CHAPTER 1

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More Newochim: Its Plan, Goal, and Method. Theologica Politica1

MAIMONIDESMOST IMPORTANT WORK is without a doubt More Newochim (Guide of the Perplexed), which I have referred to many times in this autobiography. In it we see, in exemplary fashion, his pure love of truth, his sincere religious and moral mindset, his deep insight into all branches of human knowledge, and his all-penetrating philosophical mind.

The intention of this excellent work, as the title indicates and Maimonides himself explains in his preface, is to instruct those who are wavering in their faith and reestablish the harmony [16] between (religious) faith and rational knowledge.2 His method is a deliberate lack of order and method, while his style and delivery are magnificent. One feels as if one is encountering the awe-inspiring voice of truth itself. His goal is to perfect the capacities of knowledge and volition.

The entire book is composed as a message in Arabic to Maimonides’ famous student, Rabbi Joseph Ben Rabbi Jehuda.3 Rabbi Samuel Ibn Tibbon later translated it into Hebrew.4

In a letter addressed to Rabbi Samuel, Maimonides states:5

I have always admired you, even before I knew you personally, because I could tell from your work that you had enormous speculative ability and discipline in research. And yet, I thought, perhaps his ambitions exceed his intellectual abilities. After you read with me astronomy, though, and the preceding issue of pure mathematics that preceded them, [17] my initial opinion of you was reinforced. I was impressed by your intellect and quick comprehension. While I recognized that your ambition in mathematics may have gone a bit too far, I didn’t try to change you, because I could already tell that these ambitions would nevertheless lead to great success. However, it was when you read logic with me that I knew I had not been mistaken in harboring such hopes for you.

I thought you were worthy of receiving the secrets of the prophetic writings—that is, the rational interpretations of these writings, which are secrets for those who don’t have the key. I gave you some hints about this, and noticed that they weren’t enough for you, that you wanted a more thorough explanation of these theological topics, as well as to know my judgment of the various dialecticians’6 views and methods. You had, I found, already learned something about these topics elsewhere, but not enough to satisfy your great [18] intellect. But I held you back, advising you to pursue these topics in their proper order, since in my opinion one should pursue the truth systematically, not arbitrarily. Because providence has decreed that we should to be apart, I have decided, after much reflection, to write this work for you and students like you, and to send it to you in installments.7

This work tries, first, to properly interpret various singular expressions (names) that occur in the prophetic writings; some of them are common (to many kinds of objects),8 others are figurative (and while rooted in their relation to one kind of object can be carried over onto others by way of analogy), although lay readers take them to have just one meaning. Still others are dubious.(a) [19]

My aim isn’t to explain these types of expression to the common man or philosophical beginner. Nor am I trying to teach those who want to learn nothing but the system of (religious) [20] laws. I am attempting to lay the foundation for the systematic study of jurisprudence (the wisdom of the laws). I merely want to offer some brief guidance to those in whom religion is firmly rooted as a result of education and habit, who behave ethically, who are well-versed in philosophical scholarship and methods, and who, on the one hand, are inclined to give reason its due, but on the other, are troubled and [21] necessarily embarrassed by the common meaning of the Scriptures (which in many cases conflicts with reason). Should he simply follow his reason and completely reject the ideas and images that the conventional meaning of scripture suggests? If he does so, he will be afraid that he has harmed his religious faith. If, however, he clings to the common meaning and silences his reason, he will think that he has compromised the authenticity of his faith.

This work will also interpret the allegories in the prophetic writings, or at least clarify that they are allegories that have not been recognized as such and have therefore caused thinkers no little embarrassment. I have therefore titled this work More Hanwochim, or Guide for the Perplexed. I do not mean to promise that this work will allay any possible doubts that someone might form, just the most important of them. In addition, no reasonable person can expect me to treat all my material exhaustively, or carry out to its conclusion every [22] reading of an allegory that I begin. This is hard to do in oral lectures and even harder in written presentations. I feel it necessary to make these prefatory statements so that this work will not become the target of every fool who thinks himself wise, at which he shoots the arrows of his foolishness.

In accordance with the prescriptions of the Talmud,9 this work will give independent thinkers some suggestions as to the principles of natural science and metaphysics.10 Even these suggestions will not be organized according to a particular method, but rather presented interspersed among other material. The truths in this work are meant to come to light only to conceal themselves again at once,* which is in keeping with divine wisdom (the nature of things), always hiding the [23] most important truths from the vulgar eye. As it is stated in the Psalms: “The secret of God is for the pious alone.”11

*Ac si divina natura innocent et benevolo puerorum ludo delectaretur, qui ideo se abscondunt ut inveniatur, atque animam humanam sibi collusorem in hoc ludo, pro sua in homines indulgentia et bonitate, cooptaverit. (Baco de Varulamio Nov. Org Praefatio12)

But you must not think, my good man, that I myself am in full possession of these secrets. No, truth occasionally shines forth to us human creatures for a moment, but then it darkens again, on account of our physical constitution and our ways. We are like travelers in a dark night, who now and then see a flash of lightning. For some of us, lightning flashes the whole night through. This was the level of illumination that the greatest of all prophets experienced: Moses, about whom it was said: “You stay with me”13 (with true knowledge of my nature). For others, lightning flashes at intervals, more or less often. Indeed, there were those who saw only one flash of lightning all night. Of them it is said: “They prophesied (this one time), but no longer.”14 Some do not have even the good fortune [24] to see the light of a lightning bolt even once. The light they see is merely that of a body glowing in the darkness, and even this weak light does not remain constant: it appears and disappears at different times, at different strengths. Likewise, there are different degrees of wisdom. About those who never see the light at all, but constantly cast around in the dark, we read in the Psalms: “They know nothing, understand nothing, and wander in the dark”;15 and in the Book of Job: “They do not see the light that shines so clearly in the sky.”16 To the rabble, I have nothing to say here.

Teaching these higher truths is as challenging as learning them. Even what one understands completely cannot always be communicated in an orderly fashion; other areas of knowledge, about visible phenomena, have it easier. The expression appropriate to the object and the proper method of presentation sometimes seem to suggest themselves; at other times, it costs us much effort to find them. [25] The wise ancients thus felt compelled to seek refuge in fables and allegories. If, however, you wanted to present these truths undisguised, you learned to understand them yourself, your presentation would be so obscure and roundabout that disguise would seem far preferable. In this the wise ones are, as elsewhere, compelled by the nature of the object to follow God’s will.

When God wanted to perfect our community through His practical laws, these laws presupposed pure theories based in turn on proper concepts of God and His relation to us, that is, on natural theology.17 Because this itself presupposes natural science, He began His book of laws with the story of creation, which is an allegorical representation of the principles of natural science. Our wise men say: “The actual way the world was created cannot be communicated to any human being, hence the [26] brevity of the Scriptural description—‘In the beginning God created heaven and earth.’”18 By this they suggest that the story of Genesis expresses important mysteries about nature.

To this end, the Scriptures use many expressions that have multiple meanings, which the common man understands in accord with his meager capacities, and which the wise man, in contrast, should interpret in a more intelligent way.

Maimonides then tries to demonstrate how important it is to interpret the fables, allegories, and unusual expressions properly, in order to understand the Holy Scripture properly. He lays out the different types of such expressions. Finally, he admonishes the reader to study his work attentively, and only after proper preparation. His preface then concludes with the following words:

I know that the beginner will gain something useful from this book as well, but as a whole it will be a welcome resource for the experienced thinker whose reason has shaken his faith. Confused [27] minds, whose brains are stuffed with wrong opinions and incorrect methods regarded as true wisdom (for they have no idea about what true wisdom is)—such minds will despise this book, partly because they won’t understand it, which will offend their vanity, and partly because it will expose their weak points and shine a bright light on the fatuousness of their prejudices and wrong opinions.

God is my witness for how long I refrained from composing this work, because it treats of the most important matters and is the only work of its kind in our nation. Now, in composing this work, I lean on what it says in the Scriptures: “It is time to act for the sake of God’s honor, for they have forsaken thy pure teachings,”19 and also rely on the command: “All your actions should be for the sake of God’s honor.”20

In short, because I felt compelled to present the demonstrative truth in a way that will perhaps [28] please only a single man of reason while repelling a thousand fools, for his sake I will not suppress the truth, and I won’t concern myself with the censure of the great mass of people.

In the following very noteworthy preface, Maimonides gave seven reasons why one sometimes encounters contradictions in written texts.

1  When the author of a text is merely a compiler, collecting opposing views without attributing each one to its actual creator. In such cases, the views presented necessarily contradict one another.

2  When the author alters his own views about certain things during the writing of a text, without acknowledging it, and allows both his earlier and his later views to stand.

3  When some expressions must be understood in their allegorical, not conventional, sense to resolve contradictions. [29]

4  When a condition or qualification that one defers until later is then left out, whether by necessity or choice, or when the subjects of opposing assertions are distinct but this isn’t made clear.

5  In addition, the requirement that scholarship be presented methodically can lead to an apparent contradiction. Difficult materials must sometimes be used as a basis for making less difficult material comprehensible. But a good method of teaching mandates that what is easy should come before what is difficult. So what is to be done? The teacher must try to make the difficult material as easy as possible, even give up strict precision to some extent, and defer to the capabilities of his students. He should wait for another occasion to present the given material with all due precision, as the truth demands.

6  When the contradiction is not manifest, but rather concealed, so that one doesn’t notice it by looking at the first [30] two claims in isolation. Or if one takes a given statement on its own and connects it to a sequence of other statements, one will eventually encounter the contradiction. This goes even for the best authors. If, in contrast, the contradiction between the first two statements is obvious, and the author simply forgot the first statement by the time he wrote the second, this is such a crude mistake that one shouldn’t dignify it with a critical response.

7  When one has to deal with important truths, which one cannot and must not treat comprehensively, and one can only put them before the reader in partial form, partly hiding them from his eyes, there is also sometimes occasion for an apparent contradiction. A skilled writer, however, knows how to arrange this so that a common reader won’t notice it.

Maimonides then showed which writings present this or that kind of contraction. In the Mishna and the Talmud there are contradictions of the first two types. In [31] the prophetic writings, contradictions of the third and fourth type. In philosophical writings, we find contradictions of the fifth type; and in other works, contradictions of the sixth type. The contradictions in Maimonides’ own work must therefore be of the fifth and seventh types. [32]

1 This is Maimon’s characteristically bold application of Spinoza’s famous phrase to Maimonides. It struck the twentieth-century political philosopher Leo Strauss forcibly, see Leo Strauss on Maimonides: The Complete Writings (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), “The Place of the Doctrine of Providence According to Maimonides,” p. 326n34.

2 See Maimonides’ preface to the first part of the Guide (Pines 1:5–6).

3 Joseph ben Yehuda Ibn Simon (1160–1226), a philosopher, physician, and poet. Born in the city of Ceuta in Morocco and immigrated in his twenties to Cairo, where he studied with Maimonides. Later he moved to Aleppo, and finally settled in Baghdad.

4 Samuel ben Yehuda Ibn Tibbon (ca. 1150–ca. 1230), a physician and philosopher who lived in Provence. He translated Maimonides’ Guide from Arabic into Hebrew toward the very end of the latter’s life, and consulted Maimonides on issues of translation. Ibn Tibbon’s translation was widely accepted. In fact, the vast majority of the readers of the Guide have read it in Ibn Tibbon’s translation. It is this translation that Maimon read (almost certainly in the 1742 Jessnitz edition) and which he translates, summarizes, and comments upon here.

5 This quote is from the Dedicatory Epistle at the beginning of the Guide. The epistle is printed at the beginning of all standard editions of the Guide, though its authenticity is questionable. Maimon, however, does not doubt its authenticy and his translation of the epistle is quite close to the original text.

6 I.e., members of the Islamic school of philosophy known as the Kalam.

7 Here ends Maimon’s summary of the epistle dedicatory and begins the discussion of the preface to the first part of the Guide.

8 I.e., equivocal terms.

a  [Maimon] In my commentary, I explained this murky passage in the following way. Common expressions are those that are common to many kinds of objects. Figurative expressions were originally applied to certain kinds of objects and later applied to analogous objects. The third class treats these, namely different kinds, not as different kinds, but rather as having been seen belonging to a common conceptual category, or those where this attribution is at the very least problematic. [Editorial note: Cf. Maimon, Give’at ha-Moreh, p. 2a, and his appendix on symbolism in Versuch über die Transzendentalphilosophie.]

I noted, though, that these distinctions are not fully justified, for perhaps the first two classes are not real, and all the expressions are included in the third category. How, for example, can one claim with certainty that the Hebrew word לכא is an expression common to different kinds of objects (food and fire), and thus in the first group, or that it was originally applied to food and only later carried over to fire. Originally it could have been applied to these different kinds of objects not as different kinds, but rather to the categorical concept common to them both (preserving one thing through the destruction of another). I have demonstrated this point about all so-called figurative expressions in the Berlin Journal for Enlightenment, volume 5, issue 5.

I thus include in the first type of expression solely the ones that are shared between classes of objects that have nothing objective in common and are related to each other purely subjectively. Expressions common to opposing things—for example, the Hebrew word ארב which means both to destroy and to bring forth out of nothing (create)—are of this kind; a common expression has been maintained purely through the commonality of the subjective form of an opposition. Expressions that simultaneously designate cause and effect, substance and accident, and so forth are also of this kind: shared by both kinds of objects on account of a commonality of subjective forms.

9 See Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Hagiga, 11b: “The Work of Creation may not be expounded in the presence of two, nor the Work of the Chariot in the presence of one, unless he is a sage and understands of his own knowledge.” Cf. Mishne Torah, Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah, 2:12 and 4:10–13.

10 The last sentence is a close paraphrase or interpretation of Maimonides’ text rather than a translation. Cf. Pines 1:6.

11 Ps. 25:14.

12 Maimon here inserts a passage from Bacon, see Works of Lord Bacon, 2:643 | New Organon, 12: “Just as if the divine nature delighted in the innocent and amusing children’s games in which they hide themselves purposely in order to be found.”

13 Deut. 5:28.

14 Num. 11:25.

15 Ps. 82:5.

16 Job 37:21.

17 In Ibn Tibbon: “ha-hokhma ha-elohit [the divine science].”

18 See Abraham Wertheimer, ed., Batei Midrashot, 1:251, and Nachmanides’ commentary on Genesis 1:1.

19 Ps. 119:126.

20 Mishna, Tractate Avot, 2:17.