This was the most original, most natural and best loved type of fighter combat mission. Here the fighter could determine and utilize all the advantageous factors of battle. Fighter sweeps were not an end in themselves, but always a means to an end, i.e. they are subordinated to some purpose, for example:
a) Fighter sweeps over the front area to combat and keep down enemy combat recce aircraft or artillery observation aircraft.
b) Fighter sweeps over the battlefield and the tactical area to combat enemy fighter-bombers and ground-attack aircraft.
c) Fighter sweeps in conjunction with operations of friendly fighter-bombers, dive-bombers, ground-attack aircraft and bombers; to lure up the enemy fighters to battle, clear combat areas, secure the flanks in the air, and draw enemy strength upon friendly fighters.
d) Fighter sweeps over the airfield areas of the enemy fighter force, to engage the enemy’s defenses and weaken them.
e) Fighter sweeps in the defense of Germany to engage the enemy fighter escort in battle and divert it from its escort mission.
f) Fighter sweeps against ground targets.
The fighter sweep was hardly mentioned in GAF peace time tactical regulations, although it had been the chief mission in World War I.
In Spain, more than 50% of all missions were flown as fighter sweeps. Even the ground attack Staffeln with the Heinkel 51 had great success with fighter sweep missions in defined areas behind the enemy front against targets of all kinds.
In Poland and in the French campaign of 1940 many fighter sweeps were flown, first to force up the enemy fighter force and secondly to have forces in the air during the enemy’s main periods of aerial activity, since the aircraft warning system was too bad to permit scramble starts when the enemy appeared.
The Battle for Britain was begun with a period of fighter sweeps for the purpose of so reducing the RAF fighter defense that the subsequent strategic bombing by German bombers would be as safe as possible. The later use of fighters with small formations of decoy bombers to lure up RAF fighters was a degenerated form of fighter sweeps.
In Russia the fighter sweep was especially popular and successful. Sweeps were always flown when strength and escort missions permitted.
On the Mediterranean and African fronts, fighter sweeps were the exception, because there fighter strength was already far overloaded by the great variety of required missions. Galland’s unit, J.V.44, operating with Me-262’s, flew fighter sweeps, right up to the end of the war.
Goring and his staff usually had little understanding of the employment of fighter sweeps. Instead they required fighters to fly ‘definite objective missions’.
In general the fighter command (Division, Jagdkorps, Jafu or other unit) gave orders for units to fly fighter sweeps without specifying strength, areas, and time in great detail. (Exceptions were the big fighter sweeps over Britain at the beginning of the Battle of Britain.) Fighter sweeps were permitted only when no defensive missions were to be flown.
The operational order was usually sent out from the Geschwader after the fighter command had given permission for sweeps to be flown. The Geschwader determined the strength, times and areas, but usually did not specify the altitude. The operational order was usually communicated to the Gruppen by telephone or by courier. The Gruppen in turn reported back through the same medium its time of take-off, landing time, and success.
Strength of formations varied according to available strength, enemy activity, weather, and the depth of penetration. In Russia fighter sweeps were flown in strength of the Schwarm on up; in the French campaign usually in Geschwader or half Geschwader; in the Battle of Britain, Gruppen; in Defense of the Reich, Gruppen; and in the Ardennes offensive, Gruppen and Geschwader.
The briefing of flying personnel was done by the Gruppe CO and the Staffelkapitan and was short and simple. The missions were so planned that almost all advantageous factors like position, sun, launching of attack and breaking off, were left up to the formation leader in the air.
One thing only was vital for the operation: which force first discovered the other. The relative strength of the foes played a minor role when technical performances of the aircraft were approximately equal and the training of the pilots about the same. The most certain advantage was surprise, then in this order: position, technical and tactical flying ability of formations, gunnery experience and ability, cohesion of formations, and relative strength.
In Russia, for example, the relative strength of formations was almost always to the disadvantage of the Germans: nevertheless, fighter sweeps were successful for them up to the last of the war. In Russia, German air superiority consisted of technical advantages, better tactics, and in the strong feeling of superiority enjoyed by German fighter pilots. In the Battle of Britain the Germans also had the better tactics and experience. Nevertheless, position played a very important role at the time and helped the British win. In Russia it was required (by Richthofen of Fliegerkorps VIII for example) that the fighters on sweeps first drop a bomb on some worthwhile target behind the enemy lines or at least after the mission strafe until their ammunition was gone (Russian fighters were so slight a threat that the flight home could usually be made safely without ammunition).
Start and Assembly was begun basically from the circumference dispersal areas except from fields where a runway had to be used because of bad surface conditions. (Runways were unpopular with pilots of conventional German fighters.) Assembly of a Gruppe had to be completed after one circuit in about three minutes after start. In general, at least four aircraft started simultaneously; on good fields, whole Staffeln. Formation leaders of small formations always started first, and with larger formations they usually did so too, a matter of taste. The formation for fighter sweeps was widest open of all, with considerable stepping upward as soon as more than four aircraft flew in one formation.
In the approach to the target, altitude was gained in slightly closer formation. The battle area was so entered that all possible advantages were used. With 10/10th clouds, if the ceiling was not more than 1500 feet or if sweeps were ordered under the clouds, the formation usually flew on the deck. Ground defenses prevented this maneuvering over front line areas and over the enemy rear zone.
In attacks the element of surprise was always striven for. If this was not successful, having the altitude advantage was very important. When a turning fight began, enemy fighters turning in the opposite direction warranted especial notice. Superior climbing ability was absolutely used to advantage in a turning fight. Rotten (two-ship) and Schwarme (four-ship) formations must not break up. The top cover had the mission of joining in effectively soon after the beginning of the turning fight, and at the latest upon the first appearance of weakness in the friendly formation. The top cover usually retained its superior altitude after the attack in order to attack again with the advantage. Moreover, it prevented enemy fighters from entering the fight from superior altitude.
Break off and return usually followed after the order of the formation leader. Arbitrary breaking away in air combat, diving away or split-S-ing and breaking up of formations was fatal, but occurred more and more in the German fighter arm. Galland explained this only by the insufficient training of pilots and by the deterioration of their formation leaders. This lack of discipline in battle was always a sign of an inferior fighter force, inferior in numbers, achievement, training and morale. This inferiority could not be successfully combatted with orders and punishments alone. Successes always gave the fighter arm its self confidence.
Thus, in the last months of the war, every German fighter formation broke up. At most, Rotten and Schwarme (two-ship and four-ship) held together. As a result the return flight of aircraft after each mission took place with little organization and much straggling. In the West and in the Defense of the Reich, landings after long missions were often made on many scattered airfields.
Inferior in numbers, technical performance, flying training and gunnery, unaccustomed to fighter combat and led by inexperienced leaders overloaded with many missions and insufficiently specialized, demoralized or at least depressed by a bad victory-loss ratio, the Jagdwaffe finally accomplished nothing more in purely fighter combat. An exception to all this was the fight against the Russian air force.