Weather and terrain conditions were factors to be taken into account in operations of ground attack units.
Operational minima for weather were considered:
Ceiling 4500 feet for missions over the front and 6000 feet ceiling for missions deep into the tactical area. In all cases A.A. defenses were to be taken into consideration.
In crises ground attack units operated in worse conditions, with a minimum ceiling for front missions of 600–900 feet.
A first principle was that the size of the formation was dependent on the weather. The worse the weather, the smaller the formations, in order not to restrict the maneuverability of the formation. In extremely poor weather flights were restricted to very small formations of especially experienced pilots.
For bad weather operations radar control was planned and provided. The ground attack units were vectored over the clouds or between cloud layers to the vicinity of the target, but they were to carry on the attack themselves independently after going down through the clouds and sighting the earth. (In general, ground attack units attack only targets which they can actually see and recognize.)
Terrain conditions are important for locating targets. Open country makes the finding of targets easy, while obscure country, like wooded areas, makes target locating harder. In very difficult country and in wooded areas, ground attack operations are to be discouraged, because the success to be expected bears no relation to the effort required and the attack can be entirely ineffective.
From the command standpoint the following types of ground attack missions are distinguishable:
a) concentrated attack
b) rolling attack
c) free sweep attack
a) Concentrated attack. For the conduct of a concentrated attack, ground attack units were combined. They were operated at a determined time against clearly defined targets. The time for beginning and ending the attack was ordered to the minute. Forces used were apportioned according to the size and type of the target.
Concentrated attacks were primarily flown in direct support of the army, usually just before the beginning of a ground offensive (like infantry preparation) as a surprise measure. Therefore the duration and time of the attack was determined by the army. Concentrated attacks were flown with bombs and with strafing by ground attack units. The mission was to destroy the enemy or to injure his morale so that after that the ground troops would have little or no defense to contend with.
This was only possible when the Army, immediately after the concentrated attack from the air, took advantage of its effect by launching an attack of its own. Similarly such concentrated attacks make easier the disengaging movements of friendly troops.
Secondly, concentrated attacks were ordered not for direct army support, but as indirect support against special targets which appeared, like heavily occupied airfields, RR stations, troops unloading, and so on. An attack carried through with the element of surprise increased the effect considerably.
From the command side, concentrated attacks were carefully thought out and planned using target photos and photo maps on which the smallest targets were recognizable as well as large scale maps and other necessary documents. Of special importance was the choice of bombs and fuses. Even though this was primarily the business of the flying units themselves, it was worthwhile in some cases that the command organizations insured that the right measures were taken, so that a carefully prepared attack did not become a fiasco because of bad choice of bombs and fuses.
b) Rolling attack. Rolling attacks serve as continuous support for ground operations in progress. The targets to be attacked were clearly ordered, or small target areas were determined, in which every recognized enemy was to be destroyed. For this purpose, formations of Staffel size or larger were used. In these rolling attacks it was sought by the quickest possible use of formations to paralyze every movement of enemy troops against friendly troops and to destroy every enemy concentration of forces. The time of attack was therefore not strictly laid down. Short operational readiness, short time of flight into the battle area, and occasionally the diversion of a formation already in the air were possibilities for rapid conduct of missions. Only at the beginning of a ground offensive could the times of attacks be closely fixed. Bomb loading was usually finished before the operational order was received and was according to the types of targets expected. The decisive goal was to destroy the enemy as quickly as possible, before he had the chance, by dispersing and camouflage, to protect himself against air attack or to become effective against friendly troops.
c) Free Sweep attacks. Free sweep attacks were usually carried out in the course of flowing ground combat. The objectives of free sweep attacks were broad and bold, like continuous support of a tank spearhead or flank cover for a break through wedge. In practice free sweep attacks were a kind of hunting of individual targets, which was to accomplish a suppression of the enemy and at the same time insure a continual watch over the enemy. If, in the course of the engagement, stronger enemy forces appeared on the ground which could only be successfully combatted with more air forces, additional forces were thrown into the free sweep attack.
Free sweep attacks were flown by small units (Rotte up to Staffel) which was only possible in cases of friendly air superiority. By close cooperation with ground attack control stations or by control from forward headquarters the immediate combatting of enemy targets which appeared and the keeping down of enemy resistance were possible.
The choice of targets always remains up to the formation leader. The formation leader must have good tactical knowledge in order to attack at the right place on the battlefield. By good cooperation with the ground attack control stations, the conduct of his mission was made much easier. Bomb loading was usually mixed according to the types of targets expected.
Missions for anti-tank units were flown only on special centers of resistance on the front, and long rest periods repeatedly arose for them. Anti-tank flying units with their special weapons were used against tanks and armored vehicles which had broken through. For use against tank assembly areas they were not suitable, because these areas were usually heavily protected with A.A. In pursuit, their use against parts of split up tank units was good.
For operations of anti-tank units, ground and air defense were specially considered, but weather conditions were of less importance. Even in very bad weather with very low ceiling anti-tank units could carry out effective and successful raids.
Because of the mobility of tanks, finding them in a short space of time was often hard. Especially in fluid situations, exact reports and locations about the appearance of tanks were seldom available. The operations of antitank units therefore usually took place like a free sweep attack, in which the aircraft first had to find the tanks in a large target area. Therefore, training in recognition of tanks was especially important for the anti-tank flyers.
1. Preparation for an attack.
2. Attack.
3. Breakthrough and pursuit.
4. Defense.
5. Retreat and defense against enemy breakthroughs.
1. Preparations for Attack. For preparation of a large ground offensive, ground attack units were employed in a planned manner against such targets as were found by aerial reconnaissance and which could considerably hinder the attack planned. In case the army offensive was to be a surprise, the operations of ground attack units must be omitted in order not to attract the enemy’s attention too soon.
Such attacks launched in support of a planned offensive were usually flown against targets deep in the tactical zone, such as, for example, heavy artillery, important bridges, enemy supply organizations. Attacks against air force installations belong in this class.
At night, to ease friendly preparations and deployments for attack, rolling missions could be flown against enemy artillery, and at the same time the noise of friendly tanks moving up into position could be drowned out. Furthermore, enemy supply centers, like RR stations and villages, could be attacked in concentrated attacks, especially if the A.A. defense by day were too strong.
2) Attacks. Immediately before the beginning of an attack, missions were flown against everything which could hinder the friendly advance directly. Targets were the enemy troops in the field and other fortifications, strong points, heavy weapons, headquarters, and signals facilities. At the dropping of the last bombs on the forward enemy positions, the friendly troops began their attack.
Adolf Galland as the archetypical fighter pilot, with well-worn flying jacket and crushed cap and his Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords suspended from his neck on one of his girlfriends’ garters. (US National Archives RG 242)
Galland as ‘Brylcreem basher’, as his RAF counterparts were termed: the fighter pilot as matinée idol. He was, at 30, the youngest German general (US National Archives RG 242)
A Galland who did not survive: younger brother Wilhelm-Ferdinand ‘Wutz’ Galland, who served with his brothers in JG 26. A 55-victory ace, he fell to USAAF P-47s during the first Schweinfurt raid of 17 August 1943 while leading a formation into position for a massed attack on B-17s. (US National Archives RG 242)
Gordon Gollob after a mission. A 160-victory ace, he commanded JG 3 in 1941–42 and JG 77 in 1942–44. He was the first pilot to achieve 150 victories. He was Galland’s successor as General der Jagdflieger. Galland disliked him intensely due to what he perceived as his fanatical Nazi politics and underhand personal dealings. (US National Archives RG 242)
Werner Mölders meets Hitler, December 1940. Mölders, Galland’s predecessor as General der Jagdflieger and his friend and rival, was responsible for implementing many of the tactical innovations from Spain throughout the fighter force. He was the first pilot to score 100 victories. (US National Archives RG 242)
Walter Oesau, a 123-victory ace shot down by P-38s on 11 May 1944, was a keen tactician and trainer as well as a combat leader. Commanding JG 1, he was able to form his unit into effective multi-Gruppe formations. (US National Archives RG 242)
Heinz Bär. He succeeded Galland as commander of the Me 262-equipped JV 44 after Galland had been shot down. As an FW 190-equipped Sturmgruppe commander, Bär reportedly had his pilots swear to bring down a bomber on every sortie, even if it meant ramming. Galland knew him well and respected him as a leader and pilot despite his flamboyant and impulsive personal style. He scored 220 victories, 16 in Me 262s, making him the war’s leading jet ace. (US National Archives RG 242)
Dietrich Peltz – one of Galland’s b(ecir)tes noires. He was a bomber general who, Galland felt, was ineffective as a fighter leader and squandered resources that he, Galland, was trying to use for his cherished ‘big blow’ against the bombers. Peltz planned Operation ‘Bodenplatte’, the massive counter-air strike of 1 January 1945 that lost many of the remaining fighters tying to defend the Reich. (US National Archives RG 242)
Walter Nowotny, a 258-victory ace hand-picked by Galland – who had known him since he had been through pilot training with Galland’s younger brother Paul – to command the first ever jet fighter unit, Kommando Nowotny. He was the first fighter pilot ever to score 250 victories. Galland saw him shot down and killed on 9 November 1944. (US National Archives RG 242)
Colonel Dr Thomas Kupfer, ‘Hitsch’ Hitschhold’s predecessor as General der Schlachtflieger until killed in a crash in 1944. Like Hitschhold, he had led Stuka dive-bomber units in 1939–42 before moving to ground attack work. (US National Archives RG 242)
The ‘view from the cockpit’ of Johannes Trautloft. He was Inspector of Day Fighters in the West. A friend of Galland, he supported the latter in his confrontations with Göring. He was a keen tactician, and drafted the first Luftwaffe fighter tactics manuals to embody Mölders’ innovations. Unlike Galland, he joined the Bundeswehr in the 1950s. (US National Archives RG 242)
Edgar Petersen talks with night fighter aces Werner Streib (left, 65 victories) and Hans Jabs (center, 31 victories). (US National Archives RG 242)
The ‘men in black’ who made the Luftwaffe fighter force operate: groundcrew rearm a Bf 109. (US National Archives RG 242)
Where the Luftwaffe fighter force began: an He 51 biplane fighter of 1935. (US National Archives RG 242)
The Ar 68 was operational as a night fighter as late as December 1939. (US National Archives RG 242)
The start of the ground attack arm. Galland flew these Hs 123s in Poland, and they were also used in France and Russia. (US National Archives RG 242)
The Ju 87 Stuka started out as a weapon of the Blitzkrieg but, because its dive-bomber tactics made it vulnerable to fighter and anti-aircraft fire, it became more relevant as a ground attack aircraft in 1942–45. (Wilhelm Landau via James Crow)
A wartime propaganda photograph of an early Bf 110B. Göring saw the twin-engine fighter force as an élite group, committed solely to offensive combat, unlike the Bf 109s. (US National Archives RG 242)
The standard Luftwaffe single-engine fighter of 1939–41 – the Bf 109E. (US National Archives RG 18)
A result of the absence of the defensive air–sea co-operation that Galland stressed: a merchant ship sunk by Allied aircraft off Livorno, 1945. (USSBS)
The business end of an FW 190. This is the view seen from a USAAF bomber at the closest point of a head-on German attack before the fighter rolled away to avoid collision. (US National Archives RG 18)
Ju 87G Stukas were converted from Ju 87Ds when dive-bombing became too dangerous, and armed with a pair of 37mm undenwring anti-tank guns. (US National Archives RG 242)
The FW 190A – in this case, an FW 190A-8 – helped to hold numerically superior RAF fighters at bay in 1941–42, but against a later generation of fighters in 1944–45 it was often inadequate. (US National Archives RG 18)
The Bf 109G-6 introduced the characteristic ‘bumps’ to cover the breeches of its 13mm nose-mounted machine guns. Many also carried underwing armament, being the first version designed from the outset to accept this. (US National Archives RG 18)
A ‘long-nose’ FW 190D-9 runs up for a test flight. This version started to re-equip FW 190A units in October 1944. While the aircraft was intended mainly to engage escort fighters, many were committed to Operation ‘Bodenplatte’ on 1 January 1945. (US National Archives RG 18)
The Me 410 played an important role against USAAF bombers, though the decision to arm it with an unsatisfactory 50mm weapon undercut its effectiveness. It also served as a bomber and reconnaissance aircraft (the photograph is of an Me 410A-3 reconnaissance version). (US National Archives RG 18)
An Me 163B of JG 400. Galland had advocated the forward deployment of individual Staffeln for point defense, but when he was replaced by Gollob this policy changed to one of concentrating all Me 163 operations at a single base, which, because of the aircraft’s limited range, the USAAF was able to avoid. (US National Archives RG 18)
An Me 262 in flight. After being dismissed as General der Jagdflieger, Galland took command of JV44, a fighter group equipped with Me 262s, in 1945. Galland was one of the strongest advocates for developing the Me 262 and putting it into mass production as a fighter, despite its unreliable engines. (US National Archives RG 18)
The He 162 Volksjäger light fighter was considered, by Galland, to be a waste of resources and a diversion from the need to supply Me 262s to keep the German fighter force viable. Only a few saw action in the last days of the war.
The Dornier Do 335. Just entering service at the end of the war, this aircraft met Galland’s need for a twin-engine fighter that could carry a heavy armament against bombers without itself requiring fighter escort. (US National Archives RG 18)
Directly after the beginning of the attack and during the progress of the attack the following missions took place:
a) Rolling attacks against determined targets, especially effective enemy artillery and reserves coming up.
b) Free sweep missions against all such targets as might hinder the fluid continuance of the battle. Such targets were MG nests, new enemy artillery positions, single tanks, and so on. Purpose of such attacks was to hold down the enemy and to destroy pockets of resistance so that friendly forces could continually go forward. Movement on the battlefield must be made impossible for the enemy. At the same time, the flanks of friendly attacking forces were covered.
At night, concentrated attacks could be flown by night attack units against the enemy assembly areas which were recognized by day reconnaissance. Friendly ground operations at night could well be continually supported by night attack units in cooperation with ground control stations, the aircraft flying in Rotten or Schwärme.
3) Break-through and Pursuit. In break-throughs and in pursuit of enemy forces, the rolling attack was more important. Especially retreating troop columns, strong points still holding out, approaching reserves, and massed troops at defiles were good targets. The more the battle became one of pursuit, the more the free sweep attack took precedence. In such cases the retreating enemy was attacked especially in restricted areas, where his retreat reached a bottle neck. All other targets which held up the pursuit or threatened from the flanks were destroyed.
In such situations, the anti-tank flying units had a great number of successful missions, because the enemy tank forces were split up, the A.A. defense was weakened, and furthermore, enemy air opposition was weakened because of the necessity of the retreat of enemy airfields.
At night the main effort was made against recognized forward or rearward movements simply to harrass the enemy.
