a.In peace time, before the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, German fighter units were based on the basic flight formation of three – the Kette – as was used in World War I. During and after the Spanish War and in World War II it was switched over to the element of four – the Schwarm. The size of the Staffel was twelve aircraft – three Schwarms – instead of four Ketten. This Staffel size was adequate for operations in the West up until 1943, when an expansion of the Staffel, Gruppe, and Geschwader level was undertaken. Already in 1941 the Geschwader Molders, J.G.51, had had a fourth Gruppe added to it, on Goring’s order, for operations on the Russian front and had found the increased size to be very helpful.
In late 1943 it was decided to increase the size of all the units in Germany and in the West. The expansion was carried through in 1943 on J.G.2 and J.G.26 and in all other Geschwader in the West and Germany by November 1944. The expansion was delayed by high losses early in 1944, by the invasion, and by the fuel shortage. By November, each Gruppe had instead of the former strength of 40 aircraft and pilots a strength of about 80. This expansion was accomplished by adding a Schwarm to each Staffel, a Staffel to each Gruppe, and a Gruppe to each Geschwader. In some cases another Staffel was added to the Geschwader headquarters further increasing the strength.
b.There were three reasons for this expansion:
(1) The individual inferiority of German aircraft
(2) The pilots demanded larger formations to combat Allied bombers and fighter escort.
(3) The operations from the Southern Front and the great number of missions flown from England necessitated an overall expansion of the fighter arm.
c.The expansion was made by enlarging old units rather than by setting up new ones for several reasons. German maintenance was so inferior that more aircraft were needed in each unit to commit any good sized force on operations. The shortage of staff officers and all overhead personnel precluded the activation of new units. When the units were expanded, the old ratio of mechanics to aircraft was maintained, so maintenance did not suffer. Very few non-flying personnel had to be added.
d.The mechanic ratio was two crew men for each aircraft, one ordnance man per aircraft, and one motor mechanic for every two aircraft. Another shortage which forced the expansion of old units rather than the creation of new ones was the lack of formation leaders.
e.Twin-engine fighter units were never expanded to 16 aircraft and pilots per Staffel, but continued with 12. The Me.262 units utilized a Staffel of 12 aircraft, consisting of four elements of three aircraft each.
The Staffel of 12 aircraft (later changed to 16) was both an operational and a housekeeping unit, but it could not operate independently due to the absence of signals and transport. It did house and mess its own personnel, though it was common for all pilots in a Gruppe to mess together if all the Staffeln were situated near each other. The Staffel had its own personnel for maintenance and servicing.
a.The T/O of a Staffel was as follows:
(1) Staffelkapitan (Hauptmann). For the first few weeks of his tour of duty as Staffel CO he was known as the Staffelfuhrer, until he was confirmed in this position. If an NCO led a Staffel because of a shortage of officers, which often occurred, he was only a temporary CO and was known as the Staffelfuhrer. The Staka (abbreviation of Staffelkapitan) had the American equivalent of a company Commanding Officer and could administer company punishment.
(2) Offizier Z.B.V. (Zur besenderen Verwendung–for special duties). This officer, non-flying, was a Hauptmann. He carried on the administrative duties of the Staffel and acted as counselor to the Staka, who was usually inexperienced on military routine. The Z.B.V. was usually a Reserve Officer or an old 1st Sergeant promoted to officer rank. He was usually the backbone of the unit.
(3) Four Officer Pilots. Their rank was Leutnant or Oberleutnant. Usually the officer shortage prevented a Staffel’s maintaining their T/O of officers. Before the expansion there were only three allotted to a Staffel beside the Staka and the Z.B.V. These officers not only had flying duties but also had special ground duties. One was the deputy formation leader, another the Technical Officer, one the Ic. (Intelligence Officer), and another in charge of military matters such as simple discipline.
(4) Ground Crew and Overhead. The mechanics, in the ratio already mentioned plus the other ground personnel, brought the personnel up to approximately 130 assigned to the expanded Staffel (100 having been assigned to the old 12 aircraft Staffel). The fighter arm in 1944 was repeatedly forced to give up portions of its personnel to the paratroops, which was detrimental to maintenance. In 1945 the situation became much worse.
(5) Twin-engine fighter units had the same organization except that they never expanded to 16 aircraft per Staffel, maintaining the old system. The Me. 262 units, J.G. 7 and K.G. 51, K.G. 54 and other twin-engine units, utilized a Staffel of twelve made up of four elements of three aircraft.
The Gruppe, made up of three or four Staffeln, was the smallest independent fighter unit. It was capable of independent operation, having housing, signals, transport, and repair units. The repair units could change wings and engines, and repair ordinary belly landings. It was usual for a Gruppe to operate together with all its Staffeln at one airfield.
The Gruppe Headquarters was itself both an administrative and operational unit, with at least one Schwarm of four aircraft.
a. The Staff of the Gruppe was made up as follows:
Kommandeur – A fighter pilot with the rank of Major.
Adjutant – A fighter pilot with the rank of Oberleutnant
Hauptmann beim Stabe (Captain on Staff) – This Officer was an older man, usually a Reservist. He was the Stabskp (Staff CO) and functioned more or less as an Operations Officer. He did not fly operationally. One of his functions was that of adviser to the young CO.
Medical Officer
Civilian Administrative Official (Beamter) – for unit administration Intelligence Officer, Ic-Hauptmann
Signals Officer – Hauptmann, also CO of the Gruppe Signals Platoon. Technical Officer – Hauptmann, sometimes from the Engineers Corps. 2 NCO pilots for flying operations with the CO and Adjutant.
Personnel of the Gruppe Headquarters were organized into a Stabskompanie with the following Platoons and indicated CO’s:
Signals Platoon – Signals Officer
Truck Platoon – NCO or Z.B.V. Officer of Kompanie
Repair Platoon – Technical Officer. This unit accomplished echelon repairs on Staffel aircraft.
Kompanie Troup – Admin. and Overhead personnel.
This Stabskp was headed by the Hauptmann beim Stabe and his assistant, the Z.B.V. officer. In the Defense of the Reich, a meteorologist was added to the Gruppe staff, and in all units there were a few mechanics to maintain the aircraft of the Gruppe Schwarm. A Gruppe Headquarters might have attached to it one or two reserve Formation Leaders to use for replacements. For travel purposes, the Gruppe had a small number of Me.108’s and Fieseler Storchs. Early in the war they might have had transport aircraft also, but these were later taken away.
b. The Gruppe Headquarters Schwarm on operations could fly in two ways, out in front of all the Staffeln or leading one Staffel which in turn led the others. In each case the Gruppenkommandeur or his substitute led the entire formation. The Schwarm might well be made up of as many as six aircraft if the Gruppe had enough aircraft, and pilots.
The Geschwader, made up of three and later of four Gruppen, usually had its headquarters at an airfield with one of its Gruppen. The Headquarters had a telephone or loud speaker communication system by which the Gruppen could be informed of the air situation.
In late 1944 and in 1945 the Geschwader Headquarters of units based in the West were usually so completely equipped that they could control their formations in the air, making a return to more decentralized interception tactics possible
a. The Staff of the Geschwader was made up as follows:
Kommodore – Oberst, fighter pilot.
Adjutant – Hauptmann, fighter pilot.
Operations Officer – Major, fighter pilot
Intelligence Officer – Hauptmann.
Signals Officer – Engineer Korps (This corps was made up of civilian Administrative Official – Beamter
Meteorologist – (A Civilian Official in uniform)
At first the Staff personnel of the Geschwader Headquarters were organized into platoons, headed by a staff platoon which did all the house-keeping for the entire unit:
Staff Platoon
Signals Platoon
Truck Platoon
Maintenance Platoon – for the maintenance of the aircraft of the Geschwader Headquarters.
(1) Later on in 1941, the introduction of radar and more complicated signal hook-ups forced the expanding of the Signals Platoon into a company, which then took over the administrative duties, as follows:
Signals Company – |
Responsible for signals and also for administration and housekeeping for the Geschwader Headquarters. |
Staff Platoon – |
Handling operational headquarters work. |
Truck Platoon – |
Furnishing transport for the Headquarters only, not for Gruppen, except in emergency. |
Maintenance Platoon.
Like the Gruppen, the Geschwader might have attached to its headquarters a few surplus formation leaders in case of casualties.
(2) The Geschwader Headquarters personnel, including the Kommodore, Adjutant, Operations Officer, and any surplus pilots, officers or NCO’s, flew operations either in a Schwarm or, in some cases, in a Staffel of their own. The Kommodore usually flew a great many missions. With his Schwarm he might lead a Gruppe, the whole Geschwader, or might attach it to a Staffel and lead the formation from that position
(3) The Geschwader Headquarters had a number of transport and courier aircraft for its own use. On the English Channel they had some Air-Sea Rescue aircraft, which could drop emergency equipment into the water. In Russia they had ski-fitted snow rescue aircraft, and in Africa, desert rescue Storch aircraft.
The Jagddivision, a large territorial command controlling day fighters, night fighters and Zerstorer (twin-engine fighters) varied considerably in organization. Although each had a comparable area of operations, some never had any appreciable number of fighters after they were organized in 1943. The average Divisionen (discussed here) were J.D. 1, 2, or 3, based in Germany and mainly concerned with defense against strategic bombing, by day and night. Fighter units on the Russian front were under the control of Fliegerdivisionen, and not Jagddivisionen.
a.A Division had a Staff and a Headquarters of 6000 to 7000 people. Its main complement was Signals Personnel operating all the various Radar and fighter control sites in the Division Area. It had little to do with the building and maintenance of ground installations, which were the responsibility of the other territorial commands, the Luftgau. The Division could, however, check up on ground matters insofar as they affected operations and insure the efficiency of the Luftflotten controlling the Jagddivisionen, the Jagdkorps, and the Luftgau. Supply was similarly handled by the Luftgau and checked on by the Divisionen.
b.The Division was mainly an operational command, concerned with the detailed planning, control, and conduct of missions. It exercised absolute military control of the Geschwader deployed within its borders. In addition, it tended its own signals system. It had almost no inspection function and depended on periodic conferences with the Geschwader and Gruppe CO for maintaining contact with its operational units. It could, with the Korps’ permission, transfer units within its own borders, but transfers of units from one Division to another was a power reserved, rather stupidly, by the Luftwaffe Operations Staff and Goring. The Jagdkorps from time to time exercised this power to facilitate operations in bad weather and so on, but were severely reprimanded.
c.Division Staff – The Division had a complete Staff with positions corresponding to the USAAF’s A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, and so on, but only the most important operational staff heads will be considered here.
(1) Division CO: A General, usually an old fighter man from World War I, but in 1944 some young Geschwader CO’s were given the job and attained high success. Frequently the CO had been a Jafu. In choosing men for the job, Goring laid more emphasis on dynamic personality than on fighter experience. It took at least 6 months for a CO to get enough experience to be really good, but Goring often replaced them too soon.
(2) Chief of Staff: Oberst and General Staff Officer. There was a great lack of fighter men with General Staff Training, which seriously hindered operations.
(3) Day Operations Officer (Ia Tag): Major. There was also a lack of these with both General Staff training and combat experience.
(4) Night Operations Officer: There were usually more of these available, because night fighting was not so heavy and there were plenty of experienced night fighter pilots.
(5) Intelligence Officer: Not a General Staff position.
(6) Signals Commander (Divisions Nachrichten Fuhrer): A very important officer, in charge of the Signals Regiment of the Division. If there was only one, he was its CO. These officers were either very good or very poor. Their main trouble was age, since Martini, Chief of Signals of the GAF, disliked to replace his old experienced men.
d. Changes in Organization – There were two great additions to the powers of the divisions which greatly affected the Defense of Germany. They related to Air Raid Reporting and to Flak.
(1) Air Raid Reporting – Before 1943 three agencies, the Jagddivisionen, the Observer Corps under the Luftgau and the Listening Service under the Chief of Signals each kept a situation map at a central headquarters. The Divisionen had control of radar, the most accurate and reliable form of reporting, but the Observer Korps under the Luftgau had the right to sound all the air raid alarms based on visual reports. Many conflicts and errors arose in this way. In 1943 the Divisionen were made the agencies responsible for formulating the final air situation picture. All Observer Corps and radar plots were channeled to the Headquarters of the various Divisionen, which correlated them (‘plot fusion’) and informed the Luftgau of the situation. The Luftgau then put out the raid alarms accordingly. This change at first caused much friction with the Luftgau, who had their share of empire builders. The Chief of Signals with his listening service still kept his own situation map.
(2) Flak: Cooperation of flak and fighters was up to the Luftflotten, which were so far removed from the scene of operational command that they never managed to effect active cooperation during missions. The result was that fighters were fired on whenever they entered the heavy flak zones. The flak authorities felt that they should be allowed to shoot down whatever flew into these zones, since IFF equipment was not too reliable. But night operations and bad weather flying made it impossible for fighters to navigate so exactly that they could avoid these zones, so cooperation was an absolute necessity. One proposed solution was that the flak and fighters be combined under Luftverteidigungsdivisionen (Air Defense Divisions) but staff work would have been impractical because of size and friction, so it was decided to effectively subordinate the flak to the fighters and attach a flak operations officer to each Jagddivision, to direct the flak during missions. The CO’s of the Flakdivisionen were aggrieved by this and sent only representatives to the fighter Divisionen in some cases. Disputes had to be referred to higher flak operations COs which were attached at the same time to the Jagdkorps, and in some cases disputes during missions were carried up to Weise, CO of Luftflotte Reich. Cooperation depended largely on the personalities of the flak officer and the Jagddivision CO and was in some cases very good. The type of fighter control exercised by the Divisionen headquarters was too exact and detained, and in late 1944 it was altered to give the Geschwader CO more authority and tactical initiative.
There were only two Jagdkorps, I and II, with J.K.I being the most important. It controlled the units based in Germany for the defense of the Reich, while J.K.II controlled the units based in the West, which did not assume importance until the invasion. The Jagdkorps were not set up until 1943.
a.The Korps was, like the Division, an operational command, but its powers were exercised in supervision and planning rather than actual control during missions. Only in case something unforeseen happened did they cut in on mission control. The Korps attempted to control the deployment of units in its area, but this function was usually retained by the Fuhrungs Stab (GAF Operations Staff) which otherwise would have had nothing to do with the fighter air arm.
b.The Korps carried on a running analysis for all Divisionen under it on enemy intentions, based on weather forecasts and the listening and radar services. It received the Division readiness reports and dictated broad lines of strategic fighters’ employment to coordinate the work of the Divisionen. The Jagdkorps (though subordinate to Luftflotte Reich and Luftflotte III in the cases of J.K.I and J.K.II respectively) were the most important commands in the GAF. The Luftflotten were too far removed from the operational scene to know much about fighter operations.
c.It was the duty of the Jagdkorps to marshal fighter forces against bomber raids by day and night and to supervise broadly the tactics employed. Beppo-Schmid, head of J.K.I, was not even a pilot, much less a fighter pilot, but was capable of energy and vigor. He asserted himself, grasped the situation in an amazingly short time, and was a good CO, although in Galland’s view he furthered the false defensive tactics which were very detrimental to the fighter arm.
d.The Korps had very large headquarters. J.K.II was at Chantilly and J.K.I in Holland, then in Brunswick, Waggum and last at Treuen, Brietzen, south of Berlin. The Staff was organized like that of a big Division, but there was no staff of fighter control officers to control the Geschwaders in the air. The Korps maintained a situation map and contacted the Divisionen when changes were to be made in the control of operations. One of the most important functions of the Korps was supervising the change of control from one Division to another when fighter formations passed from the range of the control equipment of one Division.
There were six Luftflotten in the GAF. Each Luftflotte was a territorial command and controlled the Luftgau, Flak, Signals, fighters, bombers and so on.
a.The Staff of the Luftflotten had a Flak Section, a flying Section and a ground Section. Galland always felt that the reorganization of Luftflotte Reich was imperative. He would have absorbed into it Jagdkorps I and have had in Luftflotte a fighter section, Flak section, and ground section. Thus, the Flotte CO and his three section heads could have conferred daily and solved problems of vital operational importance. As it was, fighter operations were in effect controlled from Jagdkorps level, while Flak operations were controlled from Luftflotte level. In addition, Luftflotte Reich had under it, until 1944, all training units and replacements pools, which were later given to a special unit without territorial command, Luftflotte 10. The primary responsibility of the Flotten was the coordination of operations of the various branches, without attempting much detained planning. Luftflotte 3 had been mainly concerned with attacks on England, and Luftflotte Reich was a Flak command before it had any fighters in it. Luftflotte 3 retained its Flak command and most of the actual planning and conduct of fighter operations was taken over for Germany by Jagdkorps I.