The NEXT DAY I went into the station with my gun-concealing North Face duffle bag in tow to discuss the Shirzai initiative. Shirzai was not an unknown quantity. Even before I left Headquarters he was under consideration as a possible partner for the Agency to team up with inside Afghanistan. His deceased father had proven to be a fearless Mujahidin fighter in the war against the Soviets, earning the moniker “Shirzai” which translates into “the lion” of Kandahar. Gul Agha had also fought against the Russians and adopted his father’s moniker, but he did not have the same reputation. His detractors believed any steel in his spine had disappeared during his years living comfortably in exile in Pakistan. As a result they had given him and his followers a less flattering moniker—“the Gucci Muj.”
Because of these doubts, the burden of proof was put on Shirzai’s back. He was told that if he could raise a sizable force of fighters inside Afghanistan, and if he demonstrated the capability to undertake offensive operations against the Taliban and al-Qa’ida, he would receive full Agency assistance, to include possibly having an American team co-located with his force. The fact that I was in Islamabad to discuss the plan to send a CIA team in to join him indicated that Headquarters, specifically CTC/SO, believed Shirzai had met the challenge and was ready for a team. It also meant that 20 years after participating in the Special Forces Robin Sage exercise I was about to actually do what the training had prepared me to do.
At the station, I had the opportunity to read the Headquarters cable that outlined the plan for Foxtrot team. I learned that CTC/SO wanted Foxtrot inside Afghanistan in four days, an ambitious timeline to be sure. I met with the Deputy Chief of Station to discuss how best to accomplish the plan. To my surprise, the DCOS, in a kindly, almost fatherly way, told me that despite what the Headquarters cable said, I would not lead Foxtrot team. Instead, Mark, an experienced Station officer who knew Shirzai, would.
I didn’t really know Mark at the time other than to have talked with him for a few minutes when I was in Islamabad the first time through. He struck me as a good officer and someone with whom I’d enjoy working. But that wasn’t the point. Headquarters had left no doubt in its cable that I was to lead the team, and while Station could challenge that decision, it had no authority to overrule it.
Of equal importance, putting Mark in charge didn’t make sense. I outranked him and I had more years of operational experience than he did, including having served as a Chief of Station. I also had six years of military experience, including in Special Forces, with whom we would be closely working. Mark had zero military experience. While his knowing Shirzai was important and valuable, it simply did not trump all the other considerations regarding who was best qualified to fill the position of team leader.
I was in an awkward position. It was blatantly obvious that Station wanted its own officer to head the team, and I knew Foxtrot would have to rely heavily on the station for support, particularly in the preparation phase of the mission. I did not want to risk that support for the team by insisting that I be in charge. My goal was to get into Afghanistan, after all, not to be a team leader.
But there were principles involved here. I knew by any objective standard of measure I was better qualified to be the team leader, and Headquarters had designated me as such based on those qualifications. Short of Headquarters changing its mind, I decided I could not in good conscience accede to Station’s wishes. Doing so would be tantamount to disobeying orders, and I so advised the DCOS.
The DCOS was not expecting pushback from me on the subject, and I could see tension and defiance come over his face as I tried my best to diplomatically enumerate the factors why it did not make sense for Mark to supersede me as team leader. My final point about the station having no authority to change the team leader since CTC/SO was in charge of the operation seemed to be particularly painful for him to hear. I did, however, tell him that if Station could persuade CTC/SO to designate Mark as the team leader then I would of course abide by Headquarters’ decision and assume whatever role I was given.
While the DCOS excused himself to meet with the Chief of Station, I decided to go find Mark, as one way or another we would likely be working with each other, and we did not have much time left in Islamabad. In fact, a plane would be taking us to the airbase in Jacobabad later that afternoon. I asked someone where I could find him, and was told he was out of the office but was expected back at any minute.
“He knows he is joining Foxtrot and we are going down to Jacobabad later today, right?” I asked.
“No, I don’t think so,” an officer in the front office told me. “If you see him you might want to let him know.”
That was a hell of a note. In just a few hours we were supposed to be catching a C-130 back to Jacobabad, and Mark hadn’t even been told that he was going. When I found him I had to tell him the score.
If it was the first he had heard of the plan, Mark took the news well. He didn’t throw rocks at me anyway. I also told him for the moment it was not clear which of us would be the team leader.
“I don’t want to be the team leader,” he said.
“Well, your station wants you to be.”
Mark just shook his head and calmly headed off to pack up some clothes. I could not imagine what must have been going through his mind. I had weeks to psych myself for going into a war zone, team leader-designate or not. Mark had only four days.
By the time Mark returned and joined me at the front office, the strained atmosphere that I had felt earlier in the DCOS’ office was gone. Quite oddly, as if there had never been any issue to begin with, I was told that Station concurred in my leading team Foxtrot. I never knew if it was my arguments that changed Station’s position or some other factor, but I was thankful the leadership question was quickly resolved.