SIXTEEN

A Season of Treachery 1817

Such were the notes that from the Pirate's isle
Around the kindling watch-fire rang the while:
Such were the sounds that thrill'd the rocks along,
And unto ears as rugged seem'd a song!

THE NEW REGIME'S first prizes—two vessels, the Petronille and L'Enrequita—came in with Champlin's General Artigas on April 7, just after Aury's departure. Aboard them were 287 slaves. Champlin's business partner, New Orleans merchant Christopher Adams, had bought an additional three hundred slaves from Aury just before his fleet sailed.¹ These unfortunate blacks were now the inaugural merchandise of an illicit slave trade that would see thousands smuggled from Texas to Louisiana thanks to the supply the privateers could provide and the organizational genius of the Laffites. Ducoing held sham admiralty court proceedings aboard Lafon's Carmelita for the time being. When a prize came in, Ducoing simply examined her papers and made a pronouncement of condemnation. Espagnol then drafted a condemnation order, and the formality was done. They kept no court records.²

Jean Laffite prepared to leave immediately after that April 17 meeting of the privateer captains. So much had happened unexpectedly in the last ten days that he had to return to New Orleans quickly to report to his several masters: Pierre, the "associates," and Sedella. He needed to consult with his brother on just how to position themselves in the days ahead. The "associates" could perhaps be induced to provide credit for building up the Galveston establishment. The Spaniards, of course, would want to know the particulars of Mina and Aury and to hear the Laffites' proposal on how to capitalize on the situation. Before leaving, Jean arranged that Lafon would bring him information if anything happened on the Texas coast in his absence, and though he could not know it, Spanish authorities in Texas had half a dozen soldiers dressed as civilians on their way to the bay to keep their own watch on Galveston. ³ Laffite also authorized someone on the ruling council to make necessary purchases from Champlin's agent on the island by charging them to the Laffites' account.⁴

Even the Devorador experienced difficulty in the pass or anchorage, for Laffite had to buy a new anchor and some anchor cable from Champlin before he could leave.⁵ Then contrary wind held the Devorador outside the bar for a day, during which three more corsairs and one prize came to anchor beside her, giving Jean an opportunity to study once more the depth of the water above the bar. Vessels had to anchor outside and wait for a pilot to come bring them one at a time through the pass.⁶

By April 22 Jean was back in New Orleans, unwell—as he had been for some time—but soon at work with Pierre on a scheme to present to the Spaniards for taking Galveston with the bay full of corsairs and prizes, and thus close off further supply of men and material to Aury and Mina. Jean wrote a note to Sedella telling him that he had talked with Mina, "who told me things of great importance." Jean said that Mina even asked Jean to accompany him on his expedition. This may or may not have been true, for the Laffites never figured in Mina's plans before this, and any invitation now would have been ad hoc and spontaneous. "I was unwilling to consent," Jean told the priest, "having the intention of reestablishing a new government in Galveston."⁷ The brothers now proposed that Spain provide a corvette, a brig, one or two schooners, and a pair of gunboats, all to sail singly in order not to attract attention and then rendezvous in the harbor at Pensacola no later than July 15. If necessary the corvette, brig, and one schooner could achieve the same end, the schooner being vital for reconnoitering and messenger service. Meanwhile, by the end of June one of the brothers would have returned to Galveston to determine the total strength of corsairs and crews, as well as prizes, and to send back weekly reports of arrivals and departures. At the same time another schooner should be sent to Soto la Marina to determine Mina's situation and the progress of his campaign, if any, while stopping at Matagorda to assess Aury's position and strength there. Then the schooner would return to New Orleans with its intelligence, and the Laffites would dispatch it to Pensacola with final instructions. If they acted quietly, no one would know what they were doing until it was all over.

The brothers' fleet would sail to Galveston with the corvette and brig flying the flag of Spain beneath the colors of the Mexican insurgency, a sign that they were prizes. Then the gunboats and a schooner, their presumed captors, would approach the bar flying the Mexican checkerboard. Jean knew from observation that a pilot would be sent out to bring them over the bar and through the pass, and once they were inside the bay the few men there should easily be overwhelmed by a landing party. Indeed, in designating the leaders he left behind, Laffite may have purposefully chosen men whom he knew would not be effective in a crisis. The corvette and brig should be carrying cannon and men to arm and crew another brig that Jean believed would be anchored outside the bar.

Once Galveston was in their hands, they would keep the schooners and gunboats in the harbor, attracting little or no attention, while the corvette and brig or brigs remained at anchor outside, posing as prizes. As corsairs approached, Jean could signal the armed ships to take them one at a time, which could be done "without firing a single shot" by a few men and only a couple of cannon thanks to the narrowness of the pass and the fact that most privateers only mounted one or two guns themselves. The Laffites stressed in their proposal that they wanted at every cost to avoid violence. Bloodshed had never been an intentional feature of their operations, and many of the privateers they would take were friends and former associates whom they might hope to employ. Privateer captains currently warned crewmen that capture by Spain meant instant death, as indeed it could. The Laffites, however, wanted every captured crew to be informed while being taken into port that they were to be offered service for Spain, and thus they need not resist or fear reprisal. That way "the desperate valor of the corsair crews will be dispersed," and each vessel captured would augment the forces to take the rest as well as Spain's naval force in the region. In such a fashion the Laffites' force could capture every privateer and prize, starving Mina and Aury of forces and supplies while the goods taken from the prizes funded the Laffite plan. Galveston taken, and Aury forced to abandon Matagorda, privateers still at large would be discouraged from continuing their trade on those shores, and the "associates" and other outfitters would lose heart. No privateer base on the Gulf coast would remain. Unsaid in the Laffites' proposal was the probability that Galveston would then be theirs to use as their own private base, backed by the power of the vessels Spain had lent them. Indeed, as if to establish the legitimacy of the rump government he'd left behind him, Jean gave to a local editor for publication a statement of the busy commerce of the port yet in its infancy. It was also a way of announcing generally that privateers had a new place to bring their prizes for a quick and favorable adjudication by the "admiralty court," followed by a speedy sale. "The affair has turned out perfectly well for us," Jean declared. "Moments are precious, and there is no time to lose." ⁸

In fact, Jean Laffite believed their plan was perfect. Just then Latour asked him to go back to the East to take up their efforts of the past year with men planning filibustering voyages, but Laffite knew he had more important work before him here and now. Indeed, he wanted Latour to persuade the men in the East to join with them. "I am at the head of an operation a thousand times more honorable than the one they have projected," he said. He had little doubt that he could sway them in person if he had to, being like his brother Pierre, convinced of his craft at persuasion. They would be doing a great boon for humanity.⁹

As the Laffites completed their plan, Lafon arrived with news. After a hard voyage Aury abandoned Mina at Soto la Marina on April 21, and on May 4 returned to Galveston to learn of the coup. The ruling council invited him to sit in on its deliberations, and he did, but only to make it clear that while he did not have the strength to resist what had taken place in his absence he would not countenance their actions, nor give up his now meaningless power as governor, by acknowledging the council's legitimacy. The council repudiated his claims to rule, and the meeting broke up indecisively with Aury going back to his ship to sulk. Aury's presence, with his commission from Herrera, compromised the authority of Laffite's council under Iturribarria's endorsement, and yet the council's refusal to take directions from him made him a cipher.

Lafon told Jean that he expected the impasse not to be broken. Aury tried to resume power, identifying himself as governor of Texas on May 7 when he took $5,000 from Nicholas Aiguette in payment for a commission for a new privateer, the prize the Diana, but the council ignored him and Ducoing continued to act as admiralty judge for about a week.¹⁰ Aury ordered him to sign an oath of loyalty but Ducoing refused, and also refused to condemn Lafon's prize the Evening Post when he found her papers to be in order—probably a Laffite loyalist's pretext for defying Aury. Vicente Garros took over after Ducoing resigned on May 8, and condemned the prize. Henceforth Garros's decisions would not be influenced by genuine papers aboard the prizes, because the captors did not risk letting them be seen in the court. Rumors soon reached New Orleans that when merchants from the city bought prize goods from the privateers, the corsairs would not take hard cash for fear of being robbed by their own associates, and instead preferred bills of credit on the city's banks. ¹¹ Meanwhile, Ducoing had condemned prizes brought in by Champlin, Beluche, Lafon, and Sauvinet, and business was brisk, with eight corsairs and prizes at anchor.¹²

Latour had been in Havana for some time, presenting his report and the proposals of the Laffite brothers of New Orleans, whom he described as "merchants of that city," though the Spanish authorities knew well enough who and what they were.¹³ Before long copies of the report were on their way to Onís and Apodaca, as well as to the governors of Texas and neighboring provinces.¹⁴ None seemed to take its warning of American expansion seriously. Onís thought it a good exercise, but one offering nothing new.¹⁵ The report did not reach Mexico City until July, and Madrid did not see it until November 1818.

Far more interesting, it seemed, was Latour's oral representation of the Laffites' propositions, and José Cienfuegos granted the brothers' wish for a fully empowered agent in New Orleans. Morphy, while energetic, had been a minor official, with almost no prior experience. Felipe Fatio, however, was a career operative with credentials. He had been in Havana when Latour arrived and presented his report on March 26. Fatio received his orders in April, and with them sufficient funds to pay the Laffites, Picornell, Sedella, and other friends in New Orleans $100 a month.¹⁶ He was to contact the Laffites through Sedella, or at least to get in touch with Pierre, and determine their sincerity. Cienfuegos wanted to know as much as possible about the Laffites, including their moral character, the attitude of the community in New Orleans toward them, their influence if any, their financial condition, and their vessels. Once satisfied, Fatio was authorized to promise them that they would be "greatly compensated" in return for useful information and action. That done, Fatio was to listen to the brothers' plans, evaluate and rank them by importance and practicability, and then adopt those he deemed suitable as well as an agent whom he trusted, being wary of Picornell. Having selected the man, Fatio could employ him on a stipend. All disbursements of funds were to be noted as coming from a cover fund called the "Commission of the Royal Services." ¹⁷

Fatio took office the day after his arrival on May 6, and that evening sent word to Sedella to bring the Laffites to him. When they met on May 7 Jean told Fatio that his observations of the men at Galveston under Aury and Mina convinced him that they had "no other patriotism, other virtue, other object, other plan than that of making themselves rich, than that of robbing and murdering, under the pretext of Independence, every Spaniard they might encounter, in order to make, if they could, a quick and great fortune."¹⁸ Jean said he would bring his diary from the voyage to Galveston to Fatio the following day. He gave Fatio his latest news on Mina and Aury, and added that he believed Aury's (incorrect) suspicion that Perry was an American agent hoping to engineer Texas independence in order to hand it to the United States. Before the meeting adjourned Fatio promised to have a schooner ready to take their plan and his recommendation to Havana and Cienfuegos.

One subject they did not address was the rumored plot for a slave rebellion. Fatio proposed that they could simply expose it and its authors by public letters sent to the East, but the brothers adamantly opposed the idea, first because it would expose their undercover work, and second because it might actually endanger their lives. It may have been nothing but a ruse in the first place, of course, and in time the Spaniards concluded that it had been a hoax from the start. They preferred to blame it on Ariza, whom the Laffites said revealed it to them. It could just as easily have been their own scheme, to raise a specter so dread that Havana would do what they wanted and send a representative. Now that Fatio was here, and with money in his pocket, they no longer needed the ruse, if ruse it had been. ¹⁹

Clearly the brothers were feeling out Fatio, otherwise they would have brought Jean's diary and their plan to this first encounter. Yet they left Fatio feeling comfortable, and the following evening the Laffites and Sedella called on Fatio to turn over Jean's diary and a draft of the plan he and Pierre had formulated. The scheme must be implemented immediately, they urged, before conditions changed. If carried out expeditiously, their proposal could end privateering once and for all.

Fatio saw the sense in their plan and their urgency, but did not commit himself. First he spoke with one or two others familiar with Galveston and spent several days making discreet inquiries into the Laffites' "moral and public conduct" since they started their Barataria operation in 1810. Reports said they were humane and generous with Spanish prisoners. Fatio was no fool. He knew that the Laffites acted in self-interest, and that they could harbor deception while pretending to be friends. Nevertheless, he thought they had to see that the benefits of being honest with him far outweighed the reward of duplicity. In their favor also was the fact that so far everything they had given Sedella had turned out to be true. Sedella had known them for a long time, and he vouched for their sincerity, adding that "from the time they first offered their services," they had complained about the sloth of the government to act on their intelligence.

Finally on May 24 he concluded to recommend their plan to Cienfuegos at face value. "Nevertheless," he told Cienfuegos, "I shall not cease to be on guard constantly; and if, unfortunately, I should observe any contradiction between their promises and their conduct, I shall be able to end the evil at its source." Fatio believed that the plan was the only way "to uproot at one blow the evil that we have so long been suffering; since to go on now and then taking one boat or another would in no wise end the life of this hydra, which would be born again of its own blood." Better yet, "the taking of Galveston is so easy in the present circumstances, without the need for losing even one man on one side or the other," Fatio advised, "and the leaders who live there are all dependent upon No. 13," Pierre's code name. He agreed that Pierre would take the Devorador to Galveston at once to get the latest information, and he would send a schooner to Soto la Marina to gather intelligence on Mina and Aury if possible. Fatio was not blind to the hazards involved. The Laffites were betraying a score and more of people in New Orleans, and a number of privateers, any of whom might be happy to see them dead if their betrayal were discovered. Fatio, too, felt the danger to his own life, and warned his superior that secrecy was paramount.

As for the Laffites, Fatio wanted them close to him, no doubt for speed of action as well as to keep an eye on them. Latour might be sent east to discourage more filibuster groups from forming there, but Fatio did not want either of the brothers sent that far away unless absolutely necessary.²⁰ Meanwhile he gave the brothers countersigns with which to identify themselves to Spanish agents as friends and disbursed to them the funds they said were necessary to put their plan into action. At last the brothers felt Spanish coin in their hands. Two days after their second meeting with Fatio, Marie Villard suddenly paid off the $1,120 mortgage she owed on the house at Bourbon and St. Philip.²¹

In April the brothers had a credit balance of over $13,000 with Champlin and Adams, probably proceeds from Pierre's last shipment to Boquilla de Piedras or investment by the "associates" into the Galveston enterprise. The day of their first meeting with Fatio the brothers deposited another $2,000 in specie, probably a reimbursement to Jean for his voyage. A week later they deposited another $650. ²² Then on May 22 just before Fatio wrote to Cienfuegos informing him of his decision, the Spanish agent paid "No. 13" $4,000 as an "installment" for Pierre's voyage to reconnoiter Galveston and Matagorda.²³ Two days later the brothers deposited another $2,020 in gold with Champlin and Adams.²⁴ Meanwhile Jean reclaimed the bond he had posted for his modest drawback for the cargo of wine and other things he had taken to Galveston.²⁵ Any dollars that could be raised from any source were urgent now. To provide the fast schooner that the plan required for running to the Mexican coast and doing courier duty, the Laffites sold Fatio their own little prize goleta the Antonio Bonifacia for $3,000.²⁶

During these busy days the brothers outfitted the Devorador for Pierre's trip, drawing heavily on their balance with Champlin. Born in New York, Champlin was a sometime planter on the Mississippi, a smuggler, a ship chandler in New Orleans, and a privateer closely tied to Aury. Now he left most of the New Orleans business to partner Adams while he sailed his corsair in search of prizes.²⁷ Adams sold the Laffites $1,157 worth of ship's biscuit, thirty barrels of pork and thirty of salt beef, two sacks of coffee beans, six cases of salted cod, three barrels of mackerel and forty-two of potatoes. There was also sugar, cooking oil, three barrels of onions, four barrels each of cider and vinegar, as well as mustard, pepper, and a barrel of cheese, all testimony to the monotony of shipboard fare for corsairs, with only the onions and cider to stave off scurvy. The men must have their drink, too, and thus the Laffites stowed aboard six cases of red wine and six white, and a dozen cases of brandy. Anticipating the vagaries of weather and bottom that often required a vessel to cut its anchor cable, they loaded eighteen lengths of cable as well. This left room for Maire to take on five passengers and their baggage, men to add to the Laffites' cadre of loyal followers at Galveston. On May 27 when Adams totaled the debits against the Laffite balance, the cost of outfitting for the trip came to $4,248.06, a little more than Fatio's installment. The passage for the five men and their equipment added another $1,175 to the voyage. ²⁸

A couple of near slips caused some minor concern. In the middle of the month several prizes condemned by Ducoing's admiralty court came into New Orleans for sale, and Fatio filed libels on behalf of their owners. Lafon and merchant John B. Laporte were particularly interested in the prizes, however, and applied to go before Judge Hall to prove that the authorities under which these ships had been condemned at Galveston were legally appointed and commissioned by Aury. Espagnol was in town and Lafon asked him to testify on their behalf, yet in spite of being owed $1,200 by Lafon, he declared that if put on the witness stand he would tell the truth of the illegality of Aury's and now Laffites government. Quite possibly Fatio or Jean Laffite had had a word with him and money changed hands.²⁹ Meanwhile Jean almost caused a problem. The transactions with Champlin and Adams were aboveboard, but Jean stumbled when his sometime partner Duparc tried to import a shipment of thirty-seven small pivot guns or swivels, of the sort mounted at the prow of a pirogue, for the enterprise. They came from Galveston and were improperly cleared through customs in order to avoid paying duty. It would have been ironic if the whole enterprise had foundered because a foolish effort to save perhaps $400 in duty resulted in a court case.³⁰ Once a smuggler, always a smuggler, it seemed. The case would dog Laffite for years, but it did not in the end impede outfitting the Devorador.

Pierre intended to set sail May 26, in Fatio's words, to gather "the final accounts which we need to execute the stroke safely." Before going he gave Fatio the designs of the insurgent flags of Mexico, Venezuela, and Buenos Aires so that the Spanish vessels in the plan could copy and fly them as they approached Galveston. ³¹ Iturribarria had arrived in New Orleans by May 15, and committed revolutionary that he was, he spoke of publicizing the shambles at Galveston. He knew that rich prizes were being taken by Aury, but the money was not getting back to New Orleans to fund the revolution. "If there are no funds there are no soldiers," he wrote to Durieux. Though Iturribarria was on good terms with the Laffites, who had done him favors in the past, his discouragement could inhibit the assembly of privateers and threaten to compromise the Laffite-Fatio plan.³² Added urgency came when the Laffites learned on May 13 that the "associates" had word of a Spanish fleet sailing from Vera Cruz, bound for Havana and thence to Spain. That meant the Gulf would be less protected for weeks or months to come, and this was the time to sail for prizes.³³ Then came late word that a disgusted Aury had left Galveston on May 18 and moved to Matagorda. This called for a last-minute adjustment making Matagorda the target and delaying Pierre's departure until June 3.³⁴

Pierre usually left the sailing to his brother, but Jean remained indisposed for some time.³⁵ The elder Laffite was also clearly the one in charge, and he needed to appraise conditions on-site. Fatio may even have insisted on it. Jean, the more experienced at ship outfitting, was now entrusted with preparing and supplying the Antonio Bonifacia in New Orleans. He needed to have her ready to sail at a moment's notice before the end of the month.³⁶ Jean Laffite also had personal business to attend to in New Orleans, among other things raising $700 by selling a slave that he had bought from his Arkansas acquaintance Notrebe.³⁷ When the Devorador finally sailed, Jean assured Fatio that if Spain did as the brothers said, she would "have no enemies to fear in this part of the world."

Pierre set sail on June 3, and may not have stopped at Galveston, knowing that Aury had left. By June 14 he and the Devorador were at Matagorda, and what he found surely encouraged him. The impetuous Aury had wrecked most of his fleet on sandbars as he entered the harbor behind Matagorda Island, and those that got in found they could not get out again. That was only the first disaster. By June 15, while Pierre was still off Matagorda, the Spaniards had assembled enough soldiers that they could march to meet Mina. Mina and Perry fell out, and Perry led some of his men away, only to be surrounded a few days later by sixty men commanded by a Spanish lieutenant who demanded their surrender. Perry refused, and took his own life to avoid capture. ³⁸

Meanwhile Mina's base at Soto la Marina was besieged and surrendered on June 15, leaving Mina isolated from support by sea. All he could do was march his men inland until they found a band of rebels, whom they joined, Mina's dreams of personal conquest and liberation disintegrating like those of so many of the filibusters before him. Laffite would not learn of this for some time, but meanwhile there was Aury and his battered fleet at Matagorda. On June 12 a Spanish frigate and accompanying gunboats blockaded Aury's vessels and fired on them in their anchorage, and may still have been doing so when the Devorador hove in sight.³⁹ By the time Pierre arrived, a frustrated Aury was already getting those he could extricate back to sea and setting off for Galveston. Champlin's ship was among those stuck in the bay, and Pierre bought a bunch of crabs that Champlin's men had passed the time netting. Pierre also leased a brig of Champlin's as a dispatch boat and sent it to Galveston with orders to stop only briefly before going on to New Orleans to take word of the latest developments to Fatio as promised. When Pierre's dispatch reached New Orleans on about July 12, Fatio gloated that Aury was in a "rat-trap." All they had to do was take him.

Meanwhile the Devorador remained at Matagorda a few days, during which Pierre bought a few barrels of white wine for his men, and two slaves from Champlin.⁴⁰ Then the Devorador set sail for Galveston, probably in convoy with Aury's remnants. They anchored off Galveston a few days later to find Garros still acting as admiralty judge, which he continued to do until he left for New Orleans on June 30 with no named successor. ⁴¹ Aury had brought with him two shiploads of slaves, numbering close to seven hundred in all. One prize had three hundred blacks, most of whom were seriously ill by this time, and the callous commander simply cast the vessel adrift in the Gulf and abandoned them. The other cargo he had Garros condemn according to form. Added to the slaves left by Champlin in April, this made more than six hundred and fifty on Galveston Island, representing a substantial potential profit. More immediately, however, Aury tried to reestablish his government. Pierre did not resist as Aury replaced Jean's appointees, for it suited the brothers' plan to keep Aury at Galveston until the Spanish attack came. There would be opportunity aplenty to reestablish their officers once Aury was out of the way.

When he came ashore to make his camp a short distance from Aury's, Pierre walked up a pathway from the landing through the coarse grass to higher ground dotted with dense brush and a few trees. At high tide he found his site no more than six feet above the water, but generally secure, with a well nearby affording nasty but potable water. There Aury rebuilt a village of huts made of planks and sailcloth, while his men stuck poles in the ground and wove wattles and thatch into them for shelter.⁴² No sooner was he established ashore than Pierre began working subtly to undercut Aury's authority. It was not difficult. Aury's unbroken record of failure and high-handedness with his men made many ripe for conversion.

By mid-July Aury decided to abandon hopes for success in Mexico, and told Pierre that he intended to take his fleet to Amelia Island off the Florida coast to join with others seeking to take over that remnant of Spain's North American mainland. Pierre immediately paid a call on General Sarracin, who commanded some of the soldiers with the fleet, and after Laffite promised provisions for his men, the general agreed to keep his command after Aury left. The next day Sarracin moved his camp from Aury's to the site of Pierre's, a symbolic move that further demoralized Aury and the rest. That was only the first defection. Soon more than a dozen of the sailors came over to Pierre, and following them came Colonel Savary and fourteen of the free mulattoes following him. After a month on the island, Pierre believed that Aury's men were so hungry he could buy them all if only he had provisions enough.

But by July 23 Pierre found himself running out of everything, "to which I am not accustomed," he told Jean. He had no choice, if he was to capitalize on his success to date, but to send the brig Independence leased from Champlin to New Orleans with a report to his brother and an urgent plea to send more supplies, along with a good store of drinkable water. Even should the brig be lost on the way due to bad weather, always a possibility now that the hurricane season was upon them, the risk was worth taking. Sending the ship directly to New Orleans had not been his original plan, but his destruction of Aury from within allowed for a shift in thinking.

Besides, he had promised passage to New Orleans to some men on the island defecting from Aury, including Iturribarria. Pierre was only too happy to send him back to New Orleans, as his departure would remove Aury's only vestige of legitimacy and a source of privateering commissions from the revolutionary junta. He also sent an appeal for Jean to come if he was over his illness, for now Pierre felt unwell, perhaps his old malady returning, aggravated by his labor and an attack of something akin to scabies. Pierre was also trying to conclude a deal with Champlin to buy the huge lot of slaves on the island, but had to negotiate through an interpreter since Champlin spoke only English and Pierre felt his command of the language unequal to the fine points of the deal despite his years in New Orleans. He felt that his brother's English was better. Besides, while he admitted that in slave dealing "there are some doubloons to be earned," he was more interested in their own plans, though he did not say whether he meant the brothers' private scheme or their undertaking for Fatio. No doubt expecting that Fatio would want to see his letter, Pierre declared that he was committed to Spain's cause, had given his word to see it to completion, and would do so even if it cost him his life. He had had as much success on the island as he could have hoped for, but he was willing to stay on until it was finished.

There is little doubt that Pierre held the upper hand on the island by the time he sent the brig to New Orleans. "I am like the Chief and father of Galveston," he told his brother. If their "friends" wanted to own Galveston Island, he could make it theirs. If they wanted it abandoned, he could accomplish that, too. Typical of the double game the Laffites played now, those "friends" could have been the "associates" or the Spaniards.⁴³

Finally, on July 28 Aury wrote a letter to Herrera announcing that he was leaving. He disclaimed responsibility for what happened on the island after he left, declaring that any acts by those put in power thereafter would be unlawful, for they would occur without his sanction as governor.⁴⁴ That day Pierre either paid his last bribe to lure away more of Aury's men or else gave a party when the commodore announced his decision to leave. Pierre bought from Champlin a "pipe" of white wine, more than one hundred gallons, to fuel the celebration.⁴⁵ Three days later Aury sailed away, hands washed of Texas and Mexico forever, his course set for Florida to seek new fortune.

While Fatio and the Laffites readied their enterprise, a steady parade of privateers sailed in and out of New Orleans. The Hotspur was in the trade, along with the Mexican Congress, the Couleuvre under Deveze, the Marie and the Rover, as well as the Alonzo,⁴⁶ Some of the goods being brought into New Orleans from Galveston had been shipped from Philadelphia and other eastern ports, intended to secure and enhance Aury's establishment. While Aury was absent convoying Mina and foundering at Matagorda, however, the shippers found no one at Galveston to take possession or pay, and so brought tons of cargo into New Orleans. Sugar, liquors, beef, pork, musket and cannon shot, as well as tar, turpentine, pitch and resin, varnish, and 11,500 board feet of lumber—the necessaries for building a village—came in aboard the Alonzo.⁴⁷

The volume of the traffic left the customs people asking Washington for instructions on how to deal with the vessels plying the Galveston trade, especially when known former offenders were taking an interest. The collector of customs in the Bayou Teche district had an inkling that "one Dominique a Frenchman that was in Prison in New Orleans in the winter 1814 & 15 for smuggling" was trying to outfit another ship, and asked if "he has not forfeited the Privilege of owning or commanding vessels under the Revenue Law."⁴⁸ The new and sudden challenge to the slave trade ban posed by Galveston also raised questions. Beverly Chew learned of the large collection of slaves at Galveston and suspected that the Laffites would soon establish a slave mart somewhere on the west bank of the Sabine, just outside American authority. Early in June there were reports of a number of Louisiana planters on their way to Galveston to buy slaves, and later in the month, as Pierre was beginning his espionage work on the island, the navy dispatched the USS Boxer to the mouth of the Sabine to try to intercept the buyers when they came back with their illicit purchases. Officials frankly confessed little optimism about success.⁴⁹

In fact, the legitimate slave market in New Orleans was glutted at the moment, with as many as 650 slaves available in July, and Champlin would sell his cargo to a middleman at very advantageous rates. That summer Pierre charged seventeen blacks to the brothers' account with Champlin and Adams for $4,500, less than half what he could expect to realize from Louisiana planters even in a temporarily glutted market. ⁵⁰ Champlin had more Africans left, and sailed for the Louisiana coast. He anchored on the coast off St. Mary's Parish late in July, probably off Belle Isle, intending to run his slaves up the Atchafalaya to Bayou Teche. Instead, as his pirogue or launch made for shore, it swamped in the surf, and Champlin drowned.⁵¹ Within days of his death Chew in New Orleans knew that Champlin had been selling slaves to the Laffites, Sauvinet, and others, but doubted that his revenue officers could either find or stop them. Chew was exasperated.

By the end of August, however, he had depositions from Ducoing and Garros to add to Espagnol's in supporting his denunciation of the Aury-Laffite government to the secretary of the treasury. He also, thanks to Espagnol, had a copy of the articles drawn up in Galveston on April 15. He had been for some time sending lists of offending vessels to Dick for seizure and legal action, and the revenue officers were doing their job even though the court often failed them. Chew believed that "these steps of the Officers of the port have irritated the Barratarian Gent, and their connexions in a high degree."

Now when Chew learned of men heading for the Sabine with money to buy slaves, he sent a party to arrest them, intending to attack the receiving end of the trade if he could not get at Galveston. But he wanted the navy to stop a reestablishment at Galveston, "otherwise the Bay will no longer be safe for any flag." Currently armed vessels came into and left the lower Mississippi as they pleased, and some armed boats committed robberies in sight of Fort St. Philip. He counted eleven private armed vessels under either Mexican or Venezuelan colors in port just on August 30 alone. He needed more revenue officers and ships, and more inspectors all along the coast. In Washington, Secretary Crawford was amazed by Chew's complaint. He was sure the navy had more than sufficient muscle to put down the pirates without the revenue service needing to build a virtual navy of its own for the task. "I cannot conceive why they are not employed in destroying the Pirates in that section of the Union," Crawford wondered of the navy. ⁵²

While complimenting Chew for his dedication to duty, Crawford told him that additional naval patrols ought to be sufficient to curtail the illicit slave traffic.⁵³ To that end, Washington authorized Patterson to borrow money from the United States branch bank to add another vessel or two to patrol the coast.⁵⁴ It was a faint response, and failed to address the new inland avenue of slave distribution.

Onís continued his campaign to gain the cooperation of authorities in Washington. Everyone was sympathetic. No one did anything.⁵⁵ In fact, the privateers had become so impudent that they had an attorney preparing a memorandum to complain to the United States Treasury about the revenue officers and to ask Washington to permit the privateers to import their booty on the grounds that they made large cash outlays to acquire it.⁵⁶

At least Chew was not the only man in New Orleans with problems at the moment. On July 7 the district court indicted Jean Laffite, Lafon, and Duparc for failure to pay import duty in the matter of the pivot guns. Duparc claimed to be their legal owner and denied any intent to evade customs, but the court required the three to post a bond of $2,225, the goods' appraised value. The court also seized the pivots and ordered Jean and the others to appear before the bench on July 19 to show cause why the pivots should not be condemned. On August 5 Jean and Lafon presented themselves at the customshouse to give their notes as sureties for Duparc, and there the matter rested. In fact, it would not come to a final settlement until 1826, after all three were dead, when the court went after Lafon's estate to collect the unpaid sureties and nine years' worth of 6 percent interest. ⁵⁷

Money remained a prime concern for Jean as he prepared to relieve the pressure on Pierre. Late in July he acted as agent in yet another slave sale for one of his Arkansas acquaintances, but within days thereafter he was on his way to Galveston.⁵⁸ By that time Pierre's situation was critical. On August 16, almost four weeks after sending his letter to Jean, he expected that the Independence should have returned with provisions. Now his supplies were exhausted, and he was forced to buy goods from incoming privateers at high rates, and on the brothers' credit. He had to borrow money from one man passing through in order to pay cash for some necessaries. Meanwhile his health and the scabies-like itch had not improved either. He needed Jean's help, and soon. Unless resupplied, he could be forced to abandon the port.⁵⁹

Fortunately Fatio gave Jean another $1,400 on August 14, which Jean immediately began spending on provisions.⁶⁰ Fatio's payment was especially welcome because Champlin's assets had been frozen pending the settlement of his estate, and now Jean could not charge goods despite a credit balance with Champlin and Adams of $2,879.56. Jean made no attempt to conceal his activity. Chew remarked at the end of the month that "Lafitte is now purchasing a large quantity of provisions, and the first cargo will soon sail."⁶¹

However, Jean kept encountering delays. Fatio would not re-lease enough money, then by late August protested that the bad weather season was upon them and the warships could not risk the voyage. Meanwhile Cienfuegos had decided that the time was not right and wanted to know more details of the plan. The Spanish fleet was simply too small and too overtaxed to take the kind of risk Jean was proposing. Fatio and Laffite met frequently, and finally Fatio agreed to authorize purchase of enough provisions and materials to hold Galveston while they awaited a more definitive decision from Havana. ⁶² Fatio gave Laffite $2,658 during the last week of August and the first week of September, and Jean ran up debts to the sum of $14,465, half of which was the cost of the two supply ships purchased for the venture. He told Fatio that he had to take out a mortgage on the house at Bourbon and St. Philip to raise another $2,800 on his own, and incurred considerable debt on the brothers' credit with the expectation of reimbursement, which may have been true or may have been a typical Laffite untruth to impress Fatio with the urgency of the situation and Jean's commitment to the cause.⁶³

By late August Pierre could hold out no longer. He left Galveston, arriving in New Orleans on or before September 1. No doubt the brothers conferred, and with Fatio, who told Pierre of Cienfuegos's desire for more information. Frustrated but resigned, Pierre dispatched a report to the captain general that did not skimp in deploring the lost opportunities, nor in blaming sloth and carelessness. Fortunately Pierre still had a spy inside Aury's command keeping him informed of the commodore's plans for Florida. Now, however, they must adjust their schemes yet again.

Pierre proposed that he and Jean reestablish Galveston, capitalizing on the trust they enjoyed from corsair captains across the Gulf and those working for the insurgencies at Buenos Aires and elsewhere. He believed the brothers could be fully in control by the spring of 1818, with a well-established base that would attract others until virtually the whole of the corsairing fleet of the Gulf would be there, ripe for the taking.

But Pierre must be able to get the word to the corsairs at sea quickly, as soon as they finished "weaving our web," if they were to get the captains lined up. "Some funds are necessary," he emphasized, but Spain would profit manyfold for its investment. If Cienfuegos did not want Galveston reestablished as a port, he should say so now, in which case the brothers would take their own measures in dealing with corsairs and prizes that fell into their hands. He and Jean had a number of men in New Orleans ready to work for them, some of whom had been their followers in 1814 when they rejected the British offer. Pierre could not help but refer to that as "a period that, without flattering ourselves, brings us honor, by virtue of our conduct and repulses of the brilliant propositions that they made to us to help them in the conquest." Cienfuegos already knew of the Laffites' aid to the Americans, but Pierre pointed it out now as an example of the fact that "there is no one in the world that can make us break our word."

The Laffites were about to send the Carmelita loaded with provisions and other goods to reestablish Galveston, and they had a brig that would be very useful in transporting more men and matériel. Thus far their expenditures more than doubled what Fatio had paid them, however, and he was doling out smaller and more infrequent amounts. They had bought much of the goods on two months' credit, and sold the brig leased from Champlin for $13,000. Pierre appealed to Cienfuegos to trust their sincerity and provide the money they needed. Even after the lost opportunities to date, if only they had sufficient money they could "execute the most beautiful political and military operation that has been conceived until now, since discovery of the Antilles." The "associates," unaware of Mina's whereabouts or plight, were still hoping to hear from him, and Laffite warned that if they got reinforcements to him, Mexico could be in real danger. A secure Galveston could help deter that, of course. "When we see ourselves in a position to give this great stroke," Pierre boasted, they would be able to hand over Humbert, Gutiérrez, Mina, and the rest to Spanish justice. However, Pierre advised the captain general that if the Laffites delivered the leaders to Cienfuegos, it must be on the understanding that they were not to be executed. Otherwise, he said, "no one in the world would be able to bring us to serve the cause of kings." Meanwhile, fearing Aury would return to Galveston if he learned of the Laffite plan, Pierre urged Cienfuegos to neutralize him at Amelia Island. Pierre confessed more personal fears, too, for he believed the longer they delayed, the more inevitable it became that the Numbers 13 would be discovered. The insurgents' followers would surely kill them if they were found out, he argued. ⁶⁴

The Carmelita, captained by Lafon, sailed on September 1, with Jean Laffite aboard.⁶⁵ When she reached Galveston a few days later, the community had been deserted. Another vessel loaded with provisions and building materials, Laporte's Franklin, stayed at anchor for a time, then returned to New Orleans early in October.⁶⁶ Lafon remained at anchor off Galveston, however.⁶⁷ Jean Laffite had brought with him about forty of the old Baratarians, "to consolidate his force and maintain himself master of that place," said Fatio. Number 13-2/720 would turn the island over to Cienfuegos whenever he wanted it, but Pierre advised that they wait until the new plan was well in effect in order that "the harvest will be complete." Fatio felt some unease. He knew the brothers resented not having been paid for their expenses, let alone a profit. Fatio believed they acted in good faith, but he did not delude himself. The Laffites enjoyed enormous authority in the privateering and insurgent community. "The knowledge they possess makes them capable of performing everything they have offered," he told Cienfuegos a few days after Jean departed, but "as enemies they would be most dangerous."⁶⁸ He could not pay what the brothers demanded, yet feared putting Pierre off too long could be dangerous. Spain was stringing them along, but it should not cut them loose just yet. Should they feel insulted or abandoned, they could easily make their Spanish associates the first victims of their wrath. Pierre's offer to go to Cuba with his family to meet with authorities, and even to be held as hostage for the brothers' redeeming their promises, did not allay a hint of suspicion.⁶⁹ Fatio would be vigilant.⁷⁰ Chew, too, knew of Jean's arrival at Galveston, and of his plans to start the community anew. Both Chew and Fatio would be watching.⁷¹