With THE FALL OF Kandahar, and Karzai’s emergence as the leader of the transitional government to come, simmering frictions between Shirzai and Karzai came to a head. A major catalyst for this was Karzai’s decision to appoint Mullah Naqib Alikhozai, the former Taliban governor of Kandahar, as the new head of security for the province. This decision enraged Shirzai. Even before we had entered Kandahar, Shirzai’s informants were reporting that Naqib was involved in helping al-Qa’ida fighters escape from the city. This was taking place even as Naqib was supposedly negotiating with Karzai the surrender of Kandahar. Shirzai would have no part of the new plan, and he threatened to challenge Karzai’s authority to appoint Naqib without his consent as the governor of Kandahar.
The growing rift between the two Pashtun leaders set off alarm bells in Washington, as it could have resulted in the splintering of the fragile, but much needed united anti-Taliban Pashtun front. To head the situation off before it became any worse, Greg and I were directed by Headquarters to meet with the two men to see if we could get them to come to a meeting of the minds on the Mullah Naqib issue.
When the meeting took place I asked Mark to come along. Throughout our time on the ground in Afghanistan, I considered him to be Foxtrot’s “Shirzai expert,” and when it came to anything of consequence involving Shirzai I wanted him to be in a position to weigh in on the issue. An ardent supporter of Shirzai, over the last several weeks Mark had grown to believe that he was not getting the credit he was due for his accomplishments in the south, and that Karzai was being favored. I actually agreed with him, but I did not take it as personally as Mark seemed to, or believe it was a deliberate decision being taken by Headquarters to disenfranchise Shirzai. To my mind the apparent favoritism was rather a natural result of Headquarters’ recognition that if he survived, Karzai, not Shirzai, would likely become the leader of Afghanistan. On this point, when there was something in the cable traffic that seemed to support Mark’s belief, and I did not seem to be affected by it, Mark would shake his head and say, “Man, you have the patience of Job.”
At the meeting, Greg took the lead, and he did not beat around the bush in laying out Washington’s concerns to the two tribal leaders. Shirzai was not cowed, however, and in the ensuing discussions made his case that Mullah Naqib was a snake and could never be trusted. In the end, Karzai agreed to look into Shirzai’s charges. Mark did not say a word throughout the meeting. I knew that he was furious that Karzai was even considering the appointment of Naqib to a government position, and I think it was everything he could do to keep his anger from showing.
Within a day or two, Karzai through his own sources confirmed Shirzai’s derogatory information about Naqib, and he agreed that Naqib would not have any position in the new government. An inter-Pashtun crisis was avoided, to Washington’s relief.