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SELLING OUT AN ALLY
By Bill Fawcett
The consequence of not being a dependable ally can be the war you do not want.
World War I traumatized all of Europe and many of its leaders. The result was the leadership of France and England making a mistake that should stand as a lesson to all leaders who are dealing with politically strong thugs. The name of this mistake is the Munich Agreement. It was nothing less than the complete betrayal of an allied democracy. This did not happen overnight, but was the result of a steady progression of concessions, under pressure from Hitler.
It began after the Anschluss, in March 1938, when Austria was basically blackmailed into uniting with Nazi Germany. Hitler knew that many in Germany and in the German army did not yet support him. He looked to further enhance the Reich and discourage what internal opposition remained. The next large German-speaking population not under his control was in Czechoslovakia. Half or more of the residents of a region known as the Sudetenland spoke German. By May of 1938, the Western Allies were aware that Hitler had plans to ocupy all of Czechoslovakia. Since that nation had a mutual defense treaty with France, England, and Russia, the Czechs resisted all of Hitler’s threats.
Hitler continued to press. He made a series of speeches designed to inflame the German population and German-speaking Czechs. All this was covered in the world’s press, and citizens everywhere began to prepare for another war, which neither Britain nor France wanted. In September, British prime minister Neville Chamberlain offered to meet Hitler at Berchtesgaden, his mountain retreat in the German Alps. Hitler agreed to hold off on any action until they met. This alone raised his status and quieted those members of the general staff who were still doubting him. At that meeting, it was agreed by Chamberlain that a vote would be taken in the German-speaking regions of Czechoslovakia regarding what country they wished to be part of. Since the referendum was being held only in the area where there was a German-speaking majority, and under pressure from the Nazis, the result was a given.
Yet even before the vote was taken, French foreign minister Georges Bonnet met with Chamberlain in London and proposed that all the parts of Czechoslovakia with a majority of German speakers, including the Sudetenland, just be given to Germany without a vote. The Czech government was not even invited to the meeting and, at first, resisted. Only when both Britain and France warned that they would not militarily support them against a German invasion did the Czechs accept.
Chamberlain then flew to Germany to meet Hitler again. This time, in the manner of all bullies, the Führer demanded not only that he get the regions, but that all non-Germans had to evacuate within a matter of days. The Czechs could not cooperate. France even began to mobilize its reserves. War seemed imminent. The French and British public saw their nations returning to the loss and deprivation that they faced in WWI. Sentiment against a new war was overwhelming.
Chamberlain arranged a four-sided meeting in Munich that included Hitler, himself, French prime minister Daladier, and Benito Mussolini. There they agreed to allow Hitler to annex the Czech territory at a slower pace. Not too strangely, the Russians remained passive and took no part in any of this. They signed a nonaggression pact with Hitler the following August. Chamberlain passed this new Munich Agreement on to the Czech leaders, who had not been at any of the meetings, but had no choice but to accept.
When Chamberlain returned to London, he was cheered by crowds happy that the war, which had seemed inevitable, had been avoided. In his now infamous speech, Chamberlain announced that this was “peace with honour. I believe it is peace for our time.” The following March, Hitler invaded what remained of Czechoslovakia and, again, France and Britain did nothing. That September, Germany invaded Poland and the Allies finally had to act. When Chamberlain announced the Munich Agreement, his chief political opponent, Winston Churchill, reacted by saying to him, “You were given the choice between war and dishonour. You chose dishonour and you will have war.” Churchill was shown to be correct within months—and WWII began.
After he’d sold out Austria and betrayed Czechoslovakia in the name of peace, Chamberlain’s concession to Hitler reinforced the Führer’s control of Germany and guaranteed an eventual war. Had he resisted, records now show that the Wehrmacht was prepared to withdraw from Czechoslovakia at the first sign of a French or British reaction. If the Allies had shown courage, Hitler, whose army was even less ready for a major war than France’s, would have had to retreat. The Munich Agreement, instead, raised Germany’s support and outright adoration of Adolf Hitler so high that any resistance to his wishes was impossible. If Chamberlain and Daladier had shown courage, WWII might not have happened. At a minimum, it would have been delayed and the Allies would have had time to modernize their armies—something France had just begun doing when the Sitzkrieg ended in the Blitzkrieg and the occupation of France. Hitler would have lost his total control over the general staff and there might have been no invasion of Poland. All history from then on would be different. There would likely have been no Total Solution, no Blitzkrieg of a better-prepared France, and no Barbarossa.
The lesson of the Munich Agreement should be clear. But how often have leaders with the best intentions (recently) conceded too much to thuggish enemies for the temporary illusion of “peace in our time”?