3
The Cold War and the Political Economy of the Park Chung Hee Regime
No one can deny that the cold war influenced the political economy of the Park Chung Hee (Pak Chŏnghŭi) regime. First, President Park used the fact that South Korea had been both politically and militarily threatened by North Korea during the cold war to suppress anti-government movements and legitimize his authoritarian regime through promoting anti-communism. Second, President Park took advantage of the cold war that restrained South Korea as a divided nation to cement an advantageous relationship with the United States.1 After 1965, Japanese foreign investment promoted by South Korea-Japan normalization and the demand for military procurement, produced by South Korean military involvement in the Vietnam War, contributed to South Korean economic development.
The policies of South Korea-Japan normalization and South Korean military involvement in the Vietnam War were promoted by the United States government because the United States regarded these issues necessary to strengthen the anti-communist bloc in the Northeast Asia. While it is important to point out that the cold war contributed to both the authoritarianism and economic development of the Park regime, it is even more important to notice Park’s skill in taking advantage of the cold war. Park deliberately selected his economic development strategy by taking the cold war factor into consideration.
Following the coup d’état on May 16, 1961, the military junta concentrated on economic development. An export-oriented strategy was not initially adopted by the military junta. Rather the Park Chung Hee regime accepted it later—after it was the only strategy left. In addition, the Park regime intentionally took advantage of the cold war. Thus, while on the one hand the South Korean political and economic regime could be regarded as the one paying for the cost of the cold war, on the other hand Park manipulated this constraint into a benefit. To see this we need to accurately assess the costs and benefits the cold war brought to the Park political and economic regime.
THE INITIAL IDEA CONCERNING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BY THE MILITARY JUNTA
If the export-oriented industrialization strategy had been recommended by developmental economics textbooks at the time of the Park Chung Hee regime, the Korean government could have simply taken the strategy directly from the texts. Indeed, it is now mainstream academic thinking that for developing countries an export-oriented industrialization strategy is much more efficient, productive, and competitive than import-substitution industrialization strategies.2 In the early 1960s, however, mainstream textbooks were influenced by mercantilist, nationalist, and Keynesian economics, rather than by neo-classical economics. In order to achieve rapid, autonomous, and genuine economic development, the import-substitution industrialization strategy was recommended the most often to developing countries.3 One cannot assume that the Park regime would adopt an export-oriented industrialization strategy simply because it was the wisdom of the day.
In fact, the military junta initially adopted an autarkic industrialization strategy known in Korean as “inward-looking industrialization” (naep’oj
k kongphwa).4 This strategy was more of an import-substitution industrialization strategy than an export-oriented strategy. Two persons who played an important role in drafting the original Five-Year Economic Development Plan, Colonel Yu Wŏnsik, and Professor Pak Hŭibŏm, wrote about how this came about. According to their memoirs,5 they had the clear intention to construct a self-reliant national economy by investing huge amounts of capital in basic industries. They were very critical of the United States aid policy at that time, and also of the Rhee regime’s previous policy that made the South Korean economy too dependent on United States aid. They put top priority on the construction of heavy and chemical industries because they felt that heavy and chemical industries would forge a self-reliant national economy. They emphasized the importance of autonomy from United States influence and insisted that the South Korean government put more priority on national interest rather than cold war ideology as the basis for economic policy decisions. Since they thought that the government must take the responsibility of managing the economy for the sake of national interest, they argued for what they called “guided capitalism.”
Yu and Pak played an important role in drafting the original Five-Year Plan published in the name of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction in July 1961.6 The Supreme Council’s plan had many characteristics of an inward-looking deepening strategy. According to the plan, the government had to take charge of investment in the manufacturing industry, while South Korea could earn foreign currency by exporting primary agricultural and mining products. They advocated huge investments into the construction of heavy and chemical industries such as steel, machinery, and petrochemicals. In their plan they insisted that this economic development strategy was the only way to achieve economic self-reliance. This inward-looking deepening strategy was based on nationalism from above. Early on, both the chairman of the Supreme Council, Park Chung Hee and the founder of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), Kim Chongp’il, one of the most important planners of the military coup, endorsed this strategy.
THE UNITED STATES’ RESPONSES TO THE MILITARY JUNTA’S INITIAL IDEAS
The military government, however, could not carry out this strategy. The reason was partly due to the fact that the South Korean government was not autonomous or capable enough to carry out the strategy over the United States’ objection. The United States was afraid that South Korean economic stability would be undermined if the inward-looking deepening strategy were to be adopted. The United States government had not seen the 1961 military coup d’état approaching. After it happened, the American embassy in Seoul tried in vain to restore the civilian government led by Prime Minister Chang Myŏn.7 The government in Washington prevented the embassy in Seoul and the United States military in Korea from interfering in the South Korean domestic politics.8 In addition, there was little internal opposition to the coup d’état.9 Rather than try to overthrow the new regime, the United States proposed various conditions in exchange for validation of the new military government. Top among these goals was the “civilianizing” of the military government. The military junta thus promised to return political power to civilian politicians within two years.10 However, the United States government was concerned that the Republic of Korea (ROK) would be more nationalistic, more authoritarian, and less amenable to the United States’ influence than the previous governments.11
According to a report drafted by the Presidential Task Force on Korea,12 the United States’ top priority should be to make the Republic of Korea’s use of United States’ aid as efficient as possible in order to stabilize the South Korean political system and the economy. The United States advised the South Korean government not to invest large amounts of capital, other than social overhead capital, into new industries, but to make the most of human resources and existing factories. According to this priority, the inward-looking deepening strategy was not desirable because huge capital investment in the heavy and chemical industries would make the South Korean economy inefficient and unnecessarily unstable. When Chairman Park visited the United States in November 1961, the American government advised the South Korean government to scale down the First Five-Year Plan’s annual growth target and adjust it to take resources and available capacity into consideration.13 However, the U.S. government did not have a long-term, concrete vision for the Republic of Korea’s economic development. Rather than directly dictate an export-oriented industrialization strategy, the United States only voiced its opposition to the inward-looking deepening strategy.
THE POLITICAL PROCESS: ADOPTION OF EXPORT-ORIENTED INDUSTRIALIZATION
The consequence of American-Korean differences in economic policy was that the military junta could not carry through its inward-looking deepening strategy. The following four cases demonstrate the collapse of this inward-looking deepening strategy. Case one represents the Korean government’s attempt to carry out a currency conversion to promote the inward-looking deepening strategy. The purpose of this conversion was supposedly to absorb “surplus” money into the government, transform it into industrial capital, and invest it in constructing heavy and chemical industrial sites and an integrated steel mill. The Korean government could not depend on the United States government to carry out this strategy, because the U.S. government did not agree with it. And because it was difficult to rely on capital from other countries, the Korean government had no choice but to supply the money itself. A successful currency conversion might have given the Korean government the last chance to carry out the construction of large-scale heavy and chemical industries during the period of the First Five-Year Plan.14 However, the currency conversion failed in the end.
The U.S. government put forth great effort into preventing the success of the currency conversion by threatening to withhold economic assistance and to take advantage of internal discord among the South Korean military junta.15 The Park military government could not mobilize domestic support to overcome the United States’ pressure because most of the South Korean business sector refrained from productive activities during this period and pressed the ROK government to release frozen money.16
In the second case, the South Korean government prioritized the construction of an integrated steel mill because they deemed such a mill indispensable for the promotion of the inward-looking deepening strategy.17 The Park administration intended to depend on West German commercial loans at first,18 but after the Van Fleet mission visited South Korea, the Park government decided that South Korea would depend on American Development Loan Funds (DLF) and commercial loans.19 When the U.S. government failed to endorse the plan,20 the South Korea government tried in vain to mobilize local capital.
Finally, the resumption of the financial stabilization plan prevented the Park administration from spending its financial budget on constructing an integrated steel mill. In the revised plan, the mill plan, which originally had been included in the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan, was eliminated.21 It took ten more years before South Koreans would succeed in constructing the longed-for integrated steel mill, POSCO.
In the third case, the South Korean military government decided to resume a financial stabilization plan. This was to prevent the military government from investing huge amounts of capital in constructing heavy chemical industries. The financial stabilization plan was forced on the military government as a result of U.S. aid leverage.22 Aid leverage had three forms: (1) organizing the timing and volume of the food aid provided under Public Law 480; (2) deciding which projects USAID would give the DLF; (3) determining whether or not the U.S. government would organize a South Korean consortium. The military government confronted the difficult decision of having to abandon the inward-looking deepening strategy in order to get aid. In any case, the internal struggles concerning the foundation of the Democratic Republican Party divided the military government at this time.23 Under these conditions, the South Korean government could not but comply with the advice of the U.S. government.
In the fourth case, the military government at last decided to revise the original Five-Year Development Plan in December 1962. The Economic Planning Board (EPB), not the Supreme Council, revised this plan. The most conspicuous differences between the original and the revised plan were as follows.24 First, the ROK government abandoned the principle of “guided capitalism” and decided to comply with the principle of a “free market economy.” Second, the South Korean government emphasized the importance of the stabilization policy. Third, they revised the export plan. According to the original plan, primary products were expected to be the main export products, but the revised plan mentioned that the Republic of Korea had to specialize in exporting manufactured, labor-intensive products. Fourth, the military government scaled down the target of the annual increase in GNP (Gross National Product) per capita from 7.1 percent to 5.0 percent. This target of 5.0 percent was set according to the advice of USOM (the Korean branch of the USAID). The revised plan indicated that the South Korean economic development strategy changed from an inward-looking deepening strategy, to the labor-intensive, export-oriented industrialization model.
Among various factors that led to the failure of inward-looking development, the most important was the U.S. government’s opposition. The U.S. government regarded the strategy as being inconsistent with American goals for the ROK economy. At this time, the ROK could not acquire capital from countries other than the United States. This was not for lack of trying. The Republic of Korea tried in vain to use European and Japanese “cards” against the U.S. government. European countries and Japan did not intend to cooperate with the ROK in implementing an inward-looking deepening strategy that was contrary to United States’ desires. Pressure from the U.S. government, which took cold war factors seriously into consideration, promoted the failure of the inward-looking industrialization deepening strategy and the later adoption of the export-oriented industrialization strategy.
THE COLD WAR AND ITS IMPACTS ON THE “IMPLEMENTATION” OF THE EXPORT-ORIENTED INDUSTRIALIZATION STRATEGY
The cold war restrained opportunities for the Republic of Korea to structure economic decision-making and prompted South Korea to adopt the export-oriented industrialization strategy promoted by the United States, not the inward-looking deepening strategy that it preferred. How, then, did the cold war impact the “implementation” of the export-oriented industrialization strategy? Are there causal relations between the cold war factor and the “implementation” of the export-oriented industrialization strategy? Early in 1960s, the available funds for South Korea to import goods were mainly from U.S. aid. In order to promote export-oriented industrialization, South Korea had to multi-lateralize its sources of foreign capital.
In order to get as much capital as possible, not only from local sources but also from foreign sources, South Korea had to gain the confidence of foreign countries. South Korea also had to pioneer new markets for South Korean exportable goods. It is true that South Korea could take advantage of diligent and cheap labor to produce competitive manufactured exports, but South Korea had to compete with similar countries to acquire the foreign capital and secure reliable markets for its manufactured exports. The cold war in turn provided favorable conditions for export. South Korea sought to take advantage of the international environment through ROK-Japan normalization and South Korean military involvement in the Vietnam War.
KOREA-JAPAN NORMALIZATION AND ITS IMPACTS ON SOUTH KOREAN EXPORT-ORIENTED INDUSTRIALIZATION
ROK-Japan normalization was accomplished in 1965. It took fifteen years from the inception of negotiations until normalization was achieved, and the negotiations were some of the toughest not only for Japan but also for South Korea. On one hand, the South Korean government initiated the negotiations to normalize relations with Japan mainly because it wanted to complete the decolonization process by starting fully fledged diplomatic relations with the postwar “new” Japan. On the other hand, the Japanese government initiated the negotiations because it needed to resolve fishery issues between the Republic of Korea and Japan, and wanted President Syngman Rhee to abandon the Rhee Line.25 Japan also wanted to clarify the legal status of Koreans living in Japan. Because the purposes and agendas of Japan and the Republic of Korea were completely different, the negotiations could not be anything but difficult.
The hardest problem for the Republic Korea and Japan to solve was Korean property claims against Japan and compensation for the thirty-six years of Japanese colonial rule.26 President Rhee demanded that in order to start new diplomatic relations with South Korea, the Japanese government must apologize and compensate for colonial rule by providing large amounts of money. For its part, the Japanese government insisted that it would pay just enough to meet South Korean legal claims against Japan. It was because of United States mediation that both governments began negotiations in 1951.
While each country’s alliance with the U.S. could help bring the ROK and Japan together, these same alliances could prevent both governments from promoting the normalization process themselves. Both Japan and South Korea regarded their alliances with the United States as the most reliable, thereby making normalization unnecessary.27 Both governments started negotiations, not because they thought normalization was necessary, but because the United States government told them to. One of the most important reasons why the normalization process in the 1950s had been very slow was that President Rhee was afraid that if the normalization were achieved, the United States would “sell out” South Korea to Japan, and the South Korean economy would once again be dependent on the Japanese economy as it had been under colonial rule.
This dynamic changed in the early 1960s when the United States changed its policy toward South Korea. Because the U.S. emphasized loans rather than grants, the United States needed more serious Japanese engagement with South Korea than before.28 The U.S. government, while limiting its role to that of a catalyst,29 a messenger, or a middleman rather than a mediator,30 decided to play a more active role in promoting ROK-Japan normalization by persuading both governments to overcome domestic opposition and accomplish normalization.31 In the 1950s, the U.S. regarded the military security and defensive capability of South Korea as most important, and had made light of South Korea’s political and economic performance. By the 1960s, however, the U.S. government’s top priority in terms of its policy toward South Korea was not military security or defensive capability, but political and economic stability. The U.S. determined that the most serious threat from North Korea was that of indirect infiltration. This could be accomplished by taking advantage of South Korean domestic political and economic turmoil, rather than direct military invasion.32
The Japanese government was also much more receptive to normalization with South Korea than before. The Ikeda administration decided to promote normalization with the Republic of Korea after the May 16 coup because the military government was much more positive in promoting normalization through containing domestic opposition. The Ikeda administration regarded a stable, anti-communist South Korea vital militarily, preferable politically, and profitable economically for Japan.33
Concerning the amount and the form of South Korean claims against Japan, there were huge and conspicuous disagreements between South Korea and Japan. The South Korean government insisted that it was entitled to legally receive all of the Korean claims against Japan to the amount of at least seven billion dollars.34 However, the Japanese government insisted that the claims problem be resolved politically, not legally, because according to a purely legal procedure, the Japanese government would provide a smaller amount. The Ikeda administration decided to resolve these differences by providing money, goods, and services as economic aid or gifts in order to clear away the South Korean claims against Japan.35
The South Korean military government also decided to promote normalization by agreeing to the way the Japanese government proposed to resolve the claims problem.36 The South Korean government agreed with the Japanese government in that the Japanese government should, over the course of ten years, provide three billion dollars as a grant, two billion dollars as a soft official loan, and more than three billion dollars as private foreign investments or commercial loans to clear away South Korean claims against Japan.
While opposition forces in South Korea insisted that the government not compromise so easily with the Japanese to solve the claims problem, the Park Chung Hee administration accepted the Japanese-initiated resolution in order to obtain economic cooperation and facilitate their industrialization strategy. The Republic of Korea’s export-oriented industrialization strategy had elective affinity with the way in which ROK-Japan normalization was resolved as economic cooperation.37 If the ROK military government had persisted in pursuing the inward-looking deepening strategy, such a resolution would have been regarded as irrelevant.
The United States, South Korea, and Japan agreed that the North Korean threat was now more political and economical rather than militaristic. The three governments also agreed that South Korea should focus more on political and economic security rather than military security. This attitude facilitated the Republic of Korea’s adoption of export-oriented industrialization, and South Korea’s decision to achieve ROK-Japan normalization through economic cooperation. Compared to the Rhee regime, the Park government gave more priority to achieving economic development and taking advantage of economic cooperation with Japan, rather than focusing on issues related to decolonization.
MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIETNAM WAR AND ITS IMPACTS ON EXPORT-ORIENTED INDUSTRIALIZATION
No one can deny that military involvement in the Vietnam War contributed to an increase in exports and the accumulation of foreign currency for South Korea.38 South Korea acquired foreign currency through military procurement in a number of ways during the Vietnam War. The Republic of Korea increased its exports to South Vietnam. The U.S. military increased the number of American troops and the ROK increased the number of Korean troops in Vietnam. American dollars were transmitted from South Vietnam to South Korea by South Korean military soldiers, who were given their overseas allowances by the U.S. government. South Korean expatriates working for Korean or U.S. firms in Vietnam also transmitted currency to the ROK. The chaebl, such as Hyundai and Hanjin, received orders from the U.S. military during the Vietnam War and brought some of their profits home. And finally, South Korean exports to the United States increased during the Vietnam War. Because the United States invested large amounts of capital into military industries during the Vietnam War, South Korean consumer goods were exported to the United States to take advantage of the shortage of consumer goods produced domestically. Even so, South Korea could not earn foreign currency in Vietnam without competing with Taiwan, Japan, and the countries of Southeast Asia.39 Here, an investigation of Park’s interactive strategies with the United States is especially instructive.
After the summit meeting with the United States President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) in May 1965, it was not South Korea but the LBJ administration who initiated South Korean military involvement in the Vietnam War.40 The Johnson administration felt pressured to persuade the South Korean government to dispatch its military troops according to the “Free World Assistance to South Vietnam” program, which was also called the “More Flags Campaign.”41 Johnson regarded other countries’ military or nonmilitary involvement in the Vietnam War important because he feared that without outside support the United States would become internationally isolated in carrying out the war and may lose domestic support for the war. This vulnerability enabled the Park regime to negotiate for political, military, and economic compensation in exchange for sending its military troops to Vietnam on behalf of the United States.
Even so, however, it is not entirely obvious why South Korea, rather than other countries in Asia, sent the largest number of troops to South Vietnam. North Korea, after all, still threatened South Korea militarily, and United States troops still protected South Korea. Might not South Korea have too little defensive capability if it sent significant numbers of troops to South Vietnam? South Korea, moreover, had no alliance treaty with South Vietnam. SEATO member countries had signed treaties obligating them to defend South Vietnam from external military threats, but only a few countries among them sent their military to South Vietnam, and those that did, did so on a very small scale. What made the Johnson administration select South Korea among all of the other countries to fight against Vietnamese communists alongside the United States military?
Actually, it was the South Korean government which had been most enthusiastic about dispatching South Korean military troops to South Vietnam and Indochina—one of the hotspots between communists and anti-communists. Just at the time of the 1954 Geneva Accords, only one year after the Korean Armistice, President Rhee suggested that the ROK was prepared to dispatch military troops to Laos or Indochina in order to defend anti-communist Asian countries from communist aggression. At that time, the Eisenhower administration declined President Rhee’s proposal with the reservation that in the near future it may be necessary to request the South Korean military troops be sent to Indochina.42
President Rhee’s proposal had two motivations: (1) to obtain bargaining power with the U.S. and (2) to acquire prestige as an anti-communist Asian power. By doing the United States a favor, President Rhee hoped to get favorable terms from the United States on issues of normalization with Japan and corruption by appealing that he could contribute to anti-communism in Asia. President Rhee also wanted the political glory of being one of the most respected and powerful anti-communist leaders in Asia. At this time, however, the United States turned down Rhee’s proposal because it was felt that it would be difficult for the U.S. government to get domestic and international support in stationing the U.S. military in South Korea while the South Korean military was being sent abroad.43
Rhee persisted, however, and made a similar suggestion to the U.S. government again in 1959. And, what is more surprising is that it was not only President Rhee but also Chairman of the SCNR, Park Chung Hee, who proposed sending South Korea’s military to South Vietnam. When Chairman Park visited the United States in November 1961 after the May 16 military coup to get political and economic support from the Kennedy administration, Chairman Park suggested to President Kennedy that he was ready to dispatch Korean military troops, whether regular or voluntary, to South Vietnam if the United States government requested. Such a proposal surprised Kennedy, and both leaders agreed that they would consider the proposal at a later date.44 We can validate, then, that South Korea had a more positive view of sending South Korean troops to South Vietnam than the United States. This is one of the reasons why the U.S. government selected South Korea as an ally during the Vietnam War.
Taiwan was the other promising candidate for fighting the Vietnam War. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek was as positive as the South Korean leaders about sending troops to South Vietnam. He regarded the escalation of the Vietnam War as an opportunity for him to recover mainland China from the communists. The U.S. government, however, did not want to take the risk of escalating the Vietnam War into a Chinese civil war between the nationalists and communists. The United States, in fact, was very cautious about Taiwanese engagement in the Vietnam War.45 This was one of the reasons why the U.S. selected South Korea as a member of the alliance fighting the Vietnam War. However, it is arguable that South Korean military involvement in the Vietnam War was mostly a product of South Korean policy makers taking advantage of the escalating cold war.
The motivation behind President Park when he decided to dispatch South Korean troops to South Vietnam, however, was not exclusively economic. It is a fact that South Korea received enormous economic gains from sending its military to South Vietnam, but the motivation in Vietnam involvement was militaristic as well as economic. South Korea sent troops to South Vietnam in order to prevent the United States from reducing its military in Korea. However, since South Korea gained more economically than other countries by sending its military troops to South Vietnam, one could argue that South Korea secured its economy by paying the cost of dispatching its military troops and fighting in the Vietnam War.46
CONCLUSION
The cold war constrained South Korea under United States hegemony and promoted the adoption of export-oriented industrialization by creating conditions under which the inward-looking deepening strategy failed. However, the Park Chung Hee regime succeeded in implementing the export-oriented industrialization by skillfully taking advantage of the cold war. It is true that the South Korean economy developed “in spite of” the cold war, but it is also true that the development of the South Korean economy was achieved “due to” the cold war. With respect to the relationship between the cold war and South Korean national interest, we can see the following double-edged aspects.
On the one hand, initially the Park Chung Hee regime did not possess autonomy nor were they capable enough to carry out an autarkic, inward-looking deepening strategy and overcome the constraints posed by the cold war. On the other hand, the Park Chung Hee regime exhibited the flexibility and capability to take advantage of the limitations posed by the cold war to carry out the export-oriented industrialization plan. In sum, President Park achieved the Republic of Korea’s national interest in the form of economic development by viewing the cold war as a given and available resource.
As long as the cold war continued, South Korea could balance its national interests between these two poles. The escalation of the cold war while the Vietnam War heated up in 1960s, in fact, appeared to guarantee the continuation of this strategic balance. However, U.S.-China rapprochement in the early 1970s transformed the cold war in Northeast Asia. Because the United States-China confrontation was the main cause of the regional cold war in the 1960s, such rapprochement could not fail to influence neighboring countries such as South and North Korea. The Park Regime responded to U.S.-China rapprochement by revising the constitution, installing the much more authoritarian Yusin regime, and promoting the Heavy and Chemical Industrialization (HCI) Program. In this new international environment, Park Chung Hee thought he could maintain balance by defining the national interest as being “relatively” more autonomous from the United States. This resulted in the installation of the Yusin authoritarian regime and the more autarkic HCI Program that included South Korea’s construction of its own defense industries.
NOTES
1. For one of the most systematic analyses concerning the relationship between the cold war and South Korean economic development see Bruce Cumings, “The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy,” 1–40.
2. Bella Balassa, The New Industrializing Countries in the World Economy.
3. Raul Prebisch, Change and Development, Latin America’s Great Task.
4. Concerning the term, see Kimiya Tadashi, Pak Chŏnghŭi chingbu ŭi sŏnt’aek, 49–74.
5. Yu Wōnsik, 5.16 pirok: hyŏngmyŏng ŭn ŏdiro kanna; Pak Hŭibŏm, Han’guk kyŏngje sŏngjang ron.
6. Kukka Chaegŏn Ch’oego Hoeŭi Chŏnghap Kyŏngje Chaegŏn Wiwŏnhoe, Chŏnghap kyŏngje chaegŏn kyehoek.
7. Telegram from American Embassy in Seoul to the Secretary of State, 1528 (May 16, 1961), National Security Files, Country File, Korea, Box 128, John F. Kennedy (JFK) Library, Boston, MA.
8. Telegram from the Acting Secretary of State to American Embassy in Seoul, 1316, (May 16,1961), National Security Files, Country File, Korea, Box 128, JFK Library, Boston, MA; Kim, Chŏnggi, “Kŭregori Hendŏsŭn ŭi hoego.”
9. Telegram from American Embassy in Seoul to the Secretary of State, 1545 (May 17, 1961), 1569 (May 18, 1961), 1570 (May 18, 1961) and Telegram from Magruder to Lemnitzer, JSC, May 17, 1961, National Security Files, Country File, Korea, Box 128, JFK Library, Boston, MA.
10. Cho Yongjung, “Tak’yument’ari: kukka chaegŏn ch’oego hoeŭi”; Telegram from the Secretary of State to American Embassy in Seoul, 222 (August 5,1961), National Security Files, Country File, Korea, Box 128, JFK Library, Boston, MA.
11. “Park Briefing Book,” National Security Files, Country File, Korea, Box 128, JFK Library, Boston, MA.
12. Presidential Task Force on Korea, “Report to the National Security Council,” June 5, 1961, National Security Files, Country File, Korea, Box 127, JFK Library, Boston, MA.
13. Memorandum of Conversation, “ROK Government Economic Planning,” November 16, 1961, National Security Files, Country File, Korea, Box 128, JFK Library, Boston, MA.
14. Concerning the planning process of the currency conversion, see the following memoirs. Yu Wŏnsik, 5.16 pirok; Ch’ŏn Pyŏnggyu, Ch’ŏnma ch’owŏn e nolda; Chung-Yum Kim, Policymaking on the Front Lines.
15. Telegram from American Embassy in Seoul to the Secretary of State, 1246 (June 8, 1962) and Telegram from the Secretary of State to American Embassy in Seoul (June 27, 1961), “Joint State/AID Message for Berger and Killen,” National Security Files, Country File, Korea, Box 128, JFK Library, Boston, MA.
16. Yi Pyŏngch’ŏl, Hoam chajŏn, 128–30.
17. Pak Ch’unghun, Idang hoegorok, 176.
18. “Oeja toip ilch’a min’gan kyosŏpdan onŭl ch’ulbal” [The first mission of the private companies introducing foreign direct investments departs today], Tonga ilbo, February 8, 1962.
19. Concerning the role of the Van Fleet Mission, See Chunghwahak Kongŏp Ch’ujin Wiwŏnhoe Kihoektan, Han’guk kongŏp palchŏn e kwanhan chosa yŏn’gu 3, 28–33.
20. William H. Bruebeck, “Memorandum for Mr. MacGeorge Bundy, The White House, ‘Accomplishments of American Investment Group Headed by General Van Fleet in Korea,’” (June 19, 1962), National Security Files, Country File, Korea, Box 127, JFK Library, Boston, MA.
21. Taehan Min’guk Chŏngbu, Kyŏngje Kihoegwŏn, Che-il ch’a kyŏngje kaebal o kaenyŏn kyehoek powan kyehoek.
22. U.S. Department of State, “Chapter 7, Part F, Korea,” Administrative History of State Department, Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) Library, Austin, Texas; U.S. Congress, U.S. House of Representatives Investigation of Korean-American Relations, 166.
23. Telegram from American Embassy in Seoul to the Secretary of State, 504 (January 18, 1963), 528 (January 27, 1963), 538 (January 30, 1963), National Security Files, Country File, Korea, Box 129, JFK Library, Boston, MA.
24. Taehan Min’guk Chŏngbu, Kyŏngje Kihoegwŏn, Che-il ch’a kyŏngje kaebal o kaenyŏn kyehoek powan kyehoek.
25. In South Korea, the Rhee Line was called the “Peace Line” (p’yŏnghwasŏn).
26. Concerning the ROK-Japan normalization process, see Kimiya Tadashi, Pak Chŏnghŭi chŏngbu ŭi sŏnt’aek, 270–94; Yi Wŏndŏk, Han-Il kwagŏsa chŏri ŭi wŏnchŏm; and 
ta Osamu, Nikkan kōshō: seikyūken mondai no kenkyū.
27. Concerning triangle relations between the United States, South Korea, and Japan in the 1950s, see Ri Shōgen, Higashi Azia reisen to Kan-Bei-Nichi kankei.
28. Telegram from American Embassy in Seoul to the Secretary of State, 722 (November 17, 1961), National Security Files, Country File, Korea, Box 128, JFK Library, Boston, MA.
29. Telegram from the Secretary of State to American Embassy in Seoul and in Tokyo (July 13, 1962), National Security Files, Country File, Korea, Box 128, JFK Library, Boston, MA.
30. Telegram from American Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State (July 26, 1962), Central File of the Department of State (Record Group 59), Decimal File, 694.95/7–2662, NARA (National Archives and Records Administration), College Park, Maryland.
31. The Department of State, “Normalization Agreement with Japan,” Administrative History of State Department, LBJ Library, Austin, Texas.
32. Marshall Green, “Limited Hostilities in East Asia,” January 27, 1960, National Security Files, Country File, Korea, Box 127, JFK Library, Boston, MA.
33. “232 Memorandum of Conversation, Washington DC, June 20, 1961, Subject Korea,” Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia, Washington DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, 489–90.
34. Pae Ŭihwan, Porikkogae nŭn nŏmŏtchiman, 194.
35. Niinobe Akira, “Joyaku Teiketsu ni Itaru Katei.”
36. “Kim pujang kwa Ilbon kowich’ŭng kwa ŭi hoedam” [The meeting of Kim Jong Pil, the director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, with high-ranking Japanese politicians], Taehan Min’guk Oemubu, oegyo munsŏ, tŭngnok pŏnho 796 [ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic documents, registration no. 796], Kim Chongp’il t’ŭksa Ilbon pangmun, 1962, 10–11, [Kim Jong Pil’s visit to Japan, October–November, 1962].
37. Concerning the argument in detail, see Kimiya Tadashi, Pak Chŏnghŭi chŏngbu ŭi sŏnt’aek, 270–94; Kimiya Tadashi, “1960-nendai kankoku ni okeru reisen gaiko no 3 ruikei.
38. Baku Konkō (Pak Kŭnho), kankoku no keizai hatten to Betonamu sensō.
39. Concerning the comparison among the countries which were militarily involved in the Vietnam War, see Robert Blackburn, Mercenaries and Lyndon Johnson’s “More Flags”; Kimiya Tadashi, Pak Chŏnghŭi chŏngbu ŭi sŏnt’aek, 323–28; Kimiya Tadashi, “Betonamu sensō to Betonamu tokuju.”
40. Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation between President Johnson and ROK President Park Chung Hee, U.S.-Korean Relations,” May 17, 1965, National Security Files, Country File, Korea, Box 254, LBJ Library, Austin, Texas.
41. Chester L. Cooper and McBundy, “Memorandum for the President: Free World Assistance to South Vietnam,” December 22, 1964, Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Microfiche number, 1979–222B. DDRS is available through the Library Congress and other major university libraries in the USA.
42. Memorandum, “Discussion at the 185th Meetings of the National Security Council,” DDRS, Microfiche number, 1985–1807; “Attachment: Political Aspects of Proposed ROK Offer of Troops to Laos Prepared by DOS, February 18, 1954,” DDRS, Microfiche number, 1984–1803.
43. Joint Chiefs Staff (JCS), “Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Consideration of the ROK Offer to send a Division to Indochina, March 1, 1954,” DDRS, Microfiche number, 1984–1576; National Security Council (NSC), “Minutes of the 187th Meetings of the NSC, Record of Actions by the NSC at its 187th Meetings, March 4, 1954,” DDRS, Microfiche number, 1985–1911.”
44. “Memorandum of Conversation, U.S.-Korean Relations, November 14,1961,” “Memorandum of Conversation, Farewell Call of Chairman Park on President Kennedy, November 15, 1961,” National Security Files, Country File, Korea, Park Visit, Box 128, JFK Library, Boston, MA.; “Message from CINCPAC to JCS: Possible Use of GRC and/ or ROK Troops in SVN, November 26–28,1961,” National Security Files, Country File, Vietnam, Box 195, JFK Library, Boston, MA.
45. U.S. Department of State, “Use of ROK and GRC Military Forces Outside Their Homelands, February 4, 1965,” Papers of James C. Thomson, Box 18, Far East: Baguio Conference, Baguio II, March 1965, Background Material (A), JFK Library, Boston, MA.
46. Kimiya Tadashi, Pak Chŏnghŭi chŏngbu ŭi sŏnt’aek, 295–330; Kimiya Tadashi, “1960-nendai kankoku ni okeru reisen gaiko no 3 ruikei.”