NOTES TO TRANSLATION

1. Unlike the case of the following line, which has a similar basic structure, there is no way to reproduce in English the alternating nominal and verbal uses of the word dao , “Way.” More literally, the first line reads, dao , [a] “Way,” “path,” or “ teaching,” kedao , [which] “can be talked about” or “followed,” fei changdao , “is not a constant Way.” Cf. the grammar and sense of the poem, “The Thorny Bush Upon the Wall,” in the Book of Odes (Mao #46). For a translation, see Legge 1970, 74–75. For other passages that discuss the Way and names, see, for example, chapters 32 and 34.

2. On the idea of being “nameless,” see chapters 32, 37, and 41.

3. Cf. the reference to xuantong , “Enigmatic Unity,” in chapter 56.

4. The point is the common theme that self-conscious effort to be excellent in any way fatally undermines itself. Cf. chapters 38 and 81.

5. Cf. chapter 40.

6. For wuwei , “nonaction,” see Slingerland (forthcoming).

7. Cf. a similar line in chapter 43.

8. Cf. chapter 34.

9. This line also occurs in chapters 10 and 51.

10. This line also appears in chapters, 10, 51, and 77.

11. Recognizing that the credit for their success lies with the Way and not with themselves is a characteristic attitude of Daoist sages. For similar ideas, see chapters 9, 17, 34, and 77. This and the previous line occur together in chapter 77.

12. For other passages discussing “precious goods,” see chapters 12 and 64.

13. In Analects 12.18, Kongzi responds to Ji Kangzi, the leader of a powerful clan who was distressed over the number of thieves in his state, by saying, “If only you sir did not desire [such things], others would not steal even if you rewarded them.” For a complete translation of the passage see Waley 1938, 167.

14. The character xin , “heart” or “mind,” can refer to the physical organ in the chest, but it most often refers to the psychological faculties of thinking, perceiving, feeling, desiring, or intending.

15. The following four lines appear in chapter 56 preceded by two lines from chapter 52.

16. This is the only occurrence in the text of the character di , “Supreme Spirit,” a name for the high god or supreme ancestral spirit of ancient China. For other passages concerning xiang , “image,” see chapters 14, 21, 35, and 41.

17. “Straw dogs” were used as ceremonial offerings. Before and during the ceremony, they were protected and cherished, but as soon as the ceremony ended, they were discarded and defiled. Others interpret the characters in this expression as “straw and dogs.” The point is the same.

18. Cf. the opening lines of chapter 23.

19. These seven lines make the point that our conception of the good is relative to different kinds of things, situations, relationships, and activities. Compare this to Aristotle’s view that there is no Platonic “Good” that all good things share or partake of; rather, each is good of its kind (see Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a–1100a). The Daodejing also expresses the belief that the good of each creature and thing in the world is realized only when all play their proper roles in the greater harmony that is the dao.

20. The reference is to a tilting vessel that would fall over and pour out its contents if filled to the top. The Warring States Period Confucian philosopher Xunzi describes this vessel in chapter 28 of the work that bears his name. For a translation, see Knoblock 1994, 244.

21. For similar lines, see chapters 2, 17, 34, and 77.

22. For other examples of “the One,” see chapters 22, 39, and 42.

23. The term qi refers to mist or vapor in general and human breath in particular. It also has come to have the more technical sense of a kind of vital energy, found in both the atmosphere and within the human body and existing in various densities and levels of clarity or turbidity, that is responsible for, among other things, the intensity of one’s emotions, one’s mood, energy level and general health. Cf. notes 84 and 109.

24. Because of their graphic similarity, xuanlan , “enigmatic vision,” has been read as xuanjian “enigmatic mirror,” by a number of translators. This would be the only instance of the use of the metaphor of the “mind as a mirror” in the text and since it can be read without emendation, I have not altered the original. However, the “mind as a mirror” metaphor is developed in interesting ways in the Zhuangzi. For a discussion of this issue in the latter text, see Carr and Ivanhoe 2000, 38 and 56.

25. This line also appears in chapters 2 and 51.

26. This line also appears in chapters 2, 51, and 77.

27. Chapter 51 concludes with the same four lines. For another passage concerning xuande , “Enigmatic Virtue,” see chapter 65.

28. Literally, only by relying on “nothing” (i.e., the empty space of the hub) can the wheel turn and the carriage roll.

29. These sets of five refer to conventional standards of evaluation with regard to the different sensory faculties. The passage is not a rejection of the pleasures of the senses, nor does it express skepticism regarding the senses per se. Rather, like the view one finds in chapter 2 of the Zhuangzi, it expresses a profound distrust of conventional categories and values and advocates moderation of sensual pleasures. For a translation of the Zhuangzi, see Graham 2001, 48–61. Cf. Zhuangzi, chapter 10; Graham 2001, 208–9.

30. This line also appears in chapters 38 and 72.

31. Cf. the thought expressed in these lines to what one finds in chapter 35.

32. Returning to an ideal past state is a common theme in the text. For other examples, see chapters 16, 25, 28, 52. The time “before there were things” refers to the age of natural spontaneity, when people simply responded to whatever situation was before them without relying on fixed and definite schemes of discrimination or evaluation.

33. For other passages that concern xiang , “image,” see chapters 4, 21, 35, and 41.

34. Pu , “unhewn wood,” is a symbol for anything in its unadulterated natural state. In other contexts I will translate it as “simplicity,” but here and in certain later passages the metaphor is an important part of the passage’s sense. For other examples, see chapters 19, 28, 32, 37, and 57.

35. Here and in certain other passages, we get a fleeting glimpse of the first-person narrator, the author of at least this line of the text. For other examples, see chapters 20, 25, 37, 69, and 70.

36. This line also appears in chapter 52.

37. This line appears again in chapter 23. I interpret it as an expression of the Daodejing’s characteristic view on de “Virtue.” For a discussion of the idea of “Virtue” in the Daodejing and how it differs from related Confucian conceptions of “Virtue” or “moral charisma,” see my “The Concept of de (‘Virtue’) in the Laozi,” in Csikszentmihalyi and Ivanhoe 1998, 239–57. For other passages concerning the concept of trust, see chapters 49 and 63.

38. Sages are reluctant and slow to speak, but their words are worthy of complete trust.

39. Cf. chapters 2, 9, 34, and 77.

40. Literally, “We are this way ziran .” For other examples, see chapters 23, 25, 51, and 64.

41. The idea that more can lead to less and its implication that less can yield more is a theme that appears in several places in the text. For examples, see chapters 19 and 38. This passage expresses the general theme that the self-conscious appreciation of virtue is a mark of the decline of the dao. Here we also see an expression of the idea that the world has fallen out of an earlier, ideal state of being.

42. Literally, “unhewn wood.” See n. 34.

43. I take this to be saying not that one should fear what most people find fearful by as it were commanding oneself to be afraid of it, but rather that one should find the fact that everyone fears a certain thing as a legitimate source of apprehension.

44. In this passage, the author enters into an autobiographical mode. See also chapters 16, 25, 37, 69, and 70.

45. For other passages concerning xiang, “image,” see 4, 14, 35, and 41.

46. For other examples of “the One,” see chapters 10, 39, and 42.

47. See chapter 24 for a set of lines similar to the preceding four.

48. The same line appears in chapter 66.

49. While the Daodejing does not cite ancient sages or texts by name, here and elsewhere it clearly does quote ancient sources. For other examples, see chapters 42, 62, and 69.

50. The same line appears in chapter 17. See n. 37.

51. See chapter 22 for a set of lines similar to the preceding four.

52. A similar line appears in chapter 31.

53. There is a play here on the difference between one’s ming , “proper name,” and one’s zi , “style.” In traditional Chinese society one does not use the former, personal name in public. And so the author can be understood as saying he is not intimately familiar with the dao and so knows only its style, or perhaps that it would be unseemly to speak its true and proper name to those unfamiliar with it. Here we find another example of the first-person narrator. For other examples, see chapters, 16, 20, 37, 69, and 70.

54. Cf. The description of the Way found in chapter 6 of the Zhuangzi: “As for the Way, it is something with identity, something to trust in, but does nothing, has no shape. It can be handed down but not taken as one’s own, can be grasped but not seen. Itself the trunk, itself the root, since before there was a heaven and an earth inherently from of old it is what it was. It hallows ghosts and hallows God, engenders heaven engenders earth; it is farther than the upmost pole but is not reckoned high, it is under the six-way-oriented but is not reckoned deep, it is born before heaven and earth but is not reckoned long-lasting, it is elder to the most ancient but is not reckoned old,” Graham 2001, 86.

55. “Natural” is ziran.

56. Cf. chapter 45.

57. Cf. chapter 62.

58. The expression ximing , “inheriting enlightenment,” is open to numerous interpretations. I take it as describing the good that bad people inherit from those who already are enlightened.

59. Or “simplicity.” See n. 34.

60. Qi , “vessel,” “implement,” or “tool,” is a common metaphor for a government official. Playing on this image, it carries the slightly negative connotation of someone with limited “capacity.” In Analects 2.12, Kongzi insists, “A gentleman never serves as a tool.” Cf. Waley 1938, 90. See also Analects 5.3; Waley 1938, 107.

61. For qu tianxia , “gaining the world,” see chapters 48 and 57.

62. These two lines also appear in chapter 64.

63. The final three lines also appear at the end of chapter 55.

64. The left side being associated with happy and auspicious events and the right side with sad and inauspicious events.

65. On the idea of being “nameless,” see chapters 1, 37, and 41.

66. Or “simplicity.” See n. 34.

67. Cf. the similar line in chapter 44.

68. For the value of zu , “contentment,” see chapters 44 and 46.

69. Cf. the teaching quoted in chapter 42.

70. Cf. chapter 2.

71. Cf. chapters 2, 9, 17, and 77.

72. Literally, one could ming , “name,” or “call” it small.

73. For other passages that concern xiang , “image,” see chapters 4, 14, 21, and 41.

74. The proper sense of liqi , “sharp implements,” is a matter of considerable controversy. Whether it refers to the weapons of the state, its ministers, labor-saving tools, the Daoist sage, or something else is hard to say, so I have left it ambiguous. Cf. the use in chapter 57. This line is quoted and explained in chapter 10 of the Zhuangzi. In his translation, Angus Graham does not include the quote of the line but does translate the explanation of it, “The sage is the sharpest tool of the empire, he is not a means of bringing light to the empire.” See Graham 2001, 208.

75. Cf. the similar line in chapter 48.

76. For the notion of creatures “transforming themselves,” see chapter 57.

77. Or “nameless simplicity.” See n. 34. On the idea of being “nameless,” see chapters 1, 32, and 41. This line employs the first-person narrator perspective. For other examples, see chapters 16, 20, 25, 69, and 70.

78. The word rendered here as “ritually correct” is li , which in other contexts is translated as “having propriety.”

79. This line also appears in chapters 12 and 72.

80. For other examples of “the One,” see chapters 10, 22, and 42.

81. The same expressions occur in chapter 42.

82. For other passages that concern xiang , “image,” see chapters 4, 14, 21, 35, and 41.

83. On the idea of being “nameless,” see chapters 1, 32, and 37.

84. The precise referents of these terms are hard to determine. I take the Way to be the most inclusive term designating the hidden, underlying structure of things. The “One” would then be its xiang , “image,” the closest thing we can have to a picture or representation of the Way. (For other examples, see chapters 10, 22, and 39.) The “two” would then be the fundamental qi , “vital energies,” yin and yang (Cf. notes 23 and 109). These, together with our image of the Way as a unified whole, give rise to everything in the world. A similar scheme is described in the appendices to the Book of Changes. See Wilhelm 1952, 273–81. This process, whatever its particulars, was understood as a natural progression. There was no creator and the “nothing” out of which things arose is a primal state of undifferentiated vital energy, the state of no things but not absolute Nothingness. In ancient Greece, Anaximander proposed a similar scheme in which the fundamental forces of heat and cold arise out of an indefinite and boundless original state. Thanks to Eirik L. Harris for suggesting this comparison.

85. See chapter 39.

86. Cf. the similar line in chapter 2.

87. For the value of “contentment,” see chapters 33 and 46.

88. Cf. the similar line in chapter 32.

89. Very close to the city, thus showing a heightened state of mobilization.

90. For the value of “contentment,” see chapters 33 and 44.

91. I take the point here and in several other passages concerning “contentment” to be something close to what contemporary philosophers call “satisficing.” The idea is that the effort expended in always seeking to maximize one’s satisfaction often offers dramatically diminishing returns and is not in fact in the agent’s overall best interests. The Daodejing claims that a satisficing strategy is not only better for individual agents but for the world at large because a focus on being content will lead people away from the competitive and frenetic pursuits that characterize much of human life. For the notion of “satisficing,” see Herbert A. Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1982), and Michael A. Slote, Beyond Optimizing: A Study of Rational Choice (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1989).

92. That is until one reaches the state of wuwei , “nonaction.”

93. Cf. the similar lines in chapter 37.

94. For wushi , “no activity,” see chapters 57 and 63. For qu tianxia, “gaining the world,” see chapters 29 and 57.

95. I read this line, and the line three lines below it, as playing on the etymological and semantic relationship between de , “Virtue,” and de , “to get.” Since those with Virtue naturally are good to and trust others, they accrue (“get”) Virtue; this enables them to gain (“get”) the support of others and realize (“get”) their greater ends. Cf. chapters 17, 23, and 38. For a revealing discussion of the early Chinese concept of de, see David S. Nivison’s “Virtue in Bone and Bronze” and “The Paradox of Virtue,” both in Nivison 1996, 17–43.

96. Cf. chapter 76.

97. This passage has been interpreted in a wide variety of ways. I take its general theme to be the preservation of one’s natural span of life, here connected to the idea that wanting something too badly often leads to its opposite. Some are fated to live long and others to die young. However, about one in three brings misfortune on himself. The missing person in ten is of course the sage. By not doing, sages avoid creating a place for death to enter in.

98. Cf. chapter 75.

99. This line also appears in chapters 2 and 10.

100. This line also appears in chapters 2, 10, and 77.

101. Chapter 10 concludes with these same four lines. For xuande, “Enigmatic Virtue,” see chapter 65.

102. This line also appears in chapter 16.

103. This and the preceding line also appear in chapter 56.

104. Cf. Analects 6.12, where Kongzi commends a man for “never taking a shortcut.” For a full translation of the passage, see Waley 1938, 118.

105. “It” refers to the Way. Note that in this and the following lines the word translated as “Virtue” also clearly has the sense of a kind of “power.”

106. The progression from cultivating the Way in oneself to cultivating it throughout the empire is reminiscent of the progression one sees in chapter 4 of the Daxue , “Great Learning,” a work primarily associated with Confucianism. There we are told that those who wish to “make bright their shining Virtue throughout the world” must first “order their states.” Those who wish to order their states must first “regulate their families,” those who wish to regulate their families must first “cultivate themselves,” and so on. Wing-tsit Chan points out that Mengzi (“Mencius”) identifies this basic idea as a “common saying” in Mengzi 4A5. See Chan 1963, 196. For a translation of the Mengzi, see Lau 1970, 120.

107. The early Confucian Mengzi also uses the newborn as an image for his ideal state of mind. In Mengzi 4B12, he claims, “The great man is he who never loses the heart of a child.” Cf. Lau 1970, 130.

108. Cf. the closing lines of chapter 5 of the Zhuangzi, where Zhuangzi says, “Follow the natural and do not yisheng , ‘help life along.’” Cf. Graham 2001, 82.

109. Early Daoists tended to advocate allowing one’s vital energies to find their natural course. For example, see the “fasting of the heart and mind” passage in chapter 4 of the Zhuangzi (see Graham 2001, 66–69). They were opposed to those such as the early Confucian Mengzi, who argued that the mind should guide the vital energies. See Mengzi’s discussion of nourishing the “flood-like qi” in Mengzi 2A2. See Lau 1970, 77–78.

110. The final three lines also appear at the end of chapter 30.

111. I take the implied subject to be the dao.

112. This and the preceding line also appear together in chapter 52.

113. This and the preceding three lines also appear together in chapter 4.

114. Cf. chapter 1, “Their unity is known as an enigma.”

115. This line also appears in chapter 62.

116. For wushi, “no activity,” see chapters 48 and 63. For qu tianxia , “gaining the world,” see chapters 29 and 48.

117. For the expression “sharp implements,” see chapter 36.

118. Cf. chapter 37.

119. Literally “unhewn wood.” See n. 34.

120. The idea is that too much attention and meddling will make either fall apart.

121. Laozi seems here to be arguing against the idea, seen in thinkers like Mozi et al., that the ideal state requires the active participation of ghosts and other spirits in meting out rewards or punishments. Laozi does not deny the existence of such beings but like Kongzi sees a direct appeal to them as inappropriate. Cf. Kongzi’s advice concerning ghosts and spirits in Analects 6.22: “Respect ghosts and spirits but keep them at a distance.” For a full translation of the passage, see Waley 1938, 120.

122. They do not disturb the people through too much attention and meddling.

123. Literally xialiu , “low flow.” Cf. the use of the same term in Analects 19.20: “the gentleman dislikes living in low places (xialiu) where all the foul things under Heaven collect.” The Daoist of course inverts Confucian values, esteeming what the world regards as lowly. For a full translation of the passage, see Waley 1938, 228.

124. In the sense that the ideal great state places itself below and attracts the whole world. Also, like a valley or the delta of a river, the great state is like a woman in being fertile and having the ability to feed the whole world. Cf. chapter 66.

125. “Inner sanctum” is the translation of ao , the southwest corner of one’s house where the household gods are lodged and worshipped.

126. Cf. chapter 81.

127. Cf. chapter 27.

128. Cf. Mozi’s discussion of how the Son of Heaven and three high ministers are to be appointed, in chapter 2 of the Mozi. For a translation, see Watson 1963, 34–35.

129. This line also appears in chapter 56.

130. For wushi , “no activities,” see chapters 48 and 57.

131. The idea in each case is that one should do what one does in unpremeditated and spontaneous response to the situation at hand. One should do away with set schemes, categories, standards, and plans and follow one’s natural inclinations and tendencies. And so, for example, one should taste and savor what one finds pleasing, not what others might enjoy or what accords with some socially sanctioned view about good taste. Cf. chapter 12. This idea is explored at some length in chapter 10 of the Zhuangzi. See Graham 2001, 208–9.

132. Here we see a clear contrast with the view of early Confucians. In Analects 14.34, Kongzi is asked specifically about the practice of repaying resentment with Virtue. He rejects it and instead advocates that one “Repay resentment with uprightness.” For a full translation of the passage, see Waley 1938, 189. Cf. chapter 49.

133. These two lines also appear in chapter 29.

134. Cf. Mengzi 7B35, “For cultivating the heart and mind nothing is better than to make few one’s desires.” For a full translation of the passage, see Lau 1970, 210–12.

135. Daoist sages take Nature as their model. In philosophical discussions of the time, there was a debate about whether the proper content of learning is part of or opposed to what is naturally so. This debate in turn was a reflection of a larger debate about the character of human nature. Mengzi endorses only particular natural tendencies—those that incline us toward morality—and on this basis claims that human nature is good. Xunzi argues that our untutored nature inclines us toward bad states of affairs. On this basis he concludes that our nature is bad and must be reformed through protracted study and practice. We can see Laozi, Mengzi, and Xunzi as representing a spectrum of views about the proper content of learning that reflects their different views about the goodness of our prereflective nature, running from greatest to least confidence in our raw natural state.

136. The idea that the best of actions flow forth without reflection or knowledge was not uncommon in early China. In his note on this line, Wing-tsit Chan cites a passage from the Book of Odes in which the Supreme Spirit or Lord on High commends King Wen for his behavior: “Without reflection or knowledge, you comply with my principles” (Mao #241). See Chan 1963, 216. For a translation of the ode, see Legge 1970, 454. Cf. Analects 15.4. For a translation of the Analects passage, see Waley 1938, 193.

137. For xuande , “Enigmatic Virtue,” see chapters 10 and 51.

138. This is the only occurrence of the expression dashun , “Great Compliance,” in the text. However, as Arthur Waley points out in his note to this chapter, it does occur in Zhuangzi, chapter 12. See Waley 1963, 223. For the reference in the Zhuangzi, see Graham 2001, 156 (who translates these characters as “ultimate course”). Note too that the same word shun appears in Mao #241, quoted in n. 136 above.

139. Cf. chapter 61.

140. The same line appears in chapter 22.

141. The idea that true virtue lies in a harmony within a tension, that it requires a balance between extremes, is seen in many traditions. Early Confucians too held a version of this view. For example, Analects 8.2 tells us, “Respect without ritual propriety becomes laborious bustle. Care without ritual propriety becomes timidity. Courage without ritual propriety becomes disorderliness. Straightforwardness without ritual propriety becomes rudeness.” Cf. Waley 1938, 132.

142. That is, they are not overly aggressive and pugnacious.

143. They avoid initiating the action, the first move being the prerogative of the host.

144. Cf. the last two lines with line 7 of chapter 38.

145. See chapter 67 for a possible reference. Note that here we see the perspective of the first-person narrator. For other examples, see chapters 16, 20, 25, 37, and 70.

146. Several lines in this chapter employ the perspective of the first-person narrator. For other examples, see chapters 16, 20, 25, 37, 69, and 70.

147. Cf. this complaint with Kongzi’s remark in Analects 14.37: "No one understands me—is this not so?” For a full translation of the passage, see Waley 1938, 189.

148. They appear common and unworthy on the outside but possess a secret treasure within. In Analects 17.1, a man named Yang Huo criticizes Kongzi’s reluctance to take office by asking him, “Can one who cherishes his treasure within and allows his state to go astray be considered benevolent?” Cf. Analects 9.12 and 15.6. For full translations of these passages, see Waley 1938, 141, 194, and 209.

149. Cf. Analects 2.17: “If you know something realize that you know it. If you do not know something realize that you do not. This is what knowing is.” For a full translation of the passage, see Waley 1938, 91.

150. This line also appears in chapters 12 and 38.

151. These two lines introduce a question and mark a dialogue within the text. Cf. Analects 12.19, in which Ji Kangzi asks Kongzi, “What about putting to death those who are without the Way in order to advance those who have it?” For a full translation of the passage, see Waley 1938, 168.

152. The death that Heaven brings to each person.

153. Cf. chapter 50.

154. Cf. chapter 50.

155. The Han Dynasty commentator Wang Bi illustrates the point of these last two lines with the examples of the roots of a tree and its twigs.

156. This line also appears in chapters 2, 10, and 51.

157. Cf. chapters 2, 9, 17, and 34. This and the previous line also appear together in chapter 2.

158. These were the main altars of the state and a common metaphor for its independence and well-being.

159. The idea that the most worthy rulers are willing to offer themselves to Heaven as surrogates on behalf of the people and in the name of the state is a motif seen in writings of this period and earlier. See Nivison 1996, 20–24. See also King Tang’s pronouncement to the spirits in the Analects 20.1. For a translation of this passage, see Waley 1938, 231–32.

160. The left-hand portion of a contract of obligation, the part that was held by the creditor.

161. The central idea of this chapter, which is also seen throughout the text, is that one cannot force others to be good. If one resorts to force, one’s actions will eventually rebound in kind upon oneself. The only way to affect others and turn them to the good is through the power of one’s de, “Virtue.”

162. That is, let them abandon writing. The use of the knotted cord to keep track of records is mentioned in the Great Appendix to the Book of Changes and chapter 10 of the Zhuangzi, as well as elsewhere in the early literature. For the Great Appendix, see Wilhelm 1952, 360. For the reference in the Zhuangzi, see Graham 2001, 209.

163. In Analects 14.6, Kongzi says, “Those who have de, ‘Virtue,’ will always have something to say. Those who have something to say will not always have Virtue.” Cf. chapter 62. For a full translation of the Analects passage, see Waley 1938, 180.

164. Confucians too had a general mistrust of glib talkers and disputation. This reflects their similar though distinct beliefs about the power of a good person’s de, “Virtue,” to sway others. For examples, see Analects 1.3 and Mengzi’s explanation of why he must engage in disputation, though not being fond of it, found in Mengzi 3B9. For a translation of the Analects passage, see Waley 1938, 84; for the passage from the Mengzi, see Lau 1970, 113–15.