Day ground attack units were organized into Geschwaders of three Gruppen. Each Gruppe had three Staffeln. Each Staffel had 12 aircraft. If it had been possible to enlarge the size of ground attack units, no new Gruppen would have been added, but instead the number of aircraft and pilots in each Staffel would have been raised to 16.
The existing organization of the units would thereby have been better used. By a slight additional increase in servicing personnel, so the required operational readiness standards could have been maintained. Furthermore, this enlargement would have been necessary on operational grounds.
Weak formations no longer achieved much success in the face of increasing defense, like stronger formations could have. A strong formation was helped by its very appearance and could fight longer and more effectively.
A further increase of the unit strength would have been impractical.
Quick operational turn-around would not have been attainable. Take-off and landing of formations would have lasted too long. This would, with the short endurance of German ground attack aircraft, have reduced penetration and time in combat so much that the units could not have been used to full advantage.
Geschwader and Gruppe staffs had six ground attack aircraft, so that each could put its own Schwarm up in combat and did not need to draw any pilots from any of the Staffeln.
Anti-tank ground attack units had usually about 16–20 a/c and pilots. During 1944 there were independent anti-tank Staffeln in SG 1,2,3, and 77, being the 10th Staffel in each Geschwader. Four other Staffeln were combined into an anti-tank Gruppe. The High Command thus planned to use this one Gruppe almost together for main efforts. With the other 10th Staffeln, they planned to have at least one anti-tank Staffel available on all sectors of the Russian front.
This one anti-tank Gruppe, IV/Pz. S.G. 9, was however usually committed in Staffel strength on various parts of the Eastern Front and was seldom used together. In order to score at least halfway effective victories over tank forces, it was necessary that these Staffeln had at least 16 aircraft each.
The following reorganization of anti-tank ground attack units was in process of completion at the end of the war.
With the conversion of the anti-tank units to the F.W.190, three purely anti-tank Gruppen were to be formed with three Staffeln each. In addition, the third Staffel of every regular ground attack Gruppe was to become an anti-tank Staffel. The use of one or two anti-tank Gruppen en masse in an area of main effort was expected to produce good and lasting success.
All anti-tank Staffeln were organized so that parts of the Staffel could use bombs to suppress ground defenses, so that the Staffeln were not bound down by the necessity of relying on other units to suppress air defenses. In the 10th Staffeln of the various Geschwader, outfitted with Ju.87 with 2 × 37 mm cannon, one third to one fourth of the aircraft were bomb carrying (the normal version of the Ju.87). The Henschel 129 carried, in addition to its cannon, a 50 kg bomb under each wing. Thus, even the Hs 129 units could combat ground defenses independently.
The FW 190 anti-tank aircraft were equipped at first with 12 Panzerschreck (Tank-terror) RP. The rockets were fired in threes from mounts fitted to a wing bomb rack. Later the FW 190 were fitted with 12 Panzerblitz (Tank lightning) RPs. Then the bomb racks had to be taken off each wing and a special rack for 6 Panzerblitz RP built under each wing. The FW 190 anti-tank aircraft could always carry along a bomb under the fuselage and instead of the Panzerschreck rack, bombs could be carried on the wing bomb racks.
Night ground attack Staffeln in the east had 20 aircraft. Two or three Staffeln were combined into a Gruppe. Since no effective night fighter defense existed on the Eastern Front, all types of aircraft could be used. The missions were usually by single ships or small formations.
The quality and performance of the night ground attack units were not up to standard as far as pilots were concerned. Concentrating the night attack Staffeln of each Gruppe onto one airfield was necessary in part because of the inadequate signals net. It was planned, after improving of the quality of the pilots, the state of training, and the serviceability of aircraft, to increase the number of aircraft to 20 per Staffel and to operate each Gruppe from a group of two or three airfields in a small area.
The supply of new pilots for day ground attack operations was good. Those pilots not entirely suitable were detected in time in the schools or in the OTUs. It proved to be very profitable for COs of primary schools who had themselves been ground attack pilots to have influence on the selection of men for ground attack forces. By skilled instruction, the good pilots could be inspired with a love of ground attack work so they would volunteer for that branch. The shoving off of poor pilots with the designation of ‘suitable for ground attack work’ was thereby avoided.
But the supply of new pilots alone could not cover the needs of operational units. School units simply did not get sufficient pupils for the ground attack force. Therefore the pilots from other branches had to be grabbed. In general only the pilots relieved from other branches were available. Fighter pilots who had been relieved because of lack of suitability and achievement failed just as badly in the ground attack arm. Only those fighter pilots who were relieved because of altitude trouble and who were otherwise good became good ground attack pilots. Reconnaissance units continually made available surplus officer pilots but only pilots from SE reconnaissance units were of use. These pilots in general proved good in ground attack operations, since they brought with them as a result of their reconnaissance experience a tactical understanding of ground attack missions.
Former bomber pilots did not usually prove good ground attack pilots. Even the conversion from TE aircraft to the FW 190 proved difficult. They lacked the practical eye for recognizing targets in the air and on the ground, and the necessary maneuverability for flying formations. Their main advantages lay in their good operational morale and willingness and in their stubborn determination to go ahead at any cost. Usually they were shot down the first time in air combat.
The ideal number of officers for a Staffel was, besides the Staffel CO, three or four young pilots who were mainly used as Schwarm leaders. The rest of the pilots were NCOs. In the last months of the war, these figures were rarely reached because of the bad officer supply situation, which caused serious difficulties.
The pilots of night ground attack units which were not outfitted with the FW 190 were worthless, unsuited for day fighter or day ground attack operations. The night ground attack units were supplied with relieved pilots so far as they had no character deficiencies, some from transport units and some from liaison units. Since enough of these pilots were available, the need could be covered after careful selection. These pilots who could not measure up to the new operational requirements when their units converted from the Ju.87 to the FW 190 usually became good night ground attack pilots. Finally old instructors from primary schools proved very good night ground attack pilots, those who were too old to be used for day fighter or day ground attack work. The FW 190 night ground attack pilots had to be well trained, good quality pilots, and replacements could not be made from surpluses of not fully capable pilots.
The quality of officers in night ground attack units was decidedly worse than that of day ground attack units, because many old officers who had long been on staff work were used in the night units. The Staffel COs had to be very good officers, however.
For anti-tank units, good pilots who had a good knack for gunnery and liked anti-tank work were chosen.
Schwarm COs. Schwarm leaders needed to have sufficient experience in formation flying, in recognition of ground situations, and in recognition of targets on the ground and in the air. He had to have much tactical knowledge to be able to lead a Schwarm on missions.
Staffel COs Officers were appointed as Staffel COs only when they had had enough combat experience and when they had proved themselves capable. Thus it was often the case that young officers were used as Staffel COs while in the same Gruppe several old officers were merely used as ordinary pilots and Schwarm leaders.
Gruppe and Geschwader COs. These were recruited from among old proved and tried Staffel and Gruppe COs. In the ground attack force, the matter was handled as far as possible according to the following principles: a Staffel CO or Gruppe CO who was in line for promotion to a higher position was withdrawn from operations from six months to one year. He was used during this period as Gruppe or Geschwader CO in a training unit. Here he had an opportunity under direction of a Geschwader or Division CO to get acquainted with his new position. When he later took over his operational unit, he brought with him, especially administratively, the necessary knowledge for his new job. Furthermore he could thereby rest up for more missions and make available the latest front experience for the training units. This planned scheme was not always possible to carry through because of the lack of officers for the usual command positions. Officers who were no longer available for operations were put into good positions at the pilots school and officers schools and could from there still help out the ground attack arm by influencing the giving over of good recruits to the ground attack arm.
Technical Officers. At the beginning of the War, the TOs (technical officers) were always flying officers who in part had been at special T.O. courses. It was then regarded as essential that every formation leader should have some knowledge of technical matters and that the prerequisites for this knowledge were courses and some experience as technical officer. In most cases it was so that the TOs didn’t like to stay off missions, flew along too often, and worried too little about their chief job. The inadequate number of flying officers led to the situation that flying officers were no longer trained as TO and could not be used long enough as TOs to gain experience. The use of old chief mechanics and grounded officer pilots, the latter after a short technical course, proved to be very good. Only to this is attributable the high serviceability of ground attack units (70%).
Adjutant. It was really planned that only flying officers could serve as adjutants. Activity as adjutant was for every officer a good basis to later become a Gruppe CO. Because of the high rate of loss of officers, the adjutants’ jobs could not any longer regularly be filled with flying officers. For this purpose, grounded officer pilots or suitable reserve officer pilots or suitable reserve officers were used.
Operations and Intelligence Officers. Experienced officer pilots, who were grounded, or suitable reserve officers were used as operations and intelligence officers. Former reconnaissance pilots were found best suited for intelligence work. For ground attack units, intelligence officers were first introduced toward the end of 1944. In the west, intelligence officers were necessary for Geschwader and Gruppe Staffs. On the Eastern Front one intelligence officer sufficed for one Geschwader. It proved to have been a mistake to have omitted intelligence work in the units.
Meteorologists. There were only weather men at the individual night ground attack Gruppen, where they were very important. They were superfluous with the day ground attack units. It sufficed for day units to have the weather reports and forecasts reported from higher headquarters, since missions rarely went more than 150 kilometers anyway.
Strength of maintenance personnel was usually the same as that in Fighter units. The only differences were that there were more bomb personnel and less ordinary ordnance personnel. The strength of technical personnel was so set that the unit could send off an Advance Unit (Vorkomando). This unit was able to prepare a new airfield for the unit and, with the aid of the other key personnel which would come in with the unit’s aircraft, to perform maintenance on the aircraft for operational serviceability. The use of women in Ground Attack units was never carried through, although orders to that effect were given out.
Outfitting with technical equipment was kept down to a minimum, usually just like fighter units. Since oxygen was rarely ever needed for ground attack operations, oxygen equipment was at a bare minimum. On the other hand proportionally more bomb loading equipment was on hand for bombing up. The equipping of Ground Attack Units was in general so carried through that operations could be flown without dependence on any ground units at all.
Telephone equipment was supplied so that the unit could have a telephone net connecting all operations rooms, dispersal areas, dwellings, and radio stations. The radio telephones often improvised by the units themselves proved good. They gave good connection between the HQ and dispersal areas, and there were no wires to be damaged. When an airfield was newly occupied, the radio telephones furnished adequate connection until wires were laid down. Its range was sufficient for the normal distance from Hq to dispersal areas. Teletypewriters were available only for Geschwader Hqs. On some occasions independently operating Gruppen were assigned teletypwriter operators by Geschwader HQ. Within the Geschwader, no teletypewriter traffic took place.
The Geschwader staffs were so equipped with radio that they could hook into the command net of the next higher command and also conduct a field order system within their own Geschwader. The Gruppen were correspondingly radio equipped in order to complete this system. The Geschwader and Gruppen both had radio telephone stations. Only the Gruppen had the Tornado radio beacons. At the end of the war, all Ground Attack units (with the exception of some few night unit, were equipped with the FüG 16 (The GAF VHF radio telephone sender transmitter, for air and ground).
A part of the night ground attack units, especially those in the west, and in Italy, were equipped with Egon control procedure personnel. The actual assigning of these personnel to the units proved to be a good idea.
In advance and in retreats the ground attack units lay closer to the front than any other flying units, because of the short ranges of ground attack aircraft and because of the desire to keep high the number of sorties flown by cutting down on the distance flown. In wars of movement, transfers were quite usual. Ground attack units were transferred sometimes on the ground and sometimes in transport aircraft. Complete mobility of the ground personnel and equipment was insured by giving them enough trucks. All ground equipment except that of the motorized repair platoon could be transferred by air. Therefore the ground attack units had in addition to the motorized repair platoon, a flying repair platoon, with equipment that could easily be loaded into transport aircraft. Because of the small amount of air transport space allotted to the various commands, the flying units were allowed only enough space to transport their key personnel. Since these transfers often took place over long distances and were usually intended by the high commands only to last for a few days, the result was that the flying units often had to carry on operations with only their key personnel and serviceability accordingly dropped greatly.
The demand of two transport aircraft for every Gruppe was recognized as justified but could nevertheless not be fulfilled because of the general lack of transport aircraft.
The equipping of ground attack units was in general such that they could with their own personnel and equipment without any support from ground units, except the bringing of bombs and fuel to the airfields, guarantee full serviceability and at the same time maintain an advance or rear party at some other airfield. For transfers over long distances, external tanks had to be given to ground attack units to keep them from having to make constant intermediate landings.