JA: Can you explain why Buddhists believe the mind is beginninglessly ignorant?
DL: There are different types of obscurations. In one way, there are two. The first is an obscuration of not knowing. The second is a case of misconceiving. If you ask from what an obscuration arises, it comes from the continuation of former moments of obscuration. If you seek another explanation, then there would have to be a first moment to obscuration. In this case there would be a contradiction with reasoning. As it says in Aryadeva’s Four Hundred, “Though there is no beginning to afflictive emotions, there is an end.” Because ignorant consciousnesses misconceive objects, there is an end to them. They can be stopped by right understanding, but since they are generated as continuations of former moments of that type of consciousness, there is no beginning to them.
JA: Why is the mind not intrinsically enlightened?
DL: Once it has defilements—is together with defilements—it’s impossible that it was previously without them. Still, because the basic entity of the mind is always unfabricated and clear, it is indeed thoroughly good. Therefore, it is called thoroughly good: Samantabhadra.34 It would contradict reasoning to propound that the mind is first pure and then later became adventitiously defiled. Thus, it can only be said that from the very start the mind is defiled.
JA: Why is the enlightened nature just a seed? Why is it not thoroughly developed?
DL: Because it is a seed its fruition is yet to occur. The fact that any consciousness is established as having a nature of mere illumination and knowing, and that that factor is capable of turning into enlightenment, is designated with the name “seed.” There is nothing more than that. If there was, you’d have to say that a God created it. Then you would have to explore the nature of God: investigate whether the nature of God had a beginning or an end. There are many such investigations in the ninth chapter of Shantideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva’s Deeds as well as Dharmakirti’s Commentary on Dignaga’s “Compendium on Valid Cognition.” I am not criticizing those who assert a creator God. I am explaining the Buddhist viewpoint. If there are many internal contradictions in a doctrine, revealed by reasoning, then one should drop that doctrine and choose one that doesn’t have such discrepancies. As it says in the fourth reliance, rely not on knowledge but on exalted wisdom. There are many phenomena that are not understood until one advances in mental development. There are many unusual phenomena that we cannot explain now with this type of consciousness.
JA: Can you explain how the other mental afflictions come out of innate ignorance?
DL: As I said, there are two types of ignorance. The first is a mere obscuration with respect to the status of phenomena. The other is ignorance that misconceives the nature of phenomena. The latter one conceives that phenomena inherently exist, which they don’t. Within this misconception of inherent existence, there are again two types: conceptions of persons as inherently existent and conceptions of other phenomena as also such. This division is made by way of a consideration of users of objects and objects used. Within the conception of persons as inherently existent, there are cases of conceiving both one’s own self and other selves to truly exist. Viewing the transitory collection of body and mind as a real “I” is a case of viewing your own self as inherently existent. With respect to this view, there are two further types. One is a conception that observes the transitory collection, which gives rise to the thought of “I” and conceives it to inherently exist. Another observes “mine” and conceives it to exist in the same way. Now, first of all, one generates a conception of the inherent existence of those phenomena—the mental and physical aggregates—that serve as the basis of designation of the “I.” After that thought, the “I” which is designated in dependence on mind and body is conceived to exist in its own right. Then, with that view of the transitory as the cause, one conceives “mine” to inherently exist. As Chandrakirti35 says, “Initially there is attachment to the ‘I’—a self—and then attachment to mine.” Once there is the class of self, there is the class of other. Once these two classes are distinguished, one becomes desirously attached to the class of self and hateful toward the class of other. From this, are generated all the other problems. For instance, due to the view of the transitory as an “I” which is inherently existent, one generates pride in oneself as superior to others. Then, even afflicted doubt—since it’s a case of emphasizing the “I” that might not believe in something (the final reason being that “I don’t believe in such and such”)—depends on this. And jealousy. Also, extreme views are induced by this view of the “I” as inherently existent: views of permanence and views of annihilation. For example, believing that former and later births don’t exist or believing that once there is a self that this self will exist forever. So first a phenomenon appears to inherently exist, and when it does, its qualities of good, bad, and whatever also appear to exist in this way. The mind then assents to that appearance. Since this is an appearance based on a superimposition of goodness and of badness—beyond that which is actually there—one’s mind falls into extreme conceptions of genuine goodness and badness and the operation of improper attitudes, which, in turn, generate the afflictive emotions.
JA: Could you describe the two truths: ultimate and conventional. What are they and how do they work?
DL: This is important. Take the table as an example. If one searches for the object designated—the table itself—it can’t be found. If one divides up the parts of the table in terms of directions or divides up its qualities or substances, then one can’t find a whole that is the table. Indeed, to our minds there is a distinction between whole and parts such that when they appear to us, there seems to be a whole separate from parts—parts separate from whole. In reality, however, there isn’t. Now, when one searches in this way, one will not find the table. This nonfinding, though, does not mean that the table doesn’t exist. We’re using it, right? But if we search for it, we can’t find it. So there are two types of modes of being of the table. One is the positing of the table by a mind that doesn’t analyze and is just involved in the conventionality. That sort of table is found by that sort of mind. However, if you take the table as the object, if you are not satisfied with just this which you put your hand on but search to discover what it actually is among the parts—whether this is it or that is it—then there isn’t anything that can be found to be it. Why is there this nonfinding of the table? It’s because the table is something that is such that if analytically sought, it can’t be found. Now what does the mind searching to find the table among its parts discover? It finds just that nonfinding of the table. This nonfinding itself is a quality of the table, its substratum or base. This nonfinding is the final nature of the table. Something more subtle does not exist. Thus, this is the ultimate or final mode of establishment of the table. Now, this mode of being is sought with respect to the table as the base or substratum. Therefore, this nonfinding is the actual mode of being of the table. Thus, with respect to the one basis, the table, there are two natures: one that is found by a nonanalytical mind and one that is found by the analytical mind. With respect to one base, then, there is an object found by a consciousness distinguishing the ultimate and an object found by a consciousness distinguishing the conventional.36 Thus it is said: “Form is emptiness. Emptiness is form.” Now these two are mutually exclusive. The two truths are one entity but are mutually exclusive.
JA: How?
DL: With respect to a phenomenon, that which is its ultimate truth is not its conventional truth and vice versa.
JA: So, it’s incorrect to say that they are mutually definitive?
DL: The one doesn’t define the other. Still, if you take the ultimate reality or emptiness of the table as the substratum and search to see if it can be found, then it becomes a conventional truth in terms of itself as the substratum. In relation to the table, its emptiness is an ultimate truth, but in relation to its own reality, i.e., the reality of the reality, it’s a conventional truth. It’s contradictory for something to be its own mode of being. Therefore, the reality of something is not its own reality. This is because when reality is sought, when the nature of things is sought, it can’t be found either.
JA: When emptiness first appears to the mind, what is it like?
DL: Even though the word, dharmata,37 doesn’t have any negative particle in it, when that—the nature or reality of phenomena—appears to the mind, it must appear through the root of a negation. It is important to make this distinction. I’m talking within the context of the two truths as set forth in Nagarjuna’s Treatise on the Middle Way. Is it that when inherent existence is sought, it is not found because it doesn’t exist, or even though it exists, it isn’t found because it can’t be found under analysis? It is the former. When you look at how things appear to your mind, they appear as if they were such that they could be found upon analysis. Therefore, if things did exist in the way they appear to our minds, when you examine them they should become clearer and clearer. The fact that they do not is a sign that they don’t exist in the way they appear to. In sum, though they appear to inherently exist, they don’t exist in that way.
Now, in your mind, you initially have a sense that the object doesn’t exist in the way it appears to. When you get used to this thought, accustomed to it, you eventually ascertain that the object does not exist at all in the way it appears. At that time, your own sense of appearances is an experience of vacuity, which is simply the absence of inherent existence. At the beginning of this process, the object—this thing that is empty—might still appear. In an easy way, if one goes to a cinema, you might differentiate two different times while watching the movie. In both cases pictures would appear to your eye consciousness, but in the first instance one would just observe them, while in the latter you would be thinking strongly that this doesn’t exist as a fact. If you strongly develop and maintain the thought that this doesn’t exist—if you concentrate on its nonexistence—then in time the appearance itself will begin to vanish. This is because the immediately preceding condition of the eye consciousness will begin to deteriorate. Therefore, when you initially ascertain emptiness, just a mere negative or absence of the object of negation—inherent existence—is ascertained. Even if at the beginning the object still appears, in time, with concentration on emptiness, it will disappear. Then due to observing the emptiness of the object, when the object reappears, the thought that it doesn’t exist in the way that it seems to is induced. This is called the illusory-like appearance. At this point you are able to control your afflictive emotions. These faulty consciousnesses can in no way be produced without the assistance of the conception of inherent existence. Even though for beginners there are cases when the conception of inherent existence acts as an assister to a virtuous consciousness, in general, it is not necessary that such a consciousness have assistance from the misconception of the nature of existence. Therefore, a consciousness realizing that objects do not exist in their own right serves to obstruct the generation of afflictions, whereas it doesn’t serve to obstruct a virtuous consciousness.
JA: At the moment emptiness is understood—when the object vanishes—what does it feel like?
DL: I’ll just give a conventional example. For instance, the reflection of a face is empty of being a face, but its emptiness of being a face is not its reality; its emptiness of inherent existence is. When from the very depths the mind realizes the absence of this kind of existence of the object, at that point no other consciousness is being generated. Not even the thought “this is emptiness.” If you did think “this is emptiness,” then emptiness would be distant. It would be like an object under observation. It would not have arrived at being the actual object of apprehension by the consciousness.
JA: So there is a loss of duality?
DL: No. Even here there is still duality. There is the duality of the appearance of the conventional object as well as the appearance of the image of emptiness.
JA: If you were to describe the image itself in conventional terms, would you say that it’s clear, vacuous, buoyant, luminous?
DL: That’s very difficult to describe. To explain this exactly is very difficult. There are many different types of dualistic appearance. One is the appearance of conventionalities—objects as we normally see them. Then there is the appearance of inherent existence; also the appearance of subject and object as if different; and the appearance of a general image—an image covering all objects in a particular group. When one gets used to the mind realizing emptiness—cultivating it even further in and out of meditative equipoise—and it turns into direct perception, then for that consciousness all types of dualistic appearance have vanished.
JA: There is no natural luminosity or clarity to the appearance of emptiness?
DL: No, but in terms of tantric practice it’s a different story. That’s not from the point of view of emptiness but from the consciousness. Due to the dissolving of the coarser consciousnesses, there are many different types of appearances. These appearances result from the subtler consciousnesses as well as being connected to one’s body; the white and red constituents and so forth.38
JA: Can you describe the mind of a Buddha?
DL: That which prevents the mind from knowing all there is to be known are called the obstructions to omniscience. With respect to the obstructions to omniscience, there are potencies,39 which are established by the conception of inherent existence and which cause objects to appear as if they inherently or concretely exist. Even though primarily the false appearance of an object is the fault of the subject—the consciousness cognizing it—there may be some fault with the object in that it itself is polluted by ignorance or the latencies of ignorance. From this appearance—that of objects as inherently existent—there is the defilement that conceives the two truths to be different entities. Due to this defilement, when phenomena appear, they seem to exist in their own right, thus preventing the appearance of their reality. Similarly, when the reality of an object appears, the object cannot. We’re talking about direct perception. When this obstruction to omniscience is removed, however, then while knowing the object one can know its nature and while knowing its nature, one can know the object. One mind can then simultaneously and directly ascertain both an object and its nature. Thus an omniscient consciousness—from the point of view of knowing conventional objects—is a consciousness that perceives the varieties of all phenomena. From the point of view of its knowing the nature of objects, it’s a consciousness that knows the mode of being of objects, i.e., emptiness. But it is just one consciousness that knows both. This is a distinctive feature of the omniscient consciousness of a Buddha.
JA: Why is omniscience dependent on the elimination of the latent obstructions through compassion?
DL: The reason for wanting to be omniscient is to help others. To do so, one must know how to help others. Thus, nothing can be obscured. Those defilements that obstruct knowledge of the different dispositions, interests, and so forth of trainees are the main enemy of a Bodhisattva. The obstructions to omniscience are never in any way helpful to a Bodhisattva, whereas the obstructions to liberation, that is to say the afflictions, can sometimes be helpful in achieving the welfare of others (as in the case of a leader’s fathering many children to help in administration). Whether or not a consciousness realizing emptiness acts as an antidote to the obstructions to omniscience depends greatly on motivation. Even though the view realizing emptiness in the continuum of a Listener or Solitary Realizer Superior is the same as the view in the continuum of a Bodhisattva Superior, the ability of the latter to serve as an antidote to the obstructions to omniscience is due to motivation and also due to great merit.40 There is no way for the collection of wisdom to be brought to completion without that of the collection of merit. It’s as if you are going to put up one of these rafters here. To do so, you need to put up two pillars. Even though you don’t need one pillar to put up the other, to hold up that rafter, both must be used. So in order for the view realizing emptiness to turn into the Truth Body of a Buddha, it is necessary for it to have all of the causes required for the production of a Form Body.
JA: How are compassionate means and the wisdom of emptiness41 ultimately identical?
DL: In the Perfection Vehicle42 there is a description of wisdom and method conjoined. For example, before entering into meditative equipoise on emptiness, one generates an altruistic mind directed toward becoming enlightened. Then the meditative equipoise is conjoined with the force of that altruistic motivation. Also, when one is practicing altruistic acts—giving, ethics, and so forth—43 these should be conjoined with the force of the mind realizing emptiness. Thus in this way, there is a union of wisdom and method, the one affecting the other. In mantra, there is a union of method and wisdom within one consciousness and even more profound features of that union within Highest Yoga Tantra.
JA: How, in a Buddha’s mind, is bliss united with this?
DL: Yes. There is a feeling of bliss. From a Buddha’s own point of view everything is a pure appearance and a blissful appearance. From his own point of view. Now, does suffering appear to a Buddha? Yes, but not from his own point of view, but due to its appearance in another person undergoing suffering. Does an appearance of inherent existence occur to a Buddha? Yes, but not from a Buddha’s own viewpoint; but by way of its appearing to a person who hasn’t abandoned the obstructions to omniscience. Now, the appearance of inherent existence does, in general, exist. Something’s existing, and its not appearing to a Buddha is contradictory. Therefore, whatever exists must appear to a Buddha, but not necessarily from his own point of view. Through the force of its appearing to someone else and only through that does it appear.