Religion in Southeast Asia: An Encyclopedia of Faiths and Cultures

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RAIS, MUHAMMAD AMIEN

Muhammad Amien Rais, born in Solo, Central Java, on April 26, 1944, is inevitably one of the key persons and leaders of the reformasi (reformation) movement that led the 1998 democratic transition in Indonesia. Since the 1990s, he actively pushed the importance of the political and regime change for a better Indonesia. As the chairman of Muhammadiyah (the largest Muslim modernist organization in Indonesia), he together with other civil society groups criticized the Suharto regime, which handcuffed political freedom, press freedom, and freedom of expression for the people. When he became one of the leaders of ICMI (Ikatan cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals), he raised the sensitive issues of the Suharto regime such as corruption, collusion, and nepotism into public concerns. Before Suharto ended his power in May 1998 as the result of this reformation movement, he was the one who advanced “succession” of political leadership to overthrow Suharto constitutionally.

Rais did his elementary and high school studies in Muhammadiyah educational institutions in Solo. He learned religious studies from his parents and at Islamic school Khususiyah Al-Islam in Solo. The young Rais was also involved in Hizbul Wathan, a scouting organization of Muhammadiyah. He pursued higher education at Gadjah Mada University, majoring in international relations. While he was a university student, Amien joined the Muhammadiyah Student Association (IMM) for which he produced many articles in mass media. Rais began his career as assistant lecturer soon after he graduated from the university in 1968. He gained his master’s degree from the University of Notre Dame, Indiana, in 1974 and earned his PhD degree from the University of Chicago in 1981. His dissertation was entitled “The Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt: Its Rise, Demise, and Resurgence.”

After returning from the United States, Rais was involved in the Muhammadiyah Central Board, and he gave speeches in many universities, joined many organizations such as the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), and wrote books and articles. In 1990, he was elected as the vice chairman of Muhammadiyah and in the 1995 congress in Aceh, he was elected as the chairman of Muhammadiyah. As chairman, Rais gave political and civic education for Indonesian people about the importance of religious power to fight against corruption, despotism, and authoritarianism. He also strove to encourage the Indonesian people to practice democracy, human rights, and to campaign against the corrupt and authoritarian regime. During the transition era, Muhammadiyah together with Nahdlatul Ulama were noted as the social organizations based on religious values that led and strongly supported the democratization of Indonesia.

After the fall of Suharto, Rais and the other reformist proponents established the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional) on August 6, 1998. This party aimed to institutionalize and support the reform agenda in the political system. Instead of a religious basis, the party employed the pluralist ideology that corresponded with the Indonesian reality, which is comprised of many religions and groups. In 1999, Rais was appointed as the speaker of the People Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) of the Republic of Indonesia. During that period, the People Consultative Assembly was the highest political institution in the country’s political system. As the speaker of the People Consultative Assembly (1999–2004), Rais was the champion of the Indonesian constitution’s amendment process. The 1945 constitution was alleged as the source of authoritarianism in Indonesian political system. The amendment process led to political changes and the creation of institutions that are very important in supporting democratization.

Rais’s religious viewpoints are moderate and he does not agree to the idea of the creation of an Islamic state in Indonesia, since there are no certain verses in the Qur’an and Hadist that support this notion. He is typically a Muhammadiyah activist who places his faith in action paradigm in thought and expressions. He values actions as more important than speculative and abstract thinking. After losing the presidential election in 2004, he set apart his life as the chairman of the National Mandate Party’s Advisory Board, as Muhammadiyah’s prominent preacher and figure, and as a continuing and influential professor at the Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

Ahmad Fuad Fanani

See also: Education; Indonesia; Islam; Morality; Muhammadiyah; Nahdlatul Ulama; Reform Movements; Study of Religion.

REFORM MOVEMENTS

Southeast Asia is home to most of the world’s religions, but with the accumulation of tradition, power, and wealth over the centuries, they have, in several places, become unable or unwilling to respond adequately to the changing context. Reform movements that challenge these tendencies and reaffirm the need for religions to be sensitive to their vision have emerged in all the religions. Reform movements in the religions of Southeast Asia have in particular defended democracy and human rights, resisted fundamentalist and theocratic tendencies, and upheld the right of religious and ethnic minorities, women, and the other marginalized sections to live and function freely. This entry will briefly examine such reform movements in the religions of the region.

Islam

As the most widely practiced religion in Southeast Asia, Islam has a rich tradition of religious reform that goes back several centuries. While reform movements in the earlier centuries were focused primarily on theological debates on orthodoxy and heresy, in more recent times, they have been concerned with the potential of religion for social transformation and the liberation of the marginalized sections of the society. As the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country, Indonesia presents a picture to gauge the reformist and progressive role religion plays in public life. Even though the country is 87 percent Muslim, Islam is not the state religion of Indonesia, and there is a long tradition of Muslim reform movements in the country. Muhammadiyah, the reformist and modernist organization founded in 1912, combines theological purification and social reform. Muhammadiyah emphasizes the moral responsibility of people and the need to purify the people’s faith in line with the Islam doctrines. Along with Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah has been regarded as mainstream Islam in the country. Both the organizations have been particularly active at the level of education by running a number of institutions and also by supporting pesantrens, the Islamic boarding schools that have been providing low-cost and free education for Muslims, especially in the remote areas of the country.

Under the leadership of General Suharto, who was the president of Indonesia from 1967 to 1998, the state ideology of pancasila (five principles)—which affirms the supremacy of God but also upholds the “secular” values of democracy and social justice—was strengthened. A systematic attempt at depoliticization happened in the country, in the process creating a climate conductive for religious reform. In the post-Suharto era, there has been a revival of some of the radical Islamist organizations, leading to ethno-religious and interreligious conflicts that threatened the very foundation of the secular democracy. The reformist organizations and movements affirm that they are alert to these challenges and are committed to upholding the spirit of freedom of thought and expression in the midst of fundamentalist tendencies.

In Malaysia, too, reform movements within the context of Islam have been actively present for several years. In particular, the role played by Sisters in Islam (SIS), an organization that campaigns for gender equality and women’s rights, is important. The original focus of the group was to challenge Islamic laws, policies, and traditions that were considered to be discriminative against women. Later, the group’s areas of work expanded to include the larger issues of social justice, democracy, human rights, and legal reform. SIS also networks with other women’s and reformist organizations in the country and abroad.

By and large, mainstream Islam in Southeast Asia has largely stayed away from extremist and fundamentalist forces that have reared their heads, time and again, in several other parts of the world. Progressive Muslim leaders affirm that the core values of Islam are compatible with democracy, pluralism, and human rights. Even though some interpretations of shari’a are discriminatory toward women, Islam emphasizes women’s right to practice their religion as equal believers. Women should also have the right to education, employment, and political participation. Reformist Islamic organizations and movements play a vital role in affirming these positive and liberative values of religion.

Buddhism

Engaged Buddhism, a movement of social, political, economic, and environmental activism that developed in the twentieth century, perhaps best represents the reformist face of Buddhism in Southeast Asia. The movement arose out of the grave social and political challenges—such as wars, famine, ethnic violence, and the oppression and marginalization of women—faced not only by the Buddhists, but also the wider world, in the twentieth century. Religion that should be providing answers for these problems that perplex humanity was found to be woefully inadequate and unwilling to take up these challenges. At the height of the Vietnam War, Thich Nhat Hanh—the highly respected Zen master who was born in Vietnam—and others were confronted with the question, whether to continue their contemplative life of meditation in the monasteries, or help villagers suffering under the war. They chose both: to be true to the essence of the Buddhist monastic life and yet be sensitive to the plight of the common people. Engaged Buddhism, born out of such a commitment, has been inspired by the nonviolent and pacifist principles of several religions and ideologies, but is fundamentally Buddhist.

Engaged Buddhism has taken contextual and regional forms in different countries. The Santi Asoke movement in Thailand rejects many of the traditional rituals in Buddhism by preaching and practicing a faith that is nonhierarchical and laity-oriented. The group also represents an alternative lifestyle that is simple, rural, and self-sufficient in food production. In Thailand also arose individual leaders like Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, who attempted to reform Theravada Buddhism. In particular, he demythologized Thai Buddhism and the Tipitaka (the original Buddhist Scripture) by focusing on the role of the individual in religious practice and principles. In politics, Buddhadasa questioned people in authority whom he considered to be corrupted by power, money, and prestige.

The Buddhist women’s movements too have been an expression of reform in religion. They focus on the status and experiences of women in Buddhist societies and, in particular, on women’s struggle for religious and social equality. They are also engaged in feminist reinterpretations of Buddhist tenets and in affirming Buddhist feminist identity in Asian Buddhist cultures and across national and ethnic boundaries. The women’s movements have also been concerned about actively redefining the relationship of women to religious institutions and other dimensions of cross-cultural movements. The Buddhist women’s movements have contributed greatly to bringing women’s issues from the margins to the mainstream and in including the feminine, women, sexuality, and gender as a subfield in Buddhist studies.

Christianity

Christianity is often perceived as a foreign religion in Asia, primarily because its theology and practice have been closely identified with the history of Western missionary movement and even of colonialism. As the colonized nations became independent one by one under a strong impulse of nationalism and self-rule, the Asian Christians too realized that Western theology that had been passed on them as the theology was no more than a European theory that had evolved in contexts far removed from their own. Accordingly, the Asian Christians felt compelled to raise questions about the faith, practices, and liturgies that they had received. During the postcolonial period, the liberation theology movement played a major role in posing appropriate questions by placing ordinary people, and not the leaders, at the center of religion. Taking the context as the starting point, the Southeast Asian Christians at the grassroots level too set in motion a process of change that redefined theology and ecclesiology from the people’s perspective.

The reforms in Asian Christianity took diverse forms in the various countries. In the Philippines in the 1970s and 1980s, the Christians played a key role in mobilizing the public against the authoritarian rule of President Marcos. Even before the Roman Catholic Church, under the leadership of Cardinal Jaime Lachica Sin, got involved in the anti-Marcos movement, lay Christian groups such as the Young Christian Socialist Movement and the International Fellowship of Reconciliation were actively present in the scene, by conducting seminars and other programs for leaders among the political parties, other community organizers, and students. These programs had a ripple effect in galvanizing the church hierarchy and the public to effectively counter the authoritarian forces in the country.

The awakening of women from traditional patriarchal structures too has been an integral part of the reform in Christianity. The Indonesia-based Asian Women’s Resource Centre for Culture and Theology (AWRC) as an organization of women and women’s organizations in Asia has been involved in seeking alternative patterns both in theology and praxis. Conceived at the Asian Women Theologians’ Conference in Singapore in November 1987 by some women theologians who recognized the need to form a community of Asian women engaged in theology and ministry, AWRC has been leading the way in promoting Asian women’s theology.

Reforms in Christianity had experienced ups and downs in the Asian context. While liberation theology had provided the theological foundation that had challenged the oppressive structures of state and other institutions, in the postcolonial period, Pentecostalism has emerged as a strong alternative. Especially in Singapore, Pentecostalism has, by and large, replaced liberal Christianity as the dominant form of Christianity, becoming popular after the state had consolidated its rule in the 1980s and suppressed liberal Christian movements, especially by expelling, in 1987, the Christian Conference of Asia from the country. Caught between the urge for social change that will liberate the marginalized people on the one hand, and a “prosperity gospel” that supports the ruling class and is individualistic and conservative in orientation on the other, reforms in Asian Christianity are indeed at a crossroads.

Hinduism and Bahá’í Faith

Arya Samaj is one of the Hindu reformist movements that is actively present in Southeast Asia. The founder of Arya Samaj, Swami Dayanand Saraswati (1824–1883), created the Samaj’s 10 principles based on the Vedas, which are considered the earliest literary record of Indo-Aryan civilization and also are the sacred books of the Hindus. These principles aimed at reforming the individual and society through the physical, social, and spiritual betterment of humanity. Saraswati’s aim was not to found a new religion, but the true development of humankind by the acceptance of the Supreme truth and rejection of falsehood through analytical thinking. Arya Samaj is actively present in many Southeast Asian countries. Arya Samaj Singapore, founded in 1927, organizes Vedic Satsang, where the members gather together and listen to religious and moral discourses by prominent preachers and leaders from India and neighboring countries. The Samaj has also been involved in educational and social reform activities that benefit not only the Hindus, but also the wider community. Arya Samaj is actively present in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand as well.

The Bahá’í Faith, which emerged out of the earlier Babi movement in the nineteenth century, identifies its mission as uniting the peoples of all religions in order to establish a divinely ordered global society of peace and justice. Initially, the only part of Southeast Asia to have Bahá’ís was Burma, but in a religious revival in the middle of the twentieth century, the movement spread to South Vietnam, the Philippines, Sarawak, Indonesia, and several other locations in the region. Bahá’ís are now well established across the whole region, with a strong commitment to social development, the promotion of education, and women’s rights. There is also an extensive Bahá’í literature in all the major languages of the region.

Jesudas M. Athyal

See also: Bhikkhu, Buddhadasa; Buddhism; Christianity; Colonialism; Contextualization; Education; Engaged Buddhism; Ethnicity; Fundamentalism; Globalization; Hanh, Thich Nhat; Hinduism; Indonesia; Islam; Liberation theologies; Malaysia; Messianic movements; Minorities; Muhammadiyah; Nahdlatul Ulama; Pesantren; Philippines; Santi Asoke; Secularism; Sexuality; Shari’a; Sin, Cardinal Jaime Lachica; Singapore; Sisters in Islam; Thailand; Vietnam; Women.

RELIGION AND SOCIETY

Religion guides the everyday lives of most Asians. While the modern, Western culture often draws a boundary between religion and society including the separation of church and state, religion for the Asians has a totalizing effect. Not only the spiritual realm, but also the social, political, economic, and ecological lives of Asians are often guided by religious traditions and values. Even as theocratically oriented monarchies gave way to democratic structures, religion continued to have a lingering effect on public life, shaping and reorienting the political narrative. The influence of religious structures on the social and economic scene of Southeast Asia is also important, especially as the region accounts for a large proportion of the world’s poor. The role religions play in responding to the challenges to the ecology and environment is another significant area. This entry will briefly review the impact of Asian religions in public life, within the broader context of the interface between religion and society.

Buddhist Context

In many Southeast Asian nations, religions have played an important role in determining the course of political developments. While political as well as religious legitimacy imparted to the monarchy was a characteristic of several Southeast Asian societies, today monarchical forms survive, to some extent, only in Thailand and Cambodia. The constitution of Thailand ensures the protection of all religious groups, but the country has a long tradition of imparting primacy for Buddhism, which also involves interference in the political process of the country. While Thailand is now a constitutional monarchy, it is perhaps the only country in the world where the king is stipulated to be a Buddhist and the upholder of the Faith. Even though Buddhist monks have long demanded the inclusion of Buddhism as the official religion of the country, the government has not yet yielded to such demands. The monks, however, continue to enjoy several perks and benefits in public life. While the Thai king interferes only rarely in political affairs, he maintains the right to do so and has intervened occasionally, including during the riots of 1992. In several respects, Thailand is unique because it is the only country in the region that has maintained an unbroken monarchy that still draws its political legitimacy from the Buddhist worldview of the Thais, who are 90 percent Buddhist. Since Thailand is a functioning democracy with a free press, there is also the space for religious activism in the public sphere, including for Buddhist reformist movements such as Santi Asoke.

The concept of god-king is also a factor to be considered while discussing religion and society in a Buddhist context. In Cambodia, the tradition of god-king goes back to the devaraja of Angkor, but its legitimacy was seriously undermined following the overthrow of the head of state, Sihanouk, in 1970. While the institution of god-king within a Buddhist framework continues to play a prominent role in Thailand, it plays an ambiguous role in the legitimization of political power in Cambodia. Another context with a tradition of god-king is Burma, but the British colonial rule there dispensed with the Burmese royalty. However, the Buddhist leadership of the country continues to exert an influence in public life. Even though the “Saffron Revolution” of Burma in 2007 posed a serious threat to the military rule of the country, the movement was quickly suppressed. Religious programs that are deemed critical of the government have been strictly regulated or banned, but patronage is given to the monks who are willing to cooperate with the military.

Buddhism plays an important role in public life in Southeast Asia by its contributions to reviving the spirit of self-dignity and nationalism. For a great majority, to be Burmese or Lao was to be Buddhist. The Buddhist monks who became involved in the political sphere did so for a number of reasons. One was a religious response to rapid changes, especially as traditional values and lifestyle were increasingly being threatened by the forces of modernization and globalization. Another factor was a faith response to tyranny. Activist religious leaders like Sulak Sivaraksa were genuinely uncomfortable with the growth of authoritarian and military rulers even as democracy and freedom were suppressed in the region. In the Burmese context, on the other hand, young monks played an important role in the movement in countering the power of the military and in promoting the democratization of the country.

Christian Context

The Philippines in the 1980s was the arena of radical political action in which the Christian Church played a significant role. In a country where close to 85 percent of citizens are Catholic, the position the church took on public matters carried considerable weight with a large segment of the population. Initially, the poorer sections of the population, often assisted by clergy and laity who were committed to radical social action, took the initiative in countering the authoritarian regime of Ferdinand Marcos. After the assassination of the opposition leader Benigno Aquino in 1983, however, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church under the leadership of Cardinal Jaime Lachica Sin got involved in the struggle for freedom. The church also effectively used the media in the protests, with Radio Veritas run by the Catholic Church emerging as the only radio station that broadcasted programs that were critical of President Marcos. The involvement of the church ensured that the antigovernment protests did not become too violent but remained at the level of nonviolent protest. The founding of the Action for Peace and Justice (AKKAPKA) for the training and organization of the people was a major milestone in the promotion of nonviolent public action. Due to all these factors, the religious character of the Philippines revolution made the events there unique. At the core of the revolution against Marcos and the democratization of the country was the essence and values of religion.

The involvement of the Christian Conference of Asia (CCA) in the social and political scene of Asia that led to the closure of the CCA office and the expulsion of the organization from Singapore presented a related but different way in which Christianity played a role in Asian public life. The programs of CCA included its work at the grassroots level in conscientizing and mobilizing the masses to oppose the forces of injustice and violence. These were considered, by the authorities of Singapore, as radical steps for a religious organization and on December 30, 1987, the government closed the head office of CCA and deported the staff. The question remains: Why would a government take such a drastic action against a reputable religious organization? There are also valid questions about the implications of such draconian steps for the freedom of religions to protest systemic injustice and oppression. The action of the Singapore authorities was in tune with an increasing tendency of governments to monitor the activities of those religious organizations that were deemed independent and, especially, critical of the political powers.

Islamic Context

As the largest Muslim-majority country and the third-largest democracy in the world, Indonesia presents an interesting case study in gauging the interface between religion and society in Southeast Asia. The ease with which democracy is flourishing in the country is usually ascribed to the moderate forms of Islam Indonesians have adopted. Despite the country being 85 percent Muslim, it was never formally declared an Islamic state. The vast majority of Muslims in Indonesia is against fundamentalism and the interference of religion in politics. There is wide spread support for the governing principle of pancasila, a secular doctrine that has five principles of peaceful coexistence. Several factors—the fragmentation of Islamic authority in civil society, reforms in political institutions, and a deinstitutionalized political party system—have contributed to Islam reshaping the relationship between religion and politics. The diversity and decentralization of Islam in Indonesia too is an important factor that ensured that religion did not dictate the everyday lives of its citizens. The absence of a monopoly over Islamic authority in the country has led to the emergence of a plethora of leaders, thereby further weakening their importance and influence in public life. The diffused presence of Islam in the society also meant that various kinds of influences, including pre-Islamic beliefs and practices, contributed to shaping a largely secular-based religious response to social and political realities. While religion-based political parties are present in Indonesia, they could not take deep roots in the eclectic and democratic climate of the country. Recent years have seen the political influence of these parties and their mass organizations constantly diminished.

Social reform has also played a positive role with regard to the public face of religion in Indonesia. The status women enjoy in public life is an important factor in this regard. Thousands of students graduate every year from pesantrens (religious schools that impart both religious and secular education), and these are open to women also, thereby creating a space for them to formally acquire theological as well as general education. This openness has enabled the Indonesian society to be more receptive than most other Muslim-majority nations to matters of gender justice and equality. Many young people that come out of pesantrens are liberal and secular in their attitude, and they have become agents of change. They are also prepared to take on religious fundamentalists. The broad dynamics within civil society, state institutions, and reforms in political parties—all these factors have contributed to the emergence of moderate forms of Islam in the public life of the archipelago. The Indonesian society is a complex one ridden with problems of religious diversity, inequality, and the unemployment of youth. Yet, the country has demonstrated that Islam, democracy, modernity, and women’s rights can all exist side by side.

Economic and Ecological Context

Religion is a key factor not only in the political process of Southeast Asia, but also in influencing the economic and ecological context of the region. Asian religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism find considerable value in suffering and renunciation, even in the face of extreme difficulties. There are also sections of Islam and Christianity that tend to gloss over the life of misery and suffering here on earth for the glories of a heavenly abode. In such a religious climate, it is possible for religiosity and poverty to exist side by side, without one influencing the other. The situation is further complicated because in the Southeast Asian context, institutionalized religion is often endowed with enormous wealth even as large sections of the society live in poverty. Yet, the spirit of reformation in religions has given rise to movements that identify the struggles for a just socioeconomic order as an integral part of the spiritual realm. The forces of globalization in modern times have led to situations where poverty and inequality are not only realities at the local and regional levels, but also are systemic problems at the larger level. Religious reform movements such as liberation theologies, in all the religions, focus on the need to address economic challenges at the local and global levels.

A religious response to the ecological challenges of Southeast Asia too is important. Most countries in the region are extremely vulnerable to global climate change. All are also densely populated and prone to floods, droughts, and groundwater depletion. Some, such as the Philippines and Papua New Guinea, would be devastated by a significant rise in the ocean level. Reduction in global climate change by reducing the extent of human-induced climate change, coupled with adequate domestic policies to promote climate resilience, becomes vital in such a context. The influence religions have on the Asian people needs to be a factor in ensuring the very survival of life in the region.

All across Southeast Asia, established religious hierarchies are in crisis. The demystification of the spiritual realm and a large-scale secularization process have led to a situation where the monopoly of the religious hegemonies are under threat. In most parts of the region, there are, indeed, tectonic shifts leading to the democratization of all religions. Despite all these changes, religions in Southeast Asia continue to influence the public domain, probably at a level unparalleled in the rest of the world. The role religion can play in positively influencing the political process, in ensuring a just economic order and sustainable ecology for all, therefore, becomes both a challenge and an opportunity.

Jesudas M. Athyal

See also: Buddhism; Cambodia; Christian Conference of Asia; Christianity; Colonialism; Education; Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conferences; Fundamentalism; Globalization; Indonesia; Islam; Nationalism; Pesantren; Philippines; Reform Movements; Santi Asoke; Secularism; Sin, Cardinal Jaime Lachica; Sivaraksa, Sulak; Thailand; Women.

RELIGIOUS CONVERSIONS

The word “conversion” is used in almost all natural and human sciences to indicate some form of change that happens to alter an existent form into something new or different. The change can be natural or induced; it can be sudden or gradual; and it may retain or radically alter the qualities of that which undergoes change. The ambiguities that attend both the concept and the process of conversion in other areas can also be observed in religious conversions.

In the religious sphere, it is not unusual for a person to be awakened to a new understanding of the meaning of life, or to be introduced to a new set of beliefs about the nature and purpose of life, that leads him or her to move from a state of nonbelief or from a set of already accepted beliefs to a new one. In the case of Lord Buddha, for instance, while living within the Hindu ethos of his royal palace, he was awakened to a new understanding of the nature of existence and of the human predicament, which impelled him to move away from his Hindu heritage to begin a new movement, which became Buddhism. In a similar fashion, Confucius, deeply troubled by the social chaos in China at his time, decided to embark on a search for some principles to reorganize human relationships at all levels of society. His teaching eventually became Confucianism.

The teachings of both Buddha and Confucius attracted disciples, who also moved away from the beliefs that they previously held to embrace the new teachings, but in the Southeast Asian context, as also within the Hindu tradition in India, such moves to embrace new teachings are not considered conversions. In the Southeast Asian religious ethos, plurality of beliefs is not considered a problem. Someone embracing a new set of teachings or following a new teacher was not considered a “convert.” Those who teach and attract new followers also do not require that their followers reject or break away from the religious traditions to which they had belonged. This meant that double or even multiple religious belonging is common in Southeast Asia. While a person follows the teachings of the Buddha, he or she might also be observing the rights and rituals of the tribal religion in their daily life. While having accepted the Buddhist teachings, one might continue to worship Hindu deities and be deeply influenced by the Confucian cultural ethos.

Historically there had been some skirmishes between the old and the new expressions of religious beliefs, but on the whole, conversion was not a major issue in Southeast Asia until the coming of Islam and Christianity. In the case of Buddhism and Confucianism, there are no initiation ceremonies, like baptism in Christianity, by which one “becomes” a Buddhist. There is an organized sangha for those who wish to join the Buddhist monastic order with ceremonies and vows attached to mark the entry into the order. But the laity is not organized into a Buddhist “church.” In fact, the transformation of most of Southeast Asia to Buddhism took place gradually; the Buddhist monks were organized to spread the Buddha dhamma (dharma) among the people, but the people themselves were not separated into Buddhists and non-Buddhists.

It would appear that the strategy adopted by the Buddhist monks was not to launch a “missionary outreach” into a nation from the outside. In most cases, the monks first approached the kings of Southeast Asian countries with Buddhist teachings, highlighting the values of compassion, nonviolence, and peace. Once the rulers were convinced, they were able to spread the Buddhist teachings under royal patronage. For instance, in the eleventh century, King Anoratha of Burma (Myanmar) was convinced by the Buddhist missionaries, and he helped them to spread the teachings among his people. Similarly, at the end of the twelfth century, King Jayavarma VII of Cambodia enabled the spread of Buddhism in his land.

Even with royal patronage, Buddhism was not forced on the people. Rather, the Buddhist teachings were released into the whole nation to gradually transform the culture and the spiritual ethos of the nation to Buddhism. This transformation was not considered or named “conversions”; rather, it was considered a religious awakening by which people “embraced the teachings of the Lord Buddha.” Further, Buddhism adapted itself to the culture of each of the Southeast Asian nations into which it was taken. Thus, Thai Buddhism has its own distinctive character even as Buddhisms in Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos.

All this was to change radically with the advent of Islam and Christianity into Southeast Asia. Both these religions claimed to have received special revelations that were valid for all humankind. They also believed that the special revelations they have had would not “fit into” the religious traditions that were already present in Southeast Asia. Further, both traditions believed in building a closely knit community that would profess their faith to the exclusion of all other faith perspectives. In this context, conversion meant not only an inner spiritual transformation or a decision to follow a set of new beliefs; it also involved a decision to give up the beliefs that a person has had until then and to move into a new community. Since religion and culture are inseparable in Southeast Asia, those who embraced Islam or Christianity also had, to a large extent, to abandon the cultural heritage of the nation and enter a new cultural ethos of those who brought the message to them. Thus, with the coming of Islam and Christianity, the word “conversion” had new dimensions, like breaking away from the past, belonging to a new community, and developing a negative approach to the religion and culture from which one had moved. This understanding of religious conversion is alien to the Hindu and Buddhist approach to religion and may be the primary reason why missions failed in their attempt to convert India and the Buddhist-dominated parts of Southeast Asia.

This exclusive approach to what it means to belong to a religious tradition, especially the attempt to create an alternate community, met with considerable resistance in Southeast Asia. In the beginning successive kings of Siam (Thailand) barred Roman Catholic and Protestant missions from coming into Thailand to do mission work. However, the Southeast nations, including Thailand, were also interested in trade, education, and modern health care institutions, which the Western missionaries would bring into the country. Therefore, from time to time, some of the rulers relaxed the ban on mission activities. Eventually these institutions of education, health care, and economic development became the chief instruments in the hands of the missionaries to gain converts to Christianity.

Although colonization played a significant role in later years, initially both Islam and Christianity came into Southeast Asia through spice traders who brought their religion with them and propagated it. However, when the spice trade became lucrative, Western nations began to undertake political colonization of many parts of Asia. The Portuguese, Dutch, French, Spanish, and British colonized different parts of Southeast Asia, which provided new opportunity for missions to convert people to their particular brands of Christian faith, but with limited success. Eventually, much of Indonesia became Islamic, and the Philippines became Roman Catholic. But the bulk of Southeast Asia resisted the missionary efforts primarily because the Christian and Islamic understanding of conversion involved the creation of an alternate community that was discontinuous with the traditions and cultures of Southeast Asia.

Controversy over Christian and Islamic conversions continues to this day. Many continue to accuse Christians of the unethical practice of using humanitarian work in the areas of education, health care, and development as tools for conversion. In Thailand, Buddhist monks have challenged Christian attempts to indigenize the church by adopting the local music, symbols, and architecture as a ploy for conversion. In Malaysia, Muslims have an ongoing legal battle to ban Christians from using the Arabic word for God, Allah, partly for the fear that conversion to Christianity might be made easier by the belief that Christians and Muslims worshiped the same God. There is increasing pressure in some of the countries to legislate anti-conversions laws (as done in number of states in India), provoking debates on religious freedom and its abuse.

Much of the controversy over conversion today relates to the relationship between conversion and religious freedom. All nations in Southeast Asia are signatories to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which defines religious conversion as a human right: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief” (Article 18). Based on this declaration, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) drafted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which is a legally binding treaty. It states that “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice” (Article 18.1). This right is qualified to address the problem of forced or unethical conversions with the article: “No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice” (Article 18.2).

There are, of course, many genuine conversions in Southeast Asia, where a person chooses voluntarily to move from Buddhism, Confucianism, or a tribal religion to Christianity or Islam. Christianity and Islam have some teachings, like belief in God, dignity and equality of all human beings, and an emphasis on community that are absent in Buddhist teachings, thus providing a genuinely alternate vision of religious life; and some are attracted to it. But it is also the case that services provided for humanitarian reasons become the vehicles of conversion. Therefore, even though Islam in Indonesia and Christianity in the Philippines were not forced on people in the way it was done in some other parts of the world, issues of “forced conversion,” where political power is used to convert, “marital conversion,” where marriage is used as a way to gain converts, and “economic conversion,” where economic benefits serve as inducement to convert, are subjects that are very much alive in the conversion debates in Southeast Asia. In the scholarly world in Southeast Asia, there are discussions on the abuse of the rights given in the human rights declarations and conventions. Some have argued that by placing the emphasis on individual’s right to change one’s religion, the legitimate rights of communities to cohere as religious traditions have been compromised.

The aggravation against conversion to Christianity has increased mainly because of the activities of some of the Protestant evangelical groups that come from the United States and Korea and groups like the Seventh-day Adventists and Mormons who do door-to-door for evangelism. In 2007, Cambodia brought laws against going from door to door to for evangelical work and against doing anything that would serve as an inducement to convert. Vietnam deals with this problem by requiring all religious organizations and missions to register themselves with authorities responsible for religious affairs so that their activities are monitored. In Malaysia, even though the constitution provides freedom of religion to practice and propagate one’s religion, it is illegal to convert a Muslim to another religious tradition. In Myanmar and Thailand, serious clashes have occurred between Christians and Buddhists and between Muslims and Buddhists over the issue of conversion. At the international level, there are attempts to develop codes of conduct for evangelism and to spell out unethical methods that should be avoided in one’s attempt to propagate one’s faith. These, however, have not been able to address adequately the social and cultural issues on conversion in Southeast Asia.

S. Wesley Ariarajah

See also: Buddhism; Cambodia; Christianity; Colonialism; Confucianism; Contextualization; Dharma/Dhamma; Hinduism; Interreligious Relations and Dialogue; Indonesia; Islam; Laos; Missionary Movements; Myanmar; Peace-Building; Philippines; Religious Discrimination and Intolerance; Thailand; Vietnam.

RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION AND INTOLERANCE

Religious discrimination refers to unequal treatment of a person or a group based on what they do or do not believe, and religious intolerance happens when a religious or nonreligious group or a state specifically refuses to tolerate the presence of or the belief and practices of another group because of their religious identity. Discrimination can be overt or covert, informal or legalized. Discrimination and intolerance at the religious level happens mostly when a religion, which is in the majority, deals with one or many minority religious groups within the nation. Since almost all nations in Southeast Asia are multireligious to varying degrees, the question of how different religious traditions can coexist in a nation has become an important issue.

Policemen surround Muslim residents evacuating their houses with their belongings amid ongoing violence in Sittwe, the capital of Myanmar’s western state of Rakhine, on June 12, 2012. Dozens of people were killed in a surge in sectarian violence in Myanmar, spurred by political and religious differences. (STR/Getty Images)

Most of the countries in Southeast Asia have a dominant majority religious group with several minority religious groups among them. Most of the countries, such as Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, have predominant Buddhist majorities with Hindu, Christian, Muslim, Sikh and Tribal minorities. Indonesia and Malaysia have Muslim majorities and the Philippines have a Christian majority, but in both there are significant numbers of other minority religious groups.

Discrimination and intolerance present two distinct problems to the Southeast Asian nations. The first is the question of the human and religious rights of individuals and groups to believe and practice their religion, which is protected by international conventions. The second relates to nation-building; religious intolerance and discrimination often leads to violent conflicts, resulting in social disruption obstructing attempts at nation-building.

Religious diversity in most Southeast Asian countries is often the result of historical developments, where the majority of the people accept a new religious tradition while some within the community choose to remain in the tradition they had belonged to. Thus, while many Southeast Asian nations adopted Buddhism, a number of tribal groups within these nations remained in their tribal religions; while the Philippines embraced Roman Catholicism under Spanish rule, a significant minority remained Muslim; in Indonesia, the majority of the population adopted Islam, but it continued to have minority Buddhists, Hindus, Christians, Confucians, and peoples with their tribal religious heritages. Minority religious groups are also created by mission activities from the outside or through population movements as in the case of Thailand, Myanmar, and other Buddhist-majority nations of Southeast Asia.

Most of the Southeast Asian nations have religious freedom written into their national constitutions and are signatories to the international charters and conventions on religious freedom. A number of them also have taken steps to promote respect for religious plurality in the interest of nation-building. The outstanding example of this is Indonesia. In 1945, President Sukarno, the first president of the postcolonial government, developed a political philosophy for the emerging new state based on the fusion of socialism, nationalism, democracy, and monotheism, called pancasila (five principles or values). Since the nation was made up of numerous islands, tribes, languages, and religious concentrations, Sukarno felt that a comprehensive and inclusive political ideology was needed, which should also respect the religious rights of the people. Even though there was considerable pressure from some Muslim leaders to name Islam as the religion of the state, Sukarno felt that such a move would lead to demands from some parts of Indonesia to break away.

However, in order to satisfy the Muslim majority, the pancasila ideology included monotheism as one of the basic principles. Under this arrangement, Indonesia named six religions as those recognized by the state—Islam, Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. This was a very significant move in the largest Islamic country in the world, where about 68 percent of the population claim to profess Islam. The official recognition given to the minority religions had enabled Indonesia to hold together as a multireligious nation. However, there are complaints of discrimination against religious groups and the tribal religions that are outside the recognized six religions. More recently, especially from 1985, some Islamic groups have again begun to question the adequacy of the pancasila with the call for the Islamization of the country. But other Muslim groups and the powerful military continue to support a government that is based on monotheism but protects all the recognized religions.

However, both the United Nations and Amnesty International have pointed to the increasing number of violent incidents against religious minorities. In Sunni-dominated Indonesia, the Shi’a and Ahmadiyya sects of Islam also experience discrimination and violence. As political power of the extremist Islamic groups rise in Indonesia, the successive governments are walking a tightrope of not offending the Muslim majority and yet protecting the rights of other religious traditions.

Religion and ethnicity-based nationalism is another factor that leads to intolerance and discrimination in Southeast Asia, as illustrated in Myanmar. Here discrimination and violence is directed mainly against the Rohingya Islamic community and the Christians in the tribal areas. During the colonial rule, the British adopted an immigration policy that resulted in a large number of Bengali Muslims from neighboring India moving into Myanmar in search of labor. This group has been denied citizenship from the beginning, but their numbers have been on the increase, resulting in Islam, along with other Islamic groups in the country, reaching a little over 4 percent of the population. Frustrated with the continued denial of citizenship, a militant group of the Rohingya Muslims began a violent struggle for a separate state for the Muslims or for the Islamic region to be incorporated into Bangladesh, aggravating the Buddhist majority.

Christian missions, when permitted to do their mission work, strategically avoided working among the Burmese Buddhists and concentrated their work mainly among the Kachin, Chin, and Kayin tribal groups and among the Chinese migrants in Myanmar. The Christians today are also about 4 percent of the population.

Already in the 1930s, a Burman-Buddhist nationalist movement called “Doh Bama” (we Burma) arose with anti-Indian sentiments that eventually turned into an anti-Muslim campaign. In recent years, radical Buddhist movements have risen again with the view to advocate and promote the ethnic-religious identity of Myanmar and to suppress other religious minorities. A section of the Buddhist sangha, led by a senior abbot of the Mandalay Buddhist Monastery, Bikkhu Wirathu, founded the 969 economic-nationalist campaign, which encouraged Buddhists to shop only in Buddhist stores. The number, signifying the nine attributes of the Buddha, six of the dharma, and nine of the sangha, was intended to preserve the Buddhist identity and heritage of Myanmar against what is considered “Islamic encroachment.” The movement eventually led to violent clashes in which hundreds of Muslims were killed and mosques and homes destroyed, leading to international condemnation. The Christian minorities also reported sustained harassment and violence against them, resulting in loss of life and property.

Buddhist-Muslim tension is also on the rise in Thailand, where Buddhism is the established religion; about 95 percent of the population is Buddhist. However, in the deep south of Thailand, there is a large Muslim minority group that has been in conflict with the rulers in Bangkok for centuries. Even though only 4.6 percent of the Thai population is Islamic, in the southern provinces of Patani, Narathiwat, Satun, and Songkha, Muslims constitute about 75–85 percent of the population. Further, the Muslims in the south are culturally different from the Thai Buddhists and speak the language of the neighboring Malays. Historically, the successive Thai governments have tried to assimilate and integrate this Islamic region, but the Muslims have been struggling to get political recognition and even a possible separate state for themselves through political insurgency. The conflicts that ensured have led to brutal violent acts and death of thousands of citizens from both sides. Today some serious steps are underway to find a political compromise, but isolated conflicts continue.

Malaysia is also a multireligious state, but with about 65 percent of the population following the Islamic faith. Even though the Malaysian constitution stipulates Islam as the “Religion of the Federation,” it also guarantees freedom of religion to minorities. The nearly 40 percent of communities of other faiths belonging to Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism, and Daoism until recent years have had considerable religious freedom. The government has also been taking several steps to promote multiculturalism and tolerance.

However, with the rise of militant Islam in many parts of the world and pressures from the outside on the Malayan Muslims to assert their national identity, there is increasing deterioration of religious freedom. Successive governments are caught between preserving their electoral majority by pleasing the increasingly militant Muslim groups, and their commitment to ensure religious freedom to all religions. Under militant Islamic pressure, the government of Malaysia has now issued new restrictions on visas to foreign clergy, limiting their entry to six months. The foreign clergy already in the country have also been given an extension of six months to their visas, with the requirement that they leave the country when the visas expire. The hard-line Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, now in the opposition, has been putting pressure to introduce the Islamic shari’a law as the common law, even though Malaysia already allows for religion-based laws for family, marriage, and inheritance.

There has also been a long dispute between Christians and Muslims over the use of the Arabic word “Allah” for God. Christians from the beginning have been referring to God as Allah, and translations of the Bible into Malay also refer to God as Allah. The sustained campaign by Muslim groups to ban Christians from using the word has resulted recently in the court ruling that the word can be used only by Muslims. Mutual animosity over the issue has resulted in a number of violent acts against Christians and their property.

It should be noted that successive governments of Malaysia and neighboring Singapore see the importance of interreligious harmony and the protection of the religious rights of all communities as the cornerstone of national stability and economic prosperity. In fact, social stability has truly been an important factor in their economic advancement. Therefore, both countries have government departments that undertake programs to promote interfaith dialogue and multiculturalism. In Malaysia, however, political pressure from radical Islamic groups is on the increase, with unknown consequences for the future.

It should be noted that majority of the people in Southeast Asia are at home with religious plurality; Buddhism, which is the prominent religion in Southeast Asia, places enormous emphasis on nonviolence, tolerance, and respect for all forms of life. However, ethnicity-based nationalisms, economic pressures, and political maneuvers contribute to rising cases of religious discrimination and intolerance. Excessive enthusiasm for mission among some Christian and Muslim groups also gives room to the feeling of being “encroached” in some of the majority-Buddhist nations. The revival of Islam in many parts of the world, especially in its militant forms, also plays an important role. On the one hand, it radicalizes the Islamic community with the call to assert themselves where they are in majority. On the other hand, this new self-assertion creates a fear of Islam even in nations where Islam is only a small minority.

Happily, in almost all the countries of Southeast Asia, the respective governments realize that discrimination and intolerance would destabilize the nations and are therefore establishing institutions to promote relationships between religious communities. Sectors within the various religious traditions also take initiatives for interfaith relations and dialogue. Hope for peace and harmony in many Southeast Asian nations depends on intensifying and strengthening these initiatives.

S. Wesley Ariarajah

See also: Ahmadiyya; Buddhism; Cambodia; Christianity; Colonialism; Confucianism; Ethnicity; Freedom of Religion; Fundamentalism; Hinduism; Indonesia; Interreligious Relations and Dialogue; Islam; Laos; Minorities; Missionary movements; Morality; Nationalism; Philippines; Religious Conversions; Singapore; Thailand; Vietnam.

RITUAL DYNAMICS

In order to understand political, historical, cultural, social, or religious processes and how certain societies function, it is crucial to deal with ritual, because ritual reproduces relationships that are fundamental for society to work. This is particularly true for socio-cosmic societies in which social and cosmological relations intervene (Barraud and Platenkamp 1990; Sprenger 2006).

Guido Sprenger (2006, 52, 68, 69) defines ritual as actions a society accepts as being operative in creating and maintaining relationships between people themselves and people and the cosmos. Rituals are used as “instruments” to communicate, be it within a given society, with another society, or with spirits, gods, and ancestors. Ritual consequently is vital for the reproduction of society. Additionally, it is important to note that if one wants to analyze ritual, dimensions such as religion, social morphology, or ethnicity usually also will come into play. At the same time, ritual systems are not static, but flexible to adjust to changing circumstances; repetition may be one important feature of ritual actions, but just as important is the changing over time. Thus, “dynamics” in its generally understood meaning—connoting movement, transformation, or change—is often seen as a quality of ritual. Bruce Kapferer describes the connection between ritual and dynamics as being so strong that he does not define “dynamics” as the opposite of “statics,” but as processes which are inherent to ritual (Kapferer 2006, 507).

This entry will look at the inner dynamics of ritual, in forms such as changes in ritual action, in terms of its connection with the second dimension of ritual dynamics: the interaction of ritual with other systems. Anthropological theories of history will also be utilized here, although in a somewhat sketchy and loose manner. Originally, the role of ritual in society was seen as rather static. Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) dealt with Aboriginal totemic rituals in Australia and explained how individuals are integrated into groups by conducting rituals on a regular basis and how this kind of ritual is intended to establish ties between the sacred and the profane worlds. Marcel Mauss (1873–1950) and Henri Hubert then closely analyzed how sacrifices were carried out. They understood rituals as collective systems, as total social facts, and therefore concluded that ritual does not necessarily have to be religious, but that it is likely to have political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions. Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942) focused more on the psychological dimension of ritual; i.e., that magic rituals reduce social tensions. The function of ritual was examined closely, and ritual obviously helps to create and maintain social coherence and harmony (see Bell 1997, 23–26, 28).

In contrast, Max Gluckman (1911–1975) investigated “rituals of rebellion” and demonstrated that ritual also expresses social tensions. He stated that ritual not only depicts social relationships, but actually forms them. Gluckman wrote in the tradition of Arnold van Gennep (1873–1957) who with his analysis of “rites de passage” heralded the contemplation of the dependence of social change and ritual. Victor Turner (1920–1983) developed these approaches further by examining the symbolism of rituals as a motor for changes in the socio-cosmic order. He paved the way for portraying ritual as a performance (see Bell 1997, 35–39, 42; Kapferer 2006, 511). Edmund Leach (1910–1989) used a linguistic model to present ritual as a mechanism for sociocultural change. He argued that ritual not only integrates people, but can also exclude them and that it often depicts ideal structures of society (see Bell 1997, 65, 68; Leach 1970 [1954], 278). Clifford Geertz (1926–2006), sharing this approach in his description of the cockfight in Bali, pointed out that ritual display can make experiences understandable. Furthermore, it forms the way the world is perceived. Ritual in all these theories communicates and molds ideas and values (see Bell 1997, 66, 67, 69). Likewise, it negotiates social, ethnic, and cultural identity. As Leach (1970 [1954]) stressed, it articulates and forms social hierarchies and power relations. One example is the Lao state, which uses Buddhist rituals to maintain and gain influence over the people. After the abolition of the monarchy in 1975, the new regime first tried to forbid religious activities, but since the 1980s, the ruling party has been slowly reestablishing religious rituals. Other examples include rituals conducted by ethnic groups in which a village is closed and nobody is allowed to enter or leave. Often, traditional dress is worn and sacrifices are made. On the inside, the coherence of society is articulated and enhanced. On the outside, the importance of borders is stressed (as an instance for Karen in Myanmar or Thailand; see Hayami 2004).

Power relations between state and ethnic groups also are visible when one considers the interaction between different religious systems. In Southeast Asia, the most fascinating ritual dynamics can be examined in relation to the communication between local belief systems and “world religions.” In the case of Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, the “world religion” is Theravada Buddhism. This includes the su:khuan ritual, which restores a balance of the body by tying the “soul” (Thai and Lao khuan) with cotton threads. This ritual mixes elements of Buddhism with those of local cosmologies. The dynamics of ritual systems can also be analyzed in multireligious rituals. An example is the interaction of Buddhism, Islam, and ancestor worship in South Thailand (see Horstmann 2011). Besides revitalizing processes, conversion processes in Southeast Asia can be traced. In the context of conversion, Josephus Platenkamp (1992) demonstrates how the Tobelo in eastern Indonesia, who officially converted to Christianity, conduct church rituals with recourse to pre-Christian ideas and values.

Thus, whether one deals with the dynamics of different religious systems or the interplay between ritual and kinship, social system, myth, identity, ethnicity, or changing ritual performances, “dynamics” always need to be taken into account when studying “ritual,” in both socio-cosmic or “modern” societies.

Eva Sevenig

See also: Ancestor Worship; Buddhism; Christianity; Ethnicity; Myth/Mythology; Popular Religion; Spirit Mediumship.

RUIZ, LORENZO

St. Lorenzo Ruiz is the first Filipino saint, also considered as patron saint of Filipinos and the Philippines, having been martyred in Japan after refusing to renounce his Christian faith under pain of severe torture and execution by the authorities.

Ruiz was born in Binondo, Manila, around 1600 to a Chinese father and a Filipina mother. He received his education from the Dominicans in his parish and served as an altar boy. Later, he became a helper and clerk-sacristan in the church of Binondo and was also a member of the Confraternity of the Rosary. As a grown man, sources claimed that he worked as an “escriba” or calligrapher, transcribing birth, baptismal, and marriage certificates in beautiful penmanship. In 1636, he was implicated in a murder case. Already in his 30s, with a wife and three children, Ruiz must have known he stood no chance to obtain justice in the Spanish colony’s courts. He asked for help from his Dominican patrons, who then included him among the group of Fray Domingo Ibanez, who at the time was going on a missionary mission. Ruiz at first thought that they were going to Taiwan, but the group was actually headed for Nagasaki, Japan, where Christians were being persecuted under the Tokugawa Shogunate.

Upon their arrival in Japan in 1636, Ruiz and his companions were arrested almost immediately. For more than a year, their Japanese captors subjected them to torture. They were tied upside down by their feet and dropped in a dry well, which had sharp stakes lining the bottom. Before they could be impaled, their torturers would stop the fall and demand that they renounce their faith. They were subjected to water torture. Bamboo needles were inserted in their fingernails.

Instead of giving in to the pain of prolonged torture, Ruiz was quoted as saying that he would never do it. He added that he was a Catholic and happy to die for God and that, even if he had a thousand lives to offer, he would offer them to God. He said this even if the Japanese authorities promised him release from prison and repatriation to the Philippines. Ruiz remained staunch in his faith.

On September 22, 1637, the Japanese authorities brought Ruiz and his 15 companions to a hill overlooking the bay of Nagasaki. Head wounds were inflicted on each of the missionaries, and they were hung upside down with their heads inside the well. In the next seven days, they died one by one, either from loss of blood or asphyxiation. Ruiz died on September 29, 1637. Pope John Paul II beatified Ruiz on February 18, 1981, in Manila, the first beatification to be held outside of the Vatican. On October 18, 1987, Ruiz was elevated to sainthood in Rome.

George Amurao

See also: Christianity; Education; Freedom of Religion; Philippines; Religious Discrimination and Intolerance.

R

RAIS, MUHAMMAD AMIEN

Further Reading

REFORM MOVEMENTS

Islam

Buddhism

Christianity

Hinduism and Bahá’í Faith

Further Reading

RELIGION AND SOCIETY

Buddhist Context

Christian Context

Islamic Context

Economic and Ecological Context

Further Reading

RELIGIOUS CONVERSIONS

Further Reading

RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION AND INTOLERANCE

Further Reading

RITUAL DYNAMICS

Further Reading

RUIZ, LORENZO

Further Reading