Göring’s Ground War
Under Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, despite the massive war on the Eastern Front, the Luftwaffe is best known for the Battle of Britain, the London Blitz and the desperate air battles over the Third Reich. It also played a key role in supporting Rommel in North Africa. What is not generally appreciated is that sizeable Luftwaffe units fought as ground troops in a series of key battles on the Eastern Front and in Normandy.
By the close of the winter fighting of 1941/42, German casualties on the Eastern Front had reached more than 1.6 million, not including sick, and Hitler simply did not have enough replacements. To make matters worse, the numerous components of the Wehrmacht, Heeres (army), Kriegsmarine (navy) and Luftwaffe, plus the Waffen-SS and the Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD or Reich Labour Service), were all competing for increasingly scarce recruits.
The Luftwaffe, like the Waffen-SS, had far greater recruiting appeal for the more motivated and educated Nazi youngsters. As a result it never had problems attracting recruits to its ranks. After the Battle of Britain in 1940 the Luftwaffe found itself with more ground crew than it really needed, amounting to some 170,000 surplus personnel.
By 1941, Göring’s fiefdom had expanded to almost 1,700,000 personnel, the bulk of whom were deployed in non-flying roles. The anti-aircraft branch accounted for 35 per cent (571,000) of the manpower and signal troops another 18 per cent. By late 1941, the number of men in flying units totalled 588,000, but most of these were ground support personnel or paratroops. In the summer of 1942, the German Army tried to secure them for retraining as vital infantry replacements.
Initially, when the German Army moved into the Soviet Union it was accompanied by Luftwaffe anti-aircraft or flak units. As the Red Air Force was swiftly smashed in the opening days of the invasion these were used in an anti-tank role – in particular, the Luftwaffe’s 88mm flak gun supplied the best defence against the Soviet T-34 tank. By 1943, there were two Luftwaffe flak corps, amounting to eight divisions in the Soviet Union.
During the winter of 1941/42 and the Battle for Moscow, all available units were sent to bolster Army Group Centre. Because of the presence of isolated Soviet soldiers and partisans behind German lines the Luftwaffe was obliged to form emergency units to protect its airbases, depots and signal stations. In particular, the Soviet breakthrough in mid-December 1941 threatened Yukhnov – the headquarters of the Luftwaffe’s 51st Fighter Group.
When General Eugen Meindl arrived at Yukhnov in January 1942, he brought with him the headquarters company of the Luftlande Sturmregiment and elements of the 7th Parachute Division. Rounding up all available units he soon put together a divisional size force for maintaining base security. This greatly bolstered the defence of Yukhnov and it was not long before Meindl was conducting offensive operations beyond the perimeter.
In early 1942, in an effort to help with manpower shortages the Luftwaffe formed seven field regiments. These rarely served together and were soon scattered across the Eastern Front. Elements of five of these regiments were involved in the relief of Demyansk. The relief of Kholm in the spring of 1942 saw the first engagement of a Luftwaffe Field Battalion, consisting of Luftwaffe volunteers from various units. As Kholm changed hands regularly the newly formed Meindl Division, later the 21st Luftwaffe Field Division, fought in this area throughout the summer and autumn.
Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, had it in his grasp to help the hard-pressed Army Group Centre and Army Group North on the Eastern Front, but in the name of safeguarding his own personal power base chose not to. Göring would not part with any of his forces, arguing with Hitler that transferring these ‘genuinely Nationalist Socialist’ young men would expose them ‘to an army which still has chaplains and was led by officers steeped with the traditions of the Kaiser’. Göring got his own way and instead moved to create twenty-two Luftwaffe field divisions to support the army.
Field Marshal von Manstein was aghast at Göring hoarding troops: ‘To form these excellent troops into divisions within the Luftwaffe was sheer lunacy. Where would they get the necessary close-combat training and practice in working with other formations? Where were they to get the battle experience so vital in the East? And where was the Luftwaffe to find divisional, regimental, and battalion commanders?’
General Meindl was recalled from the Eastern Front in October 1942 to organize the 13th Air Corps in Germany. Promoted to lieutenant general he was tasked with the formation of the Luftwaffe’s new divisions. Former commander of the 7th Parachute Division, General Petersen was appointed as the first inspector of these units. Typically, a Luftwaffe field division on the Eastern Front had just over 6,000 men, although actual fighting strength was half that. The divisional anti-tank battalion was equipped with 50mm and 75mm guns. Its heaviest anti-aircraft weapons were 20mm and 88mm flak guns. Whilst the latter could be used in a dual anti-tank role the flak battalion only had four and its high silhouette made it vulnerable when engaging tanks. It was obvious from the start that these units were more likely to be a liability than an asset.
Göring issued Basic Order Number 3, which stated that the Luftwaffe field divisions be deployed in the Soviet Union only on defensive missions in quiet sectors. He also called on the army to welcome these units and assist with training. The divisions came under the tactical command of the army, whilst for personnel and administrative purposes they remained under Luftwaffe control.
In December 1942, the 5th Luftwaffe Field Division was deployed along the Kuban River, near the Black Sea. The 1st Division was near the city of Novgorod, north of Lake Ilmen, the 9th was sent to support Army Group North, and the 3rd and 4th divisions moved to the Vitebsk area with Army Group Centre. Reliance on the 2nd Luftwaffe Field Division resulted in the loss of Nevel on 6 October 1943 to the Red Army. Combat around the town continued into December, involving all the available Luftwaffe field divisions. The net result was that they were left in a very vulnerable position around Vitebsk and the survivors from the 2nd Luftwaffe Field Division had to be merged with the 3rd and 4th divisions.
After this indifferent, if not poor, performance the army was finally allowed to assume full control of Göring’s ground forces in November 1943. About 250,000 Luftwaffe personnel joined the field divisions in 1942 and 1943; of these, 160,000 were transferred to the army. The first thing the army did was to replace nearly all the air force officers with regular army officers and reorganize them as regular army infantry divisions. The 1st and 3rd divisions were disbanded in January 1944, whilst the 5th and 15th were largely non-existent.
By early 1944, the Luftwaffe also had three flak corps: the 1st and 2nd corps were on the southern sector of the Eastern Front, while the 3rd was in France. Two new corps came into being in the second half of the year, but these were deployed to defend Germany. By 1944, in addition to the field divisions the Luftwaffe had a total of twenty-six flak divisions, again tying up valuable manpower.
By June 1944, the 4th and 6th Luftwaffe Field divisions were the only ones left in the central zone of the Eastern Front. Notably, these units under Lieutenant General Robert Pistorius and Major General Rudolf Peschel, respectively, were to play a key if brief role in defending Vitebsk in June 1944 in the face of Stalin’s major summer offensive, which was designed to coincide with D-Day in Normandy.
No one believed that they were up to much, with one Luftwaffe officer admitting, ‘They have the best morale. The soldiers are good, the weapons and equipment are excellent. But the training is insufficient. How can they gain experience? The division commanders were company commanders in their last assignment with the army. The majority of officers are as good as untrained in ground combat. Certainly the divisions will bravely defend their positions. But if they have to attack then it is over.’
Predictably, the 4th and 6th Luftwaffe Field divisions were lost in the maelstrom unleashed by the Red Army’s Operation Bagration. The remaining Luftwaffe ground units – the 12th and 21st – were assigned to Army Group North. These four divisions, though, were but a fraction of the manpower available. Three divisions also served in the Mediterranean in Greece and Italy. Other Luftwaffe field divisions were also assigned to Army Group B in France and fought against the Western Allies. By June 1944, there were five Luftwaffe field divisions manning the Atlantic Wall; of those in France only the 16th and 17th, totalling some 20,000 men, played prominent roles in the Normandy campaign.
Göring’s Luftwaffe field divisions could have been used as much needed infantry replacements to replenish Army Groups Centre and North on the Eastern Front; instead, under Luftwaffe control they added very little to the combat capabilities of the German Army, dissipated its already exhausted manpower and further muddled the chain of command. Hermann Göring’s private army was a vanity project that cost the German military dearly and should never have been allowed to happen. This folly can only be attributed to Hitler’s longstanding policy of divide and rule with the German armed forces. The Luftwaffe gained nothing from this whole sorry saga except the mistrust of the army at a crucial point in the war.