CHENEY’S PLANE, a comfortable modern jetliner very like the Vice President’s Air Force Two, had left Andrews Air Force Base about 2:30 p.m that Sunday. Accompanying Cheney were General Schwarzkopf, who had made his fourth trip to Washington from Florida in five days; Bob Gates of the NSC; Paul Wolfowitz, the undersecretary for policy; Pete Williams; Charles W. Freeman, Jr., the U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, a career foreign service officer who spoke Arabic; and a CIA expert from the National Photographic Interpretation Center with the latest top-secret satellite photographs.
The CIA man was so concerned about security he acted as if he’d surgically bonded the pouch of photos to his knees.
Cheney said he wanted to walk through a practice run of their presentation to King Fahd. He would open with general remarks, then the CIA man would brief the king on how Iraq had accomplished the invasion and on the Iraqi capabilities assembled near the Saudi border. Schwarzkopf would give his presentation on what the United States could do to help to deter and defend, and he himself would close with a summary.
Cheney said he planned to say the following: The United States has a longstanding relationship with Your Majesty and the Saudi Kingdom. We will only come in if you want us. We will only come in for as long as you want us. We are not coming to establish a permanent military presence. But we will stay as long as we can do the job. This will not be a weak or partial presence. It will reflect the President’s commitment to the full defense of your country. We won’t pull and run on you.
The CIA man brought out a dozen photos and began a technical interpretation. They showed rows of hundreds of Iraqi tanks dug into the desert, with sand embankments on the front and two sides of each tank. Stabilizing and camouflaging the tanks in this way is a standard defensive tactic. But they could back out and move forward in a short time if the Iraqis decided to mount a quick offensive. There were roughly 70,000 Iraqi troops near or advancing on the Saudi border. The photos also showed seven ground-to-ground SCUD missile launchers outside Kuwait City, aimed south at Saudi Arabia.
Cheney realized the agency man’s presentation was not going to set the world on fire. Act One of the New World Order shouldn’t begin with a technician demonstrating his prowess at reading the tea leaves from overhead photography. Photo interpretation is an obscure subject, and not terribly convincing. Only the experts can tell what the blobs, dots and shadows mean. It was not a presentation that would impress King Fahd.
Scrub the CIA briefing, Cheney said. Schwarzkopf and he would incorporate the information in their own remarks.
As for Schwarzkopf, he had a three-inch-thick, blue vinyl three-ring binder marked “Top Secret” that contained Operations Plan 90–1002. When the general opened it, Cheney went to his own compartment. He already knew the plan.
The day the President pushes the button, executing the plan, Schwarzkopf said, this is what happens. On Day 1, C-Day, the F-15s would be sent. Then in daily increments the various land, sea and air forces would be alerted and deployed. It would take 17 weeks to implement the plan, though it could be stopped at any point. “One of the lessons of Panama was send a big force and get it done quickly,” Schwarzkopf said. Because of the distance to the Middle East and the size of the force that was called for, it would take a full 120 days.
There was no discussion of alternatives. None were presented. Williams observed that once Schwarzkopf opened that little blue binder, they all just marched right through it. The White House called to report that Bush had made a public statement and wanted Cheney to have a transcript. Williams took it down and then read it to Cheney. It was the President’s “This-will-not stand” remark, his pledge to reverse the invasion.
Well and good, Cheney thought, but he didn’t have any forces on the ground to stop Saddam from going into Saudi Arabia, let alone reverse the accomplished invasion. The American shirt tail was flapping and Cheney wanted to focus on the problem at hand—defending Saudi Arabia. “Thanks for the information,” he said matter-of-factly. “It’s good to know that.”
The Secretary wanted to refine his presentation. He invited Gates, Wolfowitz and Ambassador Freeman in to his compartment individually and as a group. Each stressed that Cheney was swimming against a strong current. It was unheard of for the Saudis to ask the United States for forces. Wolfowitz said that Cheney would be asking the Saudis to confront a decision they had spent their lifetimes shying away from. It would be a radical departure to accept forces of any size.
Freeman said Fahd was a master of indecision. The Saudis could spend days and weeks arguing among themselves. Royal family deliberations could make the American Congress seem fast.
They also told Cheney that the biggest worry might be that the Saudis would agree to accept an American deployment but insist on an upper ceiling or cap of so many troops, perhaps much lower than the 250,000 called for in the Operations Plan.
Cheney said that he was going to push to get the deployment started and then deal later with any limits the Saudis might try to impose. During the Iran-Iraq War, the United States had frightened the Saudis with CIA intelligence reports alleging that Iran was coming across the narrow Persian Gulf to attack them. The Reagan administration had formally requested permission to deploy U.S. Air Force fighters to stop these expected attacks. The Saudis had refused. The attacks never materialized, and the Saudis concluded that the United States used intelligence for its own political and strategic purposes, this time to attempt to get Gulf basing for U.S. forces.
After he’d listened to all the advice, Cheney said that they had to be careful. We don’t know Saddam is going to invade Saudi Arabia, he said, so let’s not go in there and suggest it is inevitable, or that we have inside knowledge. He wanted a hard sell on the capability of the U.S. force that could be sent, and on the political commitment from the President. He wanted a soft sell on the intelligence. The Kuwait invasion spoke loudest about Saddam’s willingness to overrun his Arab neighbors.
• • •
After a 16-hour flight, at about 1 p.m. Saudi time on Monday, August 6, the Americans arrived in Jiddah. They were taken to very elaborate quarters. Their meeting with the king had been scheduled for two hours later, but word came that His Majesty, a night person, preferred to delay it six to eight hours. Unbeknownst to Cheney, Fahd was checking with Muslim religious leaders to see if they would tolerate a U.S. deployment.
The journey to Saudi Arabia, equivalent to two back-to-back transatlantic crossings, had taken a major whack out of Cheney. He seized on the down time to take a nap.
• • •
Fahd ibn Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia and Custodian of the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina was his preferred title. Fahd’s realm was very secretive and conservative, consisting of an area one quarter the size of the United States with only 14 million people. The king had been a playboy in his youth. CIA reports said Fahd used to take teenage girls for lovemaking sprees on his Boeing 747 jet. But the king had finally settled down. He basically had run the kingdom as crown prince in the late 1970s before succeeding to the throne in 1982.
That evening, Cheney, Gates, Schwarzkopf, Wolfowitz and Ambassador Freeman were conducted to the royal family’s private council room in the summer palace. Fahd and half a dozen key members of his government and the royal family, including the foreign minister and the deputy defense minister, were there. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah was off to one side.
Prince Bandar was going to do the translation for both sides.
Cheney expected that at the end of the presentation, the king would say: thank you very much, we’ll get back to you. He would then send Cheney off to sit and wait while the Saudis made up their minds.
The meeting began with small talk about Fahd’s long relationship with Bush. When Bush had been CIA director in 1976, Fahd, who’d run Saudi intelligence for 13 years as interior minister, was overseeing Saudi foreign policy as crown prince.
Ordinarily at these royal meetings, the king would open with a lengthy statement. This evening he turned to Cheney rather quickly.
The Secretary began by reminding his hosts that the United States had come to the assistance of Saudi Arabia in 1962 against Yemen and Egypt. He cited the protection of oil tanker shipments in the Gulf in 1987–88 as another example of the United States backing its allies in the region. “It’s not a commitment that we take lightly,” Cheney said. “Saudi Arabia faces what may be the greatest threat in its history.”
After a pause, he continued, “The President sent me out here to reaffirm what he told you on the phone. He stands personally behind the American security guarantee. . . . Saddam Hussein has used lies, deceit and naked aggression to already change the balance of power. He will only become more dangerous if he goes unchallenged. . . . The President’s engaged in active diplomacy. He’s contacted all the major arms suppliers” used by Iraq.
France, the Soviet Union and China had all agreed to take action, Cheney said. Secretary of State Baker was going to Moscow, where a joint statement would be issued; President Bush had spoken personally with the leaders of Great Britain, France, Germany, Turkey, Japan and Italy.
“If this is not countered, there will be grave consequences for Saudi Arabia, and serious consequences for the United States,” Cheney said. He had carefully selected his adjectives—“grave” for the Saudis and “serious” for the United States—to indicate it was Saudi Arabia that had its ass on the line.
“We all have to cooperate to see that this man does not succeed,” Cheney said. He proposed a two-part strategy: first, cooperation to defend Saudi Arabia against a future attack; second, the strangulation of Iraq. “Economic measures are important, but in future months, as Saddam Hussein begins to feel the pressure, he could lash out and attack.” So it was important to carry out both parts of the strategy at once: defense and strangulation.
Cheney then introduced Schwarzkopf. The general showed King Fahd the satellite pictures of Iraqi tanks on the way to the Saudi border. “If you put it all together,” he said, “this is one division of the best forces that Iraq has. Some place between there”—he pointed out the 50 miles—“and Kuwait City, there are two more of these divisions. After having taken Kuwait City, they moved units in to free up these so they could go to the border. But of even more concern, there are three more divisions moved down from the Basra area. We’re watching carefully to monitor what’s going on. There’s a large amount of resupply.”
The pictures clearly explained why Saudi scouts sent into Kuwait had not been able to find the Iraqi forces Bandar had said he’d seen with his own eyes in the initial overheads. The Iraqis, as was their style, were moving their command, control and communications units ahead of the mass of troops. These units were so small, the scouts had missed them.
The pictures also showed the SCUD launchers pointing menacingly south.
Remembering Cheney’s order to use caution, Schwarzkopf said, “We think Saddam Hussein could attack Saudi Arabia in as little as forty-eight hours. We don’t know what he’s going to do.” Schwarzkopf mentioned that the Iraqis had 22 aircraft loaded for combat at one air base, as well as tankers that would give them additional range. “We don’t know what the purpose of that is. It could be just against the U.S. fleet.”
Fahd said he did not see the ambiguity. “They have forces in position that are not needed just for Kuwait,” he said. “Therefore they must have other objectives.” Fahd seemed disgusted. “We used to think Saddam Hussein tells the truth. He told us, he told the U.S., he told Mubarak he wouldn’t attack Kuwait, but the opposite happened. So we know his bad intentions are there. As long as the right preparations for the right response at the right time are done, that is the best way to roll back these Iraqi actions. And I am grateful this is being done.”
The pause for translation was making it easy for the notetakers to record the meeting, but the exact meaning of the king’s last statement was not clear. It seemed that Fahd was moving in the direction Cheney wanted to take him.
“It’s right,” Cheney said, “that we can’t read Saddam Hussein’s intentions. He can move faster to attack than we can to defend. In the case of Kuwait, we watched the forces build up and the emir waited until he was attacked before he asked for any help. If you wait for unambiguous warning, it will be too late for us to help you. We have to come much further to defend than he to attack.
“We do not want to start a war any more than anyone else, but [we] believe that preparations are the best way to prevent a war. If a war should come, we would stand with you in defense of Saudi sovereignty and take the war to the enemy.”
Cheney also said, “The President asked me to assure you that we will stay as long as you want us. We will leave when you no longer need us. We will stay until justice is done but not stay a minute longer. We are not seeking bases but you are a long way away. We need to make joint preparations now.”
Schwarzkopf described Saddam’s forces. They’re not ten feet tall, he said again, but they are a very tough opponent. The Iraqis are not good in the offensive role, he said. Their chief weakness is a very centralized command system; the officers at all levels wait for the next order. “In the military, we say, ‘If you cut off the head, the body won’t function.’ ”
The U.S. naval forces already in the Gulf area were on heightened alert and it was Schwarzkopf’s opinion that that was probably the reason Iraq had its planes on alert. The aircraft carrier U.S.S. Independence and another half dozen ships were being brought into the region.
Bringing U.S. forces would entail a 7,000-mile journey for those coming by air, and 12,000 miles by sea. Fighter air squadrons would come first, followed by light ground troops. Schwarzkopf then went through a week-by-week description of the buildup. By week 17, it would be a very large force—many Air Force planes, Navy ships, two tank divisions and two other divisions.
“What’s the size of a division?” Crown Prince Abdullah asked.
Schwarzkopf said 18,000. No one asked for the total number of troops and personnel, so Schwarzkopf did not have to give the 250,000 figure. He did say he was convinced that after the 17 weeks, the force could defeat anything that came against it.
“After 120 days, we could build up a force that, together with Saudi forces, could kick them into the sea or anywhere else you want to.” Schwarzkopf did not offer the 8–12-month estimate for a full offensive option he’d given to Bush only two days earlier.
Abdullah then asked a couple of questions about the maps, trying to distinguish between actual and hypothetical Iraqi troop placements.
“The President asked me to emphasize four things,” Cheney said. “The United States is prepared to commit a force to defend Saudi Arabia that can do the job. Though Saddam Hussein possesses a large army and enormous military might, the United States can put in enough force so that Saddam Hussein will be deterred. Should deterrence fail, our forces together will suffice to defeat him.
“The second point the President asked me to repeat: to be successful, we have to have forces in place. We can’t wait until Iraqi forces cross the border. Time is of the essence.
“Third point: After the danger is over, our forces will go home.”
Under his breath in Arabic, Abdullah interjected, “I would hope so.” Bandar did not translate this.
“Because of our cooperation,” Cheney continued on the third point, “your forces will be better able to defend your country after we leave. And we will be able to return more quickly if we’re needed.”
Fahd said, yes, almost like a joint training exercise when the United States leaves equipment behind—a standard U.S. practice.
Schwarzkopf joked, “I think I might want to think about that a little bit.”
Fahd seemed to be looking for a long-run, concrete benefit from such a deployment.
Cheney picked up on it. “Our position would be much easier now if there were equipment in place.” He continued with his presidential message. “Fourth, it will be far more dangerous if we wait. If we fail to deal with Saddam Hussein now, he will only grow stronger and more threatening. I’d like to receive your approval to proceed with introducing U.S. forces. We want to work with you so that this can be an international force, including forces of regional countries, but urge you not to wait for this to be organized before you agree to the deployment of U.S. forces.”
“Our cooperation with the United States is not out of the desire to attack others or to be aggressors,” Fahd said, adding that the basis was the threat to Saudi Arabia and mutual interests. As if thinking aloud, the king continued: “We did not create the problem. The problem was created for us. One has to ask why Saddam Hussein creates these forces.” Fahd noted that Saddam spent all this money on armaments, instead of things that are for the good of his people. “No one is seeking to create a problem for him. . . . This shows how shallow he is. Why should he attack Kuwait—it’s a small country—and create oppression?
“It’s not just his aggression against Kuwait but [he] aspires to something larger. . . . Because he’s egotistical, he thinks he really knows it all. [He] makes the big mistake if he really believes that, and I think he does.
“If we do anything with our American friends, we do it only in self-defense, not as aggressors—shows how deep the relationship is between our two countries. That in itself shows these two countries consider each other’s interest and security.
“We do not do it for aggressive purposes. People all over the world are saying, what will the United States do for Saudi Arabia? I am very pleased what I heard just now. We have to work to implement the arrangements to achieve that.” Fahd then turned to his entourage and asked, “Does anybody have any comments?”
A lively exchange in Arabic ensued between the king and Crown Prince Abdullah. Bandar did not translate. On the U.S. side, only Ambassador Freeman understood what was said.
“We have to do this,” Fahd said. “The Kuwaitis waited, they waited too long and now there no longer is a Kuwait.”
“Oh yes there is,” Abdullah shot back, “there is still a Kuwait.”
“Yes,” Fahd replied, “and all the Kuwaitis are living in our hotel rooms.”
After this, the king turned to Cheney. Bandar resumed translation. “Mr. Secretary, we approve of the principle. Let’s believe in God and do what has to be done. We will proceed with the details.
“I don’t care what other people say,” the king added. “The most important thing is to proceed to protect our country together with the Americans, also bringing some people from other Arab countries who are our friends.”
“I think that would be excellent,” Cheney said.
“Very good,” Fahd said. “Some of them have said in the past they’re ready and willing. Some of them are countries that are friendly to you and us, like Egypt and Morocco.”
“I’m very pleased with your approval of our plan,” Cheney said.
The king said they didn’t have the luxury of time; they faced immediate dangers. What needs to be done quickly must be done at once, he said.
Cheney was pleasantly surprised. He had been worried that an international force including other Arab nations might be so important to the Saudis that they would insist it be put together before anything else.
“The United States has no ulterior motive,” Fahd said. “We have taken this country from bushes and stones and built it to a nation that is equal to few in the world. We’ve invested billions of dollars to build this nation. It looks like we’ve been at it for hundreds of years but actually only for a very few. I wish you would have time to see for yourself how we have built things in the middle of nowhere. You could see where the billions of dollars of oil income go. It doesn’t bother me what other media may say. People who see the facts honestly will acknowledge what we have accomplished. What matters to me is what the people of Saudi Arabia think. And as long as they live a decent standard of living, it doesn’t bother me what people may say about me.”
The Custodian of Mecca and Medina continued with the history, the sort of speech that normally would have been expected at the beginning of the meeting. “Twenty-two years ago, where you sit was formed a desert. I was the minister of education. We had no more than 33,000 students, five high schools. Now, in a short time, we have seven universities and 37 junior colleges. [We] have gone from 33,000 to 2.7 million students. . . . Who would have believed? From nothing to 2,200 factories.”
Why such success, the king asked. Because, he answered, they always went into joint ventures with people and countries who knew what they were doing. “We’re not afraid to learn from people who are better than we are. The Saudi people have no complexes. We want to cooperate with other people.” He offered to send Cheney some videos describing this transformation and he also encouraged Cheney to return and see for himself.
Fahd said he laughed at reports that most of the Saudi oil income went to the royal family. “Read in one place that I have an income of $40 billion a year. The whole income of the country is only $40 billion. Many preposterous things are said, but I don’t care what’s said outside. What I care about is the welfare and well-being of the Saudi people.”
In a direct shot at King Hussein of Jordan, who traced his own ancestry directly to the Prophet Mohammed, Fahd said, “We do not claim that our ancestors are holy. We’re just one family of the Saudi people.
“We believe strongly in our God. We believe he knows the truth and that he will guide us.
“In closing, I want to thank the President, the Vice President, his administration, both houses of Congress, you personally. You’ve come here with one objective, which is to help Saudi Arabia. [I] hope that these problems in our part of the world can subside and I still owe you a visit to the United States and I am holding to it.”
Cheney said that President Bush was eager for the king to visit. “This has been a truly historic meeting,” Cheney added.
“No doubt it is,” Fahd replied.
The Secretary said he would be going back to Washington right away to brief the President on this conversation. “General Schwarzkopf will work with your officials to work out the details. We will leave a team behind.”
“It’s good to leave a team. The quicker the work gets done, the better. The less we give to the media, the better.”
“I will give word to the President,” Cheney said. “He will start moving forces right away.”
Back in his room, Cheney told his aides, “They’ve invited us in.” He phoned the President, who took the call in the Oval Office where he was meeting again with Prime Minister Thatcher.
King Fahd has approved the deployment, Cheney said.
Bush sounded quite happy.
Cheney said he was formally asking the President’s approval to begin moving the forces.
“You got it. Go,” Bush said.
• • •
Cheney called Powell to tell him that they were authorized to start the deployment.
Powell was surprised to hear the Saudis had agreed.
General Kelly and his operations staff had spent much of the weekend in the building—first working to prepare for a deployment, and then waiting. Kelly had been told that there was movement at the political level but it hadn’t quite been settled. About 4 p.m., the mission came. They were ordered “to defend against an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia and be prepared to conduct other operations as directed.” The immediate order was to execute Operations Plan 90–1002.
The first unit sent would be 48 advanced F-15 jets from the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. The Division Ready Brigade of 2,300 men from the 82nd Airborne Division—the troops in the highest state of readiness—would be next.
The initial planes and troops could not arrive until the morning after next, Wednesday, August 8.
Powell was concerned. The Division Ready Brigade was an extremely light force. In the eyes of some military experts, it was little more than a massive airport security detail. The brigade, the 48 jet fighters, the naval airpower in the region and the small Saudi Army were no match for Saddam’s six divisions. It was naked vulnerability, prime time for Saddam to strike.
• • •
Cheney was aware that Powell believed Saddam did not want to go to war with the United States, that way down deep, Saddam would be frightened, that he had a healthy respect for U.S. military capability and would conclude that a war would be suicidal. But Cheney disagreed. Perhaps, he thought, Saddam had a very different concept of what could constitute victory. Just standing up to the United States or inflicting a bloody nose on Uncle Sam might be a significant political gain for Saddam. Perhaps even worth the price that would be paid in a war.
Saddam was not suicidal, Cheney thought, but some degree of conflict with the United States might not necessarily be a bad thing for him. He thought Saddam’s position might resemble Egyptian President Sadat’s in the 1973 war, which had begun when Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel. Sadat didn’t have to beat Israel to “win” that war—all he had to do was get across the Suez Canal and demonstrate he was willing to try to take the Sinai Peninsula back from Israel. Though it was a military defeat for Egypt, Sadat proclaimed victory; he’d made his point and the episode had won him status as an Arab leader. Cheney was sure that fighting was at least a real possibility in the Gulf.
Before leaving Saudi Arabia the next morning, Cheney met with Bandar and his father, Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan, to review the bidding. Bandar already had information from his network. “My friends Kissinger and Crowe are predicting failure,” he said, adding that the Saudis had been up all night discussing the matter.
“Look,” Bandar continued, “there’s no backing away from the decision. It’s a done deal, not just because the king said it.” He suggested they try to conceal it, proposing the two countries “just say it is a joint exercise. Saddam is not crazy. He is foxy and evil. But let’s employ some of his tactics and not advertise what we are doing.” Bandar said he was deeply worried about the first arrivals; they would be so few in number that they could not provide any kind of defense. Could they not hide what they were doing until there were enough troops to defend the kingdom?
Cheney responded that he did not know how this could be done. The President could not mislead the American people, Bandar knew that. This was a big decision for the President and his best opportunity was to lay it out straight. If he did not, the news would leak and he would be demolished. You know the American system, Cheney reminded Bandar. It wouldn’t work.
Bandar said it was just a tactic. “Let’s play dead like a desert animal and then rise up,” he said.
After more discussion, both sides agreed to delay any announcement of a troop deployment until the first troops were actually on the ground in Saudi Arabia—Wednesday morning in the United States, Wednesday afternoon and evening in Saudi Arabia. As Cheney prepared to leave, he was thinking that the agreement might be soft. With Bandar, with the Saudis, you never knew what you had. His worry was compounded when Schwarzkopf contacted the senior general in the Saudi defense ministry to begin coordination of the deployment. The Saudi general wanted to reopen discussions and talk about whether the United States was going to send troops at all.
Schwarzkopf, concerned that the invitation was off, told the general he understood it had been decided and that they were supposed to start deploying immediately. Skeptical, the Saudi said he would check. He did so and came back to Schwarzkopf very surprised. Schwarzkopf was right about the deployment.
Cheney finally departed Saudi Arabia for Cairo, where he was taken by small plane to see President Mubarak in Alexandria. He informed the Egyptian president about the coming U.S. deployment to Saudi Arabia. Would Mubarak please grant permission for the nuclear aircraft carrier U.S.S. Eisenhower to go through the Suez Canal? Mubarak said fine, but when? Tonight, Cheney said. Mubarak agreed. The Egyptian president didn’t agree to send troops, but did later when he spoke to President Bush.
Cheney left Egypt to return to the United States. When he was over Italy, he received a call directly from the President, who was still dialing the world seeking more support and troops.
“Dick,” Bush said, “I just got off the phone with King Hassan of Morocco. I’d like you to stop in and see him.”
Landing charts for Morocco were immediately faxed up to Cheney’s plane.
Since his year as CIA director, Bush had been close to Hassan, who now had ruled Morocco for 29 years. The king owed his longevity on the throne in part to the CIA, which had long provided friendly-head-of-state security assistance and training that helped him stay in power. In return, Hassan allowed U.S. intelligence agencies free run of his strategically located country at the western entrance to the Mediterranean Sea.
At the palace, Cheney saw Hassan first in a group meeting, then privately. Between the two discussions, the king took a call from Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi. All the regional heads of state were talking to each other. When Cheney and the king were alone, Hassan did not reveal what the Libyan leader had said. Cheney told Hassan that the Saudis had agreed to accept a significant number of U.S. troops. The President would welcome Hassan’s support. Hassan said that he was ready to contribute Moroccan troops immediately.
Afterwards, Cheney and Gates went to the U.S. Embassy in Rabat and called Scowcroft on the secure phone to discuss the speech the President was planning to give announcing the decision. Scowcroft was attempting to define precisely the action and the reasoning.
Cheney said King Fahd had asked that President Bush make it clear in any public statements that the Saudis had requested the U.S. presence.
Scowcroft assured him that that point would be included in the speech.
Cheney finally landed in Washington at 6 a.m. on Wednesday, three hours before the President’s speech. A draft had been faxed to him and he had reviewed it. The speech drew on some World War II analogies: Iraq had “stormed in blitzkrieg fashion through Kuwait,” and “Appeasement does not work. As was the case in the 1930s.” The deployment was cast in terms of a principled moral crusade, and the speech explicitly said that the mission was defensive.
• • •
At 9 a.m. on August 8 Bush appeared on national television from the Oval Office, looking tired and drawn.
“In the life of a nation,” he began, “we’re called upon to define who we are and what we believe. Sometimes these choices are not easy. But today as President, I ask for your support in a decision I’ve made to stand up for what’s right and condemn what’s wrong, all in the cause of peace.”
His voice was a bit scratchy and his rhythm off. His facial expression did not seem to match his words of high purpose. Holding to his “this-will-not-stand” position, the President said, “We seek the immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait.”
But he explained that the military would not be used offensively for this purpose. “The mission of our troops is wholly defensive. Hopefully, they will not be needed long. They will not initiate hostilities, but they will defend themselves, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and other friends in the Persian Gulf.”
A nervous smile flashed at several inappropriate moments. Bush stuck his fist in the air when he spoke of “unity of purpose.”
At a noon press conference, the President repeated the point that the military mission was not to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait.
At 1 p.m. Cheney and Powell appeared at a Pentagon press conference.
“I would, at the outset though,” Cheney said in a subdued manner, “emphasize for all of you—especially those of you who remember the Panama operation in December—that this situation is different.” Because it was an ongoing operation, he said he couldn’t answer many questions about what units were going, when they were going and their strength. He outlined his trip to Saudi Arabia in six paragraphs, then turned the conference over to Powell.
Powell made an unusually direct appeal to the media. “I also would ask for some restraint on your part as you find out information,” the Chairman said, “if you would always measure it against the need for operational security to protect our troops. That should be uppermost, I think, in all our minds.”
To a question concerning the vulnerability of the initial troops, Powell stretched the point. “I think they are pretty secure,” he said. He mentioned the airpower from the Independence and Eisenhower battle groups, and the Saudi armed forces with AWACS aircraft and their “top-of-the-line fighters.” The Chairman added, “So I’m reasonably sure that we can get in in good order without presenting any vulnerabilities.”
But privately, Powell was still concerned about the vulnerability of his initial forces. Many in the world, apparently including Saddam, thought somehow that the United States could deploy tens or hundreds of thousands of troops instantaneously. Of course it wasn’t true. Powell didn’t even have the Division Ready Brigade of 2,300 in Saudi Arabia yet. In the first three or four weeks, his troops would be naked and excruciatingly vulnerable. It was a secret that needed to be guarded at almost any cost. Lives depended on it.
• • •
DIA officer Pat Lang was sent out to brief Prince Bandar at his elegant, sprawling residence in Virginia. The former British commandos who acted as Bandar’s personal security guards escorted him into an ornately decorated room where he put up a map of the region. For an hour, Lang went over in detail what had happened during the Kuwait invasion and how Saddam was massing the same elite force of eight divisions on the Saudi border.
He crisply described how nearly 800 T-72 tanks were on the battle line and could move unimpeded into eastern Saudi Arabia and duplicate the Kuwait success. “We are powerless to stop them,” Lang said.
“Oh, God,” Bandar said, “Oh, God. Do they know this?” Does Saddam realize he can overrun Saudi Arabia this easily?
“I think they suspect it,” Lang replied, “but they don’t know it.” He added that reading Saddam’s mind had become the question of the day, and that so far everyone had flunked the test.
• • •
Pete Williams, who had the top security clearances and was as trusted a Cheney aide as any, did not know exactly how many troops were scheduled for deployment. He was hearing from other senior Pentagon civilians and military officers that 100,000 or 150,000 might be the final number, but not the accurate figure of 250,000. Whenever he asked Powell, the Chairman was vague. Powell seemed almost paranoid about the numbers and the locations of the troops.
From the White House, Sununu put out the figure 50,000, which was published Thursday, August 9, and attributed to an unnamed senior administration official.
• • •
When General Vuono saw the low ball figure, he was distressed. The operation, now dubbed Desert Shield, could sour on the question of expectations and credibility. With the White House and political leadership concealing facts and risks, creating false hopes for a small, short-lived operation, he heard echoes of Vietnam. The Army chief recognized that Operations Plan 90–1002 put the military in for the long haul—months and months, if not longer. No one knew how long the deployment might last. If the media and therefore the public didn’t feel they were getting the facts, there was no chance of maintaining public support. Such a massive deployment could not be concealed; orders were going to units in dozens of states. “The big question is the political will question,” Vuono told his staff. A Vuono aide soon leaked the real number of up to 250,000 to the Associated Press, which ran a story.
Vuono also detected an initial complacency in the Army operations staff. He went to see them, reminding the staff that once the Army had a heavy tank division on the ground in Saudi Arabia, they might become involved in high-intensity, central-front warfare—the stuff they had trained for and worried about in Europe for decades.
The Army is going to be tested, he said, adding sternly, “Anticipate, coordinate and verify.”
• • •
On that Thursday, retired Air Force Chief Larry Welch and his wife Eunice were scheduled for a 15-minute farewell courtesy call with Bush, a thank you to Welch for 37 years of service. When they arrived, they were asked if they could stay for lunch with the Bushes. Brent Scowcroft joined the two couples in the residence for lunch.
Barbara Bush and the President both talked at some length about their children and family. Welch noticed that Bush seemed entirely relaxed. He had watched Bush enough to realize that when the President was on the verge of making a decision, he became intense, outspoken, often launched a frenzy of public statements. Once the decision had been made, Bush would pull back and loosen up.
Welch had written part of the initial contingency plan for the Gulf deployment in the early 1980s. He was well aware that the desert would be extremely taxing and that the Saudis would be very restrictive. It would be a Gatorade, not a Budweiser deployment. Welch felt that the risks of failing to defend Saudi Arabia far outweighed the risks of sending the force. But an attempt to push the Iraqis out of Kuwait would be another thing entirely, he felt. It would reduce Kuwait City to the ruins of Beirut. Any effort to restore the status quo would likely fail because the status quo was gone forever.
“You’re doing the right thing, Mr. President,” General Welch said.
Bush didn’t dwell on the Gulf. He preferred to talk about his family. He, Welch and Scowcroft all said they were glad to have an officer as strong as the new Air Force chief, General Michael Dugan, Welch’s successor.
• • •
On Sunday, August 12, Cheney appeared on NBC Television’s “Meet the Press.” “The fact of the matter is that the United States has a significant military force in the area this morning,” the Secretary said without any specifics. “There’s more on the way.”
Pressed for numbers, he replied, “I would not want to put an upper level on that. . . . No one should assume this is easy or is going to be wrapped up very quickly or without a significant U.S. effort.” Of course, he knew the real timelines—17 weeks to defend and perhaps 8 to 12 months for a full offensive capability. But no one was even hinting that the nation had started down that road.
Bush decided he would go to the Pentagon. On Tuesday, August 14, Cheney and Powell held a one-hour rehearsal in the Tank of a briefing for the President. The next day, Wednesday, Bush visited the Tank.
Powell was alarmed about all the troops and military force he was beginning to pour into the Gulf, without any clear notion of where the buildup would end. Where was it all leading? The question had been on the Chairman’s mind since that Sunday afternoon ten days earlier when he’d watched the President get off his helicopter on the White House lawn and state unequivocally, “This will not stand.” It seemed to him like a crucial moment, perhaps a definition of a new mission. If the invasion of Kuwait were going to be reversed, what did that mean in practical military terms? How much force was needed and what kind of action should they be planning for?
It seemed to Powell that the military was rolling down a highway, uncertain which off-ramp it was supposed to take. After the Tank session, Bush, Cheney and Powell went to Cheney’s office.
I want to tell you how the buildup is going, Powell told the President. It was his first chance to talk to Bush since the deployment had been ordered. He showed the President a chart that illustrated graphically, week by week, the U.S. forces going into the Gulf. The chart ended on December 1, the closure point for the mission, when 250,000 troops would be there.
We have our mission to deter and defend, Powell said. There will be no question you can defend Saudi Arabia at the end. We have no other job, Powell said, and this is what the future looks like to December 1, when we will be completed. We’re at risk now, but we are deterring.
“If you want me to do more, the curve goes up. If you want more, I need to know whether it’s two miles or three miles down the road that I get off and exit here.”
At some point Schwarzkopf will report to you, mission accomplished, Powell told Bush. What we need, Mr. President, is for you to tell us before that mission is accomplished what you want us to do next—so if we have things in the military supply pipeline, do we stop the pipeline or keep it going, or whatever?
Powell wasn’t looking for an immediate new mission from the President. He was not pushing for a decision, just inquiring whether they had or were going to get a new military mission. There was no response from Bush, but Powell felt that he had, at least, put the President on notice that a decision would have to be made soon.
Later, Bush spoke to Pentagon employees at the River Entrance overlooking the Potomac. With Cheney and Powell standing behind him, he said:
“Saddam has claimed that this is a holy war of Arab against infidel—this from the man who has used poison gas against the men, women and children of his own country; who invaded Iran in a war that cost the lives of more than half a million Moslems; and who now plunders Kuwait. Atrocities have been committed by Saddam’s soldiers and henchmen. The reports out of Kuwait tell a sordid tale of brutality.”
It was a fiery attack on Saddam. “It is Saddam who lied to his Arab neighbors. It is Saddam who invaded an Arab state. And it is he who now threatens the Arab nation,” Bush said, his voice rising.
Standing near Bush before the crowd, Cheney thought to himself that it was far too personal an attack, harsh and overdone, ratcheting up the rhetoric way too much. The text of the speech had come over from the White House only an hour before and there had been no chance for Cheney or anyone else in the Pentagon to suggest changes.
Cheney later mentioned his concern directly to Scowcroft. Saddam now had roughly 200,000 troops in Kuwait to the 20,000 of the United States—a 10 to 1 advantage. The possibility of a slaughter still could not be ruled out and Cheney did not want some debate-team flourish by the President to provoke Saddam.
Though Bush had gone to Kennebunkport trying to take his summer vacation, Cheney had canceled two weeks of fishing scheduled to begin that day. He did not see how the Secretary of Defense could be ordering hundreds of thousands to the Saudi desert and then go fishing.
At the end of the week, Bush signed a top-secret intelligence “finding,” authorizing CIA covert actions to overthrow Saddam. The CIA was not to violate the ban on involvement in assassination attempts, but rather recruit Iraqi dissidents to remove Saddam from power.
• • •
On Friday, August 17, Cheney left for Saudi Arabia and a four-day swing through other countries in the region. He planned to visit Bahrain, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt to obtain more support. Attempting to duplicate his success with the Saudis, he was seeking landing and staging rights for U.S. forces, particularly Air Force fighters, bombers and cargo planes.
There was one scare when some reports came in that the U.S. Navy had boarded an Iraqi tanker. Cheney was concerned that some Navy officer way down the line was going to start a war. It took half an hour to get through to the Pentagon to learn that the Navy had only fired across the bow of the ship.
Visiting the U.S. units already in Saudi Arabia, Cheney was dramatically reminded of their precarious situation. Everyone seemed consumed with logistics, transportation and just getting settled. The atmosphere was like the first night at camp. Suppose there was a fight before all the U.S. forces got in place? Were they assuming the initial deployment would deter Saddam?
Cheney called Powell on the secure line. Is Schwarzkopf making certain that we are ready for any short-term contingency? he asked. What if Saddam just moves a little further and comes into Saudi Arabia? What if he goes for the oil fields?
Powell agreed they were vulnerable. But if Saddam was going to move into Saudi Arabia, why hadn’t he done it earlier? Powell said each day the United States is better off.
There was another problem on the ground in Saudi Arabia. Too many officers and staff people had been sent in the initial waves, and the commanders were urgently requesting more privates and troops who could fight.
When Cheney returned to Washington, he and Powell flew to Kennebunkport on Wednesday, August 22, to brief the President and discuss the next steps.
It was a bright sunny day at Walker’s Point, a beautiful piece of oceanfront real estate. Cheney and Powell joined Bush, Scowcroft, Sununu, Gates and Larry Eagleburger around a small circular garden table overlooking the craggy Maine coast. Baker was in Wyoming on vacation, attempting to put on an August-as-usual face.
Cheney and Powell sought Bush’s final approval to call up some 50,000 reservists. Certain critical military specialties such as logistics, transportation, medical services, construction and intelligence were concentrated in the Reserves. Frustrated by President Johnson’s refusal to fully mobilize the military in the Vietnam War by calling up the Reserves, the Pentagon had intentionally organized the services so that the specialists that would be required in a large deployment were in the Reserves. This would force a president to use the Reserves for any major military action, making it difficult if not impossible to slide slowly into war without the public’s participation.
Having committed to the large operation in the Gulf, Bush, Powell and Cheney knew the Reserve call-up was inevitable. Bush now authorized it.
The United Nations, which already had approved economic sanctions against Iraq, was now considering a resolution approving a blockade. The immediate question was whether to wait for the U.N., or go ahead unilaterally and board Iraqi ships. The Navy had stopped some Iraqi vessels, but had not yet boarded any.
Cheney could see that it was a huge decision for the President. Bush was clearly eager to assert the right of the United States to act by itself and wanted to demonstrate some muscle. Two days earlier, he had been asked by a reporter whether he was prepared to stop Iraqi tankers. He had replied with one of his dares, “You just watch. You just watch and see.” Nonetheless, Cheney recommended that the President not rush to board ships, but wait for the United Nations.
Powell pointed out that shooting up a ship for a short-term gain would not be worth it. The ship was part of the capillary system of supply and not at the heart of the problem. From Wyoming, Baker had made it clear that was his view also.
Bush was skeptical the U.N. would come through. When he was U.N. ambassador in 1971–72, the Soviets had blocked everything the United States tried to do. But this was a new era. He decided he would wait for a ruling from the U.N. Security Council.
Powell informed the President that, for the first time since the deployment had begun, the situation was not dicey. There were some 35,000 troops in Saudi Arabia or on the way, and another 20,000 U.S. sailors were on ships in the region. General Schwarzkopf, of course, was not satisfied, but Powell never expected a commander to be satisfied. There were now about 200,000 Iraqi troops in Kuwait. The situation was improving each day, though no one would be really comfortable until the tanks of the 24th Mechanized Division were fully in place. Saddam probably would not attack now, Powell said, because he had not taken the chance when he really had the upper hand during the first two weeks, when the U.S. forces had been considerably smaller.
Yet, Powell said, the Iraqi military was still capable of inflicting tremendous damage. He had pulled together lots of intelligence and updated work from the Joint Staff. One big factor was the Iraqi ground-to-ground missile force, including large quantities of the Soviet-supplied SCUD-B, which had been modified to have a range of 615 kilometers. Intelligence was not sure how many the Iraqis had, but the estimates said 800 to 1,000. Chemical weapons could be placed on some of the missiles. The Iraqis didn’t always get the fuel-to-air ratios correct, making missile performance erratic. The performance of the SCUD depended on a number of factors, such as whether the wind was blowing the right way.
Saddam’s forces in Kuwait were digging in. As the United States brought in heavy armored forces, two of the world’s large armies eventually would be facing off. If there was conflict, it would be major land warfare. This was nothing like the liberation of Grenada or Panama.
Bush asked Powell for his view—not just his military advice, Bush added, but on what course of action to take. The President wanted an overall assessment. Powell said they were doing fine defending Saudi Arabia.
By the end of the meeting, Powell saw that Bush was somewhat sobered. Talk of liberating Kuwait was no longer on the front burner.
In the following days, the President toned down his public attacks on Saddam.
On Saturday, August 25, the United Nations Security Council voted to give the navies of the United States and other countries the right to use force to stop trade with Iraq. It was the first time in the U.N.’s 45-year history that individual countries outside an umbrella U.N. command were authorized to enforce an international blockade, an extraordinary diplomatic victory for the administration.
Bush, who had sweated out the U.N. vote, was euphoric.
• • •
At the Joint Staff, General Kelly made an assessment of the situation three weeks after the start of the deployment. First, the Air Force deserved a gold star for its performance in achieving what looked like early air superiority in the region. Kelly’s major concern was what he called “the mind-set of this beast Saddam.” He had reviewed the intelligence reports from the Iran-Iraq War. Though they were not absolutely reliable, they had the grim ring of truth. In addition to the well-publicized reports that Saddam personally had executed senior advisers and ministers who disagreed with him, there was information showing how he treated his senior military commanders. Iraqi Army generals who lost 20 kilometers to the Iranians during the Iran-Iraq War had been executed, according to the intelligence. In the Iraqi Air Force, generals had been executed if they lost a certain number of planes. Consequently, they had made sure the planes weren’t flown much, leaving Iraq with mostly inexperienced and untrained pilots.
But given his mind-set, Saddam might well use his chemical weapons, and there was some intelligence that he could soon have biological weapons as well. The biggest problem, Kelly concluded, was that Saddam, his military and the Iraqi people were used to doing without, used to the pain and suffering and deprivation of an eight-year war. In fact, Kelly felt Iraq could last longer at these things than the United States.
• • •
A delegation of 16 senators, ten aides and eight military escorts left for Saudi Arabia on August 31 aboard a C-137 jet. The next day their first briefing was given by General Schwarzkopf at his temporary headquarters in Dhahran. The general put a map on the wall. He said, here are the Army units, the Marines, the Navy ships, the Air Force, the Saudi forces and the Iraqis. There was no discussion of contingency plans or options.
Later, one of the senior U.S. generals commanding troops in the Gulf told some of the senators very privately that the U.S. side was not ready to fight and would need at least another ten days. The senators then visited Marines in forward positions nearer Kuwait and had lunch—the latest version of the field ration, called MRE, for Meals Ready to Eat. Troops joked that MRE stood for Meals Rejected by Ethiopia.
Later that afternoon the delegation flew to Bahrain and a small group attended a palace dinner hosted by Emir Sheikh Isa bin Sulman al Khalifa, the leader of the small emirate. The emir inquired why the United States allowed the Iraqis to appear on CNN to criticize America and American policy.
On Sunday, the group visited Navy ships, including the battleship U.S.S. Wisconsin, then went back to Saudi Arabia for a meeting with King Fahd, who had nothing new or startling to say. Later that evening the senators were supposed to meet with senior Kuwaiti officials. The emir of Kuwait, who was in Saudi Arabia, declined to meet with them.
The senators were furious. Here the United States had undertaken this massive military deployment in part to help Kuwait, and their exiled leader wouldn’t meet his potential saviors. Republican Senator William Cohen of Maine was incredulous. It was not as if the emir had pressing government responsibilities, given that his country had been stolen from him.
The Kuwaiti officials sent to visit the senators were really the second team, Cohen could see. Cameras filmed the discussions. Cohen and the others didn’t know whether to laugh or cry when they learned that the filming was being done by the American public relations firm of Hill & Knowlton, hired by Kuwait to do some image-polishing.
On Monday, September 3—the Labor Day holiday in America and the fourth day of the grueling trip—the senators flew the two hours to Cairo and linked up with a House delegation for a meeting with Mubarak. The Egyptian president delivered a two-hour tirade against King Hussein of Jordan, who was staying out of the Arab coalition against Saddam. Mubarak also disclosed that Saddam had tried to bribe him to keep Egypt out of the anti-Iraq coalition. In the afternoon they flew 1,500 miles to Abu Dhabi, the sheikdom that is the capital of the United Arab Emirates, for meetings with His Highness President Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahayan.
The sheikh delivered a long monologue about the courage of the Kuwaitis. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the New York Democrat, seated on a beautiful couch alongside his fellow senators, grew increasingly uneasy. He moved to the edge of his seat as His Highness expounded on the magnificence of the brave Kuwaitis.
“Your Grace,” Moynihan finally shouted, his hand in the air as in his days as U.N. ambassador. “Your Grace,” he repeated in his melodramatic voice.
All eyes were on Moynihan. “Your Grace, the Kuwaitis left their wives. They left their servants. They took their money and stuffed it in Swiss bank accounts. That is not my definition of courage.”
The sheikh disagreed. He said the Kuwaitis were heroic and in need. His entourage nodded in agreement with their leader, who also noted that the Kuwaitis had been taken by surprise.
“Your Grace,” Moynihan answered, “a warrior nation is never taken by surprise.”
Cohen whispered to Moynihan, “What about Pearl Harbor?” The United States had also been surprised by the Iraqi invasion, he reminded him.
The next day the delegation flew back to the United States. Cohen felt as if he’d been presented with a sound and light show. There had been no real news or information about what really mattered—the decisions or options the President was facing in seeming isolation, with only a handful of advisers.
• • •
The next day, Wednesday, September 5, Bush invited 30 senators and congressmen, most of whom had traveled to the Gulf the previous weekend, to the White House.
Cheney, who attended the meeting, felt that the August congressional recess had been a tremendous advantage. The administration had been able to spend the month doing what needed to be done, rather than explaining itself on Capitol Hill. But Bush and Cheney, both former congressmen, knew that it was important to have congressional goodwill.
Every senator and congressman who spoke at the meeting praised Bush’s handling of the crisis, and expressed support for the military and diplomatic moves.
“Mr. President,” Cohen said when he had a chance to speak, “there is a photograph in The New York Times this morning showing a Marine being helped by his comrades. I don’t have to quote Shakespeare for us to see that if this Marine had been felled by a bullet and not the sun, there would be a wholly different reaction in this country.
“Mr. President, I’d suggest that you convene a special session of Congress and that we deal with the law of the land in the War Powers Act, and that you get a vote while you have the support of Congress for this operation.”
Cohen said that he was making this suggestion for the sake of the President, for the sake of unity between the administration and the Congress, for the sake of the troops in the desert who deserved a government unified, and for the sake of Congress, which was so deft at avoiding its responsibility.
“Mr. President, I hope you will resist the calls that are being made for an offensive action,” he said.
“When there comes a point that there is blood in the sand,” Cohen said, “the Congress—which is following its constituents now—will again do so, and follow them in the opposite direction.
“We visited the Kuwaitis, we saw the Kuwaitis and we realized that Kuwaitis are willing to fight—until every U.S. soldier has dropped.”
Bush politely acknowledged his points and moved on.