NINE

Patriots for a Price 1814

Is this my skill? my craft? to set at last
Hope, power, and life upon a single cast?
Oh' Fate!—accuse thy folly, not thy fate!
She may redeem thee still, not yet too late.

SUGGESTIONS OF A stiffening attitude by federal, state, and local authorities earlier in the year proved to be no aberration, but representative of a genuine resolve at last to attack the problems posed by Louisiana's smugglers, privateers, and outright pirates. On April 30, 1812, Louisiana became a state, and in 1814 Claiborne ceased to be an appointed territorial governor with amorphous powers when Louisianans elected him their first state governor. He had long complained of the embarrassment the Baratarian enterprise brought on the area, and more specifically of the Laffites since Holmes's arrest of the brothers brought them to his attention. The April 7, 1813, legal case brought against them for violation of the revenue and neutrality laws made no mention of piracy. These were misdemeanor charges, and nothing came of them. Though under threat of arrest, the brothers continued to operate at large, merely showing circumspection when they made their sporadic nocturnal visits to New Orleans.

By the summer of 1814 the flagrant flouting of the revenue laws by the virtual bazaars at Grand Isle and Cat Island had become well known throughout the Mississippi Valley. "The smuggling at Barataria has greatly injured all honest traders," opined a newspaper in St. Louis, Missouri. Nor was there any question in the public mind who oversaw the enterprise, though the brothers were sometimes merged into one, for the journal added that "in consequence of his [Laffites] piracy and smuggling, a great variety of goods are very cheap here." ¹ Both Jean and Pierre were constantly at Barataria now, and most visitors agreed that they directed the operation. Jean, referred to as "the younger," exercised the greater overall command of the men and personally supervised the auction sales and the collection of the money from the buyers.² "There was always a great collection of people on shore of whom Lafitte the younger had command," one privateer observed.³ Mariner William Godfrey agreed, reporting, "There were two persons named Lafitte who appeared to command the people on shore, the chief command being in the youngest person of that name."⁴

Yet Gambi also had influence.⁵ To some it appeared that Jean Laffite and Gambi shared control of the operation, while others thought Gambi was Jean's second-in-command.⁶ Some privateersmen acknowledged Laffites primacy by referring to him as "the Governor," while others used sailors' convention in calling him "the old man."⁷ Many merely addressed him by the nickname "Fita."⁸ Jean exercised some executive powers such as issuing and signing passports into and out of Barataria for visiting merchants and traders from New Orleans.⁹ He also imposed at least a few laws that he and Pierre conceived for all to observe. While the Laffites were in the business of selling illegal African slaves, they discouraged harboring runaway slaves. That was a legal offense that no real or pretended privateering commission could excuse, and only promised to alienate their planter customers. When Jean found a runaway in the Dorada's crew, or in the crew of a vessel belonging to Gambi or another privateer, he arrested the black for return to its owner.¹⁰ One story survived for years claiming that Gambi and some of his men felt aggrieved that Laffite rather than he commanded, and that Jean only cemented his control when he shot one of Gambi's followers for disobeying orders. ¹¹ The story may have had a grain of truth, for Gambi's own vicious nature was well enough known, one Spanish agent warning Apodaca that Gambi was "the cruelest and greatest assassin among all the pirates."¹² Some recalled Jean's rule as being absolute, and the punishment he imposed on rule breakers severe, but none of it seemed unjust. Most of all, in an enterprise of independent, unruly, quarrelsome, and basically criminal men, he kept order.¹³

The smuggler community extended to perhaps forty huts and makeshift houses, most poorly constructed with simple roofs of thatched palmetto fronds. It was a fluid population, consisting primarily of the crews of privateers then in port, their occasional prisoners from prizes, and the visiting buyers from New Orleans. The only long-term residents were a handful of Laffite employees, for few employees were needed. The corsair crews did the work of off-loading cargoes, and often helped run the pirogues into the interior, from which they returned with provisions for the next cruise. A few vendors may have provided outlets for the crewmen to spend their shares, but stories that reached the outside of a thriving commercial community with billiard halls and the like were pure exaggeration. Life on Grand Isle was temporary and rude, of the sort men could create for themselves anywhere they stopped for a few days. Only the Laffites lived in an actual house, at the eastern end of the island overlooking the pass into the bay.

The island had a few permanent residents—a Mr. Dugas, for one, and François Rigaud, who owned some of its land—and their relations with the privateers were excellent, neither interfering with the other.¹⁴ The privateers erected log signal towers in order to communicate with vessels seeking entry into the bay, and the Laffites built one or more warehouses for storing goods prior to auction. ¹⁵ Despite exaggerated reports of forts and artillery to protect the pass, they built none, though it is possible that they ran La Diligent aground to use as defensive battery, as was reported.¹⁶

Few had any illusion about the contents of the warehouses. Daniel McMullin spent enough time on Grand Isle to satisfy himself that summer that "Lafitte Vincent & all the others concerned with them were plunderers & smugglers."¹⁷ James Hoskins agreed that "they all appeared to this deponent to be robbers & smugglers," and John Oliver, who came to take passage aboard La Misere, frankly admitted afterward in remarkably similar language, that "Lafitte, Gambio & their associates appeared to be sea robbers & plunderers."

"There was a great concourse of people at Grand Terre, sometimes as many as twelve hundred, buying, and selling prize Goods brought in, and supplies procured from New Orleans," one sailor found that summer. Less exaggerated eyewitness accounts put the number at a steady three hundred or four hundred people.¹⁸ When Laffite goods were seized en route to market by agents such as Gilbert, or confiscated from cache houses in New Orleans, the smugglers simply established other "warehouses" in the city's environs.¹⁹ People in New Orleans suspected that the customs agents did not want to put the Laffites out of business, for the agents were making too much money from their shares of the proceeds on the confiscated goods they seized.²⁰

Yet it was not all this enterprise that ultimately triggered the decline in Baratarian fortunes, but the old 1813 misdemeanor charge for violation of the revenue laws. Both Laffites were known to visit the city by night or in disguise for business and pleasure. Certainly Pierre paid conjugal visits to Marie at the house on Dumaine that she bought in April. Almost certainly he bought it for her, though it was in her name and he was not present for the transaction for obvious reasons. ²¹ Jean, too, was seen in the city enough that citizens came to refer to him as "Gentleman Lafitte" to differentiate him from the better known yet rough-hewn and now partly impaired Pierre.²² Most likely too many successful visits probably bred complacence—for on July 8 word of Pierre being in town reached the wrong ears. Almost at once Hall's court issued an order for his arrest on bail of $12,514.52 as a result of the outstanding judgment from the year before. The United States marshal acted swiftly, probably taking Pierre unawares at home. When Pierre could not post the bail immediately, he was locked in the city jail behind the Cabildo, the old administrative building on the Place d'Arms, and shackled in leg irons, with orders to go before the judge in ten days.²³

The reaction was swift. The city press exulted, "ANOTHER EMPEROR FALLEN," ran one headline, comparing Pierre to the exiled Napoleon at Elba. Now a cell confined the man they dubbed "Emperor of Baratraria [sic], King of the smugglers." Jean's primacy among the privateers at Grand Isle was not so well known in New Orleans,²⁴ where Pierre had been the public face of the brothers' enterprise. Spaniards in town felt equally exultant. "The infamous and mean Pirate Lafitte," Mateo Gonzalez Manrique reported to Apodaca, "has been arrested and jailed for the enormous crimes, offenses and other complaints against him."²⁵ Pierre sat confined in a narrow and windowless ground-floor cell of the three-story calabozo, the door locked from the outside by a swing bolt.

Perceptive observers recognized that the old judgment and Pierre's failure to appear in court were merely pretext for getting him in jail when the opportunity presented itself. The real reason for Pierre's arrest was the death of John Stout, for which no indictment had been forthcoming for want of proof of who pulled the trigger. Manrique acknowledged this to Apodaca. "We do not ignore that the main complaint which caused his arrest and jail, is the American's spent blood, when firing against them," he reported. ²⁶ From the Spaniards' viewpoint, it would have been much better had Laffite been arrested for violations of neutrality, which would have shown some acknowledgment by the Americans of Spanish rights. But an arrest was an arrest.

Moreover, the court now had witnesses who were willing to talk about what they had seen and done on Grand Isle and Cat Island. Since the indictment of Joachim in April, more had come forward, and to bring a serious indictment against Pierre and a number of others the authorities had merely to hold Laffite behind bars long enough for a grand jury to hear testimony. With ironclad evidence of not merely revenue violations, but outright piracy, the court could strike at the heart of the smugglers' enterprise, and perhaps get a conviction serious enough to make Pierre pay for Stout's death, even if they could not indict him for the crime.

On July 18 the federal court empanelled a new grand jury, with Paul Lanusse as chairman. This did not bode well for Pierre, for Lanusse still had pending a civil case against Pierre for his interest in the goods taken from the first prize captured by the Dorada the year before. Moreover, Lanusse had unsuccessfully attempted to gain a legitimate privateering commission from the government for his vessel the Cora, and thus had cause to resent unlawful corsairs such as the Laffites.²⁷ He was a onetime president of the chamber of commerce, and a current director of the Bank of Louisiana and a leading merchant, and his business suffered proportionately from the unfair competition of the Laffites' contraband. Pierre could hardly expect leniency from Lanusse or a grand jury under his authority.²⁸

The court told the grand jury that district attorney Grymes had no presentments for indictment in hand for them to consider, but went on to open the door for them to initiate presentments for possible indictments if they so chose. It was an invitation to bypass Grymes, who may have been perceived as too friendly toward the corsairs. Lanusse's jury retired, obviously prepared for this, and heard testimony from Whiteman and two others, then returned and offered its first preliminary presentment, a charge against "a certain Pierre Lafite now detained in the prison of this City, as a pirate Sc a notorious Smuggler."²⁹ By mentioning piracy they were saddling Pierre with a serious federal charge. The only good news was that in spite of long-standing custom in the world, piracy was not a capital crime under federal jurisdiction—though that could change at any minute with Washington's increasing awareness of the problem.

Two days later the jury heard more testimony and returned a formal presentment against Pierre "for having knowingly & wittingly aided & assisted, procured, commanded, counselled & advised ... acts of piracy & robbery upon the high seas ... and for having received & repeatedly introduced goods, wares & merchandise arising from such piratical captures into this District."³⁰ A week later the grand jury issued to the court a general statement making it clear that its action against Pierre was only the first shot of a battle it would wage against the Laffite establishment. It began by decrying the "piracy Sc smuggling so long established Sc so systematically practiced by many of the inhabitants of this state." The indulgence of the smugglers and privateers undermined local credit, injured the honest fair trader, drained the country of hard currency in wartime, and corrupted the morals of their citizens. Finally, the jury said, it "stamped disgrace on our state." The jury called on the public to suppress the illicit trade by "pointed disapprobation of every individual who may be concerned." Condemning "the feeble efforts that have been made by those whose immediate duty it was to correct the evil," the jury stopped short of questioning the motives of Governor Claiborne or United States revenue and military authorities, but did charge that had they used the full means available to them the criminals would have been stopped long since.³¹

Seeing the temper of the grand jury, Pierre's friends, probably managed by Jean, began efforts to get him out of jail. Posting the $12,514.52 would have posed no problem for them, but that covered only the original arresting charge. The court had not set bail on the new charges, and would not, for it knew the Laffites' history of jumping bail. The Laffites' lawyer at the moment was Louis Marie Elisabeth Moreau Lislet, a French refugee from San Domingue and former judge of Orleans Parish.³² On August 6 he filed an "ex Parte Pierre Lafitte" argument before the court, basing the plea for bail on a presumed recurrence of Laffites physical disability that made incarceration an intolerable hardship for him. Two days later Moreau brought in Dr. J. B. Trabue of Bourbon Street, who had probably treated Pierre for his symptoms in the past, and he testified on behalf of Pierre's medical plea.³³

But Lanusse had been prepared for this and engaged two independent physicians to examine Pierre in his cell. On August 10 the jury received their written statement and testimony. They confirmed that at some time in the past Pierre had suffered a seizure or stroke, and was subject to intermittent fits of palsy and shaking on his left side. However, they found him entirely free of symptoms suggesting a relapse, and stated that his only apparent problem was depression, no doubt the result of the situation of the moment. Consequently, they saw no reason to recommend releasing him on bail or for removing the manacles "which have been applied as a means of security." Occasional exercise outside his cell was all he needed.³⁴ The next day the jury denied bail.³⁵ They would take no chances with Pierre Laffite.

Meanwhile the seriousness of the jury's intent became evident. Two days earlier the jury had indicted a privateer variously called Johanness or Johnny on a charge of piracy for his first prize taken while working for the Laffites, and with him "a certain Peter Lafite of the city of New Orleans, mariner" in that he "knowingly & willingly did assist, procure, command, counsel & advise the said Johanness the said Robbery piracy and felony to do & commit." Also cited in the indictment was Jannet for the capture in February 1813 of the ship owned by Julian Ybarra and loaded with copper and coin, a matter on which Lanusse still sought restitution from Pierre. The specification listed thirteen others as codefendants, including Gambi, Lamé- son, and both Laffites. ³⁶

From the moment he heard of Pierre's arrest, his brother's safety became Jean Laffite's first concern. With bail out of the question, however, Jean found his options limited. In ordinary times his friends might have stormed the jail and taken Pierre to safety, and this was still an option, but with a growing military presence in New Orleans thanks to the war, such a move carried risks. Jean first tried a far subtler approach that revealed his sure grasp of the social and political situation in New Orleans. He went to the press.

Some in the city believed that the Laffites, especially Pierre, enjoyed close relations with newspapermen, such as Hilaire Leclerc, a San Domingue refugee and ardent supporter of Napoleon who published and edited L'Ami des Lois?³⁷ In this paper's pages sometimes appeared parodies defending the smugglers in the wake of public proclamations, and rumor said that Pierre Laffite was their author.³⁸ Another refugee editor was Joseph C. de St. Romes, who published the Courier de la Louisiane. However, Jean decided to contact David McKeehan, the new owner and publisher of the Louisiana Gazette and New-Orleans Advertiser. It was a perceptive choice. As the names of their papers suggested, St. Romes and Leclerc published primarily for the Creole and refugee community, though each issue carried texts in both French and English. The Gazette, however, appeared only in English and was clearly aimed at the American population.

In a court run by Hall and Grymes, in a state run by Claiborne, and with a grand jury that had several American members as well as French, civil and legal power belonged to the Americans. Moreover, the French community was already sympathetic to the Laffites and their enterprise; it was the Americans whose favor Laffite needed to win. ³⁹

A week after the indictments Jean Laffite wrote a letter to McKeehan. He wrote it in English, which presented a challenge, since even his written French was ungrammatical. Writing had always been Pierre's realm. "I am not accustomed to write for public eyes, nor well acquainted with the English language," Jean confessed, asking the editor to correct his text where necessary "and publish it for the benefit of our worthy friends." Then, rather than addressing the subject of Pierre, he aimed his words directly at the self-interest of New Orleans' consumers and at some of the allegations in the recent grand jury statement.

"It is the duty of every good man to prevent monopoly, as far as in his power," he opened, and therefore he begged to inform the public that "several rich prizes have lately been brought to Grand Isle (vulgarly called Barrataria) by the remains of my uncles faithful band of loyal subjects," a reference to the Frenchmen among the privateers whom Laffite now tried to link to Napoleon, though few if any of them had served the emperor. In a veiled barb at Lanusse, he went on to say that "a certain class of monopolizing gentry in and near this city" had tried to keep the arrival of the prizes a secret from the public, while themselves going to Grand Isle in search of bargains. "Now, sir," he continued, "as the public ought to generally share the profits of this advantageous trade, I have thought proper thus to address you." He emphasized that specie was not the only currency accepted at his auctions. "Bank note money of the Banks of New Orleans will be received for goods sold," he added, in spite of the "blind and stupid opinion of the late Grand Jury of this city, who stated that our trade contributed to drain the country of its specie." Exactly the opposite was the truth, he said. "We deal in specie instead of carrying it away."

Laffite could not close without impishly adding a suggestion. "Would it not be pro bono" he asked, "to establish a press in the Empire of Barrataria?" That way the public could regularly be informed of the latest arrivals and sales. He finished by signing himself "Napoleon, Junior." McKeehan published Jean's letter on August 18, but there seems to have been no immediate reaction or repercussion, nor would Jean have expected any.⁴⁰ His best hope in writing the letter was to sway public opinion, his missive's none too subtle subtext being that if Pierre were convicted and Barataria broken up, everyone would be the poorer for paying more for their imported goods thereafter. Favorable opinion might make it difficult to assemble a jury that would convict, buying Jean some time to arrange to break his brother out of jail if necessary and move on, for Jean Laffite had come to the conclusion that his Barataria operation was finished.

The authorities in New Orleans were becoming too aggressive, with the American naval and military establishment increasingly a threat. Only the distraction of the war with Britain kept them from being even more vigilant. Business with New Orleans had been good, and could continue to be so even if the Laffites left Louisiana. Indeed, an affiliation with the new Mexican revolutionaries could give them genuine corsair commissions, and allow them a Mexican coastal base outside the reach of American interference. A court of admiralty there could condemn and clear for sale whatever their ships brought in, and then the Laffites and their brethren would be free to transport their goods to New Orleans and trade on the open market. Even if they paid customs duties, they could undersell the city's merchants since they would have paid nothing for the goods. Or Jean may have considered simply establishing a market on the Texas side of the Sabine River and inducing Louisiana buyers to come to sales there, meaning he and his associates could avoid American waters altogether. The Laffites had been planning since April to establish a new base outside the United States, and even now Jean daily expected the return of Humbert and Dominique with news, and perhaps money and a Mexican rebel commitment of cooperation. Pierre might not go to trial for months as the court gathered more evidence. Thus, though he felt concern for his brother's physical condition, Jean had time, or so he thought.

While he may have gone close to New Orleans to contact McKeehan and arrange for publication of his letter, as well as to orchestrate attempts to get bail set for Pierre, by late August Jean was back at Grand Isle assessing what he needed to do for the pending relocation, and waiting for Humbert.⁴¹ By September 2 Humbert and Dominique had returned, and with them Anaya and Pedroza. But as interesting as the news they brought with them was, almost immediately another sail showed on the horizon, introducing an entirely new dimension to the decisions facing Laffite.⁴² On September 3 at about 10 o'clock in the morning, a strange warship appeared outside the pass between Grand Terre and Grand Isle. The warship sent a few shots at a ship heading for the pass into the bay. The smaller vessel ran aground and shortly the warship dropped anchor inside the pass, leaving Jean uncertain of its intent. He decided to find out for himself.⁴³

Laffite could see the vessel from his rude house on the eastern end of the island.⁴⁴ He put out in a pirogue pulled by four oarsmen and rowed toward the mysterious vessel.⁴⁵ At the same time, about noon, a pinnace showing a white flag of truce was lowered from the vessel, which began rowing toward Laffite.⁴⁶ Soon he recognized the British naval pennant flying from the pinnace, and while he might have been inclined to rush back to shore, the boat was too close by now for him to get away.⁴⁷ When they came abreast, Captain Nicholas Lockyer identified himself as commander of the HMS Sophie and asked to be introduced to Laffite. Jean remained wary, and did not identify himself. Lockyer asked if Laffite were ashore, and Jean said that he was not certain but believed that he was. ⁴⁸ At that Lockyer handed him a packet addressed "To Mr. Lafitte—Barataria," and asked him to deliver it.

Instead, Laffite persuaded Lockyer to row back to Grand Isle with him to present the packet in person. Moments before they reached the shore Laffite finally identified himself. By this time two hundred or more privateers had gathered to see what was going on, and Laffite advised Lockyer not to say anything of his reasons for coming. British warships had fired on some of these men during the past year, and though they were largely outlaws, the island's predominantly French population had no love for Britain. This was made clear when the two boats landed amid an uproar, as some of the mob wanted revenge while others demanded that the visitors be arrested and taken to New Orleans as spies. Laffite calmed the mob, telling the privateer captains present to tell their men that he needed to cajole the British officers in order to learn their intentions, and perhaps find out the names of their spies in New Orleans.⁴⁹ Then he took Lockyer by the hand and conducted the officers away from the milling crowd to his house, thinking that both they and the secrets of his establishment would be safer with them there.⁵⁰

Laffite later claimed that even before he opened it, he thought the packet might contain important information. This was a reasonable enough assumption, for he could hardly be unaware that the British had been paying some attention to what happened at Grand Isle. English merchants on Jamaica had protested the refugee corsairs from Cuba and San Domingue sailing under their real and imaginary papers from Cartagena.⁵¹ And as Britain tried to pull Spain from the French yoke and make it an ally, corsairs preying on Spanish merchant trade and the filibustering adventures were equally unwelcome.⁵² In July the Spanish foreign minister asked the British foreign secretary Lord Castlereagh to have British ships in the Gulf destroy the nest of pirates to protect the navigation of the three allied nations, Britain, Spain, and Portugal. ⁵³ Spain also asked England to blockade Cartagena to help interdict the privateer trade.⁵⁴ By the end of 1813 Spain complained of "continual depredations" in the Caribbean by pirates, some of them taking shelter in English colonies.⁵⁵

Britain soon came to view the Baratarians from another vantage, however, suspecting that for the moment they might be useful. As early as March 1813 British spies had a copy of General Wilkinson's earlier report on the state of defenses on the lower Mississippi, and deduced from it that the Baratarían fleet could be invaluable in blockading New Orleans.⁵⁶ The past June Captain Hugh Pigot of HMS Orpheus, then off Florida trying to convince Indian tribes to assist the British, and even then arming them for the anticipated attack on New Orleans, received intelligence suggesting that the Baratarians "would cheerfully assist in any operations against the Americans if afterward protected by Great Britain." He believed there were eight hundred of them, "Pirates to all Nations," and that New Orleans lived in fear of them.⁵⁷ Pigot and others got exaggerated reports that the Laffites had a fort on Grand Terre and more than a dozen cannon emplaced for defense, an echo of the report on La Diligent's final employment.⁵⁸ Thus there could be good cause in approaching the Laffites.

While he later claimed that he first suspected that Lockyer's packet might be of use to the United States, it is more likely that Laffite's initial instinct was that it might be useful to himself. He opened it and found inside four documents.⁵⁹ The first was a copy of a proclamation dated August 29, issued by Lieutenant Colonel Edward Nicholls, then commanding British land forces operating in and off Florida. In it he exhorted Louisianans to assist in liberating themselves from "a faithless, imbecile Government," calling especially on the Spaniards, Frenchmen, Italians, and British in the area to abolish "the American usurpation in this country." If they rose to his standard, he promised help from the numerous Indians under his command, well armed and trained and commanded by British officers, and the backing of squadrons of British and Spanish ships. Men coming to his aid need have no fear of onerous taxes to carry on an unjust war, and British arms would protect their property and laws. As for the Indians, they were pledged not to harm friends, for "these Brave red men only burn with an ardent desire of satisfaction, for the wrongs they have suffered, to join you in liberating these Southern Provinces from their Yoke, and drive them into those limits formerly prescribed by my Sovereign."⁶⁰

Next was a letter from Nicholls addressed directly to "Monsieur Lafite or the Commandant at Barataria." Written three days earlier from Nicholls's headquarters in Pensacola, it called on Laffite "with your Brave followers to enter into the service of Great Britain." In return, Nicholls promised that Laffite would be given the rank of captain in the army, and that after a British victory in the war Laffite and his men would receive generous grants of land. He also guaranteed the security of their persons and property, presumably against retaliation for acts against British shipping, asking only that they immediately cease taking British and Spanish merchantmen. Instead, the Baratarían fleet would be turned over to the command of the naval commodore in the Gulf, Captain William H. Percy. In short, Laffite and his men must become soldiers and abandon their maritime endeavors completely.

Nicholls also asked that Laffite circulate his proclamation. "Be expeditious in your resolves," he said, enjoining Laffite to make his decision quickly. "You may be a useful assistant to me." Nicholls hinted that he expected soon to mount a serious threat to Louisiana, which to date had seen little of the British other than blockades off the Mississippi. Nicholls's reference to a substantial soldier reinforcement on the way, however, could only mean land operations, and of course the only target on the mainland in Louisiana would be New Orleans. ⁶¹

Laffite also found a letter from Captain Percy directing Lockyer to sail his ship to Barataria to contact Laffite, and substantially reiterating Nicholls's terms, though Percy emphasized that the land bounty would come from "His Majestys colonies in America." Percy, at least, did not expect the United States to survive as a nation. If the Baratarians declined to join in the coming offensive against the Americans, Percy suggested that they be urged to remain neutral and cease their preying on Spanish shipping. If Laffite agreed, Percy ordered Lockyer to coordinate their efforts in annoying the enemy and made it clear that he wanted the Baratarian fleet to join with his own for an attack on Mobile.⁶²

The fourth document was a letter from Percy to Laffite, dated the previous day. In it Percy revealed a rather less accommodating spirit, and more of the traditional attitude of professional naval officers toward pirates and privateers. Having heard that Laffite had taken and sold British merchantmen, he demanded immediate restitution, and informed Laffite that, should he refuse, Lockyer had orders "to destroy, to his utmost every vessel there, as well as to carry destruction over the whole place," adding that he would give Lockyer all the additional force he might need to do the job. "I trust at the same time that the Inhabitants of Barataria consulting their own interest, will not make it necessary to proceed to such Extremities," he went on to say. They had now the choice of "a war instantly Destructive to them," or cooperation that would only be to their gain. Percy would pay them for their vessels, and any of the privateers who wished to enlist in His Majesty's military or naval forces would be welcomed. If any of them were British subjects, he promised pardon for their offenses against the Crown as soon as they enlisted.⁶³

As Laffite read the papers, Lockyer elaborated on their intent, emphatically urging Laffite not to let this opportunity escape him. If he did, said Lockyer, he would regret it.⁶⁴ Laffite asked for a few days to consider and consult with his associates, but Lockyer pressed him, arguing that there should be no need for time to think, as the offer was too good. France and Britain were friends again, and so Frenchmen like Laffite should side with the British. Laffite was an outlaw in America and at this very moment his brother was in jail, quite possibly with the gallows awaiting.⁶⁵ Laffite would get ahead in the British service, even win promotion perhaps.⁶⁶ Lockyer also suggested that Nicholls wanted permission to land troops at Grand Isle, using it as a base for a campaign against New Orleans, to which Laffite replied that though he was a smuggler, he "did not intend to fight against the Americans."⁶⁷ He refused to be pushed, committing himself only to providing an answer in a few days.

Jean then raised a pretext to leave his house for a short time. Once he was gone, some of the men outside reassembled, rushed in, arrested Lockyer and a marine officer with him, and took them to a cell used for keeping rule breakers and perhaps Spanish prisoners from prizes. According to Lockyer, the men threatened and insulted him, then took from him the papers he had brought and tore them up in front of his face—though they must have been copies as Laffite had the originals in hand.⁶⁸ John Oliver heard Dominique, feeling vengeful over the British crippling of the Tigre, say he wanted to take the British ship.⁶⁹ A few called for Lockyer to be hanged—which must have galled him, since the captain was known for his kind and attentive treatment of prisoners who fell into his hands.⁷⁰

Somehow Lockyer sent an appeal to Laffite, but Jean could see the temper of his men. He had prevailed over them at the waterline, but now they had ignored his wishes and were clearly in a mood to challenge his authority, even mutiny, if he interfered. Better not to create a situation that could compromise his future sway over them, he concluded, but to wait until he found them more manageable. Consequently, Laffite did not acknowledge that the Englishmen had been arrested, and sent Lockyer's pinnace back to the Sophie with instructions to return in the morning.⁷¹

Laffite spent the balance of the daylight hours at other tasks as if nothing had happened, and that evening met with the leaders of the disaffected men. Speaking as if Lockyer had not been taken, he reminded them that if the officers were harmed, the Baratarians would all be liable to reprisals when they crossed paths with British vessels at sea. Moreover, they would forfeit the chance to learn British intentions and perhaps identify England's spies and collaborators in Louisiana. Laffite left the men to consider what best served their interests, and left Lockyer to spend a very uncomfortable night.

The next morning, September 4, when the British pinnace returned, the mob arrested its crew as well, and threatened to send them to New Orleans as spies. But as Laffite expected, the unruly men then had what Lockyer described as "a sudden change of mind," and they released the officers.⁷² Seizing the moment, Laffite immediately walked Lockyer and the others to their pinnace and saw them off. Within the hour the Sophie weighed anchor and stood out of the pass and back into the Gulf, there to await a reply.⁷³

That afternoon Laffite drafted a letter that he sent to Lockyer, first apologizing for the treatment of the visitors. As for the British offer, he told Lockyer that "indeed, at present, I cannot give you the satisfaction you wish." However, if the British could give him fifteen days, thereafter "I will be entirely at your service." He needed the time to reestablish his control over the men by dealing with three of the ringleaders in the near mutiny, who would be leaving Grand Isle in little more than a week. One of the three, who may have been Dominique, he said would be going to New Orleans, as indeed Dominique did that day, along with Humbert and the rest. Jean needed the second week to get his affairs in order, but he was essentially accepting the British offer, and with a little flattery thrown in. "You have inspired me with more confidence than perhaps the admiral, your superior, would have done," he told Lockyer. "Therefore it is with you that I would treat; and from you I shall claim, in my term, those services which I may now render you, at proper time and place." Meanwhile Lockyer could communicate with him by sending messages to his house overlooking the pass. ⁷⁴

Beyond question Jean had no intention of keeping this bargain. He was buying time to consider a complicated situation. In itself, the British proposal offered him nothing, and even that predicated on American defeat in the war. The pay that the British offered for service as an army captain was scarcely a fraction of what he made from a single good prize. He would be paid for his vessels, but would thereby be out of a frequently lucrative profession. A land bounty was no use to him. He certainly did not intend to become a planter, and he could not sell the land for much as land was cheap just then and could be obtained from the government for almost nothing. Most of all, the Baratarían enterprise would be out of business.

Laffite already knew that no matter which side won, American or British, his operation within the United States was doomed. This is what made Dominique's coincidental arrival with Humbert, Anaya, and Pedroza so fortuitous, troublesome though Youx might have been with Lockyer. Before they went on to New Orleans, probably within hours of Laffite's letter to Lockyer, Anaya informed Laffite of his new commission as agent, which Jean could not know had little or no validity. Anaya said that soon under the authority of the Mexican congress he would provide privateering commissions for the Baratarían captains, meaning that for perhaps the first time Laffite ships could sail under legitimate papers. He would start work on it as soon as he reached New Orleans and contacted those backers still willing to support Humbert. ⁷⁵ The old Tampico plan would be on again, and this time legitimized by the Mexican insurgency. It needed only a little time, yet another reason for Laffite to stall Lockyer for a fortnight.

Jean also needed to bargain some delay from the Americans, and the Britons' approach could serve a purpose. If he turned Lockyer's papers and what he had learned in conversation with the British captain over to authorities in New Orleans, he might win favor, if only temporarily. Laffite surely knew from his informants in the city that Patterson was preparing an expedition to destroy the Baratarian establishment. Anything that delayed this would give him more time to prepare the shift of base to the Mexican coast. The Laffites remained almost entirely silent as to their sympathies in the current war. Certainly they felt no patriotic affection for the United States sufficient to make them obey its laws. Yet like most of French blood, they felt an ancestral enmity for Britain. The Baratarians included many men who had fought against the British on Santiago and Baracoa prior to 1809.⁷⁶ While most of the brothers' personal and business associates in New Orleans were Frenchmen, they enjoyed good relations with some Americans as well. From a purely pragmatic viewpoint, there was still a hungry market for slaves in the United States, while Britain had outlawed the slave trade in its colonies in 1807 and was considering complete abolition throughout the empire—which would not bode well for Laffite business. Thus, even if self-exiled from their adopted home, the Laffites had a strong self-interest in American victory.

All things considered, the scale tipped toward informing authorities in New Orleans of the British visit. The choice of whom to approach may not have been difficult. Claiborne or Flournoy would have been the most logical, but Laffite might not expect either to credit something coming from him. He must contact someone who had their ear, and the name that came to mind was Jean Blanque. An immigrant to New Orleans in 1803, the same year Pierre arrived, Blanque was a merchant, onetime slave dealer, and banker who had held successive offices in the territorial government, and at the moment sat in the legislature then in session in New Orleans. Blanque was also an investor in more than one privateer, which likely led to an acquaintance with the Laffites. A few months later a Creole planter would frankly state that "Blanque is regarded as one of the persons financially interested in the piracies of Barataria, which he openly protects." He had also recently been admitted to practice before the federal district court, which might prove useful. ⁷⁷ It helped, of course, that Blanque was bilingual, and thus Laffite could communicate precisely with him and leave it to Blanque to translate his communications for the Americans.

Almost immediately after sending Lockyer his temporizing letter, Laffite addressed a letter to Blanque. "Though proscribed by my adoptive country," he claimed, he wrote to prove his loyalty and to demonstrate that "she has never ceased to be dear to me." Informing Blanque of Lockyer's visit, he enclosed the documents handed him by Lockyer. "You will see from their contents the advantages I might have derived from that kind of association," he pointed out, then went on to declare, somewhat tongue in cheek, that "I may have evaded the payment of duties to the custom house; but I have never ceased to be a good citizen; and all the offence I have committed, I was forced to by certain vices in our laws." Warming to hyperbole, he declared that he was making Blanque "the depository of the secret on which perhaps depends the tranquility of our country." Then, having called attention to his patriotism and the importance of his action, he protested that he would be content to let both speak for themselves.

A second motive for turning the documents over to the Americans emerged. "Our enemies have endeavored to work on me by a motive which few men would have resisted," he said. "They represented to me a brother in irons, a brother who is to me very dear! Whose deliverer I might become." Laffite expressed the hope that in providing this information to the Americans, he might gain Pierre's release. "Well persuaded of his innocence, I am free from apprehension as to the issue of a trial," Jean averred, "but he is sick and not in a place where he can receive the assistance his state requires." In the "name of humanity," Jean asked Blanque to use his influence to free Pierre, resorting to the same type of flattery he used on Lockyer when he added that he thought Blanque to be "a just man, a true American, endowed with all other qualities that are honored in society." Laffite lied outright when he told Blanque that he had refused Nicholls's offer, though of course he had lied to Lockyer when he indicated that he would accept. He told Blanque that he had asked for fifteen days to settle his plans, and expected that the grace period would be granted.⁷⁸ He sent the letter and accompanying documents to New Orleans by the fastest means, possibly unaware that unfolding events would negate his proposal before Blanque learned of it.

That night a person or persons unknown crept into the courtyard behind the Cabildo and stopped outside Pierre Laffite's cell. They swung open the bolt that locked the door from the outside and in a matter of seconds Pierre walked out a free man. Not content with this, he and his rescuers released three slave men being held in another cell and stole off into the night to begin the journey to Barataria, though not before Pierre sent a message of his own to Jean Blanque, who may well have assisted the escape.⁷⁹ When the cells were found empty the next morning, an immediate outcry arose. Few had any doubts as to who had managed the escape. McKeehan took it for granted that smugglers had done the deed, remarking that the jail was well situated for such a clandestine action, being behind the Cabildo and out of sight from the Place d'Arms or the city streets. Indeed, he had predicted when Pierre was arrested months before that someone would break him out whenever the time came that Pierre felt genuinely threatened by the charges against him. ⁸⁰

The jailbreak was embarrassing for Sheriff J. H. Holland, especially when the press implied that he had connived in the breakout. McKeehan commented rather pointedly that Laffite "is said to have broken and escaped from prison?—!!!" though he later apologized for the innuendo.⁸¹ Still the editor thought "it is not a very pleasant joke on the jailor" to post a mere $1,000 reward for retaking "such a man as this." He regarded the reward offer as nothing but a mockery, and assumed it was done for form's sake rather than from an expectation that anyone would bring Pierre in. It was all part and parcel of the defective way the laws were enforced and justice administered in Louisiana, he complained.⁸²

Spaniards in town had little doubt, too, that Laffite's confederates had freed him. When the break was discovered, Morphy immediately wrote of it to Apodaca, indication that they regarded Laffite as an important component in the filibustering enemy facing them. "With the aid of his companions, [he] was able to climb the walls of the jail and escape," Morphy explained. "It is not rare that this happened, because unfortunately in this city are many individuals involved in the pirate acts he committed and therefore many are interested in saving him at all costs, in order to avoid being discovered." In short, Morphy believed it was city merchants who got Pierre out of jail.⁸³ He may have been right. Even if Jean had plans for getting his brother out, he was not likely behind this break, or he would hardly have bothered to ask Blanque for his assistance. So far as the Spaniards were concerned, the how and who of Pierre's escape were immaterial, for now, "even with all his offenses and enormous crimes," Manrique complained to Apodaca, "he is already walking and free to get back to his horrific practices as he is the meanest of all pirates." ⁸⁴

While Pierre was making his way to Grand Isle, and surely before word that he was at large arrived ahead of him, Jean Laffite received information that he thought might be useful in his bargain with Blanque. Somehow he came into possession of a letter from Havana, written August 8 to a recipient in Pensacola, probably taken on a prize brought in on September 6 or 7. The letter contained some details of a British expedition bent on taking Mobile, but told little that Laffite—and now Blanque—did not know from Lockyer's papers. However, the letter went on to say that after taking Mobile, Nicholls intended to push for New Orleans, and place forces at Plaquemine to isolate the Mississippi from the Gulf⁸⁵

On September 7 Laffite enclosed the letter in another missive to Blanque, noting that Lockyer's ship still sat at anchor in sight from his house, and was now joined by two others. Jean had held no further communication with Lockyer, waiting for instructions from Blanque.⁸⁶ "We have hitherto kept on a respectable defensive," Laffite added, but then dropped the hint that "if, however, the British attach to the possession of this place, the importance they give us room to suspect they do, they may employ means above our strength." If the British warships were there to carry out Percy's threat to destroy Barataria if Laffite refused to aid them, as Jean suggested, then the enemy would have a foothold at the back door to New Orleans. This being the case, Jean suspected that Claiborne and the military might now be very receptive to receiving intelligence from him, even at the cost of a favor to Pierre.⁸⁷ Then, perhaps within hours of writing to Blanque, Laffite saw the Sophie and the other vessels raise anchor and sail out of sight. Lockyer had gotten tired of waiting, though Jean could not know whether this meant a reprieve from danger, or that Lockyer was going to inform Percy that Laffite was playing with them and it was time to attack. ⁸⁸

By this time Blanque had received Jean's first package, and by his own account he thought this a "strange communication" from Laffite. After he read the documents he immediately determined to turn them over to Claiborne.⁸⁹ Meanwhile he sent a verbal message back via Laffite's courier, a Mr. Rancher, telling Jean to remain calm and do nothing until he heard more from Blanque or from the governor.⁹⁰ Blanque's response probably took two or three days to reach Grand Isle, meaning it arrived on or about September 10. But the perfunctory message would have been far overshadowed when a pirogue came down the bay that day and Pierre Laffite stepped ashore and into his brother's arms.

It required but a few minutes for Jean to inform his brother of the past week's events. Both quick thinkers, they now dealt with the shift in circumstances caused by Pierre's escape. Jean's requests from Blanque were now moot, of course. In effect, they had given the authorities information for nothing. The information was of little value, for there was nothing in the Lockyer papers not already known in New Orleans, but now they had nothing with which to bargain. Meanwhile Percy might send a force to destroy Barataria at any time in the next few weeks, and they could not ignore the rumors coming out of New Orleans that Patterson was preparing to do the same thing. They needed time, and Pierre came up with a new carrot to dangle before Claiborne and the American authorities.

The Baratarians would offer to defend Barataria against a British attack if it came, and in return Jean would ask Claiborne for a cessation of the prosecutions against them, which implied a halt to Patterson's intended attack as well. This plan was brilliant in its way, for the governor was not necessarily to know that in effect the Laffites were offering nothing. Jean already accepted, and as much as admitted to Blanque, that he could not defend Barataria against a British attack. He had several privateers in the harbor and three hundred to five hundred men at any given time, but this was no match for English warships. But of course the British might not come. If they did not, then he would have forestalled Patterson's attack at no expense to himself, and he could still leave for the Mexican coast when ready. If the British did come, he could try to stop an attack by sending out word accepting their terms, which he had conditionally accepted already. In the worst case, if the British proved intractable, he could simply evacuate earlier than he intended and move to the Calcasieu or the Sabine.

Pierre wrote a letter to Claiborne the same day, and once more resorted to flattery, telling Claiborne that he had been elected governor thanks to his merit and the esteem of the people. Then he portentously broached a matter "on which may depend the safety of this country." Offering to restore to Louisiana "several citizens, who perhaps in your eyes have lost that sacred title," he proffered the Baratarians "such as you could wish to find them, ready to exert their utmost efforts in defence of the country." Asserting the strategic importance of his position on Grand Isle, he offered to defend it, asking in return that the current prosecutions and indictments against him and his men be quashed, and that a general pardon be granted for all they had done in the past.

"I am the stray sheep, wishing to return to the sheepfold," he went on. "If you were thoroughly acquainted with my offences, I should appear to you much less guilty." He had never sailed under any flag except Cartagena's, he protested, adding disingenuously that "my vessels are perfectly regular in that respect." Indeed, he would have brought his prizes into New Orleans if he could have, since they were lawful, but he stopped at that, saying, "I decline saying more on the subject." Should Claiborne refuse his offer, he concluded, "I declare to you that I will instantly leave the country, to avoid the imputation of having co-operated towards an invasion on this point, which cannot fail to take place, and to rest secure in the acquittal of my own conscience." Laffite did not offer to aid in the defense of New Orleans, or to join the American army, or to do any other service where needed, but only to defend Grand Isle. ⁹¹ What remained to be seen was whether the shepherd was willing to let these black sheep join his flock.