1. Norway. The conduct of air operations in the Norwegian campaign was under Fliegerkorps X. For escort purposes, two Geschwader were available: a Zerstorer Geschwader with Me.110’s and a fighter Geschwader with Me. 109E’s. The locations of these Geschwader at the beginning of the campaign were in Schleswig-Holstein, and later in Aalborg and several fields in North Jutland and later in Christiansand, Stavanger, Trondheim, and Bodo. In the course of operations the range of the Me.110 proved to be too short. The aircraft was therefore fitted with a drop tank (called Dachshund-belly). Although no experience or regulations were available for such undertakings, the missions were in general successfully carried out. Most of the attacks on the convoys were made by Blenheim bombers and torpedo aircraft and were repulsed by the fighter escort.
2. French Coast. In late Autumn 1940 came the preparations for Operation ‘Sea Lion’, the landings in Great Britain. J. G. 26, Galland’s unit, was supposed to be the first to transfer to England. Preparations were not taken seriously. Loading plans were made up, and small loading and landing maneuvers with fighter cover were conducted on the Dutch and Belgian coasts.
Beginning in 1940 and increasing in 1941, 1942, and 1943, the Navy demanded fighter cover for small coastal convoys, individual ships and for tankers. From Autumn 1941 ships were moved during the hours of darkness and laid over in ports during the day. The strength of fighter units permitted continuous fighter escort only in the most pressing cases. The usual procedure was that the Navy informed the fighter command (in this case the Jafu 2 or 3) of the Navy’s intentions, the times and the locations and asked for fighter cover. This insured the readiness of fighter escort if it were needed, but did not always mean that each Navy unit had continuous fighter cover. When, on the basis of the Radar Service or Listening Service, warnings indicated the imminence of enemy operations, the fighters were ordered to scramble and protect the Naval units.
From the middle of 1942, the conduct of sea transport in the Channel was impossible as a result of English air superiority. Along the Dutch and Northwest German coasts the use of convoys was still possible when fighter cover was available. Great attention was given to the bringing in of single blockade runners. Zerstorer Geschwader 1 with two Gruppen of Ju.88’s, a Gruppe of Me.410s (used temporarily) and a Staffel of Arado 196s were based in Brittany and assumed the fighter cover far at sea. They engaged in heavy fighting with Mosquitos, bombers, and torpedo aircraft, as well as with American long-range fighters. The missions undertaken by the Ju.88s had especially heavy losses. This operational responsibility was usually relieved in the vicinity of the coast by a Gruppe of drop-tank carrying F.W.190’s of J.G.2.
In general, the many demands of the Navy could not be fulfilled, since the fighter forces required were lacking. The Russian campaign began in Summer 1941 and forced the withdrawal of all but two fighter Geschwader (J.G. 2 and J.G. 26) to the East. Alternative counter-measures were found in making ship movements by night and in bad weather and the equipping of ships with concentrated A.A.
3. Cooperation with Motor Torpedo Boats (Schnellbooten) was prepared by direct conferences and conversations with the young and daring Flotilla leaders and C.O.’s. The mutual understanding of requirements and possibilities hereby attained was at all times very helpful for cooperation. The MT boats were mainly harassed by English fighters and fighter bombers. The fighter escort was conducted, in the critical times, in low level flights and upon the appearance of enemy aircraft the escort rose to medium altitudes. After common undertakings the conduct and the experience gained were discussed by the Naval officers and fighter men involved.
4. U-Boat Cover in the Bay of Biscay. The responsible command for this work was the Fliegerfuhrer Atiantik, and Z.G.1 was the flying unit involved. The mission was to safely escort single U-Boats and larger U-Boat formations, and to protect them against low-level attacks by aircraft equipped with cannon and bombs. The missions were similar to those used for blockade runners. Anglo-American air superiority, technical superiority of Allied aircraft, and superior quantities of Allied radar equipment made these missions progressively more difficult. Nevertheless, the fighters and Zerstorer accomplished much, often through self-sacrificing missions. The mutual understanding between fighters and U-Boat personnel was good.
5. The Channel Break-through of the German Warships. The Prinz Eugen, Scharnborsty and Gneisenau had to be removed from Brest to the North Sea. Galland was personally entrusted, by Hitler, with the job of preparing and conducting the mission, for the Luftwaffe, of covering this. The Navy bestowed all of the responsibility to the Luftwaffe and demanded complete security against all air attacks. Extreme secrecy, surprise, and deception were the most important conditions for the success of the mission. The planned conduct in all its details was settled with the Navy.
This was the first great undertaking in cooperation with the Navy. In addition, very few fighters were available. For the transition periods from night to morning and from evening to night, night fighters with Zerstorer training and experience were made available. In detailed and exhaustive form and in cooperation with the Navy, a Memorandum for the Conduct of Fighter Escort for Sea Forces and Large Naval Forces was prepared and circulated. On the basis of the experience gained in the actual carrying out of the mission, only minor changes in the doctrine had to be undertaken. An important operation of this kind was never conducted again.
The fighter escort itself was organized into:
a. Close escort against low level attacks (Enemy aircraft armed with torpedoes).
b. Close escort for attacks from medium altitudes.
c. Escort cover for low level attacks (patrol a distance from the convoy).
d. Escort cover for higher attacks. (patrol a distance from the convoy).
e. Fighter sweeping forces against anticipated attacks.
Standing strength of the fighter escort was 40–50 a/c. During the time when one patrol was being relieved, a 15–20 minute overlap period was allowed during which the cover was twice as strong. Reserves were ready for scramble starts against anticipated attacks in strength of 40 a/c. or more.
A fighter control station was set up on one of the ships for immediate control of the fighters by R/T against recognized attacks and for the control of the ships’ A.A. and friendly fighters.
The committing of the fighter forces and the relieving of one unit by another was controlled from the land by another fighter control station (Galland’s) which moved along the coast. This control was airborne to keep up with the ships. Galland had a special Ju.52 transport fitted with fighter control apparatus which he used to control operations from the ground.
The second part of the operation was conducted with the participation of night fighters who operated in this case as twin-engine day fighters. The day and night fighter forces available transferred with the fighter command as they proceeded along the North Sea Coast, toward North Jutland and Southern Norway. In Norway the control was turned over to the Jafu Norwegian, who, with its own fighter forces, took over the fighter cover from Trondheim onward. For the entire operation, twin-engine fighter units were especially valuable. On the whole, the escort mission for the warships was successfully handled by the fighter arm of the GAF.
6. Mission in Norway. Protection of naval bases, operations of German naval forces, supply and oil convoys, all presented great demands on fighters for escort in Norway. The available forces were extremely small. In the years 1940, 1941 and 1942 only one Gruppe of J.G.5 was there. From time to time it was reinforced by another Gruppe from the same Geschwader on the Murmansk front. The Jafu Norwegian controlled the missions, from either Stavanger or Trondheim. The great distances and the bad signals conditions permitted only a geographically limited control. The same geographical difficulties made the improvement of the radar and fighter control system a very difficult undertaking.
Along with the Jafu Norwegian, the Fliegerfuhrer Nord-West and NordOst at Lofoten and near Murmansk, respectively, took part in control of the fighter organization and their operations. Special difficulties were caused by drawing the boundary between the responsibility of Luftflotte Reich and Luftflotte 5 (the Luftflotte which controlled Norway). This boundary was never satisfactorily settled. All this time the Luftflotte, Reich or Oberbefehlshaber Mitte had to use the fighter control center in Jutland, Abschnittsfuhrer Jutland. Subordinated to it were the escort missions in the North Sea, along the coast of Jutland and in the Skaggerak up to the operational transfer of control of Jafu Norwegian. There was therefore adequate and well staffed fighter control commands, but there was a lack of fighters.
The conduct of the escort for the naval units was rendered easier by the fact that the attacking RAF aircraft always flew without their own fighter escort. This explains why the Germans with unusually small forces were able to achieve astonishing successes. The Zerstorer Staffel used in Norway, in addition to its fighter bomber missions on the Russian front at Murmansk, flew successful escort missions on the West Coast of Norway.
7. Baltic Sea and Lake Ladoga (Russia). Escort missions were flown here only in exceptional cases, such as the supply and evacuation of the Baltic area and the Siebel ferry undertaking in Lake Ladoga. These missions were controlled by Luftflotte I and flown by J. G. 54. At the same time the fighters flew offensively against Russian supply lines and gun boats, using strafing, bombing, and rocket projectile attacks with some success.
Naval maneuvers in the Baltic were protected, upon demand of the Navy, by OTUs and school units because of the lack of operational forces.
8. Black Sea Operations. Escort missions became necessary in the Black Sea as a result of the German supply routes and final evacuation of the Crimea. These missions were flown partly from the Crimea peninsula and partly from Roumania. Twin-engine fighters (Zerstorer) proved successful because of their long endurance. Lack of forces prevented a complete victory against the Russian attacks which were flown by much larger formations.
9. Missions in the Mediterranean. Escort missions in the Mediterranean began after the beginning of the English air activity. The Allied air superiority was such that for these escort missions, demanded by the German and Italian Navies, more Geschwader would have been needed than were available in the entire theater; the German fighters failed by the greatest margin to fulfill the many and varied demands for operations. The Italian fighters participated temporarily in these operations, but with small forces and in an undependable manner. A German Zerstorer unit was used here and there, but could not specialize in the escort of shipping because it was needed again and again in Africa for the support of tank units. The Italian Navy in general did not conform to the combat orders as to times, strengths, and courses.
In the supply of Africa the routes were so long that the necessary continuous escort and cover could only be furnished reliably in very small numbers. There could therefore be no question of an effective defense against powerful attacks on convoys or individual ships, especially tankers. This was not even achieved during the great crisis in Africa when almost all fighter forces were assigned to defend convoys. Allied air superiority, especially with the long range fighters, also decided this battle to the disadvantage of the Luftwaffe. A scramble start against attacks on convoys in the Mediterranean was not successful because it necessarily always came too late. During the battle in Tunisia an additional demand was placed on the fighters to escort air transport aircraft and Siebel ferrys. Fighter operations were controlled by the Fliegerfuhrer Africa, later Jafu Tunis, Jafu Sizilien, Jafu Italien, and Jafu Agais.
10. Protection of Naval Bases was undertaken as far as possible by the fighters being used in the Defense of the Reich. During the lay-over of the warships in Brest in 1941, J.G.26 was used there temporarily, but RAF attacks occurred only during the hours of darkness. In Norway, the use of fighters for protection of naval bases was conducted according to the demands of and in concurrence with the Navy, from the bases at Trondheim and Tromso. Italian naval bases were protected exclusively by Italian fighters.
11. Cooperation with the Sea Rescue Service was developed at the beginning of the campaign against England in the late Summer of 1940, and was later important in Norway and in the Mediterranean. The effectiveness of it declined with the increase of Anglo-American air superiority but was better preserved in those sectors not usually frequented by Allied long range fighters.
Missions of the fighters in such cooperation were to discover and announce sea crashes by place and type, to maintain contact, to lead the sea rescue boats to the scene, and to provide cover during the approach, the rescue and the trip back. Cooperation was good on the basis of close contact and assistance.