SADF and FAPLA military areas. Map shows the SADF sector areas of responsibility and the FAPLA military regions (not to scale)
By 1975, the writing was on the wall: the Rooi Gevaar (Red Peril) – the South African popular term for communism – was knocking on newly independent Angola’s door. It was an unwelcome visitor for South Africa, which controlled neighbouring South West Africa. The 1974 coup d’état in Lisbon, Portugal, which saw the leftist Movimento das Forças Armadas (Movement of the Armed Forces) overthrow the Portuguese regime of Marcelo Caetano, had resulted in independence for Portugal’s former colonies abroad.
In Angola, a war for independence had been raging since 1961. As a Western ally, South Africa had clandestinely supported the Portuguese military in the conflict against the resistance movements fighting for independence. The main resistance, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA), had sided with Russia, the Eastern bloc leader in the Cold War, and was therefore branded as communist. The other resistance movements – Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola (National Front for the Liberation of Angola, FNLA) and União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA) – had originally also sided with the Eastern bloc.
Even before Portugal had fully withdrawn from the territory, however, friction between the three resistance movements had resulted in a split that saw them fighting one another for control of independent Angola. The three resistance leaders met several times with Portuguese authorities towards the end of 1974, and eventually agreed to end their armed conflict. On 15 January 1975, in Alvor, Portugal, they signed what became known as the Alvor Agreement, granting Angola independence on 11 November 1975 and establishing a transitional government.
This cooperative agreement was short-lived. Fighting between the military arms of the three, now political, movements – the MPLA’s Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola (People’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola, FAPLA), the FNLA’s Exército de Libertação Nacional de Angola (National Liberation Army of Angola, ELNA) and UNITA’s Forças Armadas de Libertação de Angola (Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola, FALA) – escalated quickly, and the FNLA and UNITA requested support from the West.
At America’s request, South Africa this time sided with the FNLA and UNITA to put a non-communist government in power in Angola when colonial rule officially came to an end in November. In the latter part of 1975, the South African Defence Force (SADF) therefore helped ELNA and FALA try to defeat FAPLA militarily, but the MPLA managed to seize Luanda and formed a new government with Agostinho Neto as the nation’s first president. Neto established a one-party state and his government developed further ties with the Soviet Union and other nations in the Eastern bloc, as well as other communist states, especially Cuba.
The civil war, however, continued to rage. In early 1976 the SADF left Angola due to mounting political pressure from overseas. After the withdrawal, the FNLA disintegrated, leaving the pro-Western UNITA to continue the struggle against the Marxist MPLA government on its own. For a while, with no declared war between South Africa and Angola, FAPLA was forgotten by the South Africans, even though the SADF continued to clandestinely support UNITA operations logistically in Angola as part of the South African government’s Cold War strategy.
In 1975, Colonel Jan Dirk Breytenbach of the SADF had gathered the remnants of ELNA at Mpupa in south-east Angola, where he trained them and formed them into what became known as Bravo Group. In March 1976, the South African Army authorised Colonel Breytenbach to move Bravo Group to South West Africa. Bravo Group, which would become integrated into the SADF, was tasked with fighting the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and its military arm, the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), which had been waging an insurgency war in South West Africa since 1961, infiltrating the territory from bases in Angola. In October 1976, Bravo Group became 32 Battalion.
What is commonly known as the South African Border War officially started in 1966, when the first shots between PLAN insurgents and the SADF were fired. Now, 10 years on, enough was enough. 32 Battalion would fight PLAN not only inside South West Africa, but also clandestinely in southern Angola.
The SADF had divided the northern border zone in South West Africa into military sectors, with each sector commander responsible for countering the PLAN insurgency in his operational area. Sector 10, with its headquarters at Oshakati, was responsible for Kaokoland and Ovamboland; Sector 20 (originally called 1 Military Area), with headquarters at Rundu, was responsible for the Kavango; and Sector 70, with headquarters at Katima Mulilo, for the Caprivi. Almost all the infiltration and fighting between SADF and PLAN forces took place in central Ovamboland, because 25 per cent of the population lived in that area and it bordered Angola, from where the PLAN insurgency was being launched.
In Angola, FAPLA had divided the provinces into military regions. The Cunene Province (5th Military Region) and the Cuando Cubango Province (6th Military Region) bordered the South West African operational area.
UNITA’s FALA, for their own military command-and-control purposes, had also divided Angola into 17 military regions with each region subdivided into zones.
SADF and FAPLA military areas. Map shows the SADF sector areas of responsibility and the FAPLA military regions (not to scale)
Beginning in 1977 and under the guidance of Russian and Cuban advisors, and as part of a reorganisation and training programme, FAPLA withdrew most of its forces from the areas bordering South West Africa in the 6th Military Region. This left most of its bases along the Okavango River, which it had occupied since mid-1976, either manned by a skeleton force or totally abandoned. They had little to worry about though, as FALA deployments in this specific area were nothing more than poorly trained and ill-equipped compact guerrilla companies, lacking both the capability to hold ground or defend bases should they occupy them.
By the middle of 1978, most of FAPLA’s reorganisation and training was complete. Organised in line with Soviet military doctrine, it now had motorised infantry brigades (brigadas de infantaria motorizada; BRIM) equipped with heavy weaponry, such as artillery, tanks and anti-aircraft systems, to deploy in conventional warfare, and light infantry brigades (brigadas de infantaria ligeira; BRIL) to deploy in counter-guerrilla operations.
FAPLA established its 6th Military Region headquarters in the Cuando Cubango provincial capital of Menongue, which later also hosted the main recruit training centre for southern Angola.
The FAPLA regional commander at Menongue deployed 16 Brigade (BRIM) to Cuito Cuanavale, from where it was responsible for the defence of Mavinga and the occupation of towns up to the Zambian border. Mavinga was seen as a strategic position because of its airstrip. If FALA succeeded in occupying Mavinga, it could allow clandestine logistical support to be flown in from South Africa.
At the same time, 67 Brigade (BRIL) established its headquarters at Caiundo. The brigade was tasked with conducting anti-FALA operations in the area between the Cubango (the name given to the Okavango in Angola) and Cuito rivers, and up to the border with South West Africa. It was a vast area for just one brigade to cover, but, again, FALA’s military capacity in this area was limited to guerrilla hit-and-run tactics, ambushes, sabotage and general disruption.
During their August/September 1978 offensive, 67 Brigade took the town of Savate – which lies 135 kilometres south of Caiundo and 75 kilometres north of Cuangar on the border with South West Africa – from UNITA’s FALA guerrillas, and established a battalion-sized base there. The brigade also occupied all their former bases along the Okavango and Cuito rivers as far as Mpupa. The reoccupation not only gave back the initiative to FAPLA, but also effectively cut off all resupply by road from the FALA guerrillas operating in the area.
The southern Cuando Cubango Province in 1978, showing the positions of the FAPLA brigade headquarters and the area dominated by FALA (grey). All towns outside the FALA area were occupied by FAPLA
An important strategic objective of the South African military in the Border War was to eliminate any insurgency from Angola into Kaokoland, Kavango and Caprivi. By doing this, the main effort – to clear Ovamboland – could be achieved more cost-effectively.
When the minister of defence, P.W. Botha, became South Africa’s prime minister in 1978, the country’s until-then low-level military aid to UNITA in the form of food, weapons and ammunition, and codenamed Operation Silver, escalated. In light of FAPLA’s recent reorganisation, the South African generals were of the opinion that there was no point in supplying weapons to an untrained resistance movement and that FALA soldiers should, therefore, be trained. UNITA leader and FALA supreme commander, General Jonas Savimbi, met with Botha on 10 December 1978.
A decision was made to accelerate and expand the training of the FALA guerrillas, who until then had been organised into three fighting groups. The dispersed guerrilla group numbered around 8 000 men, operated in groups of about 10 and carried only their personal weapons and occasionally explosives. They wore a combination of military uniforms and civilian clothing. The 3 000 or so men of the militia group each carried a personal weapon – typically a vintage World War II rifle, with the odd AK-47 between them – and had only a few rounds of ammunition. The compact guerrilla group, with around 4 000 men wearing various military uniforms and operating in companies of about 180 strong, was more organised and locally trained. The men carried AK-47s as personal weapons and each company had two 81-millimetre mortars and one 75-millimetre recoilless gun.
SADF Chief Staff Intelligence (CSI) Colonel Flip du Preez had been coordinating the support to UNITA from an office in Rundu since 1976. He was now given the task of converting the Dodge City military base on the Caprivi into a FALA training base. (Until early 1977, Dodge City had belonged to 32 Battalion.) Before he could complete the task, however, Du Preez was transferred to Military Intelligence Division (MID) headquarters in Pretoria, with special responsibility for Operation Silver.
On 26 December 1978, fresh from a year-long South African Army command and staff course, Commandant Marius ‘Mo’ Oelschig was posted to the Rundu office as the officer commanding (OC) the Special Tasks field office. Oelschig, a paratrooper, had served as military attaché in Luanda in the early 1970s and had experience with Angola and UNITA. He spoke fluent Portuguese, which Du Preez did not, and this gave him an advantage in communicating with the FALA commanders. Oelschig’s main responsibility was as primary liaison and executive officer for Operation Silver in the Cuando Cubango Province. He reported to Major General Jannie Geldenhuys, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of South West Africa Command, headquartered in Windhoek. Geldenhuys, in turn, was under the command of the chief of the South African Army, Lieutenant General Constand Viljoen.
The strategy regarding the nature and scope of support to UNITA was significantly influenced by Geldenhuys’s strategy for the region as a whole. At their first meeting, Oelschig received his first strategic guidelines:
In one of my first meetings with General Geldenhuys, he told me, in no uncertain terms, that he expected me, meaning UNITA, to ‘keep Sector 20’s doorstep clean’. The ensuing operational concept was to harass and interdict the lines of communication to such an extent that continued occupation by FAPLA of isolated bases like Calai, Dirico, Cuangar, Savate and Mpupa would be unsustainable.
By 1979, the South African military had changed its strategy to such an extent that the Reconnaissance Commando (the ‘recces’), 32 Battalion and, on a smaller scale, 31 Battalion (later renamed 201 Battalion) were now allowed to provide clandestine combat support to UNITA. Five years after fleeing before FAPLA and its Cuban allies, former ELNA cadres, now in the guise of a fully fledged, well-disciplined SADF military battalion (32 Battalion) led by white South Africans, would once again get the opportunity to engage their former enemy.
In line with Botha’s directives, Oelschig had set up training programmes. On 5 December 1978, 180 of FALA’s best guerrilla fighters reported to Camp Delta, a small clandestine training base on the Caprivi, to receive training in basic intelligence from South African Recce Commando instructors. Savimbi’s presidential guard would be derived from this group. At the same time, two experienced 32 Battalion officers, Captain Piet Botes and Lieutenant Des Burman, were transferred to MID. On 22 January 1979, together with six national servicemen, they began training the first 350 FALA compact guerrillas. These would form the basis of what would become FALA’s fourth group, the semi-regulars, which, by the end of June 1980, numbered around 5 000. The semi-regulars were organised into battalions based on the South African Army’s model and armed as such.
In the meantime, FALA guerrilla activities continued throughout the Cunene and Cuando Cubango provinces. The headquarters of FALA’s Colonel Samuel ‘Mwanangola’ Chiwale was at Cafima, about 100 kilometres south-east of Cassinga in the Cunene Province, which itself was controlled from a CSI field office in Oshakati. By the end of June 1980, Chiwale would be the FALA commander, with 800 compact guerrilla fighters in the area north-east of Ionde alone.
Since FAPLA’s reoccupation during its August/September offensive of the previous year, UNITA had not made any effort to upset the stalemate. It was now time for the South Africans to act. On 23 February 1979, Savimbi and Brigadier Miguel N’Zau Puna (UNITA’s secretary general) met with Du Preez and Oelschig, as well as Colonel P. Moller, Commandant J. Swart and Major H. Venter from 1 Recce Commando, at Camp Delta. The decision was made to deploy four recce commando teams of eight men each, starting in March, with the aim of assisting UNITA in operational planning, intelligence gathering, performing reconnaissance tasks, and establishing communications between the SADF and FALA. The deployment, codenamed Operation Broadcast, would entail sending two teams to Chiwale in the Cunene Province and two to support Savimbi in the Cuando Cubango Province.
FALA organisation by end of June 1980
Four days later, on 27 February, an operational planning meeting was held, again at Camp Delta, between Savimbi, N’Zau Puna, Geldenhuys and his second in command, Brigadier P.E.K. Bosman. At this meeting, two approvals were given: one for joint operations between the SADF and FALA (although with separate tasks), and the other for the provision of SADF fire support (in the form of 81-millimetre mortars) for FALA attacks. The change in SADF strategy was being clearly marked and the ball was now rolling.
On 8 March in Pretoria, Savimbi met with General Magnus Malan (chief of the SADF), Constand Viljoen and representatives from MID. At this meeting, the overall UNITA strategy and objectives for 1979 were finalised:
The Cuando Cubango border area, which was occupied by FAPLA in their offensive, should be re-taken by UNITA as a matter of priority within six weeks, with the assistance of 32 Battalion troops, if necessary, so as to provide UNITA with a safe base area in which to form the nucleus of an alternative government, as well as to restore the logistical lines and communication between south-east Angola and South West Africa. [Department of Defence Documentaion Centre, File DI/311/1/3 Silver Vol. 8, Enc. 106, 113–15.]
A decision was also made to establish an operational headquarters for UNITA at the Rundu field office, from which FALA operations could be controlled. FALA’s chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Demosthenes Amos Chilingutila, would fill this post.
Until this point, UNITA was in control of southern Angola, as the operational planning thus far had been guided by politics. Now, however, the first signs of SWAPO’s PLAN insurgents infiltrating the Kavango region of South West Africa began to surface. Intelligence reports suggested that PLAN was looking to activate the Kavango and create a foothold for further infiltration of the Mangeti – the traditional white farming area – and beyond. The area west of the Cubango River in southern Angola was uninhabited and had no water resources, making it virtually impossible for PLAN to establish bases or successfully infiltrate the Kavango from there. The insurgents would have to follow the longer route south via Beacon 34 into the military-patrolled area east of Nkongo base, along the 17˚30' cut line and, when south of the Chandelier Road, turn east to the Kavango. Not only was this a lengthy journey, but the insurgents would also risk making contact with security forces.
FAPLA’s occupation of all the towns along the Okavango River meant that PLAN had readily available bases to supply logistical support and protection. Those bases located some distance from the border, like Savate and Mpupa, were conveniently situated to serve as staging areas for PLAN operations against the SADF’s 1 Military Area (called Sector 20 from late 1979). Such insurgencies would be a major problem for the SADF, potentially leading to extended call-ups of Citizen Force units and additional budgetary allocations, things that the South African Army wanted to avoid at all costs. Therefore, while there were no indications that it was going to happen as yet, FALA, with South African support, nevertheless went on a six-week offensive.
The first action occurred on 21 March, when 600 compact guerrillas under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Kanjimi, along with Savimbi’s two recce commando teams, attacked the town of Xamavera, on the bank of the Cuito River. Recces Lieutenant A.J. Verwey and Lance Corporal J.G. Olivier were in the attack group, while the rest of their recce commando delivered fire support. Within an hour, the town was taken, but Olivier was killed and Verwey wounded. The latter concluded that the FALA guerrillas were not ready for conventional attacks and advised a long-distance mortar bombardment on the FAPLA base at Mpupa, which would hopefully result in the enemy fleeing the town as well.
In the Cunene Province, Chiwale received instructions to prepare for an attack on Savate using the 1 200 men he had grouped at Ionde. This attack, however, never materialised.
The first fully trained and equipped semi-regular FALA battalion was deployed from Dodge City to the Cuangar area between 1 and 3 April. Not long after, the 32 Battalion Reconnaissance Wing was ordered to help the FALA battalion attack the Cuangar base, to provide mortar fire support and to destroy a Soviet-manufactured Coke-type transport aircraft, which had broken down on the airfield.
After a week of rehearsals, 40 men of the 32 Battalion Recce Wing were instructed to move to the Rundu headquarters. They were to take with them civilian clothing to wear during the attack, as they would be part of the FALA battalion and South African involvement was not to be revealed. They arrived at Rundu and awaited deployment. After four days, it was decided that using so many South African soldiers in a direct attack in support of UNITA at this early stage was too sensitive, so Recce Wing’s participation was called off. On 17 April, the FALA battalion, with no South African support, successfully attacked Cuangar in a confrontation that lasted just 15 minutes. FAPLA fled, leaving behind eight vehicles and the aircraft, which was later destroyed.
Following this success, 32 Battalion’s Corporal Etienne ‘Ore’ Venter and his mortar group, assisted by recces, bombarded the Mpupa base on 19 April. As predicted, the enemy vacated the base.
Savimbi was eager to follow up with further successes. At a meeting in Rundu on 24 April – chaired by Major General F. Loods (commanding the recces) and attended by representatives from South West Africa Command, 1 Military Area, the South African Air Force (SAAF) and the Rundu field office – Savimbi said he wanted to open the logistical routes to central Angola from the south. It was decided at the meeting that the recces would become more involved in direct attacks, with the first targets being Caire and Calai.
Although a planned attack with 32 Battalion mortar support on Caire did not materialise when a final reconnaissance proved that the base was empty, Calai was successfully attacked on 19 May. Four recce commando teams, consisting of a total of 30 men and under the command of Major H. Venter, penetrated the town, killing 29 enemy soldiers. At the same time, a FALA battalion attacked an enemy base four kilometres north of Calai, killing one enemy and allowing 150 to escape. This attack signalled the last of UNITA’s activities for a while, as preparation for its national congress at Coutada do Mucusso, starting on 27 May, was already under way. Savimbi seemed to think it was more important for his commanders to attend the congress than conduct operations. In the meantime, however, training continued at Dodge City and Camp Delta.
The seasons determined and influenced the fighting in the Cuando Cubango and it was not long before a clear pattern for control of the province developed. FAPLA would launch its offensives during the dry season (June to October), which allowed for the large-scale transport of forces by road. FALA would then infiltrate and retake the towns during the rainy season (March to June), when the roads were impassable for vehicles and the thick foliage gave cover for guerrilla attacks. When the dry season came round again, and it was clear that FALA was not sufficiently trained and equipped to hold the towns it had captured, FAPLA would launch another offensive. In a meeting between Savimbi and Oelschig on 15 July 1979, it was decided that FALA’s tactics for the dry season would remain the same and that FAPLA would be allowed to reoccupy the towns.
FAPLA’s 16th and 67th brigades launched their next offensive, codenamed Operation Kilo-Kilo, in July 1979. FALA compact guerrillas concentrated on delaying the pace of the FAPLA advance by deploying ambushes, planting mines on approach routes and trying to isolate the besieged towns until such time when a full-scale attack could be launched. By the middle of July, 67 Brigade had captured Cuangar, but it quickly became evident that FAPLA had lost momentum due to the logistical difficulty of supplying their units all the way from Caiundo.
Following FAPLA’s reoccupation of the towns, FALA continued with what it was good at: using hit-and-run tactics to cut FAPLA’s logistical supplies, resulting in the brigades’ gradual starvation.
At the beginning of August, SADF staff in Pretoria identified certain strategic targets, such as bridges, in southern Angola that were to be destroyed. On 10 August, Malan was informed and gave his approval. On 18 September, Geldenhuys met with Savimbi and other high-ranking FALA officers with the objective of integrating South West Africa Command’s operational plan for southern Angola with the overall planning and strategy of Operation Silver. In line with the earlier decision taken in Pretoria, Geldenhuys asked Savimbi to attack and destroy specific targets in southern Angola.
On 24 September, two months after capturing Cuangar, FAPLA’s 67 Brigade managed to capture Calai. Three days later they also occupied Dirico, which until then had no or few military activities.
By 15 October, FALA had 1 993 trained and equipped fighters organised in almost three semi-regular battalions, which included a mortar group of 32 men fresh from training at Camp Delta. The number to be trained put tremendous pressure on Dodge City, with the result that instructions were issued to open another training base at Bwabwata, on the Caprivi. Called Tiger, this base became operational in February 1980.
FALA forces attacked Rito and Mavinga in October, but saw little success in November and December. By year end, FALA had lost the initiative and FAPLA had reoccupied all captured towns.
In 1980, FALA expanded its compact guerrilla operations west of the Cubango River and north of the border with South West Africa by sending a mixture of untrained compact guerrillas and militia to set up base north of Beacon 40 in the Anhara Capembe area. The guerrillas were logistically supported from the CSI base in Rundu. Under the cover of darkness, South African Army trucks belonging to CSI would transport supplies from the Rundu base by driving west on the Chandelier Road and then north along the 18-degree cut line into Angola.
Towns occupied by FAPLA at the beginning of 1980
From its new base, FALA slowly expanded its guerrilla activities northwards. Before long, it had established a small guerrilla presence at Tandaue, north-west of Savate, with the aim of joining up with Chiwale’s guerrilla force operating in the vicinity of Ionde. The harsh and dry landscape, as well as restricted logistical support from their southern base, made conditions almost unbearable for the guerrillas at Tandaue.
Operationally, FALA kept a low profile in the first months of the year. In January, Operation Silver’s headquarters was compelled to ask Geldenhuys to use 32 Battalion to reoccupy Dirico, because in enemy hands it was a threat to the FALA logistical route being used to supply forces east of the Cuito River from their stronghold in Mucusso. A final reconnaissance on 10 January, however, found that the FAPLA occupiers had already left Dirico, leaving only individual enemies in the base, who departed soon after. The 32 Battalion Recce Wing nevertheless completely destroyed the bridge spanning the Cuito River, cutting off the only means of crossing the river from Dirico.
On 21 January, a new FALA semi-regular battalion of 567 men started training at Dodge City. At Camp Delta, starting 30 January, French instructors presented an intelligence course to 15 students. One of the graduates was Captain Huambo ‘Wambo’ Kassito.
During a meeting in Rundu on 31 January – attended by Dr G. Viljoen (the administrator general of South West Africa), Geldenhuys, Major General D.J. Earp (the director general of operations), Bosman, Brigadier R. Badenhorst (the OC of Sector 10), Colonel G. Nel (the OC of Sector 20), someone named Du Plessis and Oelschig – the Forward Angolan Joint Management Centre (F-AJMC) was established to coordinate the strategy that had been developed for Operation Silver.
The F-AJMC was to take into consideration the strategic objectives and operational planning of both the South West Africa Command, whose name, in the meantime, had changed to the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF), and the civil administration of the administrator general’s department. It was reasoned that Operation Silver operated from South West African soil and that it was necessary to coordinate with the general security activities of the defence and civil administration in South West Africa, particularly when it came to planning and conducting operations in southern Angola.
Before the F-AJMC had a chance to meet, in mid-February FAPLA led an unexpected offensive in the Cuando Cubango Province. This was unusual because FAPLA did not normally operate during the rainy season. The Rundu field office also received intelligence from UNITA that three FAPLA battalions, supported by MiG-17 fighter jets and three Mi-8 helicopters, were operating in the area at the confluence of the Cautir and Luatuta-Capango rivers (north-east of Caiundo) with the intention of moving south along the Chissombo River to reinforce Cuangar. It was deduced that FAPLA wanted to catch off-guard FALA guerrillas in the Cuando Cubango and destroy them to achieve their 1979 objectives in the province. South African intelligence sources, however, thought it might be a reaction to a sudden upsurge in FALA attacks and ambushes between 11 and 13 February. On 11 February, a FALA battalion had attacked Baixa Longa, but failed to capture it. On 12 February, they killed eight of the enemy in an ambush on the road near Caire and, on 13 February, they bombarded Dirico after a small force from Mpupa moved down and occupied the town.
But both the South African and UNITA intelligence communities were wrong regarding the FAPLA offensive. FAPLA high command had realised the tactical impossibility of effectively occupying and supporting bases along the Okavango and Cuito rivers, and of conducting anti-FALA operations with only one brigade from a brigade headquarters at Caiundo, 210 kilometres from the border with South West Africa. The reported activity was FAPLA’s 60 Brigade (BRIL), commanded by Captain Eusébio de Brito Teixeira. Until two weeks before, 60 Brigade had been busy training in Huambo, but was now conducting operations with the objective of taking over the Savate base from 67 Brigade, which was earmarked to conduct operations from Caiundo north towards Menongue, east to Baixa Longa and west to Ionde. Teixeira’s brigade took over the bases along the Okavango River.
It was clear that better cooperation and coordination were necessary between the SADF and UNITA. For this reason, the first F-AJMC meeting, headed by the administrator general, was held on 16 March to coordinate UNITA’s plan of action with the SADF’s own concept for operations in Angola until July 1980. The first order of business pertaining to the Cuando Cubango Province and Sector 20 was that, between UNITA and the SADF, they had to secure FALA’s logistical routes into the interior of Angola. Secondly, and more importantly for the SADF’s strategy, they had to control the illegal border crossing of civilians and the PLAN infiltration into the Kavango.
A plan formed around the intended capture of Cuangar, Calai, Mpupa and Rivungo before 31 May, and the towns of Rito and Savate before 30 June. While FALA would be responsible for these attacks, recce commandos and 31, 32 and 35 battalions would provide clandestine support in the name of UNITA. To facilitate operational planning and control, a joint SADF/UNITA command-and-control committee was established in Rundu under the chairmanship of Nel, who would be assisted by Major D.W.K. ‘Des’ Lynch (OC of 301 Air Component) and Oelschig. Representing UNITA were N’Zau Puna, Lieutenant Colonel Manovakolo (operations), Major Samukuva (logistics) and Captain Kassito (intelligence).
The joint plan to regain control over the Cuando Cubango Province began to be implemented at the beginning of April. Cuangar was the strongest and best defended of the bases along the Okavango River, and so the committee decided that the attack on Cuangar should start without delay. A Dodge City–trained battalion, supported by a 32 Battalion mortar platoon, was used for the attack. From 3 to 5 April, Captain Daan de la Rey, the commanding officer of Dodge City, reconnoitred Cuangar. This was followed by an air reconnaissance on 7 April.
The attack started at first light on 14 April, and by 10:00 the town and base had been captured and secured. FALA lost 12 men. The enemy fled, leaving behind some vehicles. FALA occupied and reinforced the town, and pursued FAPLA to the Chissombo River.
The focus now shifted to Mpupa and Rivungo. On 6 April, a four-man 31 Battalion recce team had started a reconnaissance of Mpupa. When they returned on 12 April, they had only covered 50 per cent of the area. To gain more information on Mpupa, CSI approached the 32 Battalion commander, Commandant Deon Ferreira (nicknamed ‘Falcon’), and asked him to send 32 Battalion recce teams on ‘snatch’ operations to Calai and Dirico, hoping to get information from captured enemy. On the night of 26 April, the Dirico snatch went terribly wrong but the Calai one was a success and enough information was received to plan attacks.
The attack on Mpupa was nevertheless delayed, because in the first week of May it was reported – but not confirmed – that FAPLA forces were regrouping at Caire with the intention of launching a counter-attack on Cuangar. After the snatch operation, the FAPLA forces in Calai and Dirico either realised that a possible attack was forthcoming or that they were cut off from supplies at Savate after the capture of Cuangar, and they vacated their bases.
In the meantime, FAPLA’s 60 Brigade commander, Teixeira, was transferred from Savate to Cuito Cuanavale and a 23-year-old alferes (Portuguese for ensign or second lieutenant) named Daniel Rufino took his place. Rufino was not an experienced commander; he had been the brigade’s political commissar. As a teenager in 1974, he had enrolled in FAPLA and received recruit and weapons training at Comandante Kwenha’s base in the Namibe Province; thereafter, he had joined a unit in Menongue, then still Serpa Pinto. On 1 August 1975, the 18-year-old had experienced his first combat in clashes with ELNA near Menongue.
‘Inexperience dictated in combat; you see for yourself but never forget,’ says Rufino, recalling his first engagement. ‘We left in disarray. Some fled to the woods and others were captured. I also ran away.’
Rufino went to Cuito Cuanavale, where he found refuge with his family. Months later, ‘the sense of patriotism led me to return to military life,’ he said. By 1976, he was back in FAPLA.
Starting on 21 June 1976, Rufino attended a six-month political-commissar course at Comandante Gika’s military school in Luanda. On 12 January 1977, he was promoted to sub-lieutenant and placed in the 4th Military Region, Huambo Province. On 28 January 1980, he was appointed political commissar of 60 Brigade.
On 2 May, a second trained FALA semi-regular battalion was sent from Mucusso to reinforce Cuangar, which meant that only one semi-regular battalion was available for an attack on Mpupa, which was not enough. On 7 May, the joint planning committee decided instead to concentrate on Savate, because its capture would relieve the threat of a FAPLA counter-attack on Cuangar.