(1) The fighter escort mission is that of protecting naval forces and convoys from attacks by enemy torpedo aircraft, bombers and fighter bombers, as well as repulsing enemy shadowing aircraft and destroying them. It is necessary in all ocean areas where attacks of enemy aircraft are to be reckoned with. Lacking aircraft carriers, the limits of fighters escort depend on the range of our fighters.
Of greatest urgency is protection against torpedo aircraft.
(2) Escort can be conducted by:
(a) Close Escort.
It furnishes the best security against air attacks by continuous cover directly over the ships, but requires nevertheless strong forces.
(b) Cover Escort (Striking Reserve).
It is used when strong fighter forces are available over and above the close escort to combat the approach flights of enemy formations.
(c) Alerted Escort.
Used when only weak forces are available. Fighters make a scramble start only after the recognized approach of enemy formations. It provides no sure protection for shipping.
(3) The use of fighter escort is dependent upon weather and time of day.
(a) For day operations visibility of at least 5 km. and ceiling of about 1500 feet are operational minima.
(b) Twilight requires usually the strongest fighter cover, because it is the favorable time for torpedo attacks. Operations are only possible when visibility is 6 km., so that; (1) enemy and friendly aircraft can be distinguished from the ships (taking into consideration the difficulties attending recognition signal exchange) and (2) so that fighters can recognize enemy fighter bombers in time.
(c) By night – including by bright moonlight – and for operations which require night take-offs or landings, only TE aircraft (night fighters or TE day fighters) can be used.
(4) The relieving of the close escort is to be so arranged that an overlapping of ten minutes at least occurs over the ships. In this period a double protection should be over the objective, insofar as pressing reasons do not make necessary the immediate return of the relieved close escort. If an enemy attack occurs during the changing of the escort, the relieved fighter formation must take part in the combat up to the limit of its flying endurance.
(5) Independent breaking off by the fighter escort may only take place:
(1) at the limit of endurance.
(2) in bad weather or in twilight when too low visibility no longer permits the carrying out of the mission. In both cases a simultaneous report must be made to the ships by visual signals. Report will be by radio only when radio silence has not been ordered.
Fighters will not break off when the weather becomes temporarily bad. The fighter formation will move away in the direction of the enemy in order to avoid the bad weather area and will resume the escort after the bad weather has passed along. Upon approaching the ships again, visual recognitions will be exchanged.
A breaking off on the desire of the ships can be ordered by them by radio or visual signals.
(1) Frictionless cooperation requires early liaison activities between the Air Force and Naval commands concerned. For large operations, the mutual appointment of liaison officers is useful.
(2) For the planned conduct of fighter escort for ships, a mutual exchange of information between the controlling commands of the Navy and Air Force about the momentary location of the ships and of the fighter formations forming the fighter escort is decisive.
The reports about the fighter escort being sent out or withdrawn must include time of take-off, number, and aircraft type.
(3) At the Headquarters of the controlling Air Force command, the position of the ships must be continually marked on a sea situation map. The pilots are to mark on their maps before take-off the last announced position and course of the ships to be escorted, so that when announcements about the enemy are made they will be able to form a picture of the situation and to bring the reported enemy approaches into correct relationship to the ships.
(4) If in addition to the fighter cover, a form of immediate protection is used. (This immediate protection – eng Sicherung – is a naval concept and means close support for ships, rendered either by small naval units or by naval aircraft.) In the case naval aircraft are referred to, mutual notification by Air Force units and ships must take place, in order to avoid confusing them with enemy aircraft and to prevent mutual interference. The duties of the immediate protection force cannot simultaneously be taken over by the fighter escort.
Around the ships and in their vicinity the seaplane, Arado 196, must be reckoned with; it is used for immediate protection and in some cases as an emergency fighter, starting from aboard ship against shadowing aircraft. Notifying the fighter cover about the catapult aircraft of this is not possible because of radio silence on the ships.
(5) A vital condition for the planned conduct of operations at sea is the keeping of strict radio silence by the ships and fighter units until contact is made with the enemy.
The giving up of radio silence may only take place on the part of the flagship or the fighter formation when it can with certainty be assumed that the enemy has already ascertained the location of the ships (through presence of enemy shadowing aircraft, or from an imminent enemy air attack). Radio silence can at any time be reimposed by the flagship by radio or short code signals.
Even changing relief or breaking off of the fighter escort is not to be reported from the aircraft during radio silence.
(6) As soon as the fighter cover is within sight of the ships, it may be committed to combat by the fighter control officer (naval) on the flagship against any attack formations or shadowing aircraft detected and recognized as enemy with certainty by eye or with radar. In such cases the following facts are to be reported to the fighter escort by radio:
(a) Bearing of the enemy aircraft from the ship. Announcement takes place according to the aircraft reporting rose (clock face) oriented with the course of the ship at the time,
(b) approximate range,
(c) approximate statement of the aircraft’s course, in case they are not directly approaching the ships,
(d) any major alterations in course intended during the attack by the fighter escort.
(7) Complete use of the strongest anti-aircraft protection of the ships must take place, even if it makes difficult the job of the friendly fighters.
The fighter formations must therefore seek to combat enemy aircraft outside the anti-aircraft area. Target indicating shots of the ships’ anti-aircraft artillery should make it easier for the fighters to locate the enemy.
Ship’s anti-aircraft is to only fire on enemy fighters when an attack is suspected from the manner of approach.
Heavy anti-aircraft will cease as soon as friendly fighters are in an attack position which promises success, but in the field of fire of light anti-aircraft, the fighters must give way in all cases.
The endangering of friendly fighters by ship anti-aircraft must be reckoned with in critical situations and it does not relieve the fighters of their mission.
(8) Target indicating shots of the ships’ anti-aircraft or regular batteries consist of a chain of several explosions fired in the direction of the target. AA fragmentation shells and under some conditions AA flare shells with parachutes are used. At the same time the attention of the fighter escort is called to the target indicating shots by one or more Morse smoke signals from the deck of the ship giving signals (flagship). Target indicating shots and smoke signals are only to be fired within the field of vision of the fighters.
(1) The fighter forces are to be stepped up, in cloudless weather not over 12,000 feet, and under solid clouds up to the ceiling. Where clouds are dispersed and the possibility of attacks through holes in the clouds exist, a weak force (about one Schwarm) is to be used above the clouds.
The main effort of the fighter escort lies always in low level protection. It flies in Schwarm (4-ships) and stays below 3000 feet. For example, when 16 fighters are available, three Schwarm will fly for low level protection and one Schwarm will fly as top cover between 3000 and 10,000 feet.
(2) The top cover and low level cover must always fly so they can
(a) keep the ships directly in sight,
(b) combat attacks as quickly as possible
(c) not be surprised by the enemy
(d) not fly over the ships even in approaching or going away during changing of cover and during attacks against enemy aircraft.
It is useful to have two Schwärme fly on the side towards the enemy according to visibility, and these Schwärme fly back and forth in opposite directions in long stretches parallel to the course of the ships. One Schwarm can meanwhile be used on the side of the ships away from the enemy. In such cases the ordered altitudes are to be maintained and approaching closer than 6000 feet to any ship, including the screening force, is to be avoided.
If only weak forces can be used, they will fly in Rottes (2-ships).
(3) Regardless of all other principles, combat with fighters is to be avoided. Only enemy fighter-bombers which threaten the ships with bombs or strafing are to be attacked.
For recognized bomb or torpedo attacks, it is necessary to destroy the enemy before he drops his load, to hinder him in aiming or in emergency to ram him to turn him away from his target.
In such cases it is vital, that
(a) regardless of unfavourable position for attack, even from head on, the enemy must be attacked as quickly as possible, before he reaches the Anti-Aircraft zone or, above all, the ships.
(b) All weapons be used for as long as possible before dropping of the bombs, regardless of self-protection or the tactically correct carrying-out of the attack.
Enemy aircraft on their way back may only be attacked when no further attacks are apparent. Pursuit out of sight of the ships is forbidden to the close escort.
(4) The top cover too has the mission of combatting bombers and torpedo aircraft first of all. Furthermore it should try to improve the position of the low cover when the enemy is first contacted by effective attacks from good positions. When attacked at great altitudes it cannot count on support from the low cover.
(5) After warding off an enemy attack, fighter forces are to reassemble and resume their formation and altitude. The mission must as far as possible be carried through with all forces until the ordered time. Only urgent technical trouble in the aircraft or in all weapons give single aircraft the right to break off.
(6) The relieving fighter force is always to reach the ordered combat altitude from a still greater altitude, i.e. in cloudless weather from an altitude of about 10,000 feet, and in weather forming a ceiling from just under the ceiling. As far as possible recognition signals are to be fired on approaching.
(1) Escort cover is only justifiable when sufficient forces are available and support of the close escort is required. It is to be used as soon as the air raid reporting service or the radio listening service report an intended attack or when the close escort must have relief from continuous unexpected attacks.
(2) The fighter forces designated for escort cover are to be kept in sitting readiness and after take-off they will be so led onto the enemy that they find and destroy him as early as possible. Their primary mission is the combatting of the approaching enemy and they can only go over to pursuit when this mission has been fulfilled. If they arrive too late to repulse the attack, they can only pursue on receipt of a special order.
(3) The forces of the escort cover may also be employed as close escort by the order ‘stay with the object’. Before every mission therefore the assigning of the Schwärms must take place to insure frictionless taking over of the close escort.
(4) If in the protecting of an especially important naval force a diversion of a part of the close escort against shadowing aircraft cannot be effected, emergency Rottes (two-ships) of the escort cover can be used to combat them. The vectoring onto the enemy must take place from the flagship by the fighter control officer (naval).
(1) Where only small fighter forces are available, fighter escort for convoys along the coast must be provided by alerted escort and scramble starts. In some cases fighter forces already committed on other missions can be diverted.
A sure protection for convoys cannot be guaranteed by an alerted escort. It must be taken into consideration that convoys can be attacked in a short time before friendly fighters can disturb the conduct of the attack or drive away the enemy.
(2) Operations resulting from timely recognition of enemy intentions or upon request from the convoy. Anticipatory mutual determination of convoy routes makes possible the careful deployment of fighter forces on airfields near the coast, so that all points along the convoy can be quickly reached. According to the forces and airfields available, one fighter unit (Gruppe says Galland) should lie ready for every 100–150 kilometers.
(3) The fighter units designated for alerted escort are to be held in the most advanced state of readiness for scramble starts.
Because of speed and combat efficiency, only single engined fighters are suitable for these operations.
Formation strength should not be under one Schwarm (4 aircraft).
When the distance to the convoy is short, belly tanks and fittings for them can be dispensed with to achieve greater speed.