In the German Air Force the Me.110, Me.210, and Me.410 were called Zerstörer. (literally Destroyer) The basic idea originated with General Wever, around 1935–36, for the use of such aircraft as long range fighters with the main missions of bomber escort and strategic fighter missions beyond the penetrating depth of single engine fighters. Very early (1939) the idea of fast bomber missions with the Zerstörer aircraft was introduced. In this a basic mistake was made. Only the performance of the aircraft (speed, climbing, ability, maximum altitude, and maneuverability) determined whether a Zerstörer aircraft could prevail against a SE fighter. Stronger armament, rearward armament, two engines, instruments, equipment for blind flying and radio navigation, a two man crew and finally greater range were all of minor importance in this question. Our Zerstörer aircraft Me.110 (various series), Me.210, and Me.410 were always inferior to German SE fighters at any given time. Only the Dornier Do.335 would have provided an effective combat capability and would probably, by its improved technical performance, have become a Zerstörer aircraft capable of competing with enemy fighters. The Zerstörer must therefore at least perform as well as a fighter. Since this was not the case it could not achieve its goal in the operations conceived for it.
In the planning at the time, the TE Zerstörer was absolutely determined upon as the long range fighter. Thus the need for an SE long range fighter with good performance (like the Mustang) was not considered in time. The proof for these contentions was provided in the Battle of Britain.
After this began the dissipation of the operations of Zerstörer units, but not of the aircraft.
The uses of these so-called Multi-Purpose aircraft now came under:
(1) Ground Attack...........................................Gen. der Schlachtflieger
(2) Fast Bomber Missions (In Army and Navy areas)............Gen. der Schlachtflieger
(3) Fast Bomber Missions on a strategic basis (Me.410 night raids on England) (Bombers).....................................Gen. der Kampfflieger
(4) Staff Staffeln of Stuka Geschwader............Gen. der Kampfflieger
(5) Reconnaissance Missions.......................Gen. der Aufklärer (Recce)
(6) Night Fighter Missions...................Gen. der Jagdflieger (Fighters)
(7) Day Missions in Defense of the Reich..............Gen. der Jadgflieger
Thus there resulted a complete dissipation of the TE forces and nothing was left of the original intended use.
What was still more decisive, however, was the fact that then and for the foreseeable future no fighter with good performance and long endurance for air defense and strategic operations was available.
Zerstörergeschwader had 2–3 Gruppen. Each Gruppe had 3 Staffeln and a Staff Company.
Every Staffel had 12 aircraft.
The Geschwader had a Signals Company (motorized)
This organization, similar to that of fighter units, was introduced only at the end of 1942. Until then, in accordance with the planned strategic use of Zerstörer, the units were dependent on Airfield Servicing Companies, as were bomber and Stuka units. An increase in the unit strength of the Zerstörer (as in fighter units) was never planned.
(1) Polish Campaign Here the single completely equipped Zerstörergruppe, I/Z.G.76, was in action. Its peace time base was Olmutz and its CO was Hptm. Reincke, who was later killed in Norway. It scored some successes with very small losses, since no equal opponent appeared. The successes of the Zerstörer in low level attacks are worthy of special notice. After the Polish campaign the unit transferred to Jever near Wilhelmshaven. Its job was protecting the coastal area and also the pursuit of the enemy over the ocean as far as possible. Its missions included attacks off Norway and the air warfare over the North Sea coast in December 1939. The victories of the Zerstörer were about the same as those of the SE fighters.
Demands for Zerstörer were increased on the basis of the operations planned. In January, Göring personally recruited pilots from SE fighter units for the Zerstörer Arm as an elite unit.
(2) Norway and Denmark One Zerstörer unit took part in this campaign, namely I/Z.G.76. The newly created unit I/Z.G.l under Hptm. Falk was given occupation duty.
In the Norwegian Campaign, after the appearance of the first British aircraft carrier fighters in the Narvik area, one Staffel of I/Z.G.76, equipped with 900 liter belly tanks, was moved up to Trondheim and escorted bomber formations from there to the Narvik area. Several victories were scored against the Blackburn Skua which appeared there for the first time.
For operational airfields I/Z.G.76 used Stavanger-Sola, and I/Z.G.1 used Aalborg-West.
I/Z.G.1 was transferred to Kirchhellen shortly before the beginning of the campaign in the West.
(3) Campaign in the West Meanwhile the production of the Me.110 had been further raised in order that new units could be equipped. Thus, the following units were ready for the campaign:
I/Z.G.1 at Kirchhellen
II/Z.G.1 at Buer
Z.G.26 (with three Gruppen) at Crailsheim under Oberst Huth.
III/Z.G.76 (location not known) – under Oberst Grabmann.
In the first 10 days of the campaign these units scored considerable success. They shot down many of the few Belgian and Dutch fighters in the air and proved especially good in low level attacks against airfields, anti-aircraft positions, and troop columns. After initial uncertainty, French Morane fighters resolved to attack Me.110s and discovered that Zerstörer were easily shot down. From this time on German losses increased.
Before the beginning of the Battle of Britain, an organizational change took place. I/Z.G.1 was transferred from the Zerstörer arm and, as I/N.J.G.1, founded the German night fighter arm. II/Z.G.1 was renamed II/Z.G.76 and now consisted of three complete Gruppen.
(4) Battle of Britain Here were used Z.G.26 (with 3 Gruppen), Z.G.76 (with 2 Gruppen), and Erprobungsgruppe 210 (Experimental Gruppe) with Hptm. Rubensdörffer as CO. Z.G.76 was at Laval and Le Mans. The missions for England departed over the Channel Islands, Cherbourg, and Caen. Z.G.26 was in the Lille area.
After about 6 weeks’ combat the Gruppen went back to Germany for refreshing after losses of about 20 crews per Gruppe. About 10–12 experienced crews were left per Gruppe.
On one occasion I/Z.G.76 took part in the Battle of Britain from Stavanger. It was supposed to escort K.G.26 on a bombing raid against Driffield from Norway. On this mission bitter fighting with Spitfires resulted, south of the mouth of the Tyne, and the Gruppe lost its CO, Hptm. Restemeyer, two Staffel CO’s, and 12 good crews. To replace I/Z.G.76 which had thus been torn to pieces, II/Z.G.76, which had been re-set up in Germany, came to Norway in September 1940. Here it took over the fighter and escort jobs, flying and operating in Staffeln and Schwärme. Its fields were from Bardufoss to Christiansand.
(5) Eastern Campaign For this campaign, Erprobungsgruppe 210 was reorganized into Schnellkampfgeschwader 210 (Fast Bomber Geschwader) under the General der Kampfflieger, with Major Storpe, as its CO. It had two Gruppen. I/S.K.10 was the former Erprobungsgruppe 210 and II/S.K.G.210 was the former II/Z.G.76, which had returned from Norway. Still another Gruppe of Z.G.26 was thrown in on the middle sector of the Russian front.
The chief functions of the Zerstörer units on the Russian front at this time were attacks on airfields at low levels, dropping 2 kg. fragmentation bombs and 50 kg. bombs, and support of the Army and of tank spearheads. Enemy artillery and A.A. positions were also bombed by them.
At the beginning of 1942, S.K.G.210 was transferred to Lechfeld to re-equip with the Bf.210 (Messerschmitt). This idea came to nothing, however, because the aircraft was not satisfactory from a flying standpoint. Thereupon, out of S.K.G.210 and four former Army reconnaissance Staffeln, two mixed Zerstörer Geschwader were set up under the General der Jagdflieger. They were Z.G.1 and Z.G.2 with three Gruppen each. After early 1942 they went into action in Russia, each having two Gruppen with the old Bf.110 and one Gruppe with the Bf.109. They were used as ground attack units. Insufficient supply of new aircraft caused the units to collapse in the winter of 1942–43.
(6) Bay of Biscay With the introduction of Air to Surface Vessel (ASV) radar equipment on English Coastal Command aircraft, German submarine losses in passing through the Bay of Biscay began to rise. To give the submarines some relief by day at least, on the request of the Navy, a Schwarm of Ju.88C6s was set up in July 1942 from K.G.40 (the bomber unit which operated attacks against shipping in the Atlantic). This Schwarm was built up first to Staffel strength and then to Gruppe strength up to November 1942. As V/K.G.40, this Gruppe was led by Major Hemm. Operating in Schwärme it flew to about 16° West, and in exceptional cases it started from its airfields at Lorient to combat heavy bomber attacks on the U-boat bases, when no Allied fighter escort was along.
Initial successes against single aircraft in the Bay of Biscay were satisfactory. But with the reinforced appearance of Coastal Command Mosquitos and Beaufighters, the Zerstörer were forced to fly in double Schwärme formation. Against the Beaufighters the Ju.88’s could get along fairly well, but against the Mosquitos they had high losses.
A further job of the Zerstörer was the protecting of German blockade runners. For these frequent missions, one Zerstörer Gruppe no longer sufficed and in early 1943 I/Z.G.1 was transferred from Russia to Brest. The Bf.110s scored considerable successes against bombers, but were under great pressure from Spitfires which flew down to Brest. On one mission, which extended into the ocean North of the Scilly islands, nine out of 12 Bf. 110’s were shot down. For operational coordination of the Zerstörer Gruppen operating in the Bay of Biscay the Headquarters of Z.G.1 was moved to Lorient, and the Ju.88 Gruppe in Lorient was re-named II/Z.G.1, in early 1943.
The deeper penetrations of Allied fighter escorts into the Bay of Biscay made the Zerstörer operations increasingly ineffective, with very high losses.
In the Winter of 1943 and 1944, the Zerstörer units were recalled from the West into Germany. I/Z.G.1 went over to the Defense of the Reich operating from Wels, near Linz, Austria, and II/Z.G.1 converted to the Bf.109 and became a Gruppe of J.G.4.
(7) Southern Theater of Operations In 1941, III/J.G.26 was operating here with three Staffeln of Bf. 110 and one Staffel of Dornier 17, later Ju.88C6. Chief missions were:
(a) Protection of air and sea routes to Africa.
(b) Combatting of ground targets in Africa.
(c) Bombing raids on Malta.
(d) Sea and land reconnaissance.
(e) Attacks on enemy ship convoys.
This Gruppe was mostly divided operationally into Staffeln and operated from Africa, Crete, and Sicily.
The Headquarters of Z.G.26 and III/Z.G.1 with the Me.410 came into the Mediterranean area in December 1942.
Both Gruppen, especially III/Z.G.26 scored great success in combat. Among other things, they were very effective in the attacks against Crete. The worst thing was that here the Zerstörer were never used in a consistent concentrated way for special missions, but instead they were overloaded as a ‘Maid of All Work’, with too many varied missions. With the increase of Allied air superiority, the Zerstörer had higher losses, without having achieved their full purpose. Everywhere, where Allied SE fighters operated Zerstörer units demanded fighter escort by German SE fighters. But the Bf. 110 was just equal to the British Beaufighter. What was achieved under these conditions is best shown by a diagram (taken from documents of III/Z.G.26, at No.2 GAF Personnel Holding Unit), at the end of 1942.
During the battle for Tunisia in 1943 the Zerstörer were mainly used as escort for sea movements and air transport. At this time, however, these convoys were attacked only by enemy forces with fighter escort, so that the Zerstörer also had to have their own fighter escort. Also the air transport units, who flew poor formations, were often attacked from Africa by strong fighter forces. In such cases devastating losses occurred. When escort was mixed, the Zerstörer always flew the close escort and the SE fighters the escort cover.
After this the Zerstörer were withdrawn to the Italian mainland, one Gruppe to Naples and one to Rome. Together with fighter units they were used against American heavy bomber formations. Also attacks with RP were carried on. They scored some success worthy of mention in missions with heavy losses. Adequate fighter escort was lacking, because SE fighter units were still needed in Sicily. The Ju.88 Staffel was based at this time in Greece and proved its worth in combat further in the Aegean Sea, because here bombers without escort and therefore vulnerable were still used.
After the evacuation of Sicily, the Geschwader Staff of Z.G.26 and its two Gruppen were transferred back into Germany, reorganized, rebuilt, and set up for missions in the Defense of the Reich.
(8) Operations of Zerstörer in the Defense of the Reich In the summer of 1943 Z.G.26 with its two Gruppen was withdrawn from Italy into The Reich, because of the stronger and deeper penetrating American heavy bomber formations. The third Gruppe was recalled from the Russian front and the first Gruppe of Z.G.1, which had until then operated from Brest over the Bay of Biscay, came back to Germany with its Bf.110’s.
The operational airfields of Z.G.26 were at first Wunstorf and Hildesheim, later Braunschweig, and finally Königsberg/Neumark. I/Z.G.1 was based in the southern Germany area and for the most part of its operational period in Wels, near Linz, Austria. The Gruppe was transferred for about three weeks to Constanza for the evacuation of the Crimea, and shot down 28 Russian aircraft for two losses, in escort missions, and then returned to Wels for Defense of the Reich. In September 1943 Z.G.76 with three Gruppen was re-formed and stationed in the South Germany area. (I/Z.G.76 came from reconnaissance Staffeln, with Me.110, II/Z.G.76 from school units and from night fighter units, III/Z.G.76 – a skeleton unit – and I/Z.G.1 under Z.G.76.) Operational airfields were Ansbach, Wertheim, Ottingen, and later Lepheim, Prague, Vienna, and Malacky in Czechoslovakia. III/Z.G.76 was again dissolved in February 1944 for lack of new aircraft.
The supply of crews came out of the two Zerstörer schools under the General der Eliegerausbildung (Gen. of Training), from Z.G.101 with Gruppen in Memmingen and Bad Aibling, and from the two OTU Staffel of the Zerstörergeschwader 26 and 76, in Braunschweig and later in Sagan.
Aircraft Equipment of the Various Zerstörer Geschwader
I/Z.G.26 – Bf.110 with 4 × 2 cm or 2 × 3 cm (MK 108) and 4 ×
21 cm RP. From May 1944, Me.410 with 4 × 2 cm.
II/Z.G.26 – Me.410, with 4 × 2 cm., from early 1944 with 5 cm. cannon (BK 5), and 2 × 15 mm.
III/Z.G.26 – like I/Z.G.26 but with GM 1 boost apparatus for oxygen injection.
I/Z.G.1 – Bf.110 with 4 × 2 cm., or 2 × 3 cm. (MK 108) and 4 × 21 cm. RP.
I/Z.G.76 – Bf.110 with 4 × 2 cm., or 2 × 3 cm. (MK 103) and 2 × 15 mm.
I/Z.G.76 – Bf.110 with GM 1 – 2 × 2 cm., 1 × 37 mm. (Flak 18) and 2 × 21 cm. RP. from May 1944, Me.410 with 2 cm. and 3 cm. (MK 103) mixed. I/Z.G.76 – like I/Z.G.76.
The flying qualities of the Bf.110 fully loaded and at the combat altitude of 25,000 feet were bad. Formation flying with it was hard for new crews, because it had to be flown with full throttle.
In flying with the GM 1, the radio man could not operate the rear MG for lack of space, so the device was taken out again. The Bf.110 with the Flak 18 37 mm. cannon was very nose heavy and turned poorly. Moreover the weapon was not cold-resistant at all, so that usually it jammed after 1 or 2 shots. In place of the Flak 18, the 37 mm. Flak 43 was tried with better results.
The Me.410 with the 5 cm. (BK 5) was likewise very nose heavy and bad in turning combat. It did have the advantage that it could be effectively fired from a range of 1000 yards with the telescopic sight (Zielfernrohr 4) and one hit usually brought about a victory. Gunnery with the telescopic sight required much practice, however, plus neat flying, and a long period of time in the shooting position. The first difficulties with the loading were mitigated by the installation of an improvised clearing device. (shell cartridge case). On the whole, however, this method of employing large calibers, forced by the High Command against great resistance from the units themselves, proved false. Rockets should have instead come into timely use.
The Me.410 was not as well liked among old Zerstörer crews as the old Bf.110, despite its greater speed, (about 80 km/hr more than the Bf.110), since it turned worse, was more sensitive to hits, and was hard to bail out of if it burned.
The operations of Zerstörers in Defense of the Reich were so conceived that they were to be used outside of the range of the American fighter escort and exclusively against four engine bombers. To make up for the lack of maneuver ability and in the hope that they would not have to engage in fighter versus fighter combat, the Zerstörer could be equipped with heavier armament. This resulted, therefore, in equipping them with the 2 cm. RP, and 3, 3.7 and 5 cm. cannon. With these the heavy bomber formation was to be shot at and broken up from outside its effective zone of defense. After that, the individual bombers were to be attacked with the 2 cm. cannon and destroyed.
These tactical concepts were correct and brought considerable success, as long as the American fighter escort was not present. But if it came to contact with enemy fighters, heavy losses resulted every time, because the Bf.110 as well as the Me.410 was absolutely inferior in every respect. In such cases, only a defensive Lufbery was helpful, which however required flying experience and formations of at least 12 aircraft, or armament toward the rear.
Three basic phases of Zerstörer operations in the Defense of the Reich can be identified.
(1) Operations of Zerstörer against heavy bombers without fighter escort.
(2) Operations of Zerstörer with fighter escort when enemy escort was expected.
(3) Operations of Zerstörer in a mixed formation when American fighter escort was sure to be present.
The Gruppen of each Geschwader were based on airfields close to each other. Upon receiving that start order over the tactical voice radio, a take-off by Schwärme took place. The Gruppe assembled in a column of Staffeln during a wide left hand curve over the airfield, and flew on, still climbing to the Geschwader assembly point, which lay over some prominent geographical point or in bad weather over a radio beacon.
At the Geschwader assembly point the Gruppen formed into a column of Gruppen. Where formations were mixed, that is, with one Bf.110 and one Me.410 Gruppe, the Bf.110 Gruppe flew ahead of the other.
Upon sighting the enemy, the formation deployed into a line, in which the stepping up of the Gruppen was very important if 21 cm. RP were to be fired. After discharge of the RP, which took place at a range of from 800–1000 yards, the formation was closed up again and an attack with MG and cannon carried through. The range for shooting down bombers with the RP was gauged either by estimating it in the ordinary Reflex sight or with a stereoscopic range finding sight. Some crews scored up to eight victories with RP. The RP were fired on the order of the formation leader, given by radio. (Individual firing was possible.) In attacks from the front or from the side, overshooting was the common tendency, and in shooting from the rear, the tendency was to undershoot. The most practical and ballistically most perfect manner of attack was dead astern. After the attack with the MGs and cannon, the column formation was resumed and the aircraft flew home.
The operational strength of each Gruppen was, in the case of the Me.410 units, about 15 aircraft per Gruppe. With the Me.110 units, it was about 20–30 aircraft per Gruppe. Losses were about 5–10% per mission and successes in this phase of the Defence of the Reich were good.
After the increased cases of contact with American fighters towards the end of 1943, the Zerstörer were, first, moved back and, second, provided with one fighter Gruppe for each Zerstörer Gruppe, to take over the escort of the Zerstörers as their chief mission. As a result of this innovation, the Zerstörergeschwader assumed command of its fighter escort Gruppe that was attached in this combination.
During this phase, most of the Zerstörer units removed their 21 cm. RP tubes in order to be more maneuverable in case of contact with enemy fighters.
The fighter Gruppe flew close escort for the Zerstörer Gruppe with two Staffeln, which flew in Schwärme formations to the sides of and behind the Zerstörer, about 1500 feet higher, in the shape of a half cross. The third Staffel of the fighter Gruppe took over the top cover about 6,000 feet higher. The COs of the fighters and Zerstörers were in radio contact.
At first, the fighters were forbidden to attack the bombers. Only when the Zerstörers had carried through their attack and absolutely no American fighter escort was to be seen, did the fighter formation leader give the order to attack the bombers. The top cover Staffel was excluded from this.
At this time the attack from head-on was more and more used by the Zerstörers, who flew in a column of Schwärme. After passing through once from the front, the next USAAF formation following it was either attacked from the front also, or after the Zerstörer turned in and attacked it from the rear, continuously in Schwärme. Especially good cooperation between fighters and Zerstörers was demonstrated by I/Z.G.26 with the fighter Gruppe of Major Specht (I/J.G.11) as well as by II/Z.G.76 with the fighter Gruppe of Oberstleutnant Dahl (III/J.G.3). Losses in this manner remained within bearable limits and successes were good.
After March 1944 the American fighter escort came from the West as far as Stettin-Berlin-Munich and from the South up to Vienna. This condition led the Zerstörers to suffer unbearable losses, since even the fighter group which each Zerstörer Gruppe had as escort was immediately involved in air combat and had all it could do to take care of itself. On 16th March 1944, Z.G.76 in the Augsburg area lost, out of 43 aircraft in action, 26 shot down and 10 belly landed, shooting down only four heavy bombers. The attack of the fighter took place just as the Zerstörer were attacking the bomber, so no defensive Lufbery could be formed.
The fighter commands decided as a result of this to form up battle formations in which the Zerstorer Gruppen, together with the available fighter units, would be brought concentrated into the attack. This tactic proved good during the initial period following contact with the enemy, but after the first successful attacks on the bomber from head-on, the formation of German aircraft was usually spread out a little so that the Zerstörers could be attacked individually or in Schwärme by the American fighter escort. Thus in the first American raid on Berlin in March 1944, I/Z.G.26 was almost totally destroyed and I/Z.G.76 had about 10 losses. Victories scored were in ratio to losses about 1:2. These mixed battle formations were led by the Kommodore of a fighter Geschwader with his Staff Schwärme; the Me.110s hung on behind him and behind them came the Me.410 Gruppen, with the other fighters bringing up the rear. The assembly usually took a very long time and unified control in the air by radio was very difficult to achieve. The strength of the battle formation during the first attack on Berlin in March was about 200 aircraft, of which about 70 were Zerstörers.
Even after the conversion of I/Z.G.26 and II/Z.G. 76 to the Me.410 ended in May 1944, these conditions remained the same. The American fighter escort had become as much stronger as the German fighter force had become weaker. So it merely became a question of being either skillfully vectored or lucky enough to meet a heavy bomber formation, whose fighter escort was not on hand. In such a case, for example, Z.G.26 scored about 15 victories against heavy bombers for two losses during a raid on oil works at Stettin. During an attack on Budapest, in July 1944, 12 Me.410’s of I/Z.G.76 shot down eight American heavy bombers for no losses. The greatest success was enjoyed by I/Z.G.1 in the area of Budapest-Vienna-Munich, which under Hptm. Albrecht scored many victories with very low losses. But even this unit was victim of a surprise attack by Mustangs in a raid on Wiener Neustadt and lost 13 out of 26 Me.110’s. I/Z.G.76 started from Vienna with 12 Me.110’s and in climbing up to an assembly point on the Danube to the West was surprised by Lightnings, losing 10 crews in all.
Z.G.26 and 76 were converted to SE fighters at the end of June and beginning of July, which fulfilled finally the long-felt wish of the Zerstörer crews themselves.
This historical sketch of the Zerstörer cannot be complete and all inclusive. Documents and records are lacking. But the most important things have been noted and are summarized shortly below:
(1) The Zerstörer aircraft was in its performance so inferior to a well equipped enemy, especially when air superiority was lost, that its planned purposes could not be fulfilled.
(2) The multi-purpose use of the Zerstörer as ‘Maid of All Work’ meant a giving up of its own intended use and a complete dissipation of effort in the respect to tactics and technical matters.
(3) On the other hand, the idea of the Zerstörer had diverted attention from the necessity of increasing the range of SE fighters.
(4) In 1943 the Zerstörer were brought nearer their old purpose, even if only in a defensive role in the Defense of the Reich. With this the dissipating of forces to all fronts ceased.
(5) The Me.210 was a great technical error.
The Me.410 came therefore into operation one year too late.
The F.W. (Tank) Ta 154 was supposed to bring about the replacement of the Me.410, offering better performance, but it had to be cancelled from the production program shortly before the series production began.
The Dornier Do.335 would have been a useable Zerstorer. But even in the planning stage, and in the production preparation the High Command squandered the whole thing in talk of fast bombers, night fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, and Zerstörer all using the Do.335 airframe.
Finally a proposed series of very heavily armed Tank Ta 152 aircraft (the Tank 1520) was designated as a Zerstörer. The technical equipment of Zerstörer aircraft was still a matter for argument.
(6) Despite all these mistakes, the Zerstörer force achieved remarkable things, through the good morale and courage of its personnel, even in the hardest times. The high quality of the old formation leaders and crews is mainly responsible for this.