Each German fighter pilot supposedly had his own chute, but they sometimes were mixed. All of the pilots used the quick release for the straps, and each pilot carried a knife in his boot for cutting the shrouds. Experiments were made with a barometric pressure release. Other experiments included a band type parachute for jumping from the Me. 262, the theory being that the great speed and rapid deceleration required a chute with less resistance and greater falling speed, but it was never popular.
Each pilot was supposed to wear helmet, goggles, and gloves. Late in the war they were all equipped with natty two piece leather suits which gave very good fire protection. Their fur boots were well built for walking and were worn all summer long by some pilots.
Dinghies were not built into German fighter aircraft (single engine) but were carried around the waist of the pilot, where they sometimes inflated at high altitudes and had to be punctured. Mae Wests were required for flights over water or along coastal areas. For winter flying in Russia pilots were equipped with snow shoes or short skis, because it was impossible to walk through the deep snow after a forced landing.
R/T discipline in units was always poor, which was a result of short training and the fact that German fliers always found themselves quanitatively inferior in battle and continually called for help. Galland stated that it was always easier to control a winning team than a losing one.
Various measures were introduced to counteract this tendency to talk too much in the air. In J.G. 26, in 1941, Galland installed an extra R/T button in all fighters so the pilots had to push two buttons before they could talk. The monitoring of R/T and resultant punishment of some offenders helped very little. High losses caused such rapid personnel turnovers that it was hard to determine who had done the talking. The pilots did not have time to learn each other’s voice over the R/T.
Promotions in the Jagdwaffe were on the same basis as those of other GAF flying personnel, except that the fighters at first received more promotions for bravery than did other branches. The length of time in grade was usually much longer than that required in the USAAF.
(1) NCO pilots usually left the fighter schools with the rank of Uffz., but the front line units complained and asked that only those who were really ready for combat receive this rank. From then on men not ready for combat went to the front units with the rank of Gefr. or Ogefr. and were promoted when they proved their worth. NCO’s could be promoted up to Uffz. by their Gruppenkommandeur and to Ofw. by the Geschwader Kommodore. The TO of each Staffel called for five officers and 11 Ofw. (Master Sergeants). Each NCO was usually required to spend a year in grade but promotions for bravery could freely be given out by the Kommodore.
(2) Officers were of three classes, Active, Reserve and Kriegs (comparable to our AUS). Active officers were trained as pilots in special flying schools for officers and then continued their training to the regular fighter schools. They were commissioned when they left the Luftkriegsschulen. Kriegs officers were of two types, those selected and trained as officer candidates after they became NCOs and those who passed special examinations and entered the GAF as officer candidates. From the start of the war no more active officers were commissioned, but Kriegsoffiziers could become active by passing special tests and signing up for life. Great stress was always put on political reliability. Often the officer candidates could not be spared from operational units and they were commissioned directly without going to the Luftkriegsschule.
(3) Goring frequently appeared in operational units and made spot promotions of NCOs to officers for little or no reason, thereby burdening the GAF with some unqualified officers.
(4) Early in the war, requirements for officers included the (Abitur) successful completion of a course in a Gymnasium or higher school which was roughly equivalent to a US prep-school or high school. However, later, this requirement was reduced to only eight years of school, the usual amount taken by German youths.
(5) Galland does not believe in making all pilots officers. The German conception of an officer, idealistically stated, is a man who is given special privileges and extra duties commensurate with his superior abilities. In an ordinary fighter unit of the GAF, there were not enough extra duties to keep more than five officers happy and busy, so they were staffed with five and usually fewer.
(6) Officers of the three lowest ranks were treated with the same regard, as to promotions, whether they were Kriegs or Aktiv, but Reserves were not promoted as rapidly. For promotion above the rank of Major, active officers were preferred. It was common to promote young officers to higher grades simply because they held a high TO position, but Galland believes it would have been better to have had dual ranks, one based on seniority and the other based on position, wherein a young officer of ability could have the pay and honor of a high position and still not promote him too fast. He could have a special title which went with his position, for example, Kommodore or Kommandeur.
(7) Officer promotions were usually made on the basis of a seniority list. These positions on the list were determined first by grades received on the officer candidate’s examinations and later his fitness and efficiency reports.
(8) Before a man could be promoted, his superior officer had to certify his political reliability as a National Socialist. Poor indorsements in this respect were rare and good indorsements were automatic in most units.
(9) Very early in the war, many able young fighters were promoted very rapidly and later proved to lack leadership ability. This practice was later discontinued.
Fighter pilots were not held in high esteem by the Luftkriegsakademie. This school was composed chiefly of bombardment personnel who were not sympathetic toward the fighter arm. In 1942 the Luftkriegsakademie pronounced seven fighter pilots unfit to be staff officers. As a result of this, no fighter officers were sent to the school for about a year. In 1944 the fighter arm again began sending officers to a short staff training course of about four months’ duration.
Early in the war most of the higher decorations were given out by Hitler and Göring. It was then much harder to get the Eiserne-Kreuz II (Iron Cross 2nd Class) and the Eiserne-Kreuz I (Iron Cross 1st Class) than it was later. In the last years of the war, they were given for about one and five victories, respectively. It was first intended that the Ritterkreuz (Knight’s Cross) would be the highest decoration, but the Eichenlaub (Oak Leaf), Schwerte (Swords), and Brillianten (Diamonds) added new superlatives. No fighter pilot ever got the Golden Eichenlaub (Gold Oak Leaf), the highest award, which was set up only in the last few months of the war, except Rudel, who was a ground-attack expert.
It soon became apparent that some medals were needed in between the Eiserne-Kreuz I and the Ritterkreuz, so the Deutsche Kreuz in Gold (German Cross in Gold) was invented. The Deutsche Kreuz was actually an anomalous medal which could be awarded at almost any point in the series after the EK I and was often awarded to people who were not deemed worthy of going one step higher. German medals could not be awarded more than once to the same person. Only the next higher medal could be given, which caused some trouble and forced the introduction of stiffened requirements to avoid the cheapening of the medals themselves. This, however, came at a time when victories were much harder to score against toughened Allied air forces and hence morale was badly affected. Hitler and Göring thought the fighter arm had more than its share of medals and made it more difficult for them to get decorations. Unfortunately, this happened just as the air war became much harder for the fighters.
Other steps in the line of medals for combat were the Ehrenpokal (Cup of Honor), a loving cup awarded by Göring, and a silver framed picture of the Reichmarschall himself. No special pay was ever given for awards or decorations. Another distinction was a mention in the OKW communiqué, which Galland won three times.
Awards were also given for a number of combat missions, and only missions for which the enemy was contacted counted for this decoration, the Frontflugspange (Front Flight Wings) in bronze, silver, and gold. This was the only distinctive decoration by which branch of service (i.e. fighters, bombers, etc.) could be determined. The Fighter Spange had an eagle in the middle of it while other branches used an eagle’s head, bombs, and so on.
Early in 1944 the point system for fighter decorations was introduced, and Galland set it up at Göring’s order. It made bombers in formation count more than bombers out of formation or fighters and so on, and it varied from time to time. Victories on the Eastern Front counted less than victories on the Western Front or over Germany. All the medals were made a bit harder to get.
Honorary medals for office workers and administrative officers were in the form of the Kriegsverdienstkreuze II, I (War Service Cross – similar to the Bronze Star or Legion of Merit) and Ritterkreuz. Commanding officers of high units could also be awarded the regular combat decorations if they were exposed to enemy action; for example, Kesselring got the Diamonds for his transport flights across the Mediterranean in the face of heavy opposition while he commanded the Luftwaffe forces in Africa. General Staff officers often did tours of operational flying to gain a few medals necessary for prestige and promotions. Hitler sometimes violated his own rules and awarded combat decorations to men who had never left their desks. This sat badly with the front units. It became common to award all decorations up to the Ritterkreuz for such chairborne activity.
Despite the stiffening of awards late in the war, Galland believed that the fighter arm continued to be stimulated by the race for decorations and no great changes in policy would have been needed even had the war lasted a year longer.
Disciplinary problems in the fighter arm were almost non-existent.
[…] Galland believes that the use of military brothels did not minimize VD, but they did minimize homosexuality, which has always been a problem in Germany.
In general, the youth of fighter pilots tended to make life in each unit fairly lively.
Fighter training units had little time for recreation and the conduct was more strictly controlled in these units.
The quality of pilots and commanders at the beginning of the war in 1939 was good. There were plenty of experienced leaders – at least, there were plenty to fight the war which was planned.
The reasons for the decline in quality of pilots and commanders were:
(1) Inadequate training
(2) High losses
(3) Lack of staff training for commanders
(4) Decline in morale due to the overwhelming power of Allies
Gollob stated that no positive measures were taken to counteract the decline in quality because of the serious and continuous reverses in the war. There was very little aerial gunnery training.