§1. Sociology, in the meaning understood here of a word often used in quite different senses, shall mean: a science that in construing and understanding social action seeks causal explanation of the course and effects of such action. By “action” is meant human behaviour linked to a subjective meaning on the part of the actor or actors concerned; such action may be either overt, or occur inwardly—whether by positive action, or by refraining from action, or by tolerating a situation. Such behaviour is “social” action where the meaning intended by the actor or actors is related to the behaviour of others, and the action is so oriented.
§2. As with any form of action, social action can be determined by either (1) purposive rationality: through expectations of the behaviour of external objects and other people, and employing these expectations as a “condition” or “means” for one’s own rational ends, as sought after and considered objectives; or by (2) value rationality: through conscious belief in the unconditional and intrinsic value—whether this is understood as ethical, aesthetic, religious, or however construed—of a specific form of particular comportment purely for itself, unrelated to its outcome; or by (3) affect, especially emotion: through actual emotions and feelings; or by (4) tradition: through ingrained habituation.
§3. Social “relationship” shall refer to the meaningful content of the mutual disposition of several persons, and comportment arising from such an orientation. A social relationship therefore consists entirely and quite exclusively of the Chance that action will be social in a (meaningfully) manifest sense, leaving to one side for the moment the basis of this Chance.
§4. Actual regularities can be observed within social action, that is, regularities whose intended meaning is typically similar in action repeated by the same actor, in action replicated by many actors, or in both of these at the same time. Sociology is concerned with typologies of such modes of action, unlike history, which concerns itself with causal imputation with respect to important, fateful, singular events.
An actually existing Chance of regularity in the orientation of social action will be called a practice if and to the extent that the Chance of its existing among a group of people depends solely on its actual performance. A practice that has become familiar through lengthy exercise shall be called a custom. A custom is regarded as having been “determined by interests” if and to the extent that the Chance of its empirical existence is determined solely by the purposively rational orientation of individual action to similar expectations.
§5. Action, especially social action, and even more specifically, a social relationship, can be oriented by an actor’s conception of the existence of a legitimate order. The Chance that this actually occurs will be called the “validity” of the relevant order.
§6. The legitimacy of an order can be guaranteed
I. purely inwardly, either
1. purely affectively: by instinctive dedication; or
2. value-rationally: by belief in its absolute validity as the embodiment of ultimate, obligatory values (ethical, aesthetic, or of whatever kind); or
3. through religion: by the belief that salvation depends on inner adherence to the order;
II. also (or only) by expectations linked to specific external consequences, hence given interests, but also by expectations of a quite particular kind.
An order will be called a
a) convention, where its validity is externally underwritten by the Chance that deviation from its observance will, in a given human group, result in relatively general, and in practice, tangible disapproval;
b) Law, where its validity is externally underwritten by the Chance that physical or mental coercion will be applied by a specialised staff of people whose task is to enforce conformity or punish contravention.
§7. Actors can ascribe legitimate validity to an order
a) by virtue of tradition: the validity of the ever-existing;
b) by affective, especially emotional, belief: the validity of the newly revealed, or the exemplary;
c) by virtue of value-rational belief: the validity of that which has been revealed to be absolutely certain;
d) by virtue of positive statute, whose legality is believed.
Legality with such a positive source can be treated as legitimate
α) by virtue of an agreement among interested parties;
β) by virtue of its imposition, on the basis of the legitimacy ascribed to the rule of man by man, and conformity.
§8. A social relation is contested (Kampf) where an actor is oriented to the imposition of their own will on an unwilling partner or partners. “Peaceful” means of conflict are those that do not actually involve physical force. “Peaceful” conflict will be called “competition” where there is a formally peaceful attempt to gain powers of disposition for oneself over Chancen that are also desired by others. “Regulated competition” is where the ends and means of competition are oriented to an order. “Selection” involves the latent contest for the Chance of existence, or of survival, among humans or types, although such contest is not a conscious intention: “social selection” refers to Chancen arising during the lifetime of an actor, and “biological selection” where it concerns the Chance for the survival of inherited characteristics.
§9. A social relationship will be called a “communalisation” (Vergemeinschaftung) if and to the extent that the disposition of social action rests—in the individual instance, or on average, or as a pure type—on a subjectively felt (affectual or traditional) mutual sense of belonging among those involved.
A social relation will, on the other hand, be called “sociation” (Vergesellschaftung) if and to the extent that the disposition of social action is directed to a balance of rationally motivated interests (whether value rational or purposively rational), or to the connection of interests motivated in the same way. Vergesellschaftung can typically be based on rational agreement arrived at through mutual consent, but not exclusively so. In such a case, sociated action is rationally oriented (a) by value, to a belief in one’s own obligations, or (b) purposively rationally, to the expectation of loyalty from one’s partner.
§10. A social relationship, whether communalisation or sociation, will be called open to outsiders to the degree that participation in the mutual social action oriented to the substantive meaning that constitutes such action is not proscribed by prevailing valid rules to anyone so inclined and able to participate. By contrast, a social relationship is closed to outsiders to the extent that its substantive meaning or its prevailing rules exclude such participation, or restrict or permit it only according to specific conditions. Openness and closedness can be defined traditionally or affectively, by value or by purposive rationality. Rational closure can in particular arise for the following reasons: admission to a social relationship lends participants the Chance that inward or external interests can be satisfied, whether this be on account of the purpose of the relationship itself or because of its successful prosecution, whether it arises from solidaristic action or from a balance of interests. If the participants anticipate that wider dissemination of the relationship will improve the degree, nature, certainty, or value of their own Chancen, then they are interested in the openness of the relationship; if, on the other hand, they anticipate that their own Chancen are improved by monopolising it, then they will be interested in closure against outsiders.
A closed social relationship can secure its monopolised Chancen to participants in a number of ways. Such allocation might be (a) freely arrived at, (b) regulated or rationed by degree and form, or (c) appropriated1 on a more or less permanent basis by specific individuals or groups. This represents internal closure. Appropriated Chancen can be called “rights.” According to the order concerned, such appropriation can be made (1) to those participating in particular communities and associations (e.g., communal households); or (2) to individuals, and here a distinction can be made between (a) purely personal appropriation, and (b) appropriation made in such a way that, in the event of the death of the person enjoying such Chancen, one or more persons linked to them by a social relation, by birth (kinship), or by designation succeeds to the appropriated Chancen. It can also made by (3) the holder (a) transferring the Chance to a particular person, or finally, (b) transferring the Chance to any number of others in a more or less free manner through agreement (alienable appropriation). A party to a closed relationship will be called a member (Genosse), and where participation is regulated in such a way as to secure Chancen to that party, a legal member (Rechtsgenosse). Chancen that are appropriated to individuals through inheritance, or to heritable communities or associations, will be called property (of the relevant individuals, communities, or associations), and where appropriated as an alienable Chance, free property.
§11. A social relationship can, for those involved according to tradition or statute, have as a consequence
a) that particular kinds of action are imputed by each participant to all (in “solidarity”), or
b) the action of particular participants (“representatives”) can be imputed to the other members (“the represented”), such that they both enjoy the Chancen or bear the consequences.
Power of representation (authority) can be appropriated as prevailing rules dictate
1. completely, in all its forms and degrees (self-appointed authority), or
2. in accordance with particular criteria, whether permanently or for a specified period, or
3. by specific acts on the part of members or third parties, temporarily or permanently (statutory authority).
Whether social relationships (communities or societies) are treated as solidaristic or as representative is determined by a number of factors, and it can be said quite generally that the degree to which action is directed towards (a) violent conflict or (b) peaceful exchange is decisive here, while recognising that only individual studies would identify the numerous special circumstances critical to this issue. Naturally, this tends to follow the least where purely ideal goods are pursued with peaceful means. The degree of outward closure is often, but not always, linked to the incidence of solidarity or power of representation.
§12. An organisation is an externally regulating limited or closed social relationship if the observance of its order is guaranteed by the behaviour of particular persons charged specifically with its implementation, such as a director (Leiter) and, quite possibly, of an administrative staff that normally also has powers of representation, where appropriate. Control of the managing instance, or participation in the activity of the administrative staff—the “governing powers”—can be permanently, or temporarily, or for particular cases, assigned (a) by appropriation, or (b) by prevailing organisational orders to particular persons, or to persons selected for particular characteristics, or to persons selected according to particular forms. “Organisational action” will mean (a) the legitimate action of the administrative staff itself in the realisation of the order by virtue of its governing powers or powers of representation; (b) action by organisational participants directed by ordinances of the organisation.
An organisation can be
a) autonomous or heteronomous;
b) autocephalous or heterocephalous.
“Autonomy” means that the order cannot (as in heteronomy) be subordinated to the statutes of outsiders, but only by members by virtue of being members (and regardless of how this is done). “Autocephaly” means that the executive and corporate staff act according to their own organisation’s directives and are not subject to directives (of whatever kind) from outsiders, as with heterocephaly.
§13. The statutory orders of a sociation may originate
a) by voluntary agreement; or
b) through imposition and compliance.
The governing power of an organisation may claim a legitimate power to impose new orders. The constitution of an organisation denotes the actual Chance—varying in degree, form, and preconditions—of compliance with the power of imposition enjoyed by the existing governing bodies. Prevailing rules might specify that among these preconditions, particular groups or sections of the corporate membership be heard, or be called upon to express their agreement, in addition to which there are the most varied other possible preconditions.
An organisation’s orders can be imposed on members and also, in particular circumstances, on nonmembers. Territorial circumstances are especially relevant here (presence, place of birth, performance of certain actions in the area). This is “territorial validity” (Gebietsgeltung). An organisation whose order is imposed primarily by virtue of territorial validity will be called a “territorial organisation,” regardless of the extent to which the claim of validity over its own members only has a territorial basis (which is possible, and at least occasionally occurs).
§14. An order regulating an organisation’s action will be called an “administrative order.” An order that regulates other social action and guarantees to actors Chancen that such regulation creates will be called a regulatory order. Insofar as an organisation is oriented only to orders of the first kind, it will be called an “administrative organization”; insofar as an organisation is solely oriented to the second, it will be called a regulatory organisation.
§15. Activity (Betrieb) is continuous purposive action of a particular kind; an enterprise (Betriebsverband) is a sociation with a continuous and purposively acting administrative staff.
An association (Verein) is a voluntary organisation whose statutes are valid only for those who are members by virtue of joining on a personal basis.
An institution (Anstalt) is an organisation whose statutes can, within a given domain, be (relatively) successfully imposed on all whose action has specified particular characteristics.
§16. Power can be defined as every Chance, within a social relationship, of enforcing one’s own will even against resistance, whatever the basis for this Chance might be.
Rulership is the Chance that a command of a particular kind will be obeyed by given persons. Discipline is the Chance that, because of a practised disposition, a command will find prompt, automatic, and schematic obedience among a definite number of persons.
The fact of rulership turns only on the presence of one person successfully issuing commands to others, independently of the existence of an administrative staff or of an organisation, although in all normal cases one of these is true. An organisation will be called a ruling organisation (Herrschaftsverband) insofar as its members are subordinated, by virtue of a valid order, to relationships of rule (Herrschaftsbeziehungen).
§17. A political organisation will be called a “ruling organization” to the extent that its existence and the validity of its orders can be continually guaranteed within a given geographical area by the application and threat of physical coercion by an administrative staff. An institutionally organised political enterprise (Anstaltsbetrieb) will be called a state if, and to the extent that, its administrative staff can lay claim to a monopoly of legitimate physical force in the execution of its orders. Social action is “politically oriented,” especially also organisational action, when it is directed to influence a political organisation’s leadership, in particular, the appropriation, expropriation, redistribution, or allocation of governmental powers.
A ruling organisation will be called hierocratic where it guarantees its order through the employment of psychic coercion through the distribution or denial of religious benefits (hierocratic coercion). A church is a hierocratic institutional enterprise where its administrative staff lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate hierocratic coercion.
1. See the discussion of Weber’s usage of Appropriation in the Translation Appendix.