In the second half of the twentieth century, the Republic of Korea (ROK) achieved a double revolution. In a few short years, South Korea shifted from an underdeveloped agricultural economy to an industrialized, high-income economy with highly developed heavy industry and information technology. During the same time South Korea shifted from military authoritarian regimes to civic democracy. These historical changes began under President Park Chung Hee (Pak Chŏnghŏi) (1961–79) who seized power through a military coup on May 16, 1961, and then ruled the country for almost eighteen years until his regime collapsed after his assassination on October 26, 1979. It has been widely observed that the state played a dominant role in East Asian industrialization,1 and in this regard the ROK has been particularly notable for its rigid centralization, combined with a competent technocracy, among other driving factors.2
During the Park era, the growth rate of South Korea’s Gross National Product (GNP) averaged 8.5 percent per annum.3 Exports, which had stood at a mere $100 million in 1964, when the Park state launched export-led industrialization, amounted to $10 billion in 1978, the year before Park’s assassination. In 2008, South Korea reached an estimated $432 billion in exports.4
The top-down industrialization through the Park state’s guided economy became known as the “Miracle on the Han River,” (Hangang ŭi kyŏk) and was admired by many political leaders in the region, including Deng Xiao Ping in China and Mahathir in Malaysia, who both adopted the Korean model of development for their own countries. International recognition of the ROK’s successful economic development, however, did little to mollify Park’s domestic critics. Over the last thirty years, especially since South Korea’s democratization in 1987, many Koreans continue to question the extent to which the socio-cultural and institutional legacies of the Park era may have created the continuing imbalances in South Korean society. In the meantime, the ROK’s economic miracle has baulked twice, initially in the 1997–8 financial crisis and again in the global economic crisis brought on largely by the U.S. in 2008, which reduced the ranking of the South Korean economy from the thirteenth largest in the world to the fifteenth.
Table 1 Average Annual GDP Growth Rates in Four Year Increments 1955–2004
Year: GDP Growth Rate
1955–1959: 4.2
1960–1965: 6
1966–1970: 10.6
1971–1975: 7.4
1976–1980: 7.2
1981–1985: 7.8
1986–1990: 9.8
1991–1995: 6
1996–2000: 4.4
2001–2004: 4.75
Yet, the ROK’s recovery from these economic crises has in both instances been swift, although at a high price, paid particularly by ordinary working people. Following the 1997–8 crisis, many ordinary Koreans suffered layoffs or became irregular workers as a result of neo-liberal economic restructuring and subsequent reforms since the liberal government of Kim Dae-jung (Kim Taejung, 1998–2003). In 2009, South Korea, the fourth largest economy in Asia, is reported to have recorded the sixth fastest increase in economic growth in the April–June period among the group of twenty economies, with a 2.5 percent increase.5 The Republic of Korea’s democratic consolidation is no less impressive. According to the Freedom House survey published in 2006, South Korea received a rating of one for political rights (with one indicating the most free and seven least free), and a two for civil liberties.6 In regard to freedom of the press, South Korea ranked higher than Australia, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States.7 In 2010, Korea ranked twenty-sixth among 127 of the most democratic nations in the world. Although the success of the ROK’s economy and democracy must, in its final analysis, be considered as a collective outcome of the efforts of all Koreans, the South Korean case serves as a prototype for the Asian developmental model, with the defining feature of detailed intervention in manpower planning, particularly in the state’s implementation of the Heavy and Chemical Industrialization Plan launched in January 1973. A brief review of the Park era (1961–79) is useful and sheds some light on the extraordinary changes in South Korean society over the past three decades since Park’s assassination.
HISTORICAL REVIEW
In 1961, when Major General Park Chung Hee and his young army colonels staged a military coup and overthrew the Chang Myŏn administration of the Second Republic (1960–61), South Korea ranked as one of the poorest countries in the world with a per capita income of only $87. Under martial law, the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR)—formerly known as the Military Revolutionary Committee—appointed a special military tribunal to purge the military, the government, and society itself of people regarded as corrupt or undesirable. The military junta also dissolved the National Assembly. At the same time, Lieutenant Colonel Kim Chongp’il, Park’s nephew-in-law, established the Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) in June 1961,8 which concentrated primarily on suppressing domestic political opposition.
From the beginning of his military junta, Park promoted an “economy first policy” together with anti-Communism as a prerequisite for “restoring” democracy. He insisted on applying what he termed, “administrative democracy” or “Koreanized democracy,” a radically centralized measure, which according to the military junta was the key to fostering “National Reconstruction.” After nationalizing four major banks and creating a super-ministry called the Economic Planning Board (EPB), Park subsequently launched South Korea’s First Five-Year Economic Development Plan. The military junta’s problem was that they had neither the financial nor administrative resources to carry out their plan and thus the First Five-Year Plan had to be radically revised in mid-1964. In September 1963, for example, South Korea was on the verge of national bankruptcy with National Treasury holdings of U.S. currency amounting to just $93,298,000.9
Although Park struggled with American pressure and his Communist past, which had become a hot issue just five days before the election, Park won the presidential election by a narrow margin of 1.5 percent on October 15, 1963. Thus in May 1964, when Park adopted an export-led industrialization (EOI) policy for his new government, he and his newly appointed economic ministers knew all too well that they needed to generate exports at any price in order to save the country from bankruptcy. The EOI policy rapidly shifted the focus of manufacturing in South Korea from import substitution to exports, particularly the export of light industrial products such as textiles, clothing, footwear, and human hair wigs. As a strategic adjunct to this policy, Park also adopted a clear set of export earnings targets of $100 million, $300 million, and $1 billion for 1964, 1967, and 1970 respectively.
The Third Republic (1963–71) turned out to be a political paradox for Park. While his regime successfully induced rapid industrialization and urbanization, the workers who streamed into the cities did not automatically support Park politically. In fact, rapid urbanization led to an equally rapid erosion of Park’s political support, especially among workers (see Chapter 7). Furthermore, as the United States became mired in Vietnam, the international environment became increasingly more unpredictable, especially when President Richard Nixon announced his plan to visit China. This announcement took place in March 1971, a little more than three months after the U.S. had withdrawn one-third of its 62,000 troops stationed in South Korea. Faced with this major change, Park declared a state of emergency in December that year and then under martial law declared the Yusin (Restoration) Reform on October 17, 1972. Ten years after his military coup, Park again suspended the National Assembly and dissolved all political parties. Under the new Yusin Constitution (promulgated in December), Park emerged as a president with supreme power, a leader indirectly elected by the National Council for Reunification. The new constitution stipulated that one third of the National Assembly (and all administrative offices down to the county head) be appointed by the president himself.10 Moreover, Park equipped himself with supreme power dubbed “Presidential Guidance” (taet’ongnyŏng chisi), which in practice represented the law itself, particularly when it came to implementing the state’s HCI Plan as the top priority of Park’s Yusin State (1972–9).
Not surprisingly, the state’s HCI policy triggered a burst of anti-Park and anti-government protests. In fact, the state’s suppression of workers’ rights under the HCI policy sparked the Pusan-Masan uprising of 1979 that ultimately led to Park’s assassination. The extraordinary twist following Park’s assassination, however, was that army Major General Chun Doo-whan (Chŏn Tuhwan) seized power through a highly orchestrated coup on May 17, 1980, with the Ronald Reagan administration’s blessing coming in June.11 The public protest against this military coup quickly turned into the heroic May democratic struggle in Kwangju which marked a turning-point for the South Korean people’s democratization movement. It also opened the new era of the South Korean minjung (working people)12 culture movement of the 1980s. This movement combined heated debate among radical student activists, later known as undongkwŏn, and progressive dissident-intellectuals known as chaeya in the Korean social formation discourse (Han’guk sahoe kusŏngch’e): debate that discussed in detail the question of what sort of character and identity South Korean society should have in terms of structure and practice.13 According to minjung theorists, the minjung are the driving force of Korean society and they alone are the subjects (chuch’e) of Korean history. Needless to say, the concept of minjung was built on historical teleology with the perceived social contradiction between the people (minjung) and wealthy business entrepreneurs or chaebŏl; the former being historically portrayed as economically, politically, and culturally exploited by the latter.14 By the early 1990s, however, the minjung movement and the debate on South Korea’s social formation had virtually died out, or more accurately, been replaced with the new phenomena of civil society and the proliferation of NGO movements, which ultimately shaped the character of South Korea’s citizen-led “miraculous democracy,”15 particularly notable since the Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003–8).
The Park Syndrome: Myth and Reality
In the wake of the 1997–8 financial crisis, the public demanded an answer to how such a disaster had erupted. Some speculated that the economic failure of the late nineties was the result of “crony capitalism,”16 despite voluminous evidence to the contrary.17 Ordinary Korean people, meanwhile, reacted to the crisis with an overwhelming sense of national humiliation. The public reaction, especially against rampant political-economic corruption coupled with mismanagement of the national economy, ironically popularized the so-called Park Chung Hee Syndrome, with many looking to Park’s strong leadership that had brought about the economic miracle in South Korea. The Park Syndrome, in other words, was and remains a simplistic but enduring expression of many South Koreans’ disappointment and anger towards their country’s increasingly weary economic performance marred with continuing corruption among the leaders of the political, economic, and bureaucratic community, even under democratically elected governments.
It is fair to note, however, that Korea is not the only country in Asia where its people increasingly entertain themselves with authoritarian nostalgia. According to a recent survey, many countries in Asia that have adopted “third-wave” democracies such as Taiwan, the Philippines and Mongolia, for example, show symptoms of authoritarian nostalgia, and even the Japanese are not exceptions from such longing.18 Curiously enough, public perception in South Korean society of President Park changed dramatically within one generation. Park went from being the most loathed president to the most admired president in contemporary Korean history, with an almost cult-like status among many, both young and old. In this respect, the unrivaled popularity of Park Guen-hye, Park’s daughter and former chairwoman of the ruling Grand National Party, who is expected to run for presidency in the 2012 presidential election, perhaps reflects Park’s enduring legacy. Not surprisingly, therefore, public debate on the Park era and his authoritarian leadership over South Korea’s rapid industrialization has been highly charged with emotion, whether for or against. Some argue that Park did not seize power in a vacuum, but built on the educational successes and other achievements of the Syngman Rhee (Yi Sŭngman) administration. They argue that much of the personnel necessary for economic planning had already been assembled by the end of the Rhee administration, and significant economic planning had already begun.19 In fact, in his memoirs published in 1999, Yi Kihong, former director-general of planning for the Ministry of Reconstruction (1960–61) explains in detail how he had drawn up the Republic of Korea’s First Five-Year Economic Development Plan under the Rhee and Chang Myŏn governments.20
In his ambitious initial attempt to draw up the ROK’s First Five-Year Economic Plan, the then Major General Park Chung Hee, as chairman of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (Kukka Chaegŏn Ch’oego Hoeŭi), certainly adopted a range of political and economic policies from the Rhee administration. However, many observers seem to ignore or underestimate the poor state of South Korea’s administrative capacity at that time, especially the capacity to draw up a long-term economic plan and implement it. One of the key reasons for the military junta’s radical administrative reform under Prime Minister General Song Yoch’an (July 1961–March 1962) was to lift the standard of the civil service, in order to secure American support for the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan on which Park and his military clique staked their own political survival.21 A U.S. Embassy telegram dated August 12, 1961, reveals the following insight:
Prime Minister Song (who is far more capable as a manager than as a policy maker) is working his ministries 18-hour days to drive through programs and decisions. He has commented to me several times that he simply cannot understand how govt [sic] ever functioned heretofore. He said civil service simply has no idea of how to work up a staff paper or effect interministry [sic] coordination and he has instituted methods used by [the] military, i.e., staff studies defining the problem, discussing the issues, and coming up with alternate recommendations for top level decision. He has established task forces and date deadlines for completion. He has started two, three, and four weeks training seminars for senior and junior executive grades with compulsory attendance one hour daily to learn how to do their jobs…. Offenders are being disciplined and even fired.22
PUBLIC DEBATE ON THE PARK ERA TODAY
Almost three decades after the end of the Park era, public debate on this era and Park’s role in contemporary South Korean history continues to rage between two camps—those who approve of Park-style modernization and now promote the “advancement” (sŏnjinhwa) of South Korea,23 and others who insist that Park-style “compressed” economic development inherently delayed South Korea’s democratization and now promote social justice and economic equality. The rivalry between these two camps is also seen in the ideological divide between the older and younger generations: the older generation showing more conservative and the younger generation more progressive tendencies. The popular movements of the so-called New Right and New Left are two examples, although the former claims to promote “rational conservatism” instead of old, extreme, rightwing principles, and the latter a “sustainable progressiveness” with the aim of creating a new, ideological paradigm different from the traditional leftwing philosophy. The rivalry between these camps boils down to an argument over how people should understand the Park era and contemporary history.
The older generation, at large, tends to agree more with the necessity for strong authoritarian leadership than the younger generation who, in general, demands more radical change in South Korean society and rejects the legacies of Park-style modernization built on the three pillars of statism, growth-firstism, and authoritarianism.24 Few dispute the need for a serious assessment of the Park era, not only to understand South Korean modernity, but also to pave the country’s future direction, especially by reconciling the national past. In this regard, the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission by the Roh Moo-hyun administration in December 2005 was notable not only because it attracted about 11,000 cases of alleged state crime and abuse submitted by individuals and organizations since its establishment, but also because it opened a new door for national reconciliation, however imperfect and controversial.25
One of the aims behind the Committee to Clarify the True Facts of Anti-National Pro-Japanese Acts (Ch’inil Panminjok Haengwi Chinsang Kyumyŏng Wiwŏnhoe) was to reassess many Koreans’ suspicions that wealthy families, who had benefited from state-led industrialization, were the same families who had previously been co-opted by Japanese colonial authorities.26 Similarly, the presidential committee to clarify “questionable” military history sought to reveal the truth behind civilian massacres during the Korean War and human rights abuses during the military authoritarian period. In addition to this and other government-led investigations, several new studies on the Park Chung Hee era, including inter alia on Park’s policies and leadership,27 coincided largely with the twentieth anniversary of the ROK’s democratization in 1987 and sparked yet another round of public debate on Park and his policies. The Tonga ilbo pointed out that these new studies opened a new dimension to public debate and broadened the hitherto prevalent dichotomous approaches noted above.28
The aim of this volume is to offer a selected collection of new interpretations by leading experts on the topics of both Park Chung Hee and the Park era. The contributors to this book address some key questions including: What is the link between South Korea’s economic miracle and political oppression during the Park era? How have the legacies of this era affected South Korean society today? And what impact has the Park era’s industrialization had on to today’s South Korean democracy? Of course, the authors represent a variety of points of view that do not, as a whole, provide a unified narrative of the Park period. The common characteristic of these authors, however, is that they share a view that any historical evaluation of the Park era, whether of the events or the individual, cannot be definitive, but needs to be intentionally tentative and provide an honest assessment that could lead to answers to the fundamental questions raised above.
National Development and Democracy
When we look at Park and the Park era historically, we note a number of critical turning points that demand explanation: the move from military junta to an elected civilian president in 1963; the policy switch from import substitution to export-led industrialization (EOI) in mid-1964; the declaration of the authoritarian Yusin reform in October 1972, followed by the state-led HCI Plan in 1973; and finally, the demise of the Park regime. Hyung-A Kim shows how Park, with his extremely nationalistic, anti-Communist strategy, institutionalized state-led industrialization, especially through the HCI Plan. She argues that the implementation of HCI was primarily aimed at building South Korea’s homeland security posture, especially as a counter to North Korea’s security threats, which, Kim contends, became one of the most defining legacies of the Park era. By focusing on the state’s national security policy behind the HCI program, this interpretation challenges the structuralist approach to economic development.
Tadashi Kimiya, by contrast, sees Park’s adoption of the EOI policy in the early 1960s as a “virtue made out of necessity,” and the search for political and economic autonomy as a defining feature of Park’s leadership. He emphasizes the heavyweight politics of the cold war, particularly the political process by which the Park regime garnered its “strategic position as a frontline state directly facing a communist rival” to achieve economic growth.
In this respect, Seok-Man Yoon’s chapter on POSCO, formerly Pohang Iron and Steel, reveals details of ROK-owned industry and focuses specifically on the leadership of Pak T’aejun, founder and president of POSCO for twenty-three years, from 1968 to 1992.29
Yoon explains that state-led industrialization offered benefits as well as obstacles. His essay is perhaps most persuasive when he stresses that “strong leadership” is the key prerequisite for building a successful institution and a company’s own brand of “spirit,” or what Yoon characterizes as the official representation of “institutional culture” such as the “POSCO Spirit” cherished by POSCO today.
Democracy
In Development as Freedom, a study into the types of freedom that are fundamental to the quality of life, Amartya Sen, winner of the 1998 Nobel prize for economics, asks: “What should come first—removing poverty and misery, or guaranteeing political liberty and civil rights, for which poor people have little use anyway?”30 Contrary to Sen’s salient message that the “intensity of economic needs adds to—rather than subtracts from—the urgency of political freedom,” South Korea’s rapid development, as Sen himself noted, took off precisely under Park’s authoritarianism. In 1972, Park declared the authoritarian Yusin reform as a pretext for his final plan to revolutionize South Korea’s industries by prioritizing the building of its national military defense capability. The political oppression during the Yusin State, in other words, was the opposite side of South Korea’s industrial revolution through HCI implementation. This is what makes the Park era so controversial and Park’s ideas of “democracy” so confined, especially in terms of valuing the state’s rights before an individual’s rights. From the beginning of his leadership, Park adopted an emergency measure which he termed “administrative democracy” or “Koreanized democracy” as a prerequisite for national reconstruction, especially for an “independent economy” and “independent national defense.” Park dismissed liberal democracy such as Western/American-style democracy, with his personal belief that such a democracy was “meaningless to the people suffering from starvation and despair.”31
Park regarded economic deprivation and poverty as threats to national security on the basis that South Korea, like many underdeveloped countries in Asia where Communism was the biggest national security threat, could not fight Communism while the people were struggling with starvation.32 Park’s reason for rejecting Western/American-style democracy was not rooted in Confucian attitudes and custom-led “Asian values” or the “Lee-thesis” formulated by Lee Kuan Yew, the former prime minister of Singapore, but rather on the harsh reality of the cold war. Hence, Park insisted that the South Korean people distinguish the values of political freedom, between that of big freedom (k’ŭn chayu) or the survival of the state (kukka) and that of small freedom (chagŭn chayu) or the protection of individuals’ rights.
Retracing Park’s governing ideas, especially the concept of these “small” and “big” freedoms, Young Jak Kim questions whether liberal democracy should be the “only basis or the supreme criterion” for evaluating political leadership. James Palais, on the other hand, criticizes much of the discussion about the expansion of civil society and democracy for leaving out the issue of the South Korean people’s struggle. Viewing “struggle” as a necessary condition for the establishment of democracy, Palais contrasts the superficiality of Japanese democracy imposed by the American Occupation to the robustness of the current South Korean democracy attained through sustained struggle over more than forty years.
This, for Palais, is precisely the dialectic legacy of the Park era. Hagen Koo’s essay suggests that the structural characteristics of internal consistency of labor policies and relations were the chief merits of the Park era. Viewing Park’s approach to labor as “productionist and instrumental,” Koo points out the instrumental approach of Park’s economic planners, who rarely noted the “human side of labor” other than seeing labor as a potential source of disruption to the nation’s productivity. Koo contends that the labor policies of the Park era were not sustainable in the long-run because “strong mistrust among labor, capital, and the state” were the product of those policies.
Cultural Influence and Civil Society
The assessments by Clark Sorensen and Myung-koo Kang deal with the cultural influence of Park’s rapid industrialization policy on South Korean society, especially on the perceived national character of the Korean people. While, Sorensen reflects on what he terms, “peasant mentalité” of the earlier phase of the Park era, Kang examines the “developmentalist mentalité” of the South Korean people today and links its roots to the Park era. The two portrayals of images of the South Korean people’s national character, according to these two authors, are largely the product of Park’s modernization policies. Retracing the historical roots of rural development policies of the Park era to the colonial era, Sorensen raises skepticism about the originality and effectiveness of rural development under Park and argues that Park, like many leading figures in the colonial era, accused the rural peasantry of being an “impediment to development” because of their “traditional peasant consciousness.”
Such an elitist “colonial” view, Sorensen asserts, was the basis of Park’s rural development program, the Saemaŭl (New Village) movement during the 1970s, which focused on cultivating a “New Village Spirit (Saemaŭl chŏngsin),” or simply “Can-Do” spirit. The thinking of liberal intellectuals in the 1970s and thereafter, however, changed more radically, especially in their struggle against the state’s forced-draft rapid development at the cost of the human rights of workers.
In this light, Myung-koo Kang argues that South Korean society today is in a critical mess because “civil virtues and morals of solidarity and tolerance have been replaced with avaricious desire for material possession and indiscriminate competitive survival mentalities.” Kang labels this peculiar mentality of the Korean people today as “developmentalist mentalité” which, according to him, was formed during the Park Chung Hee era.
The final chapter in this volume by Gavan McCormack takes us to the emergence of “people power” during the Park era. He notes that apologists for national security claim that the domestic opposition movement, and the international forces that supported it, were guilty at best of blindness to the reality of North Korean repression, and at worst of submission to P’yŏngyang’s orchestration and direction. However, he argues that in the end the anti-fascist and anti-dictatorship movement in South Korea in the 1970s and 1980s was victorious. He essentially argues that the history of the Park era should not neglect the dimension of the international civil society network that evolved in and around the struggles of that time.
1. See Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975; Alice Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant; Robert Wade, Governing the Market; Ezra F. Vogel, The Four Little Dragons; World Bank, The East Asian Miracle.
2. See Hyung-A Kim, Korea’s Development under Park Chung Hee.
3. Kwan S. Kim, “The Korean Miracle (1962–1980) Revisited.”
4. CIA World Fact Book.
5. “Gov’t report: S Korea’s Economic Recovery Sixth Fastest among G20 Economies.”
6. This rating reflects global events from December 1, 2005 through to December 31, 2006. In 2004, South Korea ranked a two for political freedom. The Freedom House Website, http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/press_release/fiw07charts.pdf.
7. The Canberra Times, May 11, 2007. South Korea ranked thirty-first, Australia and France tied with the rank of thirty-fifth, Spain forty-first, Japan fifty-first, and the United States fifty-third.
8. The Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) changed its name to the Agency for National Security Planning in 1981.
9. Han’guk Ŭnhaeng Chosabu, Ky
ngje t’onggye yonbo, 204.
10. These changes in the constitution were passed by a national referendum held on November 21, 1972.
11. For detailed background on Chun’s rise to power and the American blessing, see Hyung-A Kim, “Behind the Carter-Park Standoff.”
12. For the debates on the question of who exactly the minjung were, see Kenneth M. Wells, South Korea’s Minjung Movement. During the Park and Chun regime, most writers were careful to avoid defining the minjung as a class in the full Marxist sense because, under the National Security Law, one could easily have been arrested.
13. Pak Hyonch’ae and Cho Hŭiyŏn, Han’guk sahoe kusŏngch’e nonjaeng.
14. See Pak Hyonch’ae, Minjok kyŏnge wa minjung undong; Han Wansang, Minjung sahoehak.
15. Chaibong Hahm, South Korea’s Miraculous Democracy, 128–9.
16. See David C. Kang, Crony Capitalism.
17. See Hajun Chang, Hongjae Park, and Gyue-Yoo Chul, “Interpreting the Korean Crisis; Jim Crotty and Gary Dymski, “The Korean Struggle: Can the East Asian Model Survive?”
18. Chang Yu-tzung, Chu Yun-han, and Park Chong-min, “Authoritarian Nostalgia in Asia,” 66–80.
19. David H Satterwhite, “The Politics of Economic Development.”
20. Yi Kihong interviewed by Hyung-A Kim in September 2004. For details of Yi’s explanation on the background of the ROK’s First Five-Year Economic Development Plan see, Yi Kihong, Kyŏngje kŭndaehwa ŭi sumŭn iyagi, 263–77.
21. For a critical analysis of the military junta’s administrative reforms, see Hyung-A Kim, “State Building.”
22. U.S. Embassy telegram 293, August 12, 1961. Cited in Hyung-A Kim, “State Building.”
23. This term was initially articulated by Pak Se-il, Professor of Law, Seoul National University. Pak Se-il, Taehan Min’guk.
24. Kang Wŏnt’aek, “Sedae, inyŏm kwa No Muhyŏn hyŏnsang”; Song Hogŭn, Hanguk, musŭn il i irŏnago inna, 79–107.
25. Since the publication of its latest report in late 2009, the Commission has been winding down mainly because its four-year mandate will expire at the end of March 2010 and President Lee Myung-bak has publicly made it clear that the mandate will not be renewed.
26. For a well-known study of one such “co-opted nationalist” see Carter Eckert, Offspring of Empire.
27. Studies include: Hyung-A Kim, Korea’s Development Under Park Chung Hee; Hyung-A Kim, Pak Chŏnghŭi ŭi yangnal ŭi sŏnt’aek; Cho Hŭiyŏn, Pak Chŏnghŭi wa kaebal tokchae sidae. The Academia Coreana of Myongji University, for example, began its range of academic activities on issues concerning the Park era in December 2005 when it hosted a seminar entitled, “Park Chung Hee Era in Korean Modern History.” Its regular forum on the Park era and issues related to Park’s policy still continues in 2011.
28. “Taehan Min’guk, 21-segi sin inyŏm chihyŏng: Yanggŭk esŏ tagŭk ŭiro [Republic of Korea, the landscape of the twenty-first century ideology: From the dichotomous approach to a multidimensional approach],” Tonga ilbo.
29. Since 2001, Pak T’aejun remains Honorary Chairman of POSCO.
30. Sen, Amartya, Development as Freedom.
31. Park Chung Hee, Our Nation’s Path, 196.
32. Ibid., 197.