In THE ENSUING 15 plus years since Kandahar fell, seemingly much has transpired in Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai, the soft-spoken Afghan I met that dark night at the airbase in Pakistan in November 2001, has taken his place in history, after serving for over 12 years as the leader of the country. During his tenure a new constitution was put in place, and a relatively large Western-trained, centrally-controlled military was established. Today, far more children are attending school than ever before, and the overall health of Afghanistan’s people is significantly better as measured in life expectancy. From the U.S. national security perspective, the original, and in fact the only, objective at the outset of the U.S. intervention—ridding Afghanistan of al-Qa’ida—has been achieved, and was achieved quickly and early in what nonetheless has become America’s longest war. These are no doubt positive developments of which the Afghans and the thousands of foreigners, military and civilian, who have helped to make them a reality, should be proud.
These accomplishments of course did not come without costs, both human and material, and it is not only fair but also right to ask, “Was it worth it?” The death of CIA officer Mike Spann in Mazar-e-Sharif in November 2001 was only the first American casualty in Afghanistan. His death was soon to be followed by the deaths of other courageous Americans as well as soldiers and civilians from allied nations. It began with a trickle of deaths perhaps, especially in those early years from 2001 to 2004, when around 158 Americans died. But even a trickle if it continues long enough can fill a bucket, and enough buckets can fill a barrel, and so it goes and has gone in Afghanistan. From 2005 to 2013, another approximately 2,857 Americans died. From 2014 to 2016, as the U.S. military drawdown first announced by President Obama in 2011 began in earnest, casualties precipitously declined with another 116 Americans losing their lives. Small numbers perhaps, especially when compared to the conflicts in Vietnam and Korea, where in both cases the U.S. death toll reached scores of thousands. Even so, those numbers represent lost lives and much suffering for the affected families and friends.
The above numbers of course do not include the death toll of Afghans, which dwarfs the number of foreign soldiers. Nor does it include the number of wounded, many grievously, which is several times larger than the number of dead. Thus, despite these losses and the supreme sacrifices they represent, and despite the direct involvement of the militaries of the U.S. and other nations, and despite the sophistication and advanced military technology brought to bear, the old maxim “the graveyard of empires” continues to apply to Afghanistan. The land is still hard, the enemies found there are still tough, and military victory remains difficult and fleeting.
But the question remains: “Was it worth it?” Certainly the destruction of al-Qa’ida’s sanctuary in Afghanistan, from which the worst attack in history against the U.S. homeland was planned and directed, was a required action. It had to be done. But as noted previously, this was accomplished very early on, certainly by the end of 2002, if not sooner, when the cost in American lives was only a fraction of the number it has reached in the years since. If the same question were asked at that point, when al-Qa’ida had been routed and was no longer active in Afghanistan, then it would be much easier to say, “Yes, it was worth it. A few courageous men died, but it was the price that had to be paid.” But we did not stop after our goal was obtained. To give a satisfactory answer to the original question, we have to answer the additional questions of why did we stay and why so long? For it was in our lingering in Afghanistan that our greatest costs accrued.
After our initial success, and by ours I mean the U.S. and its allies, most notably the Afghans, there was clearly a need and opportunity to help get Afghanistan on its feet after many decades of war. I personally agreed with U.S. policy makers at the time that we could not simply walk away from Afghanistan as soon as our counterterrorism objective was accomplished. A stable and peaceful Afghanistan was seen as the best way to keep al-Qa’ida from regrouping in some remote corner of the country and emerging to again threaten the U.S. homeland. Afghanistan needed time to get its political house in order and to establish a functioning government, including a professional security service and military. The U.S. made the decision to help in this regard by committing additional combat troops and government advisors, and investing in the infrastructure of the country.
Although all of this went against President George W. Bush’s declaration that Afghanistan would not become a nation-building exercise, the path the U.S. undertook was not an unreasonable one. It made sense as a strategy, and as we have noted, significant achievements can be cited with much of the credit due to the policy of continued U.S. involvement. It has not, however, resulted in peace. The Taliban is still in business, conducting conventional attacks and suicide operations with regularity, and perhaps most concerning, the presence of ISIS, the new al-Qa’ida, is on the rise.
So if the strategy of continued U.S. involvement in Afghanistan was sound, why after all these years has it not resulted in a peaceful and stable country? I believe there are many factors responsible for this. One of the primary ones was the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the results of which undermined our efforts in the critical early years in Afghanistan by shifting the U.S. focus, as well as resources, towards Iraq. This no doubt boosted the morale of the Taliban and other enemies in Afghanistan. More tangibly the shift caused a slow down of critical programs intended to help establish the new Afghan government and secure the country. In effect our efforts in Afghanistan went into a hold pattern. The result has been a much longer and protracted U.S. involvement in the country. The delays in implementing programs also allowed the Taliban to reconstitute itself as a potent insurgent force. Aiding and abetting in this new rise of the Taliban was the decision to stop supporting local militias, and the “warlords” that led them, before effective government security forces could be established, trained, and deployed. With the militias losing power, the Taliban was able to fill the vacuums that were created and reassert itself in many areas of the country. The U.S. responded ultimately to the rise of the Taliban by increasing combat forces by tens of thousands. But the damage had been done. Afghans lost confidence in the ability of their government to protect them, and the number of U.S. and allied dead and wounded rose dramatically.
But there were still other consequences for Afghanistan flowing from the U.S. decision to invade Iraq. ISIS, born out of the disintegration of the Middle East that stemmed from the U.S. overthrow of Saddam Hussein, is reported to have a presence in Afghanistan. An unintended consequence of our actions, no doubt, but a consequence nonetheless. The only positive thing that can be said about this development is that for now at least, ISIS and the Taliban appear to be competitors and not allies, unlike al-Qa’ida and the Taliban. Let’s hope this competition continues, as should their relationship improve, it could be the determining factor on how long the U.S. maintains a potent military force in Afghanistan.
So, has it been worth it? Sadly, I believe for the reasons laid out above, many of the lives lost and people wounded in Afghanistan could have been avoided if the U.S. had not invaded Iraq. In the interest of full disclosure, it was an invasion I did not support at the time. But does that mean the human sacrifice and treasure spent in Afghanistan has not been worth it? I think that depends on how and when the ongoing Taliban insurgency is resolved.
If nothing else, it should be clear at this point that the Taliban as a political and military force in Afghanistan is not going away. To defeat it militarily would require far more combat forces than the U.S. and its allies are likely willing to commit, especially after so many years of war. This being the case, a negotiated peace between the Taliban and the Afghan government that includes the participation of the U.S. is the only possible solution. America’s primary goal in any such negotiation should be that no matter what form the resulting government takes, all parties to the settlement agree that no foreign extremist elements will be allowed to operate in Afghanistan. If they try to do so, the government, including any Taliban elements, will pursue them. Beyond this, all other issues and provisions should be up to the Afghan participants.
If, in the relative near future, an acceptable agreement is struck that ends the insurgency, brings peace and unity to Afghanistan, and guarantees that no extremists can gain sanctuary in the country and become a threat to the U.S. and its allies, then the answer to the question of “Has it been worth it?” is yes. Even as hard as those costs are to accept. If however, the Taliban insurgency continues with no end in sight, and particularly if ISIS is able to establish itself in Afghanistan and become a threat to the U.S., then no, it hasn’t been worth it, and we will have squandered the huge sacrifices that were made on a lost cause.