Basically it is to be recognized that German ground attack units possessed the ability to attack pin point targets. Special medium bomber units for the support of the Army were lacking in the GAF, therefore the twin engined bombers intended for strategic bombing were used for this purpose, although from the beginning of 1943 most of these bomber units did engage in strategic bombing. Since then, the operations of medium bombers were almost completely lacking over German battle areas. Medium bombers are able to combat area targets for the support of the Army. A ground force attack must consist of units which can combat area targets as well as forces which can bomb and strafe pinpoint targets.
On the German side, the chief missions and targets of ground attack units were:
a. For the support of the Army.
(1) Fighting troops on the ground, troops in positions, and troops on the march.
(2) Material – medium and heavy weapons, MG nests, anti-tank guns, artillery, rocket guns, A.A. guns, tanks and tank columns.
(3) Transport – horse-drawn vehicles, locomotives, railroad, shipping, trucks.
(4) Signals facilities – radio stations, wire communications (by attacks on entries and exits to villages) bridges, ferries, troops in villages, houses, and troops in woods.
b. Coastal Area – ships and water vehicles of all kinds, warships, landing places, etc.
c. Air combat – destruction of enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground.
a. Day Attacks
b. Anti-Tank Missions
c. Night Attacks
d. Day attacks as follows:
Ground attack missions were usually carried out in Gruppe, Staffel, Schwarm or Rotte strength. Only in exceptional cases where great forces were massed did attacks in Geschwader strength take place. In the Fall of 1943 seven Gruppen had the F.W. 190 and the other 14 or 15 had the Ju.87 Stukas. By the end of the war all but one of these Ju.87 Stuka units had been converted to the F.W. 190.
Radio control from the ground (Egon Procedure) was planned for the units but was not to be introduced until a time several months after the war actually ended. It was planned to use the Egon Procedure to lead the aircraft to the target in bad weather only. After being led directly to the target, they then conducted the attack after sighting the ground.
Ground attack units conducted their attacks as dive (80-60°), shallow glide (50-20°) or low level attacks.
Armament of the F.W. 190 ground attack model was 2 × MG 151 2 cm. and 2 × MG 131 13 mm., one 500 kg. bomb rack under the fuselage, and 4 × 50 kg racks under wings.
The choice of the mode of attack (dive, shallow dive, or low level) was dependent on the enemy’s anti-aircraft and fighter defense, weather, and the type of ammunition and bombs to be used. If the enemy anti-aircraft and fighter defenses were disregarded, the most successful modes of attack were the shallow dive for dropping bombs and the low level attack for strafing. Very often it was the job of the ground attack pilot to seek out the most important targets over the battlefield, and some of these targets were very well camouflaged. This forced him to fly at altitudes from which only a direct shallow dive or low level attack was possible. The shallow dive attack brought about the best possibility of hitting, and the type of bomb and fuse determined the dropping altitude. This was especially true with the type of bomb container from which a great number of small bombs were strewn (cluster bomb units) and which required a certain dispersion to be effective. (For ground attack aircraft like the Ju.87 and other aircraft with computing bomb sights, the dive attack is the most practical.)
If the anti-aircraft fire could be kept down or nullified, the ground attacks were flown as shallow dives or as low level attacks. It was often necessary to use part of the unit to hold down the anti-aircraft fire with a suitable bomb load (containers with 1 kg. anti-personnel bombs), in order that the greater part of the formation could carry through an effective attack with as little interference as possible from ground defenses. If the suppression of the anti-aircraft fire was not possible, dive attacks had to be flown. (It repeatedly proved good to have friendly artillery keep down enemy anti-aircraft fire, when ground attack units were attacking targets near the front line.) If the anti-aircraft fire was too strong, a massed, closed-up dive attack had to be carried out in formation. In this manner the anti-aircraft gunners had only a short time to combat the attack and could not concentrate their fire on individual targets. Approach altitude and the beginning of the attack dive were, if possible, so arranged that they lay outside the effective range of the anti-aircraft fire.
Besides anti-aircraft defense, fighter defense rendered difficult the conduct and effectiveness of ground attack missions. It was proved on the Western Front and in Italy that ground attack missions were impossible when the attacking side did not have air superiority, at least over the battle area during the time of the attack. Otherwise the losses of the ground attack aircraft were too high in relation to what was accomplished. The ground attack pilots had to be able to carry out attacks unmenaced by enemy fighters. If fighter opposition was absent, the ground attack unit could carry out their attacks very much opened up and dispersed in the air, but if fighter opposition was present, the ground attack formation had to be kept closed up over the battle area.
On the Eastern Front it was usually sufficient if part of the ground attack formation took over the fighter escort for the rest of the mission. It was even possible to use bomb-carrying F.W. 190’s as fighter escort. This was done in the following way: at the beginning of the attack, one part of the formation stayed at altitude and furnished fighter cover. This part was then relieved by another part of the formation which had already dropped its bombs. The top cover then went down to conduct its own ground attacks. In case of contact with the enemy, bombs had to be jettisoned, with fuses armed if over enemy territory.
If the enemy had air superiority, fighter escort furnished by regular fighter units was advisable. Strong fighter opposition forces the ground attack formation to make greatly concentrated mass attacks (usually with approach at great altitude for a dive attack, or on occasion a low level attack with the element of surprise). Effective strafing attacks could not then be flown, because the effectiveness of the ground attack units was thus already cut in half. The most effective weapons of the ground attack F.W. 190 were its 2 cm. cannon MG 151 and its heavy MG 131 13 mm. Bombs were less effective.
It was the goal of every ground attack mission to combat the enemy to the last round of ammunition, to destroy all recognizable targets on the ground, and then by a prolonged stay over the battlefield to render impossible every movement of the enemy. (This opportunity was to be utilized by the army for attacks, redeployment, retreat, etc.)
The weather in part decides the type of mission to be flown by ground attack units and also the size of the formations, i.e. the worse the weather, the smaller the formation. A minimum ceiling of 6000–8000 feet is required for dive bombing attacks. Shallow dive attacks can be flown with a ceiling of 1500 feet and low level attacks with still lower ceilings. Attacks under low ceilings usually result in higher losses, because the anti-aircraft fire cannot be adequately combatted and because the ground attack aircraft are too easily sighted by enemy aircraft.
It was necessary to use special anti-tank ground attack units against modern tank formations. In cases of lucky tank break-throughs, the army was often not in a position to throw in enough of its own tanks or anti-tank guns to stop the advance. In the Spring and Autumn in Russia, the ground was so muddy and roads so bad that moving tanks for defense against enemy tank break throughs was so slow that the only possibility of combatting them was to use these special anti-tank ground attack units.
It was apparent that ordinary ground attack units were not able to destroy enough tanks with their guns, cannons and bombs, but the special anti-tank units with armour piercing cannon and special anti-tank rockets were very successful. Anti-tank aircraft were the Henschel 129 with the MK 101 3 cm., later the MK 103 3 cm.; the Ju.87 Stuka with 2 × 37 mm. cannon, and the usual F.W. 190 ground attack model with rocket tubes fixed to its bomb racks.
These aircraft were successfully used against tanks which had broken through on the battlefield or all the way into rear areas. The missions against tank assembly areas were a great mistake because these were always protected with many anti-aircraft guns and resulted in high losses compared to completely unimportant accomplishments. For attacks on tank assembly areas it was better to use formations which carried a great number of containers of 4 kg. hollow charge armour piercing bombs, which can be dropped from halfway outside the effective anti-aircraft fire. Enemy tanks which have broken into friendly troop areas can only be safely combatted by special antitank ground attack units, without endangering friendly troops.
Troop columns which have broken through can be defeated if the antitank units fight the tanks and the regular ground attack units attack the more thinly armoured vehicles which follow the tanks. In good weather, tank break-throughs were, however, protected with a strong fighter cover. The beating down of this fighter cover was a pre-requisite for a successful employment of anti-tank ground-attack units. If bad weather was used for tank break-throughs the anti-tank units can fly anyway, since they usually fly in low level attacks.
Next to the neutralizing of the enemy fighter cover, the beating down of anti-aircraft defenses is another condition for the successful use of anti-tank flying units. After a long series of successful missions against tanks, the enemy started to give the tanks anti-aircraft protection and always increased it, and at the end of the war, every nation had some sort of mobile anti-aircraft gun which could protect the tanks. The use of anti-tank units with regular ground attack units to keep down the A.A. fire became necessary. When the ceiling was low so that ground attack units could not effectively act against anti-aircraft defenses, the anti-tank units had to be used with the element of surprise and the attack was carried through in the shortest possible time before the anti-aircraft tanks, not ordinarily ready for combat, could unlimber their guns and start to shoot. Experience and practice in immediate recognition of tanks and shooting them up in the first attack brought about good successes without important losses. In the last year of the war, the Russian tank troops had accustomed themselves to the anti-tank flyers and the tanks were well camouflaged wherever possible. At the approach of anti-tank units they immediately sought cover near houses, tree clumps, or hay stacks. Often the tanks could only be found from their tracks and the Russians usually erased these by dragging branches behind the tanks.
Anti-tank units fought in Rotten, Schwärme and, at most, in Staffeln formation. Larger anti-tank units used simultaneously over the battlefield hindered and confused each other. The attacks with armor piercing cannon were conducted like ordinary strafing missions. To ensure hits, the pilots had to approach as close as possible. The best range was 100–150 yards. The gunnery run had to be very even and calm, and the direction of approach was determined by the ground situation and with the 3 cm. and 37 mm. weapons aimed at the vital points of the tanks.
The mission of the night ground attack units was to combat or harass the enemy on the front and in rear areas exactly as the day ground attack units did it.
This idea arose from the use of the Russian harassing aircraft, the U-2. At first the German used harassing (Starstaffeln) Staffeln, using normal training aircraft like the Arado 66, Gotha 145, Heinkel 46, and the Bucker 181.
At the end of 1943 German ground attack units in Italy could not operate by day without difficulties and heavy losses because of great Allied air superiority. Some Ju.87 Stukas were used experimentally against the Nettuno (Anzio) bridgehead by night. The employment proved practical. There followed in 1944 the conversion of night ground units to the Ju.87 and the F.W. 190. These units were able when used in sufficient numbers to disturb the enemy continually in the night, to hinder materially night marches, to hold down artillery fire and to hinder attacks. In this way considerable relief could often be given German troops.
The targets for night ground attack missions had to be small area targets; the combatting of point targets (as by day) was only possible to a limited extent. Good targets proved to be firing artillery, lighted transport columns, defiles, bridges, villages, and areas and geographic points of importance recognizable at night as troop concentration areas. Best of all were missions against lighted targets, such as tracks and firing artillery. Dark targets had to be illuminated with flares dropped from the air to the ground or through target markers either dropped or shot from the ground. The lavish use of 2 kg. fragmentation bombs (especially early in the night) was good to restrict the enemy’s use of roads during the night.
An effective employment of forces was the rolling attack – a series of hard blows one after another. Such rolling attacks continuing throughout the entire night on the Russian front greatly hindered the preparations of the enemy for attacks on the following day.
Usual tactics of the night ground attack units were dive and shallow dive attacks. Horizontal attacks were conducted only rarely and by very low ceiling, and where large area targets were in question.
Ordinary weather requirements for missions were a ceiling of 3,000-6,000 feet, visibility of 4–5 kilometers. Moonlight made the mission easier because the targets were easier to see. Average anti-aircraft fire could, even by night, be held down effectively by repeated bombing. Strong anti-aircraft fire made the mission harder. Night fighter defense against night ground attacks was not present in the East, but was very effective in Italy. Radar control (Egon) proved good in Italy and in the West and was a great help in combat. A close co-operation with the Army in the battle area would produce great results. This was not achieved, since the continual retreats of the Army made cooperation of Army and Air Force harder and harder. It was proved, however, that night ground attack units, well directed from the ground, though partly equipped with antiquated aircraft, could achieve considerable results and effectively support the Army.