for its strict observance of the Qur’an) that conquered Hejaz, or Mecca and Madinah, in 1924, Nahdlatul Ulama set as its main goal to preserve the existence of the traditional ulema and their pesantren institutions, as well as the teachings of orthodox Sunni and Sufism.

Although NU is representing traditional Islam in Indonesia, this does not mean that the organization is run traditionally without a modern structure. Indeed, as in other modern organizations, NU also has a sophisticated structure. The highest body of NU is the Supreme Council, known as Dewan Syuriah. It is followed by the Executive Council, called Dewan Tanfidziyah. Leaders of both councils are chosen every five years through Muktamar (Conference), in which all NU branches at provincial and district levels have equal vote. Under the Executive Council, there are provincial and district boards, as well as some autonomous bodies, institutes, and committees, with the structure extending down to sub-branch representative council boards in villages, called pengurus ranting.

The role of NU in the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia is undeniable. A well-known fatwa (religious edict) of the NU to defend the independence of the country, which is known as “Resolusi Jihad” (Jihad Resolution), whipped up the spirit of fighting and resulted in the huge battle of Surabaya in 10 November 1945. NU is also known as the first Islamic organization that accepted the state ideology of pancasila as its basis. The significant role of NU becomes most evident in education. Currently, NU has around 17,000 pesantren, more than 4,000 schools (from elementary to high school levels), and 44 universities. Through its pesantren networks, NU also plays an active role in improving the living standards of rural communities.

Achmad Zainal Arifin

See also: Ahmadiyya; Aisyiyah and Nasyiatul Aisyiyah; Education; Indonesia; Interreligious Relations and Dialogue; Islam; Maarif, Ahmad Syafi’i; Muhammadiyah; Myth/Mythology; Pesantren; Rais, Muhammad Amien; Reform Movements; Religion and Society; Sufism; Wahid, Abdurrahman; Women.

NATIONALISM

Nationalism can be defined as an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity, and identity on behalf of a population some of whom have decided to form a “nation” (Smith 2000, 1). It is directly connected to the formation of nation-states in eighteenth-century Europe founded on the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The “nation” is a group or groups of people that have a common culture, communication system, traditions, history, beliefs, and ideas (Gellner 1983, 7). The “state” is an institution or set of institutions concerned with the enforcement of order, such as police, government, etc., that consists of a “nation” or “nations” (Gellner 1983, 4). As such, nationalism is the ability of a “nation” to articulate their wish, goals, needs to support itself, and the “state” that it is in. Nationalism is not only connected to the building of modern states, but critical to forming and supporting identities of people to the nation-state they belong to.

Early studies of nationalism can generally be categorized into two main strains, which were highly influential up to the emergence of revisionist historiography and postmodernism in the 1980s–1990s that are relevant to Southeast Asia: civic and ethic. Civic nationalism stresses secularism; upholds law and equality of all citizens; and holds that anyone that conforms to the rules, traditions, and laws of the state can be a part of it. Ethnic nationalism stresses the centrality of blood relations and common culture, history, language, religion, and traditions of a particular ethnic group or ethnie that dominates the state. Ethnic nationalism is considered to be exclusive in that only members of the particular ethnic group can truly belong (Smith 1998, 125–26). Later studies in nationalism with regard to Southeast Asia hold that the region’s nations were a product of modernism and more similar to “imagined communities” than truly factual entities predating the modernity of the eighteenth century. Benedict Anderson stresses that modern nation-states are socially constructed (generally by elites) with the stated purpose of building modern political bodies able to compete and centralize resources to further construct identities of a similar nature. A nation of people draws on particular histories, myths, myths of origins, primordial states that transgress time and space, heroes, leaders, patriotism, and symbols (such as flags, songs and anthems, tombs of soldiers/unknown, etc.) in order to come together under a banner of singleness (Anderson 1983). Third-wave studies of nationalism with reference to Southeast Asia are drawn from cultural studies and stress how states of the region are particular and do not follow or fall into simple categories of definition as prior studies would indicate. This strain of thought puts forth the various forces involved in nation-building in postcolonial states such as the geopolitics of the Cold War, ideological struggles, struggles for control of economies and resources, ethnic tensions and identifications, maps and cartography, and control of state resources such as media, education, and economy, which in some cases consolidated states and in some cases created large-scale violence and suffering. The political use of nationalist symbols, be it monarchy, ancient kingdoms, ethnic diasporas, language, or religious communities, has a common thread in that when they are put into use, they become mediums for political mobilization for political structures, elites, leaders, and the masses of people (Brubaker 1996).

Nationalism may be considered as a method for the expression of ideas, interests, values, and identity/identities of large collectives of people. Generally, this expression takes place against the backdrop of calls for independence or self-determination. More specifically, nationalism need not always express a view of independence from, but also inclusion within the policy of states. Regardless of the nature, sources, or purposes, nationalism provides an avenue for human collectives to express their wishes, desires, fears, needs, and histories (real or imagined) in ways that seek to empower the group.

William J. Jones

Southeast Asian nationalism is suggested by Sidel to be separated into a Mainland version and an Island version. The Mainland version (Cambodia, Burma, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam) stresses an exclusive conceptualization of dominant core of ethnicity and its history and symbols to internally colonize minority groups; whereas Island Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore) stresses a more inclusive fragmented and less stringent version of nationalism (Sidel 2012). Nationalism in Southeast Asia must take into consideration that all Southeast Asian states (with the exception of Siam/Thailand) were created in the twentieth century with the downfall of colonialism. Southeast Asian states are relatively new, and nationalism is especially strong in the region due to colonial histories of oppression, exploitation, and independence struggle. Some major factors heavily affecting the region are a high degree of diversity in language, ethnicity, and religion. The following are two cases of mainland and island nationalism and the role of religion in modern nation-building in Southeast Asia.

Indonesian nationalism is considered to be of the civic variety in order to account for the diversity of the Indonesian archipelago and the building of the state. Only for a short period of time during the presidency of Sukarno during his “Guided Democracy” period (1957–1965) did “NASAKOM”—the political concept based on Army, Islamic groups, and Communist—become the basis for nationalism (Leifer 2000, 156). This nonsecular nationalism has its roots in the “Jakarta Charter” of 1944 under Japanese rule, where Sukarno stated that every Indonesian should believe in his or her own particular God (Tarling 2004, 133). The Indonesian archipelago accommodates a huge diversity of peoples, and as such, under the corporatist rule of Suharto (1967–1998), religion was sidelined as a nationalist force, only gaining major expression in the race riots (Chinese pogroms) during the fallout of the Asian economic crisis of 1997–1998 (Sidel 2012).

Thai nationalism, while enduring periods of extremism during the Plaek Phibunsongkram premierships (1938–1944, 1948–1957), has its roots in the Rama VI (1910–1925) period of the current Chakri dynasty, which professed the current triad of Thai nationalism as Nation, Religion, King (Tarling 2004, 193). Buddhism as the official state religion and part of state ideology puts forth ethical and moral codes for people to follow, such as upholding their duty, industriousness, and upholding social hierarchy (Connors 2003, 238). The social hierarchy is connected by the Buddhist story of The Three Worlds Cosmology of Phra Ruang that links the hierarchy of gods and deities to karma according to which humans on earth are also subject to karmatic order of the Three Worlds and official state ideology (Jackson 1993). It is seen that Buddhist religious virtues, when upheld, legitimize the Thai/Siamese king and his right to rule, thus giving the Thai state a focus of national expression or embodiment via its virtuous Buddhist monarch.

William J. Jones

See also: Buddhism; Colonialism; Communism; Ethnicity; Freedom of Religion; Indonesia; Islam; Minorities; Myth/Mythology; Orientalism; Postcolonial Theory; Religion and Society; Secularism; Thailand.

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NACPIL, EMERITO

Further Reading

NAHDLATUL ULAMA

Further Reading

NATIONALISM

Further Reading