In general, fighter units maintained their mobility throughout the war. The smallest fighter unit which could subsist and operate independently for any length of time was the Gruppe (40 a/c early in the war and increased to about 80 in 1944). The Gruppe had its own signals organization, supply and motor transport. Fighter units, with their entire personnel, were fully motorized and could move anywhere.
(a)Throughout the war there was a struggle between two different schools of thought about aircraft maintenance and mobility of fighter and other units. The High Command of the Luftwaffe always favored a system whereby each airfield would have a regular complement of signals, maintenance, and supply personnel which would service whatever unit happened to be based at that field. The fighter units, on the other hand, favored a system whereby a unit was independent. Bomber units and twin-engine fighter units (Zerstorer) did use the station complement (Flughafenbetriebskompanie) system, but single engined units of the fighter arm were able, throughout the war, to resist the introduction of the station complement theory into the fighter force. It would indeed have simplified the purely physical problems of moving units, but the maintenance problem for fighters would have been vastly complicated. The station complement mechanics were never as well acquainted with maintenance problems as the unit’s own mechanics, and fighter aircraft were more susceptible to minor peculiarities than bombers. Moreover, bomber units did carry some mechanics in their own aircraft during transfers, and the aerial engineer and radio operator in a bomber assisted in the maintenance of their aircraft.
(b)Although most fighter units were fully motorized when originally organized, they were not always able to repair their vehicles and became partially dependent on civilian transport which they confiscated from time to time. SS and Army units in turn confiscated transport from fighter units during retreats in Russia and France after the invasion. The gasoline shortage was another limiting factor.
(c)As fighter equipment became more complicated, the need for special transporation arose, for example, special tankers for the GM I and Methanol boost equipment, special weapons repair trucks for the heavier caliber guns, fuel trucks, etc.
(d)Some units were organized in Germany as permanent units without transport, but they usually managed to confiscate a few trucks and by the time they had to retreat in 1945, they were motorized, though poorly.
(e)In transferring from one base to another the theory was that operations were to continue without interruption. An advance party (Vorkommando) was sent out several days in advance of the transfer to the new airfield to prepare it for the arrival of the Gruppe. On the day of transfer, the Gruppe would fly a mission and land at the new field. The main body of ground personnel would follow by truck or rail, while the advance party would service the aircraft at the new field and prepare them for another mission. The advance party was large enough only to service the aircraft with great effort. At the old airfield, a rear party remained to clean up and followed later. In some moves during the French Campaign, the advance party and the main force were transported by air, along with supplies.
(f)A few Gruppen early in the war managed to get enough transport aircraft so that they were almost entirely airborne. This system worked very satisfactorily in the Polish and French campaigns but ended soon after that for lack of fuel, transport aircraft and trucks.
The transportation difficulties on the Russian Front were so acute that ground equipment was overrun time and time again, and units had to evacuate their best ground personnel in fighter aircraft. The Me. 109 could carry two passengers in addition to the pilot. The F.W.190 could carry three passengers. This performance was also accomplished in the evacuation of fighter units from Tunisia to Sicily. Despite the difficulties in Russia, it was clear that motorizing fighter units was the salvation of the fighter arm, which without its trucks would many times have been overrun and completely wiped out.
(g)It was often possible in Russia to transfer a fighter unit by attaching only its aircraft and pilots to another unit. The otherwise impossible maintenance problem attending such a unique transfer was solved by the fact that the aircraft strength of units on the Russian front was usually so low that the mechanics of one Gruppe could easily service the aircraft of two Gruppen. Ground losses of servicing equipment in Russia usually was a more serious detriment to operations than the loss of ground personnel.
(h)The supply of units was also ideal for rapid movements. In certain campaigns, such as Poland, France and Africa, gasoline, parts, and ammunition were transported by aircraft. Otherwise each Gruppe had its own motor transport to haul supplies from supply dumps which were to service every 6 to 10 airfields on any front.
(i)Although the mobility of fighter units was often impaired by fuel and truck shortages, it was proved right in principle time and time again.