7

1957—Stassen’s Gaffe?

In March 1957 a second round of meetings of the UN Subcommittee on Disarmament began in London. Although there were changes in the cast of characters among the five powers represented, Stassen remained the chief US delegate and exhibited the same exuberant optimism he had displayed since his appointment. On the eve of resumption of the London talks, Stassen outlined to Dulles his program of progressive aerial inspection zones, first in Europe and the Bering Strait and then expanding to cover the entire Soviet bloc. To confirm his plans, he not only repeated these steps to Eisenhower two days later but also added a draft of a treaty that incorporated the major points of US policy. The president’s response was to agree that the draft treaty could be used “for illustrative purposes on a personal basis,” but not as the official stance. Ambiguous though Eisenhower was, his reply was sufficient for Stassen to pursue his program in his own independent way.¹

Stassen’s assumption that he had the continuing confidence of the president seems unreasonable, based on his behavior in 1956. His caper over Nixon’s vice presidency ended in failure and brought to the fore the many reservations even his closest friends had about his temperament and judgment, particularly when his own ambitions were involved.

Stassen Downgraded?

Stassen was aware in the winter of 1957 that currents in Washington were not flowing his way, as evidenced by the rumor that he would resign his position in the White House and seek the Republican nomination for governor of Pennsylvania in 1958. There was some substance to the rumor: he told his wife in May 1957, “We can hunt together for a site you like. If Pennsylvania develops as the course we wish to take. It continues to be, as far as I am concerned, a matter of keeping alternatives open.”² After his awkward encounter with the Soviet delegate to the UN Subcommittee on Disarmament in May 1957 (described later), the rumor reappeared in October 1957.³

It should have been impossible for Stassen to miss a key signal from the White House when his disarmament duties were shifted to the State Department on March 1, 1957. The experience could not have been more humiliating. As his friend and disciple Robert Matteson observed, his staff was “tossed out of the White House executive office building and pushed into an old house across the street. He was not only moved out of the White House but given a temporary office behind the State Department a mile from his staff. His authority was reduced by putting him under Mr. Dulles. Many a man has walked out of government for far less.”⁴

If Dulles could have had his way, Stassen would have been fired immediately. Dulles suggested to the president that Stassen be assigned an embassy position in Scandinavia or the Netherlands, where he would lose his position as disarmament adviser. But Eisenhower still valued Stassen’s abilities and his arms-control aspirations. Respecting Dulles’s sensibilities, he decided instead to place Stassen in the State Department under the secretary’s supervision. Knowing Stassen as he did, Dulles did not consider this a satisfactory arrangement, but he laid down some ground rules, asserting that Stassen would no longer attend regular cabinet and National Security Council meetings. Not surprisingly, Stassen replied that the president wanted him at these meetings to express a liberal (i.e., the president’s) viewpoint. Dulles had to be satisfied with a demand for Stassen’s complete loyalty to the State Department, whether or not he agreed with its policies. Specifically, he was not to communicate with the press on his own authority. However, he would keep his role as special assistant to the president on disarmament.⁵

Whatever qualms Dulles had about his new subordinate, he could take satisfaction in the reduced status of the special assistant and, by implication, his own elevated role in the disarmament process. At the meeting of the NSC on March 6, 1957, where Stassen presented his aspirations in negotiations with the Soviets, Dulles warned him that if policy matters other than those approved by the NSC were the subject of discussion, they must be pursued with great caution to avoid the possibility of appearing to make any US commitment to its allies. If such views were advanced, they had to be made on a purely personal basis unless the State Department had provided approval in advance. The NSC itself made a point of emphasizing that “draft provisions for a treaty and statute were for illustrative and planning purposes and were not submitted as proposals for action by the Council and approval the President at this time.”⁶

None of these caveats made an impression on Stassen in his capacity as chief US delegate to the UN Subcommittee on Disarmament. He interpreted the president’s careful endorsement of his mission as freedom to pursue the objectives he had outlined without interference from his superior, the secretary of state. Even though Stassen stated that his initiatives were personal and unofficial, it was predictable that members of the subcommittee, chanceries of the NATO allies, and Soviet adversaries would regard the words of the senior US official at the London meetings as the voice of the government. It is also unlikely that Dulles actually believed that Stassen would become a docile member of his team.

Although Stassen understood that he had many enemies in the administration who were pleased with the downgrading of his office, as always, looked at the positive side of his situation. The inveterate optimist saw glimpses of light in Bulganin’s correspondence with Eisenhower, and he intended to take advantage of any opening he found. Stassen had originally believed that a test ban should be embedded in a complete disarmament package. But if this objective was out of reach, Bulganin presented the alternative of aerial inspections of preselected areas.⁷ Could this be a wedge that opened the way to a more ambitious program?

Prelude to the London Talks

Bulganin’s alternative was the substance of Stassen’s proposals to Dulles and Eisenhower at the NSC meeting in March 1957. They reflected his optimism about the progress he could make with the Soviets. As noted, Eisenhower’s response was guarded but positive, while Dulles seemed to regard Stassen’s statements as evidence of acquiescence in his inferior status in the Eisenhower administration. If so, it was a miscalculation on the part of the secretary of state.

But the administration’s reception of his proposals was not the only source of his confidence as he prepared for the resumption of negotiations on disarmament. He seized on Bulganin’s agreement in January 1957 to cosponsor a US resolution, based on past proposals (including Open Skies), calling for a reconvening of the UN Disarmament Subcommittee. The resolution was passed on January 25, 1957.⁸

These signals offered enough encouragement to propel Stassen in the direction he sought. He had reason to believe that his incremental approach impacted Soviet reactions. Two Soviet representatives at the United Nations, Vasilii V. Kuznetsov and Akadii A. Sobolev, asked Lodge and Stassen four questions that suggested their willingness to accommodate US positions: (1) Would the United States clarify Eisenhower’s Geneva proposals with respect to progressive inspection? (2) In reducing the level of armed forces to 2.5 million, how much air inspection would be needed? (3) What was the US opinion on the 1.5 million final level and on Soviet proposals for a one-third reduction in Germany, notably in Warsaw Pact and NATO Pact territory? (4) What was the US reaction to the Soviet suggestion of a special session of the UN General Assembly to examine proposals concerning the prohibition of nuclear weapons?⁹

Stassen’s reactions, solicited by Lodge, were positive. He was willing to display flexibility whenever possible. Although the United States wanted to implement Eisenhower’s Geneva proposal in its entirety, he was not insisting that this was the only path. The United States would certainly consider alternative ways of achieving a credible inspection system, as long as it included aerial inspection. Reducing the 2.5 million force level would improve the climate of negotiations, but steps toward this goal would involve European armaments and the question of German reunification, which were outside the scope of these discussions. The Soviets did not extract support from either Stassen or Lodge for calling a special session of the UN General Assembly. This should come only after an agreement on its substance by the principal powers. Kuznetzov made it clear that the Soviets preferred to begin negotiations by prohibiting nuclear tests, without reference to how that prohibition would be enforced. Stassen preferred not to look at the caveats. In his judgment, these issues could lead to a sound opening step as long as adequate inspections were included.¹⁰

Stassen’s hopes of achieving positive movement on disarmament impelled him to raise with Dulles the possibility of withdrawing US troops from Germany and imposing a sharp limitation on German armament in exchange for reunification. Dulles silenced him by relating the problem of German reunification to the status of the satellite countries. Only if they were truly independent could the United States consider troop withdrawals from Europe. When Stassen asked if their independence would come about if Soviet forces were withdrawn from their territory, the secretary pointed to Czechoslovakia, which was still under Soviet control even though no Soviet troops were stationed there. He likened the problem to “disarmament ‘controls’—full of practical complexities.”¹¹ Here was an example of Dulles treating Stassen not as a rival but as a naïf.

The secretary’s skepticism rested on more than his personal differences with Stassen or his visceral distrust of Soviet behavior. He had to consider the reactions of allies, an aspect of foreign policy that often eluded Stassen. Britain was on the verge of major nuclear tests that would take place in May. To change course and precipitously endorse even a modest suspension of nuclear tests might serve as an opening gambit with the Soviets, but it could blight Anglo-American relations. When Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan met in Bermuda in March 1957, the British were assured that “continued nuclear testing is required, certainly for the present.”¹²

Stassen was prepared to ignore setbacks, since he felt that world opinion was working in his favor. He believed that a suspension of nuclear testing could be separated from the general question of disarmament. This was Stassen’s position but certainly not Dulles’s. Asked if such separation were possible, the secretary of state said it would be “rather difficult.” When Stassen presented his staff’s draft of provisions for a disarmament treaty to the NSC on March 6, Dulles was certain that “Governor Stassen would be the first person to agree that such a presentation … was merely an illustrative exposition.” The Soviets would not accept Stassen’s plan because his approach to the progressive installation of an inspection system would be perceived as too favorable to the United States. “So, while Governor Stassen’s plan was interesting and useful, it was not [at] all likely to eventuate in the near future as a reality.”¹³

This was a gentler dismissal of Stassen’s proposal than the secretary of state might have delivered. Undoubtedly, Dulles’s reaction would have been more negative had the tide of world opinion not been so strongly in favor of suspending nuclear tests. The alarm Adlai Stevenson had spread during the 1956 presidential campaign continued to have resonance in the United States. In Europe the sentiment was even more pronounced. Norway, agitated by heavy radioactive fallout from Soviet tests in the fall of 1956, proposed an agreement whereby all tests would be announced in advance, permitting international observation. Responding to these pressures, Lodge offered a five-part disarmament program to the UN General Assembly on January 14, 1957. It called for an end of the production of nuclear weapons under strict international supervision, followed by a treaty to eliminate “all nuclear test explosions.” Pro forma reductions in conventional forces were included as a version of Eisenhower’s Open Skies.¹⁴

Stassen rightly interpreted Lodge’s initiative as an endorsement of his steps toward a nuclear test ban. Colonel Andrew J. Goodpaster, Eisenhower’s staff secretary, reported Stassen’s support of a resolution “that would give continued consideration of the plan of Mr. Eisenhower … for exchanging military blueprints and mutual aerial inspection and the plan of Mr. Bulganin … for establishing control posts at strategic centers.” Lodge regarded the UN Political Committee’s subsequent vote to refer all disarmament proposals to the subcommittee as a Stassen success.

The resolution, adopted unanimously on February 14, 1957, surprisingly buried all proposals for ceasing H-bomb tests, despite the favorable mood at the United Nations for ending such tests. But the resolution included affirmative mention of Eisenhower’s Open Skies plan. “This is the first Russian vote,” Lodge informed the president, “in any way friendly to ‘open sky.’” For this achievement he gave full credit to Stassen’s role, and his remarks were more appreciative than Goodpaster’s: “The fact that Harold Stassen was able to give me prompt decisions made all the difference and I wish to pay tribute to the results he has achieved in developing a positive United States position which enables us really to take the initiative—something which was impossible under the old state of affairs.”¹⁵

Whatever disappointment Stassen felt when his office was placed in the State Department was offset by the conviction that he was on the right path to nudging the Soviets toward the US outlook on disarmament. He was certainly aware that successful negotiations would have a favorable bearing on his prospects for the presidency in 1960. He left for London with the usual ambiguous blessing of the president. The US stance on disarmament remained unresolved but sufficiently malleable to permit him the freedom he had always exercised in the past. Eisenhower was prepared to continue to explore any Soviet openings that could be found, although the caveat was clear: Stassen’s proposals would be illustrative and personal and would not bear the imprimatur of the NSC.

The new Soviet interest in a major diplomatic effort toward arms control appeared to be based largely on ongoing worries about the future of a rearmed Germany in NATO, along with concerns about the loyalty of the Warsaw bloc raised by the Polish and Hungarian uprisings in 1956. These worries could account for the concessions implicit in Bulganin’s November 17, 1956, letter to Eisenhower. From the Soviet perspective, Stassen was the perfect vehicle to exploit schisms within the Western alliance. His passion for an agreement on disarmament could be manipulated to Soviet advantage, which seemed all the more possible in light of his willingness to accept a suspension of nuclear testing—a Soviet priority.

The UN Subcommittee on Disarmament—Round 2

The State Department’s instructions on procedures for the London meetings of the UN Subcommittee on Disarmament reflected less confidence about the USSR’s change of heart than Stassen felt. He hoped to test “whether the unanimous General Assembly Resolution of February 14 presents new hope of progress.” In essence, the resolution welcomed the various proposals on disarmament submitted by UN members. Dulles had no expectation of any serious changes. He was mainly concerned about Stassen straying from his instructions. Stassen was worried that the Soviets would try to dominate the proceedings at the beginning of the session, giving the press a distorted view of Western plans. Therefore, it was suggested that the subcommittee first consider disarmament under topical headings so that the Soviet Union “does not seize the ball at the outset.”¹⁶

The presence of Valerian Zorin, the new head of the Soviet delegation, helped alleviate Stassen’s concerns. Former ambassador to Czechoslovakia and deputy prime minister of the Soviet Union, Zorin was an influential figure in the Kremlin. Even more than his colleagues, he seemed anxious to pursue a relationship with Stassen, prefigured by Khrushchev’s warmth during the Soviet reception at Claridge’s in April 1956. It was equally obvious that Stassen appreciated the relationship, as he related to Dulles: “The first two weeks of this session have been quite different than the preceding subcommittee series. There has been a lack of recriminations from the Soviets and a more sensible approach to procedures than before.” He made a point of telling his wife that the first week of meetings had been conducted in “a businesslike manner.”¹⁷

Stassen’s communications with the secretary of state indicate no sense that he was now occupying an inferior status or displaying deference to established State Department positions. Stassen appreciated his ongoing leadership on the subcommittee, and the information he provided Dulles indicated a continuation of his freewheeling activities, with no worries about their consequences in the State Department. He told Dulles about extensive talks with George Brown, the minister of defense in the shadow cabinet of the Labour Party, which was moving in the direction of the Eisenhower administration on nuclear testing policy. He did not intend to share details with the secretary of state: “His consultation with me, for his own sake, should be kept confidential.”¹⁸

He had an opportunity to present his views face-to-face to Dulles, Strauss, and representatives from the US Information Agency, CIA, and Department of Defense. The occasion was a meeting at the State Department on April 20, when Stassen was in Washington over the Easter break. Stassen recommended, without contradiction from the secretary of state, that US foreign policy objectives should be a limited first-stage agreement that did not involve an unacceptable price in return. He believed the Soviets had indicated a willingness to accept a limited moratorium on nuclear testing if complete cessation could not be achieved. There was a sense of urgency, he asserted, because France would be ready to test its weapons in two years. Stassen envisioned only a modest risk in his twelve-month suspension proposal while a nuclear inspection system was being installed. Dulles was worried that the “fourth country” (France) would continue its preparations. Stassen disagreed, based on the assumption that France would wait to see how a moratorium worked with the three nuclear powers.¹⁹

Stassen and his team were prepared to meet objections from all quarters of the Eisenhower administration. He rejected criticism from Lewis Strauss of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) that the cessation of nuclear testing would mean the end of US weapons development, since scientists would drift away from the laboratories. Stassen assured him that under his proposed system, the laboratories would remain open. He also assured the Defense representative that the first steps would include conventional reductions and provisions for the transfer of nuclear materials to peaceful uses. When Secretary Dulles examined Stassen’s proposal of a 10 percent reduction in nuclear delivery systems, he asked how it would be possible to decide how much 10 percent amounted to, since the Soviets had not provided any information about their total arms. Stassen quickly replied that the figure would be determined from the report on the armaments blueprint, which was due within the third month after the effective date of the treaty and would be verified during the remaining nine months of the year. He went on to identify concerns the United States shared with the Soviet Union, including a rearmed and “uncontrolled Germany” and nuclear weapons in the hands of “irresponsible powers.”²⁰ Stassen not only anticipated these queries from his cabinet colleagues but also implied that he had no problem classifying the Soviet Union as a “responsible” power.

None of these Easter-break exchanges was supposed go beyond discussions at this early stage. Certainly, that is how Dulles, Strauss, and Major General Herbert B. Lopez, assistant to the secretary of defense for atomic energy, considered the meeting with Stassen. But Stassen’s perspective differed from that of his colleagues. His fertile brain sought to cover all contingencies. He could envision little incentive for any country to violate a first-step agreement if one could be reached: “The risks of detection would far outweigh whatever advantage could be gained.” He looked ahead to a second stage, after Zorin returned from his consultations in the Kremlin. Although Stassen repeatedly said these were only preliminary drafts of working papers, this was a cover for the more ambitious plans he had in mind.²¹

In a free-ranging conversation with the president during the same week, Stassen observed that the Soviets were showing more seriousness than they had in the past about grappling with nuclear disarmament. And he felt he was winning arguments with Zorin. The Soviet delegate seemed prepared, he told the president, to make his country’s proposal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons “separable” from other aspects of disarmament. Zorin even accepted Stassen’s refusal to have foreign bases abolished. When Eisenhower asked whether the Soviets showed indications of being ready to accept inspection, he responded that “they have indicated willingness to give a good deal on this issue but seem genuinely worried as to whether they could sustain their regime under such circumstances.” Stassen sounded smug when he told Eisenhower that if the Soviets laid aside earlier unacceptable proposals, “we might be prepared to agree initially on less than complete air inspection throughout their country, so long as there is an undertaking to expand progressively the geographical area to be inspected.”²²

Dulles remained skeptical of Stassen’s initiatives and did not quite believe his initial disclaimer that “the obstacles are, of course, very great and the odds continue to be adverse.” He never forgot Stassen’s propensity for going off on his own, despite his apparent acceptance of his new position under the State Department’s authority. When Stassen spoke with the president on April 23 about daily meetings with his own delegation, a noon meeting of Western countries, and private bilateral meetings “from time to time as seems appropriate,” he raised eyebrows in the cabinet. Dulles claimed that he wanted to hear Stassen’s “ideas about any modifications in his existing instructions,” but he appeared to take comfort in the knowledge that no changes could be made before the NSC and the president considered them.²³

Stassen, true to form, ignored Dulles’s caveats. It was his relationship with Zorin that buttressed his optimism. The head of the Soviet delegation had indicated earlier in the month that his government had “carefully reconsidered” US proposals. As evidence of his seriousness, he asked if the Senate would ratify an agreement once it was reached. Stassen told him, “If the President and Secretary Dulles considered that the agreement was sound, and approved it, they would be able to gain the necessary support of the people and the Senate.”²⁴

This was precisely the Soviet attitude Stassen was counting on. He anticipated that the next step would be completion of the inspection arrangements. He acknowledged that if Zorin returned from Moscow with “an obstinate stand on any collateral issue, this will be sufficient signal that they will not reach an agreement.” But this was not his prognosis in April 1957.²⁵

Significant as his relationship with Zorin was, the key to progress in ending nuclear testing and advancing mutual nuclear disarmament was where Eisenhower stood on the issue and how much he trusted his special representative. The president was fully aware of the direction Stassen was heading, more so than his secretary of state. Stassen cautiously raised the possibility of a twelve-month moratorium on testing, conditioned on the stoppage of nuclear production for weapons purposes. Eisenhower was receptive but foresaw obstacles in the cabinet. In fact, he thought the United States “might be the hardest to convince on the limiting of tests.” He felt US scientists were “fascinated” by the potential outcomes offered by testing. He was also concerned about the reactions of allies, which did not occupy a central role in Stassen’s calculations. If Stassen were to succeed, the president judged that unlimited inspections were “almost essential to any disarmament agreement.”²⁶

The president’s mind-set in the spring of 1957 was inevitably influenced by the increasing tempo of opposition to nuclear testing. The firm advocacy of testing by the Atomic Energy Commission and much of the military, backed less vocally by Dulles, had an impact as well. In addition, at a meeting with Eisenhower in Bermuda in March, Britain had confirmed its intention to test an H-bomb in May. Moreover, the AEC had announced in January a series of tests at the Nevada proving grounds scheduled for late spring and early summer. The president’s support for ongoing nuclear testing was hardly wholehearted. He hoped to undo the negative publicity from resistance to a test ban by announcing publicly that the tests would be observed by independent international officials. He promised that the fallout would be reduced to a minimum.²⁷

Eisenhower’s reassuring words to the AEC were not enough to slow the momentum toward a nuclear ban. When Albert Schweitzer, the world-renowned physician and philosopher, lent his name to the antinuclear cause, it carried enormous weight. As Schweitzer told Norman Cousins, editor of the influential Saturday Review of Literature, “All people are involved, therefore the matter transcends the military interests of the testing nations. It is clearly in the human interest that the tests be stopped.” Schweitzer’s appeal encouraged US Nobel Prize winner Linus Pauling to mobilize American scientists behind the ban-the-bomb project. Congressional hearings only added fuel to the fire of opposition. The Gallup poll reflected a change in US sentiment. When asked in April whether the United States should cease testing if all other nations did so as well, 63 percent of respondents said yes, 28 percent said no, and 8 percent had no opinion. But just six months before, 56 percent had opposed a test ban; the danger of nuclear fallout was beginning to penetrate the nation’s consciousness.²⁸

That Eisenhower recognized this rising opposition to nuclear testing was obvious. It was a major factor in his support for Stassen’s initiatives, especially his proposal of a moratorium on testing. Although Dulles remained as doubtful as ever about the possibility of reaching a genuine agreement with the Soviets, he did not take the lead in opposing Stassen’s goal of halting nuclear tests. Arguably, it was not necessary. Zorin’s amiable exchanges with Stassen notwithstanding, there was a familiar deadlock at the five-nation subcommittee meeting in May. Stassen’s call for an agreement to stop the production of all nuclear weapons as a precondition to a test ban was countered by the Soviets’ demand for an immediate and unconditional cessation of all tests. Their aide-mémoire also insisted on “a solemn obligation not to use for military purposes atomic or hydrogen bombs of any type.” Given the imbalance in conventional weaponry, this requirement could have been a deal breaker had Zorin’s instructions not included an even larger inspection zone in the USSR than the United States had proposed. Optimistic as usual, Stassen saw this concession as a positive step toward nuclear disarmament.²⁹

In a letter to Dulles on May 5, Stassen indicated that he regarded the aide-mémoire as a negotiating document that provided opportunities for the United States to advance its priorities. He said he had ideas about how to proceed but would like to go over “both the substance of such a partial agreement and the negotiating method.” He was at least giving lip service to his new role in the State Department, but it was clear that his initiatives in promoting a partial test ban for twelve months would set the parameters of his discussions with the secretary of state.³⁰

Stassen’s apparent accommodation to the Soviets understandably set off alarm bells in the Pentagon and the AEC. Was he exceeding his authority by pushing ahead with plans for a partial ban on testing? Admiral Arthur M. Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, certainly thought so. His response could not have been more explicit: “We cannot trust the Russians on this or anything. The Communists have broken their word with every country with which they ever had an agreement.”³¹ Radford’s allies in the AEC and the Pentagon did their best to bolster support for continued nuclear testing, but it was too late for them to slow the momentum against it.

Dulles, well aware of popular sentiment and the president’s predilections, was fearful of just how far Stassen’s partial agreement with the Soviet Union would go. When Dulles asked him “to indicate in concrete terms the elements of the partial agreement which he thought would be acceptable to us and have some chance of achievement,” Stassen replied that, “upon the effective date of the partial agreement (estimated as July, 1958) all signators would be committed to a twelve-month moratorium on nuclear tests.” Additionally, they would be obligated to “cooperate in the design of an agreed inspection system to verify the nuclear materials cut-off commitment.” The wave of world opposition to nuclear testing had given Stassen more confidence in his plan than the circumstances warranted.³²

Stassen’s initiatives seemed to leave little room for Dulles to maneuver. The secretary could hope for delays in April arising from the need to consult the Senate about the boldness of the proposals. Seeking flaws to exploit, he could concentrate on the political impossibility of Europeans accepting nuclear-free testing zones without their approval. Moreover, a plan that split the United States, leaving some areas subject to Soviet overflights while others were not, would have no chance of ratification.³³

If Dulles seemed unable to cope with Stassen’s bold maneuvers at this point, an explanation lies in the president’s position in support of Stassen’s proposals. Radford’s outburst had infuriated Eisenhower. In a press conference on May 22, he expressed his hope for successful London talks and warned his countrymen against being “recalcitrant “or “picatunish” about arms control: “We ought to have an open mind and make it possible for others, if they are reasonable, logical men, to meet us half way so we can make these agreements.” When it became obvious that neither Radford nor Strauss shared his openness to change, the president demanded: “Something has to be done. We cannot just drift along or give up. This is a question of survival and we must put our minds at it until we can find some way of making progress. Now that’s all there is to it.” Stassen listened and took to heart Eisenhower’s obvious sympathy with his approach.³⁴

He had Dulles’s attention. When Stassen suggested that he return to Washington to talk with the secretary about implementing the partial agreement that might result from Zorin’s instructions from the Kremlin on April 26, Dulles advised against it. He said an abrupt return to Washington “would give rise to undesirable optimistic speculation.” Instead, he urged more preparatory work and recommended that details of any partial agreement be sent to the State Department. “After it has been studied then you could, if it still seems desirable, return in person.”³⁵ Though he expressed his feelings more diplomatically, the secretary of state was no less dismissive of Stassen’s proposals than his colleagues in the Pentagon and the AEC had been.

The flurry of correspondence between Stassen and the State Department in April and May disclosed his impatience for action. He claimed he had consulted with the principal allies on the subcommittee and won their informal concurrence with his ideas. Zorin’s responses, he assured them, provided a clear view of the kind of partial agreement that would be acceptable to France, West Germany, and other key nonnuclear countries and still serve US objectives without exacting an excessive price. He wanted Dulles’s authorization to tell Zorin that if the subcommittee agreed to the draft of partial measures, as a first step, the foreign ministers could sign the agreement and then, “if fruitful work appeared possible,” establish negotiating groups to seek solutions to the inevitable political problems. “Early action is needed to assure the Soviets that we are serious in these negotiations for partial agreement despite speeches from Pentagon leaders that fed Russia suspicions about U.S. intentions.” He might have added that Soviet suspicions were reinforced by their knowledge of the AEC’s and Pentagon’s opposition to ending nuclear tests.³⁶

In Stassen’s mind, however, none of these problems presented obstacles that could not be overcome. If the Senate could not tolerate Soviet inspection of specific zones in the United States, Stassen would confine the affected areas to more remote parts of the nation such as Alaska and the Aleutians, to be matched by the Kamchatka Peninsula and the Kurile Islands on the Soviet side—all north of the Arctic Circle. He understood as well the special fear of West Germany that exposing its territory to Soviet inspection would promote not disarmament but insecurity. Adenauer made this clear during a visit to Washington in May. Stassen also anticipated similar if less urgent reservations from other NATO allies. Dulles responded, “We must see if our allies would permit our going alone with Russia, and whether the Soviets would do so without a prior solution to the European problem.” He emphasized that Stassen should talk with the three Western powers to agree on a common approach with Zorin.³⁷

Although agreement with the allies was an unlikely prospect, Stassen was excited by what he took to be free rein to exploit the administration’s willingness to entertain a nuclear test ban with the Soviet Union. It would obviously involve the NATO allies, and he was eager to present the new position to the British and French immediately. He was confident that the allies would go along without serious reservations. All he had to do was win agreement among the four powers in London and then give the NATO members in Paris a background briefing.³⁸

Stassen’s staff was less sanguine about managing relations with the NATO allies. They felt that NATO Secretary-General Paul-Henri Spaak and the North Atlantic Council were “not educated” on the issues involved and demanded an unreasonable length of time to deliberate before granting their approval. C. H. Owsley expressed the annoyance of his staff colleagues when they rejected Belgium’s insistence on “fuller knowledge and participation in negotiations.” He suggested that Stassen “gently remind [the Belgians] that the Sub Committee was set up as [a] small body which could more effectively seek solution[s] of disarmament question[s].”³⁹

Dulles, too, was doubtful about the ease of dealing with the allies. Both the British and the French had nuclear ambitions that would be impacted by the new developments. As for German reactions, Stassen brushed aside potential problems by suggesting “the possibility of NATO setting up a side negotiating group in London.” Germany, he knew, “was considering sending a man to their London Embassy.” He assured Dulles that if other nations did that, “it would be a way of coordinating.” Moreover, he was convinced that Adenauer “had come close to our position that German reunification was not a prerequisite to a first step in disarmament.”⁴⁰

That this was Adenauer’s position was arguable. Dulles was aware of the danger inherent in reducing pressure on the Soviets with respect to German reunification. The thrust of Stassen’s negotiations was to undermine the rationale of the US military buildup in Germany. And while the Germans appeared to accept the first stage of a nuclear test ban, they stressed that it was a long way from a final resolution of the nuclear problem. It was obvious that Stassen underestimated German fears that the proposed European inspection zone would lead to the eventual demilitarization of Europe. Eisenhower soothed the German chancellor on May 28 during Adenauer’s visit to Washington, saying that the United States would take “no action on any matter in which one of our allies is concerned without permission of that ally.” According to historian David Tal, this gave Adenauer a de facto veto over American policy on nuclear testing. Dulles further complicated the issue by promising Adenauer that no system of inspection and control in Europe would be applied until German unification had been secured.⁴¹ Stassen was not privy to this information.

Stassen’s staff director Robert Matteson was amazed by the successes he achieved in April and May 1957: “Despite the opposition of almost all of the top advisers to the President, Stassen had succeeded in building a psychological atmosphere at home and abroad that seemed to be moving the US and U.S.S.R. towards agreement.” The president himself was caught up in the mood of this moment, expressing at his April 17 press conference his confidence in Stassen’s belief that “the atmosphere is better and there is more indication that we are really, all of us, trying to get some kind of a reasonable answer than we have been in the past.”⁴²

It was a bravura performance by the former Minnesota governor. “The sheer boldness and imaginativeness, of his approach,” Matteson gushed, “had left Stassen’s opposition flat-footed and almost speechless. In one month’s time Stassen had written into the official UN record personal ideas which went beyond anything authorized as US policy. And governments were responding to the ideas as if they were US policy.”⁴³ Eisenhower’s imprimatur was largely responsible for the atmosphere that fostered his freewheeling ways—not that the president specifically endorsed each step, since he was left in the dark on the nuances of the negotiations. Ultimately, Stassen’s hubris would lead to his departure from the administration.

Stassen’s Blunder

Stassen knew that his negotiating proposal was a working paper that could not be taken as government policy until approved by the president and the National Security Council. He had heard these warnings many times before and thought he could ignore them. As for the NATO allies, he recognized that they had to be brought up to date on the status and control of armaments.⁴⁴ These precautions did not faze Stassen. He was confident about his powers of persuasion and felt he was on the cusp of a major triumph that would serve both the nation’s interests and his own presidential prospects for 1960.

Nevertheless, Stassen knew that he still had enemies in the government and that Dulles’s apparent willingness to give him leeway had distinct limits. As so often in the past, Stassen gave his detractors sufficient ammunition to derail his plans. To forestall any disruption of his progress, he pushed ahead too quickly, only to find himself out on a limb. His presumption of an informal alliance with Zorin, whom he saw as his counterpart in the Kremlin, led him to tell Zorin that the decisions made in Washington would accelerate the path toward a partial disarmament agreement. The Soviets would be informed of the details as soon as the NATO allies had been consulted. When Zorin replied that his delegation should not be the last to know, Stassen not only reassured him but also asked for a day-long meeting between the US and Soviet delegations on May 31. In typical Stassen fashion, he acted on his own authority. To further cement his relations with Zorin, he gave the Soviet delegate the same informal memorandum provided to the Western delegations, outlining the new US policy decisions reached at the White House on May 25.⁴⁵

Junior Soviet diplomat Arkady N. Shevchenko, who served with the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in 1957, confirmed the direction Zorin was signaling, He suggested that the Soviet posture on disarmament changed considerably at this time, largely due to the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, and a number of substantial concessions to the West were made. He was convinced that Khrushchev was making a genuine effort to reach an accord with the United States “on at least some measures for limiting the arms race, and that he was moving our country in the right direction.” Shevchenko felt that Khrushchev “was making an effort to change the country’s direction in the face of resistance from those die-hard conservatives who resisted any change of the old order.”⁴⁶ If Shevchenko’s reflections are credible, Stassen’s timing in approaching Zorin seemed serendipitous.

It did not turn out that way. Stassen did not anticipate the storm of criticism that would descend on him for sharing the memorandum with Zorin. He had paid no attention to Undersecretary of State Herter’s May 30 cable: “I trust we shall receive promptly the revised basic paper incorporating May 25 decisions which you discussed with the Secretary on Sunday. President expects this to be agreed by interested agencies here and then submitted to him before you undertake detailed negotiations based on the revised policy.”⁴⁷

Stassen’s response seemed to signal full compliance: “US Del[egation] will continue to confine its activities to informal explorations and informal indications of potential; movement, drawing out the Soviets, and will not … undertake detailed negotiations based on the revised policy at this time.” He chose not to see any impropriety in his informal communications with Zorin. The key term for him was “informal,” which he considered permissive enough to take the action he did. In fact, his reply to Herter was serenely optimistic: “We are well advanced on the initial informal consultations and are pursuing them actively with the governments concerned. Preliminary reactions as favorable as could be expected.”⁴⁸ Apparently, it did not occur to him that his “informal” talks with the Soviets would be taken as settled US policy.

The essence of Stassen’s memorandum to Zorin was the president’s authorization to resume negotiations for a partial agreement as a sound first step toward disarmament. The US delegation “is further authorized to meet half-way on a reasonable basis the positions and proposals of the other members of the Subcommittee including the USSR’s.” It is worth noting that he did not concede any basic principles of the US position. The United States, he underscored, is “not willing to completely renounce the use of nuclear weapons and finds unacceptable the Soviet proposal for such a complete prohibition of use.… Thus, the United States will not agree to a partial agreement which includes such a clause or such a declaration.” On the critical issue of nuclear tests, the US delegation would consider a temporary cessation of tests, provided the USSR considered cessation of the manufacture of fissionable material for nuclear weapons.⁴⁹

There was little in his lengthy presentation that contravened US intentions, as developed a week earlier in Washington. He had the willing imprimatur of the president and the less enthusiastic backing of the secretary of state. What might be read between the lines was another matter. Would the Kremlin detect in Stassen’s zeal for accommodation a weakness that could be exploited in subsequent negotiations?

This was not a question that deterred him. He focused on the partial agreements that could be used as confidence-building measures and lead to further progress at the negotiating table. To achieve this goal, he was glad to demonstrate his understanding of Soviet sensitivities. For example: “with respect to the inspection system, the United States Delegation further comments to the Soviet Delegation that it does not contemplate an inspection system so onerous as amounts to the management control of the entire atomic economies of our respective countries.” And the US proposal also agreed with the Soviets about the dangers of a fourth power acquiring nuclear weapons: “all signatories who had not previously produced nuclear weapons would as of the effective date of the treaty voluntarily … renounce the manufacture, possession, or acquisition of nuclear weapons.”⁵⁰

The Impact

Stassen exceeded his authority no matter how cogently he explained the US problems with the Soviet response to his proposals. He violated the clear instructions of the State Department and the formal admonition from the president about consultation. The French rightfully complained that he gave an important new proposition on disarmament to the Soviets before any real consultation with the NATO allies. The lack of appropriate consultation with the allies had long been a concern of the State Department. NATO Secretary-General Spaak was especially disturbed that the memo to Zorin had been sent just a few days after Stassen and Moch had assured the North Atlantic Council that the time had come for it to prepare a Western position on a “European-Russian inspection zone.”⁵¹ In this context, the Stassen memo to Zorin came as a shock, since it had been dispatched without NATO approval.

Stung by what he considered unwarranted criticism, Stassen fired off an indignant response to Undersecretary of State Christian Herter. He denied that any new proposals to other states had been initiated, with the obvious exception of the British, French, and Canadian delegations on the subcommittee. They had been consulted on the outlines, as had the North Atlantic Council at its session in Paris. He justified the timing of his actions. Had he “further delayed any talk with the Soviet delegation there was danger of a complete breakdown in the atmosphere and the potential for a careful and constructive negotiation in line with the new US decisions might have been lost.” He dismissed British and French fears that the Soviets would use the memorandum for propaganda purposes: “The paper has been carefully drafted so as to contain more propaganda advantage to the US than to the USSR.”⁵²

As for exposing his views to Zorin without consulting the allies, he protested in his report on the four-powers meeting on June 3 that “he had no intention of discussing the informal talking paper in subcommittee at any time.” If the Soviets would not respect a “talking paper it would mean they were not really interested in reaching an agreement.” But if they were interested, “it was important that they [had] not misunderstood [the] US position.” A few days later, he reverted to his optimistic prognosis, noting that Zorin’s reactions to the informal memorandum suggested that the Soviets had moved toward the US position on nuclear testing and on the wider application of aerial inspections, even if they remain dissatisfied with the US refusal to reduce troops in NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.⁵³

His rationalizations did not appease the allies. The French government expressed its unhappiness with Stassen’s action immediately. Jules Moch, the prickly French representative on the subcommittee, was miffed, according to Herve Alphand, France’s ambassador to the United States, because Stassen had said nothing to him about his intention to send the memorandum to Zorin. Alphand objected to Stassen presenting “objectionable” new ideas to Zorin, such as the aerial inspection of Europe, to which neither France nor Germany had agreed. The French foreign ministry was sufficiently upset to consider instructing Moch not to attend future meetings of the subcommittee, or if he did attend, “he would remain completely silent.” Arguably, the nub of the problem for France was its government’s conviction that “there was no such thing as a personal approach to the Soviets who would exploit any statement or document as having official meaning.” Actually, France’s response turned out to be mild compared with Germany’s.⁵⁴

Chancellor Adenauer was livid when he heard that Stassen had given Zorin a paper that he considered a sellout to the Russians. The Americans, he feared, were “prepared to give away all of their bases” for the sake of an agreement with the Soviets. The US consul general in Bonn, Elim O’Shaughnessy, did his best to calm the chancellor, claiming he had no knowledge of such a paper being given to Zorin. More importantly, he repeated Dulles’s assurances that the United States would stand by the recent commitments made in Washington concerning phase one of the negotiations. Adenauer was supposedly comforted by this knowledge and believed it, he told O’Shaughnessy, “only because of his strong faith and trust” in Dulles.⁵⁵

Adenauer was not fully satisfied and continued to refer to the “Stassen paper,” which he knew was bound to leak to the press, implying that US policy was one thing privately and another publicly. He worried that the German public would assume their country had been duped, which would have a disastrous effect on his upcoming electoral campaign. Dulles quickly disowned Stassen’s memorandum to Zorin: “It was unauthorized and unknown to us in Washington. It exceeded his authority and as soon as the President and I learned of it we instructed Mr. Stassen to inform Mr. Zorin that it was not authorized or approved by the President or me and that its return was requested. Mr. Stassen has done this and tells us that he has Mr. Zorin’s agreement to treat the memorandum as nonexistent.” Dulles had already rebuked Stassen in much the same words the day before.⁵⁶

Of all the allies who were disturbed over Stassen’s memorandum, the British reaction most alarmed Eisenhower. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan felt betrayed. Stassen’s action “was particularly inept,” allowing the Disarmament Subcommittee “to develop a kind of life of its own without sufficient control from the Governments concerned.” As he wrote to Eisenhower, “I would not be straight with you if I tried to disguise a certain feeling of distress that we were not told in advance that this document was to be given to the Russians.… A cynical critic might say that, at the end of the process which they envisage, two great nuclear powers would remain: the United Kingdom would be prevented from developing the nuclear strength which she is just beginning to acquire.” He concluded his complaint with a reminder that whatever the final agreement, the United States had promised that “the United Kingdom’s nuclear needs would not be prejudiced.”⁵⁷

In his apology to Macmillan, the president stated how “disappointed” he had been to learn of these developments, which “took place without any knowledge or authorization of any of us here in Washington.” He was contrite when he assured Macmillan that “the cooperative spirit so obviously present at the Bermuda Conference is something I regard as of the greatest value as between our two countries and I shall do my best to preserve it and live by it.” He went on to recognize that “once the Soviets have a piece of paper in their hands from the Head of the United States Delegation, it puts you and our other allies in an awkward position, one that is not easy to address, but we shall do what we can.”⁵⁸

To his friend John Hay Whitney, the US ambassador to Britain, Eisenhower said he was “wholly on Harold Macmillan’s side—in fact I was more than angry. I dictated a telegram to Harold Macmillan which expressed my feelings in no uncertain terms.” Dulles toned it down, however, explaining that the furor was already dying down. “Nevertheless,” Eisenhower admitted, “it is going to be hard for me to forgive a man for what I believe to be, at this moment, one of the most stupid things anyone on a diplomatic mission could possibly commit.”⁵⁹

Despite the president’s distress over this gaffe, he did not fire Stassen. Eisenhower acknowledged that he had “not heard the other side of the story but on the face of things, it looks like he was more than clumsy.” The extent of Stassen’s punishment was Dulles’s report to Macmillan that, “with Presidential authority, I have had a very thorough review of disarmament procedures with Governor Stassen and that the President and I feel confident that there will be no repetition of unauthorized proceedings or uncoordinated submissions to Soviets of US position papers.”⁶⁰ This was hardly more than a slap on the wrist.

Certainly, Stassen did not behave as if he had been thoroughly chastised. Under ordinary circumstances, Stassen would not be disturbed by harsh tones of criticism, which would just pass over his head. He dutifully asked Zorin to return the informal draft, without ever acknowledging his gaffe in presenting it to the Soviet diplomat.

Dulles informed the president in a telephone conversation that Stassen appeared “very humble and contrite,” and he vowed that no such lapse would happen again. To secure this promise, the secretary of state had Julius C. Holmes, a seasoned diplomat and special assistant to the secretary of state for European affairs, monitor Stassen’s behavior in his capacity as Stassen’s deputy. Any disagreement between the two would be referred to the State Department before any action was taken. Eisenhower seemed relieved when Stassen accepted Holmes as his guardian.⁶¹

Given the many failed efforts to restrain Stassen, the question remains: why did the Eisenhower administration keep him in office? No matter how much humility he displayed about his errors, there was nothing in his past behavior to indicate that he would become a loyal subordinate to Dulles. Just two days before the telephone conversation between the secretary of state and the president, Stassen was still trying to explain away his actions. He insisted to Dulles, “My endeavor during these past two weeks was to bring the NATO Council into negotiations without causing a breakoff with the Soviet Union, and to do so carefully within my instructions on both procedure and substance.… The discussion with the Soviet Delegation took place only after the other three Western delegations had been consulted on all points.” Nothing in the discussion with the Soviets, he asserted, gave them any reason to believe that any new commitments would be unfavorable to NATO or to West Germany. Stassen concluded his letter to Dulles with the comment that both Macmillan and Adenauer had “been given erroneous briefings on the contents of the US talking paper.” He was now convinced that “they will both support our position [at] the London talks when they correctly understand it.”⁶²

There was no sense of contrition in this communication, nor any hint of misjudgment on his part. He confidently expected to continue his leadership of the US delegation at future meetings of the UN Subcommittee on Disarmament. Eisenhower and Dulles may have perceived humility in Stassen on June 11, but there is scant evidence that he took their rebukes seriously.

It is worth asking how far Stassen really departed from the agreed-on US position in May that misled both the allies and the Soviet adversary. It was more the tone than the actual message that aroused his opponents. Eisenhower’s readiness to forgive was understandable. He shared with his special assistant a wish to de-escalate the Cold War and implement disarmament measures, no matter how limited the means to accomplish this vital end. He might have expressed embarrassment over Stassen’s impulsive behavior, especially as it complicated relations with the NATO allies, but this did not change his conviction that Stassen was the appropriate person to move negotiations with the Soviets toward a satisfactory conclusion.

Dulles was less forgiving. His feud with Stassen was too long-standing for him to believe in a conversion experience. He could take satisfaction in the harsh scoldings both he and the president had delivered. Dulles’s rebuke, unlike Eisenhower’s, was intended to humiliate his rival, and the president noted that if Stassen had received such a message, he would have resigned. Stassen’s most intimate associate, Robert Matteson, was bemused by Dulles’s seeming unwillingness to fire him. Matteson assumed that “every day that goes by he wishes that he had taken the bit in the teeth and done it then.”⁶³

Stassen kept his job because the president appreciated the talents he brought to his office and chose not to remove him. There were other factors that affected the secretary of state as well as the president. Public opinion at home and abroad was growing rapidly in favor of ending nuclear testing, beyond the exhortations of the scientific community. Dulles himself began to see the usefulness of continued negotiations. Consequently, Stassen remained at his post in London.