In the month of June 1919, Sir Eric Drummond, the new Secretary-General of the League of Nations, presented a note on the functioning of the future administrative services, of which the Secretariat would initially be installed at Sunderland House in London. There was much to deal with: the permanent location of the seat of the League; the status of the Free City of Danzig; the admission of new member States; the fate of minorities in Turkey. But one issue demanded immediate attention: the plight of prisoners-of-war held in Russia and Siberia.
Estimates of the total number of prisoners-of-war taken during the First World War vary. Figures of between 6 and 8 million have been mentioned, but by 1920 the vast majority of them had managed to find their way home in one way or another. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had reported that there were still at least 200,000 prisoners-of-war in Siberia belonging to Germany and various other nationalities of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire: Austrians, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians and Romanians. The Swedish Red Cross had made public opinion in Western Europe aware of the circumstances in which these men were being held: many of them had been captured in 1914 and were now facing their sixth Siberian winter living in inadequately heated and overcrowded quarters, lying on bare boards wearing the rags of uniforms they had worn since they were captured. Their food was quite inadequate and they had no money to pay for the bare necessities of life. Technically, the Bolsheviks had released the prisoners and they were free to go wherever they pleased—but the transport system had collapsed. Locked in the grip of a Civil War, the Russians were largely indifferent to their fate. If these men were not returned home before the winter of 1921, they were likely to die of hunger, cold and neglect.[1]
By 27 September 1919 the Supreme Economic Council of the League of Nations had become aware of their situation and proposed setting up a repatriation commission.[2]
In January 1920, the Secretary-General of the League received the unofficial visit of representatives from the Society of Friends’ Emergency and War Victims Relief Committee, who had gathered information from more or less reliable sources showing that there still remained some 400,000 prisoners held in Russia.[3] Of these, 100,000 were located east of Lake Baikal. Furthermore, the British High Commissioner at Irkutsk had estimated that at the beginning of December 1919 there were 50,000 Austrians and 10,000 German prisoners-of-war in places not under the control of the Soviet Government. There were also some former Turkish and Bulgarian soldiers held in Russian camps. To these figures should be added huge numbers of prisoners-of-war of the former Tsarist Russia held in Germany and not yet repatriated. Finally, a small number of Allied prisoners had been captured by the Bolsheviks during military operations in support of the White Russians. Since the Allies did not recognize the Soviet Government and wanted this state-of-affairs to continue, they were keen for the League of Nations to act as an intermediary in bringing these men home. This was also a way of sharing the cost among several countries.
Amid growing concern, the Red Cross had been approached by the German Government about the exchange of Russian prisoners in Germany for German prisoners in European Russia and Siberia. A limited prisoner exchange programme had been going on between Russia and Germany since March 1918, but required considerable co-ordination with Poland and the Baltic countries—not to mention the Allies. The German office responsible for prisoner-of-war issues was under the responsibility of the enterprising Social Democrat Moritz Schlesinger.
Millions of Europeans still had relatives in captivity and for them the war was not over. The Allied military authorities had a repatriation scheme that began functioning in January 1919 mainly under the responsibility of the Germans, but the Allies refused to pay for it, while many countries of Eastern and Central Europe could not afford to repatriate their own countrymen. Another reason for the Allies to show a lack of enthusiasm was that prisoners-of-war repatriated from Germany to Russia could easily be used to strengthen Bolshevik military forces fighting the White Russians. Even so, some Russians were being used by the German military to oppose the Bolsheviks in East Prussia. Meanwhile, in the prisoner-of-war camps there was conflict between White Russian and Bolshevik agitators who tried to set off uprisings among the prisoners, which could easily have led to de-stabilizing Germany itself. Germany was considered vulnerable to chaos due to communist revolutionary and counter-revolutionary movements.
The United States, under the direction of Herbert Hoover, was providing extensive aid programmes to the Russian prisoners in Germany. Both President Wilson and Hoover saw the provision of food as a way of bringing stability to Europe and thus halting communism. Nevertheless, most of the prisoners-of-war simply wanted to go home and the Allies were faced with the moral responsibility of doing so for humanitarian reasons. In February 1920, the Allies estimated that all of their own combatants who had been taken prisoner had now been released and therefore removed all further obstacles standing in the way of the repatriation of prisoners of other nations. Now, some kind of supra-national co-ordination was required.
The Allied Economic Commission in Paris recommended that the League of Nations should take responsibility for keeping the prisoners alive and sending them home.[4] The Society of Friends made a proposal to the Secretary-General via the Hungarian Red Cross that a series of rest camps should be created from Siberia to Central Europe so that these men could be brought back in stages. Secretary-General Drummond referred the deputation to the League of Red Cross Societies in Geneva, which he considered as the competent organization to take charge of the matter. He advised them to present the idea to Lieutenant-General Sir David Henderson, its Director, and added that if the latter thought it necessary he would present the case before the Council of the League of Nations. A telegram was sent to Sir David Henderson from Lord Robert Cecil requesting him to present the matter to the monthly meeting of the Council of the League of Nations in February 1920 in Paris.[5]
Secretary-General Drummond was not convinced that the repatriation of prisoners-of-war was actually a matter that should be dealt with by the League of Nations, believing that it was not mandated to intervene. On the other hand, subordinates like Philip Noel-Baker pressed the League to seize this opportunity. In view of the urgent situation, Léon Bourgeois, who was the President of the Council, agreed to include the subject on the provisional agenda of the Council’s next meeting.
Thus, at the second session of the Council meeting on the 11 February, the chairman Léon Bourgeois handed to the Council the letter he had received from the Supreme Economic Council and a letter mentioning the Red Cross in Geneva which offered to take charge of repatriation of the prisoners in Siberia—if the Council should request it to do so.[6] It was suggested that the matter should be referred to the Secretary-General of the League for consideration and a report presented at the next meeting of the Council. Apart from setting up this committee to make a report, this game of “pass the parcel” continued during February and March 1920.
In a memorandum to his staff on 16 February Drummond wrote:[7]
The Question of Prisoners-of-war in Russia. Monsieur Bourgeois, at the last meeting of the Council formally placed on the table a Resolution from the Supreme Economic Court dealing with the question. . . . As Dr Nitobe and Dame Rachel Crowdy will before long be going to Geneva to take part in the First General Council of the League of Red Cross Societies, I have asked them to take charge of this question and to prepare the necessary documents for the Council. Meanwhile, I should be glad if . . . Mr Baker will write to Sir David Henderson suggesting to him that a memorandum should be got ready for communication to Dr Nitobe and Dame Rachel Crowdy.[8]
In the letter Drummond’s assistant Philip Noel-Baker wrote to Sir David Henderson we read the following:
The whole question of the Prisoners-of-war in Russia and their desperate condition has been brought officially before the Council of the League of Nations by a motion of the Supreme Economic Council. It will therefore come up for consideration at the next meeting of the Council. . . . It is possible, however, that there may be an earlier meeting of the Council held in London, in which case this subject, which is an urgent one, would no doubt be considered. It is quite probable that the Council when it deals with the matter will invite the League of Red Cross Societies to undertake some duties in connection with it. In anticipation that this may occur, and that he may be as fully informed as possible on the whole subject, the Secretary-General has asked Dame Rachel Crowdy of the secretariat and Dr Nitobe . . . to discuss the whole subject with you as fully as possible. He asked me further to suggest to you that it would be very useful if you could prepare for them a memorandum on the present situation including whatever details you may have to the present condition of prisoners, the measures of relief which you consider it would be possible to carry out, points on which you would require authority or assistance from the League and any other general conditions connected with transport, finances or the organisation of relief, which you may think it well to include.[9]
In the meantime, Crowdy and Nitobe, the two senior staff members of the League of Nations mentioned by both Drummond and Noel-Baker, wrote a report on the situation in Siberia.[10] This document—several pages long—gave a complete picture of what the prisoners were enduring. The staff of the League of Nations had already identified that the plan of action for repatriation could be broken down into three parts: (a) preliminary negotiations; (b) the provision of funds; and (c) actually bringing the men home. No satisfactory negotiations could be carried out unless a specific body was appointed and given full power to investigate and negotiate. It should consist of a commissioner appointed by the League of Nations (and given full power by the League), representatives of the Red Cross, the League of the Red Cross Societies, the former warring countries, etc.
This internal report was discussed in the director’s meeting on the 31 March 1920, and Secretary-General Drummond suggested that the Council of the League of Nations should appoint one person to determine the true facts, find the necessary money and report to the Council. This person should be advised that much private and a certain amount of governmental effort was being undertaken and it was his task to co-ordinate it all.[11] Thus, finally, at the fourth session of the Council (Paris, 9–11 April 1920), the repatriation of prisoners-of-war in Siberia was at the top of the agenda. At the end of the meeting, the delegates agreed that the task of repatriation should be given “to a person enjoying a world-wide reputation for his organizational and executive abilities and for his high moral standing.” What was required was a well-known person from a small neutral country. They already had in mind such a person who had all the qualities needed and who could assume this “heavy but honourable duty.”
The name of Fridtjof Nansen as a candidate for the position of the High Commissioner of the League of Nations for the Repatriation of Prisoners-of-War was circulating in private correspondence well before his appointment. In fact, on 22 March 1920, just a couple of days after the Secretary-General received the report on the situation of the prisoners-of-war, and before it was circulated to the members of the Council, the name of Nansen appears in correspondence between Noel-Baker of the League and J.A Salter, secretary of the War Reparations Commission based in Paris. Noel-Baker wrote: “the Secretary General believes that if a Commissioner of authority is appointed (such as Dr Nansen) and if this Commissioner set forth the condition of the prisoners and proposing the division of responsibility for the credits in accordance with the plan suggested, then no government would be able to refuse to bear its share, viewing the pressure of public opinion.”[12] Salter replied a couple of days later: “I think Dr Nansen would be exactly the person to be in charge.”[13]
The Council of the League of Nations decided to telegraph Nansen inviting him to undertake the task of High Commissioner. The outline of a letter was drafted by the Italian delegate.[14]
Sir,
The Council of the League of Nations has had under consideration the question of prisoners-of-war now in Siberia, and has instructed me to invite you to investigate on its behalf the problems connected with the repatriation of prisoners-of-war who have not yet been able to return to their homes.
The Council realizes that, in extending to you this invitation, it is asking you to undertake an arduous and difficult task; but it feels that this work is of real humanitarian importance and of the utmost urgency.
The Council knows the interest you take in the fate of prisoners, and the great efforts which you and many of your countrymen have made to mitigate the sufferings caused by the late war. It has therefore every confidence that you will accept the invitation.
The Council recognizes that to carry out the task satisfactorily it will be necessary for you to get in communication, not only with the various voluntary agencies at present helping to ease the suffering of the prisoners, but also with the Governments of all those states concerned directly or indirectly in their repatriation. The Council has therefore instructed me to help you in every way in my power, both in regard to diplomatic and other facilities and in regard to your dealings with the Governments. Should you find it necessary for the execution of your duties to have the services of a small expert secretariat, the Secretary-General will be happy to render you such assistance in its formation as may be in his power, and all the charges and expenses of yourself and staff will be regarded by the Council as charges upon the League.
On the same day—9 April 1920––a telegram almost identical to the draft letter was sent by Sir Eric Drummond to Nansen. Drummond asked to receive a reply by the following day, but Nansen did not reply until 14 April. Furthermore, his reply was communicated by the French Embassy in Christiana, which must have contributed to the delay. When the Council meeting completed its work on 11 April Nansen had not replied and no other name had been put forward, which suggests that the delegates were very keen that Nansen should accept this post. Here is Nansen’s reply:[15]
I am deeply honoured by the confidence that the Council of the League of Nations has shown to me by the proposal of your telegram. It placed me in a very difficult position as the proposition is entirely new to me that I do not know what to answer. I do not grasp how much work it actually would involve, par example whether it would necessitate journeys for examinations of the conditions and numbers of prisoners in Russia, Siberia, etc. As I understand it, not knowing more than your telegram, such a thorough investigation would be required and the whole task would mean years of work in which time one could do nothing else, in that sense I cannot accept this important assignment as it would mean that I had to give up my scientific work. But if I am mistaken, and it means less work than I expect, I might of course reconsider it.
The very same day Sir Eric Drummond replied mellifluously by telegram.[16]
I have received your telegram. I do not think the work required will be as great as you suppose. It is almost essential that arrangements should be made before next winter for early repatriation of greater part of prisoners, but this having been done; actual execution of measures decided on might be placed in other hands if you personally found it impossible to continue. It is true that for the next few months any other work would no doubt be difficult if not impossible and the investigations are likely to necessitate journeys in Europe and Russia. Nevertheless, the Council would wish me to urge you very strongly to accept their invitations as they could find no one with such great experience and authority to carry out the negotiations […]. Memorandum follows by post and if necessary I could send a member of my secretariat to Christiana to explain matters further.
The original idea was that a “commissioner” would be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations and sent to Russia as the head of a delegation consisting of representatives of the former enemy countries, the Red Cross and some neutral countries—Denmark and Sweden are specifically mentioned in correspondence. In a briefing report prepared by Noel-Baker, Drummond recalled the relationships that Nansen may have established during his voyage to Siberia in 1913. Drummond added: “But all these routes [through Estonia, Poland or the Black Sea] in the last resort depend on the goodwill of the Bolsheviks and on the railway material of which they dispose. I’m sure that in this respect your efforts may be of the greatest value, as the Bolsheviks are well disposed towards you.”
Why was Nansen the ideal candidate? He was well-known and trusted by Allied politicians, particularly the British Government and Herbert Hoover. The role of commissioner was a temporary position that did not involve a great deal of power and prestige, only requiring that the job should be done. It was believed that Nansen was viewed sympathetically by the Soviet authorities. He was a legend, a hero, a man who made an instant impression. It may further be pointed out that the League did not have a budget for this operation and it was therefore necessary to appoint a person of private wealth who would be reimbursed for expenses but would not require a salary.
In the exchange of telegrams that followed Nansen said that he was willing to take up the position if he could work out of Christiana. He was in fact feeling restless and was looking for another great adventure. On the 20 April Drummond was anxious to complete the deal and wrote: “I have now heard informally from the President of the Council that he agrees with your proposals. Mr Philip [Noel-]Baker, the official who has been dealing with the subject, left this morning for Christiana and will probably call you on Friday 23 April.”[17]
In a letter from Drummond to Léon Bourgeois, chairman of the Council, on the 19 April, we read the following (in French): “As Dr Nansen is the most eminent person qualified for the mission, I believe therefore that we must do everything in our power to ensure his collaboration. Once he has begun his inquiries, I am convinced that he will devote himself body and soul to the success of this task.”[18] In a telegram to Drummond, Bourgeois confirmed that he was “absolument d’accord” [entirely in agreement].[19]
When Noel-Baker arrived in Christiana he telephoned Nansen in order to find out how to reach his house. But, much to Noel-Baker’s surprise, Nansen, who had returned from the United States in 1918 with a Model “T” Ford, immediately drove himself down to the British Legation.[20] For Noel-Baker and Nansen it was the beginning of a long collaboration, with the latter very quickly agreeing to Drummond’s proposal. Some years later, Philip Noel-Baker described their meeting as follows:
And then for seven hours without one moment’s intermission—right through the Minister’s luncheon party, through his tea party, till darkness had fallen outside—Nansen asked me questions about how the repatriations could be done. The Legation Chancery had to find him maps; the encyclopaedia had to be consulted; every possible hypothesis and every plan had to be considered and discussed.[21]
It was, indeed, a great meeting of minds: Noel-Baker admired Nansen’s international approach, his courage and his impatience with bureaucracy; in Noel-Baker Nansen found an enthusiastic, level-headed and enterprising emissary. Apart from a distinguished academic career, Philip Noel-Baker was a skier and athlete, which appealed to Nansen. He had participated in the 1912 Olympic Games in Stockholm.[22] He was also a Quaker and had served as a non-combatant volunteer in an ambulance unit during the First World War, being decorated for bravery by the British, French and Italians. His influence at the Paris Peace Conference and in the League of Nations was out of all proportion to his junior position and, as far as Nansen is concerned, he emerges time and time again as a key player. Up until 1924, Noel-Baker became Nansen’s right-hand man and wrote many of his speeches—even after this date.
On 1 May 1920 Nansen wrote to Torsten Valdemar Lundell at the Swedish Red Cross that he had accepted the job as High Commissioner “in much doubt.” There are a number of reasons why he accepted this post but, most of all, he felt a significant moral commitment to humanitarian work. Later he wrote to Lord Robert Cecil that the work he was involved in was “of the greatest humanitarian and political importance.” He felt sympathetic towards the Russians and he was keen to play a significant role in the success of the League of Nations. As we have seen, after his visit to the United States in 1917 he had acquired a taste for international humanitarianism.
Once he had accepted the new assignment, Nansen set to work immediately. If as many prisoners-of-war as possible were to be repatriated before the winter of 1920, it was necessary to start the process already in the spring of that year.
First, Nansen thought it would be very desirable that the League should express its appreciation and gratitude to the Governments of Finland and Estonia for their help in facilitating the return of prisoners. This would encourage them to continue providing assistance. He also asked the Council of the League to pass a general resolution requesting that prisoners-of-war should be allowed free transit and reasonable medical supervision while passing through third countries on their way home, such as Romania, Ukraine and Poland. In his opinion, it was premature to send clothing, medicine and other supplies for the prisoners, when the whole Siberian population were suffering from the same shortages. Nansen also saw the International Committee of the Red Cross as the key to the success of the enterprise.[23]
Since the end of the First World War, the Allied governments had been deliberately blocking the return of German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners-of-war held in Siberia and of Russian prisoners in German camps until all of their own nationals were returned home. However, in January 1920 the British Government withdrew its objections and the Prime Minister told Parliament that they would now support the actions of the League of Nations. The League acknowledged that the French and Italian Governments also shared the same opinion.
Several non-governmental organizations were already playing a central role in repatriating the prisoners-of-war. The Red Cross, particularly the Swedish and Danish sections, had been concerned with prisoners throughout the First World War and continued to do so during the Russian Civil War. The Red Cross had negotiated an agreement between Germany and the USSR over prisoners-of-war in April 1920 and then managed to extend it to cover all the nationalities concerned. It was therefore in a position to provide expertise. Among other important charitable organizations playing a supporting role was the American Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA).
While the Red Cross had established a system for bringing the prisoners home, it needed money, the consent of the transit countries and the Allies to actually implement it. Shipping was a key issue—the British controlled all German shipping on the Baltic Sea.
The Allied governments did not recognize the Soviet Government, therefore they needed the League of Nations to act as the middleman and the League needed an individual whom the Soviets would accept as an interlocutor. It was evident that the Soviets would recall sympathetically Nansen’s efforts in the spring of 1919 to send food aid to Russia. Neither the Soviet nor German Governments were actually consulted as to whether they would accept Nansen as a commissioner. At the beginning of May 1920 Noel-Baker simply informed the Germans and Soviets that the repatriation of prisoners would take place more rapidly if they would provide all the relevant information to Nansen.
In the first instance, it was impossible to determine the number and residence of prisoners in European Russia, Siberia and Turkmenistan, particularly since many of them were on the move. At this stage and for the same reason, it was also too soon to establish complete plans for their repatriation or estimate the total cost. A group of prisoners had just been repatriated via Narva on the Russian-Estonian frontier to Swinemunde (at that time in Germany, now Świnoujście in Poland). While every effort was being made to consolidate and expand the route through Russia to Estonia, it was also of the greatest importance to open up new routes so that as many prisoners as possible could benefit.
In the spring of 1920, the Red Army invaded Poland. It reached the gates of Warsaw but, to everyone’s surprise, the Polish Army then won a decisive battle and drove the Russians out again. This was the context in which the repatriation of prisoners was to take place because it meant that the possibility of returning the prisoners-of-war by land routes across Poland was virtually impossible.
Nansen reported to Sir Eric Drummond that he would be meeting in Berlin with the German Government, the Red Cross and delegates from Austria and Hungary. During this meeting that took place on 18 May Nansen learned that the central German organization for repatriating prisoners and the Red Cross had already reached agreement with the Soviets about the exchange of prisoners before Nansen and the League entered the stage.[24] However, the Red Cross needed political support and money to carry out the plan, and it was anticipated that Nansen and the League would provide both of these. At this meeting a plan of action was adopted and tasks distributed; food and clothing would be supplied; medical posts would be set up on both sides. During the summer of 1920 four ships travelled backwards and forwards across the Baltic ferrying prisoners-of-war in both directions, but it was obvious that their capacity was too limited.[25]
From those who had already returned Nansen had obtained some information about the prisoners-of-war located in Siberia and Turkmenistan. There was the possibility of a route back to Europe from Tashkent to Batum in Georgia, which involved crossing the Caspian Sea to Baku in Azerbaijan. Many prisoners-of-war had set off on this route and had apparently reached Bukhara in Uzbekistan but could not proceed any further. Even if they could reach Krasnovodsk and cross the Caspian Sea, they would have to travel by rail through the Caucasus where fighting was still taking place. In the end, this route was abandoned.
Nansen believed that the prisoners stuck in Turkmenistan were of their own accord actually moving north-west in fairly large numbers along the Russian railway line towards Samara on the Volga River. On the very same day that the Conference opened in Berlin, the League of Nation received an urgent telegram for the Red Cross stating that Ukraine had sent 20,000 prisoners by train to Poland which was threatening to close its border.[26]
Once back in Christiana on 25 May Nansen started work on a plan to repatriate prisoners from Central Russia through the Estonian port of Narva.[27]
Another meeting took place on 16 June at 10 Downing Street in London with members of the British Government and Leonid Krasin, the Soviet Government’s representative in London. Nansen was invited to attend since the matter of repatriation was on the agenda.
On 26 June Nansen met Maxim Litvinov, representative of the Soviet Government, and delegates of the Russian Red Cross in Copenhagen. Both the Allies and the Soviets accepted Nansen as playing a role of some importance in Western/Soviet relations because both parties needed a neutral go-between. Internal Soviet correspondence of the time refers to him as “a naïve leftist intellectual” who could easily be exploited.
The discussions in Copenhagen concerned, among other things, the opening up of as many repatriation routes as possible through Latvia and Lithuania. Following this meeting, Nansen decided that it would be profitable to visit Moscow. He travelled alone by sea and by train via Tallinn in Estonia and met Georgy Chicherin, the Soviet Foreign Minister, in Moscow.
As an opening barrage, Chicherin rejected Nansen’s credentials from the League of Nations, so Nansen asked at once to be returned to the frontier by special train. Chicherin then backed down and accepted to deal with Nansen as an individual.[28] He introduced him to Alexander Eiduk, who was in charge of the transportation of prisoners of war through an organization called Centroevak. Although Eiduk was a hard-liner and a most unsavoury character, he agreed to bring the prisoners to the border and did indeed respect his part of the deal with Nansen. The Soviets would not allow many foreigners on their territory, including the staff of the Red Cross, but were meticulous in distributing supplies earmarked for prisoners-of-war.
The Soviets declared that they would be able to send one train daily from Moscow to Narva, and perhaps another one to Björkö in Finland where the prisoners could then travel by ship to Swinemunde or Stettin. They also stated that they would run Red Cross trains between Central Russia and Siberia concentrating the prisoners on Moscow. Nansen hoped that 60,000 prisoners would be repatriated before the onset of winter. This route was already functioning and prisoners were arriving rapidly, so rapidly in fact that the Red Cross reported that the Narva Camp was soon overflowing while trains continued to arrive. Narva had become a bottleneck and it was therefore urgent to arrange more maritime transport to avoid the system breaking down. The fact that the prisoners were no longer in Russia but in Estonia meant that the Western leaders could no longer ignore them by saying that they were a Soviet responsibility.
Nansen decided to tackle the British Government about shipping. In fact, the British had impounded the German merchant fleet after the war and it was on these vessels that he had his eye. They were still manned by their German crews and could rapidly be deployed.
It should be pointed out that there were also hundreds of thousands of Russian prisoners-of-war in German camps. The ships bringing the prisoners home from Russia could then take the Russian prisoners back across the Baltic Sea in the other direction. Thus, the final total of men returned home includes not only Western Europeans held in Russia, but also Russians in German prisoner-of-war camps (i.e. soldiers of the former Tsarist Russia).
Nansen presented a report to the Council of the League of Nations in which he stated that, apart from political problems preventing the repatriation of prisoners, there were three fundamental difficulties:
The collapse of government, and especially of means of communication, in many of the territories where the prisoners were located.
The complete severance of communication between Russia and the rest of the world.
The inability of some of the governments to pay for the cost of transport for their own subjects.
In fact, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia were unable to pay for the repatriation of their own men. The only realistic option was to grant them international loans to finance transport costs.[29]
On 10 June 1920 Nansen had a meeting in London with Sir William Goode, the British Representative to the Supreme Economic Council,[30] and Sir Eric Drummond and his staff. The meeting was intended to be concerned with the immediate charting of ships. However, once this subject had been settled, it soon moved on to the subject of money, i.e. loaning money to governments to pay for the repatriation of their prisoners-of-war. Sir William Goode explained that the International Committee for Relief Credits would probably consider financing the matter if the countries concerned asked for part of the committee’s money to be used for the repatriation of their prisoners-of-war. The International Committee for Relief Credits was a body set up by the governments of the Allied powers and Western neutrals with the intention of rebuilding Europe after the war. It was decided to advise the governments concerned to apply for the first loan of £680,000 in the way proposed by Goode.
Accordingly, Nansen invited the Austrian and Hungarian Governments to apply for £220,000 (30%) each and the Czechoslovak, Yugoslav, Polish and Romanian Governments for £70,000 (10%) each. Nansen also asked the lending governments to agree to these requests.
At the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations on 14 June in London Nansen further urged members to bring pressure to bear on the governments represented on the International Committee for Relief Credits to instruct their delegates to accept Goode’s proposal. Moreover, Secretary-General Drummond wrote a letter of encouragement to the heads of each of the lending governments represented on the Committee. The letter to the British Government was addressed to the Prime Minister and its receipt was acknowledged by him.
The British representative at the meeting of the Council, Lord Curzon, in both his private and public speeches encouraged Nansen to believe that the assistance requested would be approved. Convinced that Goode’s scheme would work, and trusting in the assurances of goodwill and assistance he received from several prominent members of the British Cabinet, Nansen suspended his search for money elsewhere. He cancelled his appeals to private charities until the question of government loans had been settled.
It was therefore something of a shock when on 2 July a telegram was sent to Nansen from John Gorvin, the Secretary of the International Committee for Relief Credits, stating that the British Treasury’s view was that the money should not be diverted from its original purpose, i.e. it would not be available for the repatriation of prisoners-of-war. The British Government was not opposed to funding the repatriation, but did not feel that this committee was the appropriate agency. The French delegate took a similar view. The committee therefore recommended that delegates of lending governments should enter into direct negotiations with the League of Nations and countries requiring the repatriation of prisoners to decide how the money should be raised. This meant that Nansen was no further forward that he had been a month earlier. The loss of every day was of the greatest importance to him, particularly if the prisoners were to be repatriated by the winter of 1920–1921.
Nansen was now in a very difficult position. Either the British Government should instruct its delegate on the Relief Credits Committee to reverse his attitude—and to induce the French delegate to do the same—or they should somehow give instructions to make a comparable sum of money available to Nansen. It had already been shown that the League of Nations was not an aid organization, nor did it have a budget for such initiatives. However, Drummond had spent nineteen years working in the British Foreign Office in Whitehall and had at one time been private secretary to Arthur Balfour, an influential conservative politician. Drummond now wrote to Balfour: “I should be very grateful if you felt it possible to use your great influence with the Government on Dr Nansen’s behalf. It would be rather sad if the League failed in a question which it has assumed a certain responsibility. Would you find it practicable in the circumstances to place Dr Nansen’s suggestion before Mr Walter Long?”[31] Balfour had been British Secretary of State during the Treaty of Versailles negotiations and knew Nansen very well. According to Noel-Baker, Balfour wrote “a very strong letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer” to coincide with the Prime Minister’s Cabinet meeting on 15 July. Furthermore, Nansen sent a telegram from Tallinn in Estonia that was read out at this Cabinet meeting with considerable impact. Due to these efforts, on 29 July Nansen received the money he wanted and more—Balfour had asked for the larger amount of £850,000. Noel-Baker thought that the French Government “would follow the lead of the British” and this eventually turned out to be true. The British Government stipulated that “no portion of the fund” should be used for the repatriation of German prisoners.
Although the United Kingdom and Switzerland agreed to release the sums required—on condition that other European States did likewise—it proved difficult to actually lay hands on the cash since the British would not put any money on the table until France and Italy followed suite. Nansen met Balfour on 11 August 1920 and explained the situation. Balfour immediately contacted Austen Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Thus it was that some money was actually paid into the bank on 20 August. However, the Treasury continued to make difficulties because the other countries did not pay their part fast enough.
Nansen attended another meeting on 12 September in Kaunus, Lithuania, with representatives of Germany, Austria and the international aid agencies. Now that Nansen had been accepted by the Soviet authorities, it was decided that he should lead the repatriation efforts.
When the repatriations began a number of transit camps were set up in the USSR under the authority of Alexander Eiduk. Nansen’s team knew that success would depend upon two factors: the efficiency of the Russian railways; and the capacity of shipping in the Eastern Baltic. It turned out that the capacity of the Russian railway system was not as limited as had been anticipated, so that all those prisoners located in European Russia and Western Siberia could be repatriated via the Baltic ports. Trains brought prisoners to a gathering place in Moscow run by the German Soldiers’ Council, while one train a day took them on to ports on the Baltic coast where the Red Cross took over. Narva in Estonia quickly became overcrowded and it was apparent that the limiting factor was not the Russian railways, but the number of ships available to pick the men up.
At the beginning of August 1920, Nansen’s staff planned for four trains a week from Moscow to Narva in Estonia, two trains a week to Björkö in Finland, and two trains a week to Riga in Latvia, with each train carrying 1,000 passengers. This meant that at least 28,000 men could be repatriated per month. Most of the repatriated Russian soldiers departed from Stettin, at that time the largest German port on the Baltic. A central warehouse for both medication and clothing was located at Stettin.
After the meeting in London in June 1920, the British Admiralty made a number of ships available for a fee, but then began to make difficulties and threatened to withdraw all of the ships—even the four original ones that were already ferrying the men home. Nansen had to intervene forcefully with the British Government to prevent this from happening. By late August there was a complete change of heart by the Admiralty and the British relaxed the “red tape” so that a total of fifteen ships were in operation.[32] The fact that these seized German ships were used for repatriation was a significant element in reducing costs, since Nansen’s staff did not have to charter ships on the open market. Another fortunate circumstance was that it would have been very expensive to take out insurance on ships travelling to Russian ports, whereas this did not apply to Estonia and Finland.
For the three-day voyage, the ships were crewed by members of the German Navy and were equipped with beds, kitchens, latrines and stoves for heating. By September 1920 the repatriation operation was functioning to everyone’s satisfaction.
In the middle of all this coming and going, Philip Noel-Baker participated in the 1920 Olympic Games being held in Antwerp, Belgium. He was the captain of the British team and carried the national flag during the opening ceremony, winning a silver medal in the 1,500 metres. He is, in fact, the only person to have won an Olympic Medal and also to have been awarded a Nobel Prize.
In October 1920 the League of Nations moved its headquarters to Geneva. In his speech at the first annual Assembly of the League on 18 November 1920[33] Nansen said:
Never in my life have I been brought into touch with so formidable an amount of suffering as that which I have been called upon to endeavour to alleviate. But this suffering has been only an inevitable result of a war such as that which convulsed the world in 1914. It is right for the League to deal with questions such as that of bringing the prisoners to their homes, but the real lesson which I have learnt from the work which I have undertaken is this—that it is vital for the League to prevent for evermore a recurrence of catastrophes from which such incalculable human suffering must inevitably result.
The Secretary-General presented a report to the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations on 23 February 1921. He remarked that Nansen did not wish to lay too great a stress on the financial aspects, but the lack of money was a constant source of anxiety. Matters had not developed as desired, and it was now necessary for him to appeal to the Council for their assistance to complete the work with which he had been entrusted. A complete resumé of the position was laid before the Council so that it could consider the steps that should be taken to deal with the financial situation.
By February 1921, 280,000 prisoners of all nationalities had been returned to their respective countries. This figure is impressive inasmuch as, in spite of the great difficulties of transport during the winter months, the weekly average had been well maintained. Owing to ice, however, the ports of Narva and Björkö had been closed and it was necessary either to make use of other ports or to increase the use of railways. A sea route was organized in November from Baltischport (nowadays Paldiski in Estonia) and although at one time it was feared this route would also be closed by ice, this did not happen. Another route from Riga in Latvia was also available. There was a problem, however, in supplying food for the prisoners in transit. Since this had to be purchased on the open market, the small amounts of cash available were hardly sufficient.
Nansen had always wanted to make greater use of railways, but this ambition had been hampered by the unsettled state of affairs in some of the Baltic provinces, particularly in obtaining permission for trains to run through the “Polish corridor.”
This problem was addressed at a conference held at Riga on 17 January 1921 at which representatives of the German, Soviet, Polish, Latvian and Lithuanian Governments were present. Nansen was represented by Édouard Frick of the Red Cross. This conference was extraordinarily successful in reaching an agreement between all concerned. As a result, transportation by rail between Russia and the other countries was established. The Lithuanian, Latvian and Polish Governments gave permission for three or four trains per week to cross their territories in each direction.
These arrangements resulted in quicker repatriation and consequent economies. Ships and trains would continue working as long as necessary to carry all the men home. It was hoped that no man would be delayed by transport difficulties upon reaching his own country.
A further report was submitted by Nansen to the Council of the League of Nations.[34] In it, he said that the total number of prisoners of all nationalities repatriated by the Baltic route up to 1 June 1921 amounted to approximately 323,850 men.
Owing to the very disturbed political situation in the Black Sea and Caucasian provinces, there was considerable difficulty in obtaining reliable information concerning the numbers and whereabouts of prisoners in the region. In consequence, Nansen sent a special Red Cross mission there in December 1920 in order to look into the position. Previous to the departure of this mission, an agreement was made with the Soviet Government whereby prisoners in Turkmenistan should be collected and transported by rail to Moscow, from whence they would be channelled through the Baltic routes. This plan worked satisfactorily and about 5,000 prisoners passed through immediately. It was estimated that a further 12,000 men still remained in Turkmenistan.
The Red Cross mission reported on its activities in the Caucasian region. Following the complete breakdown of all rail transport and the political disorganization of these territories, it was impossible to deal with prisoners from these regions in the same way as those from Turkmenistan. As far as the Red Cross Mission could ascertain, there were about 15,000 prisoners waiting to take this route, of whom 2,000 were at Novorossiysk on the Black Sea. The first steamer brought 14,089 prisoners of many different nationalities from Novorossiysk to Trieste. It was reported that some prisoners, principally Austrians and Hungarians, were being forced to join various revolutionary armies within Russia, thus making it even more difficult to obtain information about the numbers to be repatriated.
According to the information available when Nansen made his preliminary estimates of the total cost of repatriation, there were about 15,000 prisoners who needed transportation from Eastern Siberia. Some US$3 million promised by the American Red Cross would allow ships to repatriate these Austrians and Hungarians. This route was obviously the most complicated and expensive of all, since the voyage from Vladivostok to Trieste took forty days. The final number of prisoners conveyed from Vladivostok was 11,080 who were all returned to their native countries.[35]
While the Russian prisoners-of-war held in Germany were receiving American aid under the leadership of Herbert Hoover, for the men held in Russia and Siberia the situation was not the same. Even though the Red Cross had a number of representatives in the USSR, they could not possibly feed and clothe all of the remaining prisoners-of-war during the winter of 1920‒1921. There was clearly the need for an organization to provide supplies to them.
Since the Russians did not recognize the League of Nations, any organization providing relief had to be politically neutral. Beyond his duties in repatriating prisoners-of-war, Nansen became involved in an independent charity organization called Nansenhilfe [Nansen Aid] which provided money, food, medicine and clothing to those held captive in Russia. This body was formally founded at the meeting of September 1920 in Kaunas, Lithuania, between Nansen, the German and Soviet authorities, and a number of non-governmental aid organizations. As usual, the Soviets took advantage of the meeting to air a number of grievances about the way they were being treated by Western governments.
Previously, on 24 August Nansen had sent a number of telegrams to non-governmental aid organizations suggesting that their scattered efforts to help prisoners in Russia would have more impact if he co-ordinated them. Thus, all the different NGOs were asked to communicate with a headquarters established in Berlin.
Moritz Schlesinger, who was in charge of the German department responsible for prisoners-of-war, realised that it would be impossible for all of the prisoners to reach home from Siberia before the winter of 1920‒1921 and therefore it was necessary to provide food, clothing and medicine to them. Nansen was of the opinion that it was more efficient to concentrate all resources on bringing the men home rather than on providing supplies. However, it was evident that not all of them could be repatriated in the short term and aid measures would raise the moral of the prisoners. The result was that Nansen would not divert money from the repatriation fund, but was prepared to accept Schlesinger’s proposal and to participate in it. Nansen contacted the Soviet authorities who accepted to distribute aid to foreign prisoners held in Russia on condition that this was under the control of Alexander Eiduk’s Centroevak organization and local Russian staff. This condition was accepted both by Nansen and Schlesinger—and also by Western public opinion.
Although the headquarters of Nansenhilfe was located in Berlin, daily operations were co-ordinated by a working group in Geneva. In Moscow there was a central distribution committee, with local committees situated in different parts of Russia. Nansenhilfe distributed money, food, clothing and medical supplies, as well as gift packages from NGOs coming from all parts of the world. Despite the fact that they would not grant entry permits for foreigners, the Soviet authorities turned out to be surprisingly co-operative and competent.
Nansen had lent his name to an organization created on German initiative—a unique event in contemporary humanitarian organizations. The choice of name reflects the aura of Nansen’s personality and the fact that he was politically neutral—he was not associated with any Western government, was even considered independent of the League of Nations and negotiated with the Soviet authorities as an individual. In this political vacuum it was believed that Nansen’s name would expedite the distribution of aid. It was also probable that the use of his name encouraged contributions from sources that otherwise might have refused to deal directly with a German initiative. Nansen was able to observe himself how aid should be distributed, which would come in useful in the very near future.
Money, clothing, food, gifts and other supplies came from a variety of sources to the 40,000 prisoners-of-war remaining in Russia. We may mention particularly the American and Canadian YMCAs, and the Hungarian Government.[36]
In addition to the work directly connected with his own plans, Nansen had been obliged to intervene in other repatriation efforts. He obtained the release and repatriation of some Americans from Russia, and also a certain number of French prisoners from Baku in Azerbaijan. The settlement of a long-standing dispute between the Greek and Bulgarian Governments over the exchange of prisoners was settled by Nansen through the dispatch of a Red Cross mission to these countries. Through Nansen’s intervention an agreement was reached between the Hungarian and Romanian Governments for a final exchange of prisoners. It was anticipated that all outstanding questions relating to prisoners-of-war in these countries would be completed by the middle of 1922.
A key player in the repatriation of prisoners-of-war was Édouard Frick. In 1918 he had been the Red Cross delegate at Petrograd in Russia and as of January 1919 he was appointed head of the new Assistance Mission for Russia.
While Nansen’s High Commission provided financial and political support, most of the practical work was carried out by the Red Cross. When the newly released prisoners reached Berlin, Björkö, Narva, Riga, Stettin or Swinemunde, they were housed in temporary accommodation managed by the Red Cross. In charge of each camp was a Swiss citizen who was a delegate of the Red Cross. Even the doctors were Swiss citizens. The Red Cross staff in each camp were responsible for supervising the prisoners, verifying their nationality, ensuring the security of the camps, and generally facilitating transportation. Upon arrival at the camps the prisoners were given a medical examination, disinfected, fed and given a clean set of clothes. Governments were wary of transmitting epidemics, both physical and ideological.
The purpose of determining the prisoners’ nationality was so that the cost of repatriation could be distributed proportionally. A significant point here is that the Red Cross issued temporary identity documents for many of the prisoners—a clear forerunner of the subsequent Nansen Passport.
The whole operation took more than two years to accomplish. In his final report to the third annual Assembly in 1922, Nansen was able to state that 427,866 prisoners of nearly thirty different nationalities had been repatriated; of these, over 250,000 were Russians.[37] The Fifth Committee paid a fitting tribute to Nansen’s achievement:
The Council of the League of Nations, by a resolution dated 11th April 1920 entrusted Dr Nansen with the duty of coordinating all the efforts which hitherto had been made to help prisoners-of-war and to achieve their repatriation. Dr Nansen, to whose active love of humanity no appeal is ever made in vain, accepted this heavy responsibility. At that time, many experienced men considered him rash; the work was so immense and the resources almost non-existent. The most optimistic considered that part only of the soldiers could be repatriated and that even this would take many years and only be achieved at enormous cost. On 1st July 1922 Dr Nansen had completed this repatriation and the funds at his disposal had not exceeded 400,000 British pounds.
When there were no ships, Nansen found ships. When the mistrust of the Soviet Government was at its height, Nansen secured its goodwill. The International Committee for Relief Credit could only furnish limited sums of money, but Nansen spent less than £1 for each life saved; all the money came in the form of loans. Nansen secured so much help, so much goodwill and so much co-operation that the mere lack of money could not stop him. One month after his appointment as High Commissioner the transport of prisoners began. By September 1920 100,000 prisoners-of-war had been repatriated and this number rose to 280,000 by February 1921. By March 1922 there remained some 4,000 stragglers, some of whom were either difficult to reach or not anxious to return. On this account the activities of the repatriation organization were maintained until 1 July 1922. The few hundred men who did not avail themselves of this opportunity could still be repatriated through the regular transport system.
Nansen himself stressed that it was a first-rate example of fruitful co-operation. He expressed his gratitude to the Red Cross for its support in all matters concerning the repatriation of prisoners-of-war. Without the network of relief workers and the infrastructure provided by the Red Cross and the other voluntary organizations, the task would have been impossible. It could even be said that the Red Cross did the work and the League of Nations took the credit. People like Philip Noel-Baker wanted to show that the League had the liberty of action that individual countries did not have, that it could serve a purpose and therefore was needed. It is evident that without Nansen’s passion and his ability to overcome obstacles, the operation would not have been as successful as it was. It is also true to say that both the Soviet and German authorities were very keen to see this operation carried out successfully and contributed to its completion. However, such was the political climate at the time that neither the Soviet nor the German Governments benefited directly from the loan arrangements.
The High Commissioner of the League of Nations, assisted by the Red Cross and other charitable organizations relieved the Allied Powers of a politically awkward task. The success of the operation to repatriate the prisoners-of-war after the First World War was the League’s first great humanitarian task and greatly enhanced the prestige of the new organization, making it widely known and admired.
Memo 184489/W/57, box R‒1474, League of Nations Archives. [All League of Nations documents are copyright: United Nations Archives, Geneva.]
Report written by Crowdy, ref. 40/3179, box R‒1574, League of Nations Archives.
Doc. 2792, box R‒1574, League of Nations Archives.
Report written by Crowdy, ref. 40/3179, box R‒1574, League of Nations Archives.
Ibid.
Minutes of second session of the Council of the League of Nations, League of Nations Archives.
Memorandum 3052, box R‒1574, League of Nations Archives.
Memorandum from Drummond to his colleagues concerning prisoners-of-war, doc. 40/3161/792, box R‒1574, League of Nations Archives.
Letter to Henderson, ref. 40/3053/2792, box R‒1574, League of Nations Archives.
Doc. 3179, box R‒1574, League of Nations Archives.
Doc. 40/3713/2729 box, R‒1475, League of Nations Archives.
Doc. 40/3653/2792, box R‒1475, League of Nations Archives.
Ibid.
Doc. 40/3808/2792, box R‒1475, League of Nations Archives.
Doc 40/3850/2792, box R‒1475, League of Nations Archives.
Ibid.
Doc. 40/3890/2792, box R‒1475, League of Nations Archives.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Huntford, R. Nansen: The Explorer as hero, p. 601. London: Abacus, 1997.
Whittaker, D.J. Fighter for Peace: Philip Noel-Baker, 1889‒1982, p. 48. York, UK: William Sessions Ltd., 1989.
Huntford, p. 602.
Nansen’s first report is dated 28 May, doc. 40/4606/2792, box R‒1476, League of Nations Archives.
Ibid.
Doc. 40/4078/2792, box R‒1474, League of Nations Archives.
Doc. 40/4459/2792, box R‒1475, League of Nations Archives.
Ibid.
Huntford, p. 606.
Doc. 40/4372/2792, box R‒1475, League of Nations Archives.
Doc. 40/4606/2792 and 40/4836/2792, box R‒1475, League of Nations Archives.
Letter from Drummond to Balfour dated 2 June 1920, ref. 40/4525/2792, box R‒1475, League of Nations Archives.
Huntford, p. 607.
Records of the first Assembly of the League of Nations, 1920, League of Nations Archives.
Missions of the third Session of the Council, League of Nations Archives.
Records of the second Assembly of the League of Nations, 1921, pp. 105‒106, League of Nations Archives.
Concerning Nansenhilfe and its work, we received much valuable information from Carl Emil Vogt.
Records of the third Assembly of the League of Nations, 1922, pp. 105‒106, League of Nations Archives.